Re: [decentralization] LIPP: a Lossy Inefficient Paranoid Protocol
- I am reminded of the techniques:
The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability
J. Cryptology (1988)
(Also http://komarios.net/crypt/dc.htm & http://komarios.net/crypt/dc-demo.htm)
Chaffing and Winnowing: Confidentiality without Encryption
Ronald L. Rivest
March 18, 1998 (rev. April 24, 1998)
> I am reminded of the techniques:Canonical stuff. After a few false starts at responses, I realized that I have
little to add, except perhaps a hope that there are approaches to these
that the overhead and trackability of real programs is not such a problem. For
There are web sites that allow user data to be posted and queried via a GET.
of such sites. At each one it looks for messages directed towards the user, for
example that contain a code word or correct MAC, optionally drops off messages
intended for the other party, and optionally drops off chaff messages.
The sites can either be dedicated to this use or be commandeered into it, e.g.
A usecase for this is casual dissidents, people who aren't committed enough to
their cause to install heavy equipment like Freenet but who still need
protection. For example, non-activists doing low intensity griping about a
- --- In decentralization@y..., "Lucas Gonze" <lucas@w...> wrote:
> The spy and controller simply put their messages inSounds like Usenet.
> random public places within a limited range. The
> range might be a neighborhood; five or six city blocks
> for example. When the controller has the message
> "need info on bombs" he writes it on a flyer and
> staples it to a bulletin board within those five or
> six blocks. If the spy happens to see the message
> he can create a flyer that says "they are manufactured
> in Omaha" and, also, post it anywhere in the range.
e: marc at precipice dot org
> Sounds like Usenet....or, come to think of it, Spam. Indiscriminate broadcasting is the key.