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CityPaper...Uncle Sam is the ultimate pusher -- Ira Einhorn was right!

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  • David Crockett Williams
    August 6, 2000 55th Hiroshima a-bomb anniversary Since the early 1970 s when he brought information to the Pennsylvania State Attorney General showing CIA
    Message 1 of 1 , Aug 7, 2000
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      August 6, 2000 55th Hiroshima a-bomb anniversary

      Since the early 1970's when he brought information to the Pennsylvania State
      Attorney General showing CIA complicity on a massive scale in the illegal
      drug trade, now a fugitive, Ira Einhorn has been trying to expose this
      CIA-mafia drugtrade 50year ongoing alliance that other researchers now
      believe accounts for 80-90% of the illegal drugs coming into the US totaling
      $200-250 billion per year in laundered profits multiplied in offshore
      banking low interest loans to Wall Street businesses to fuel mergers and
      profits with low cost capital while funding to a large extent both
      Democratic and Republican party candidates who have been corrupted by this
      money and complicit in this CIA drug trade to the highest levels including
      Clinton and Bush.

      Now in France under temporary protection of the French government, Einhorn
      has consistently maintained he was framed for the 1979 murder of his
      ex-girlfriend Holly Maddux ("The Unicorn Killer" TV psychodrama series) to
      silence his effective activism on social and environmental justice issues,
      on covert development of advanced electromagnetic weaponry, mind control,
      and other secret military systems possibly connected to reverse engineering
      of US and other governments' acquisition of crashed UFO's, etc.

      Recently President Clinton himself has contacted the French government
      pushing for Einhorn's extradition to face his life sentence meted out after
      an unconstitutional in-absentia trial authorized by special Pennsylvania
      legislation. Spearheading the extradition campaign assisted by the rabid
      Philly tabloid writers, Philly DA Lynne Abrahams fraudulently claims Einhorn
      will receive a new trial, which she knows is patently unconstitutional also,
      in order to bait the French government to acquiesce to Einhorn's
      extradition. http://www.egroups.com/group/ira-einhorn

      Below is second of two-part series, front page current articles in a
      Philadelphia newspaper detailing corruption in Philly District Attorney's
      office associated with the CIA drug trade.

      Is it any wonder the protestors in Philly are receiving such harsh treatment
      by the police and DA's office which apparently, along with the Feds, in a
      move unprecedented in America are treating the protestors as terrorists?
      What are the government officials affraid that the demonstrators might bring
      to public attention if they succeed?

      It is a long article so I have introduced it with a few excerpts. This
      information should be brought out at the upcoming Aug14-17 LA Shadow
      Convention http://www.shadowconventions.com (which it won't be for reasons
      the reader can determine) and at the Aug9-12 LA Peoples Convention
      http://www.peoplesconvention.com (where it will be brought out by Michael
      Ruppert, former LAPD police officer speaking there as editor of From The
      Wilderness newsletter http://www.copvcia.com and
      http://www.suppressedwriters.com which have the proof)

      Starting with the last two paragraphs/sentences of earlier issue of the
      Philadelphia City Paper locally known as the "Inky" from part one cover


      "Why did [Philly DA] Lynne Abraham's office in essence hand out
      'Get Out of Jail Free' cards to dozens of Dominicans with prior drug-dealing

      "And why did Al Gore show up at a fundraiser attended by PRD members under
      investigation by the DEA for money laundering and narco-trafficking?"

      Now excerpts from the below last week's cover story overshadowed by the
      Shadow and Republican Conventions: [see my
      conclusions/evaluations/suggestions at end]

      "The trouble started, they say, when they told the CIA to go pound sand."
      "CIA Agent Lawrence was adamant about getting this information as he was
      agitated when BNI personnel refused the request." McLaughlin added that he
      and his crew "feared for the life of the informant and his family if this
      information was revealed because if the informant disappeared there would be
      no problem for the Clinton administration."
      "The CIA people cautioned them that any move to confiscate Pena Gomez's drug
      money would have to be cleared with the U.S. State Department first, with
      the DEA as an intermediary."
      "...only the CIA and the Clinton-Gore State Department would have had both
      the influence and the authority..."
      "It is an outrageous allegation, that the CIA and the State Department were
      so intent on protecting the Dominican drug traffickers in the PRD that they
      used the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office to destroy the careers of four
      Pennsylvania narcotics agents".
      "...the District Attorney and the U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia
      independently chose to take all of the pending BNI cases and, as the cops
      might say, "shit-can" them. It was a unique, scorched-earth approach that
      was also, the BNI agents claim, the only prosecutorial measure that would
      ensure a quick and permanent demise for BNI's investigation of Dominican
      "The scandal hit at a time when the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office
      was already in a state of general turmoil. The elected AG, Ernie Preate, had
      gone to prison for campaign finance corruption. "
      "In October 1996, prominent members of Dominican drug trafficking
      organizations - people assigned special DEA identity numbers - attended a
      fundraiser for the New York Democratic Party at an Upper West Side tavern.

      "The guest of honor that night was Vice President Al Gore."


      August 3-10, 2000

      cover story

      The Dominican Connection, Part Two: Shafted

      They can't go home again: The Bastard Squad's former place of employment,
      BNI headquarters at 7801 Essington Ave.

      photo: Jay Matsueda

      Four angry narcotics agents are suing to prove that Uncle Sam is the
      ultimate pusher man.

      by Noel Weyrich

      page 1 | page 2 | page 3


      In the first part of "The Dominican Connection," the name of Edward Eggles
      was inadvertently omitted, due to a court clerical error, from the list of B
      NI agents suing the State Attorney General's and U.S. Attorney's Office in a
      1997 federal civil rights complaint.

      The trouble started, they say, when they told the CIA to go pound sand.

      For five months, the four Philadelphia-based agents from the state Bureau of
      Narcotics Investigations and Drug Control (BNI) had doggedly followed a
      trail of dollars and drugs that led from the squalid street-corner crack
      markets in North Philadelphia all the way to the campaign coffers of a
      leading presidential candidate in the Dominican Republic.

      As detailed in last week's City Paper ("The Dominican Connection, Part I"),
      informants had told narcotics agents in late 1995 that Dr. Jose Francisco
      Pena Gomez was bankrolling his Dominican presidential campaign with
      narco-profits earned on the streets of Philadelphia and other East Coast
      cities. The federal Drug Enforcement Administration had confirmed that Pena
      Gomez had been linked to narcotics traffickers in his home country, but
      nothing had been proven.

      In late March of 1996, the four agents - John "Sparky" McLaughlin, Dennis
      McKeefery, Charlie Micewski and Edward Eggles - were working closely with
      the DEA's New York office, which had its own Pena Gomez investigation under
      way. Together they planned to track the flow of drug money and seize the
      candidate's presumably ill-gotten gains during his next fundraising swing
      through New York City. It promised to be a headline-making bust, one that
      would help cement BNI's reputation among the cream of Philadelphia's
      crime-fighting crop.

      That's when CIA agent David Lawrence showed up at the bureau's Philadelphia
      headquarters, a nondescript building near the airport, with a few specific
      demands of the agents. He would leave empty-handed and angry.

      As recounted in a diary kept by Sparky McLaughlin, the BNI agents had
      previously given Lawrence and other CIA agents copies of audiotapes made by
      an informant who had infiltrated Philadelphia chapter meetings of the
      Dominican Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD). The tapes recorded numerous
      comments linking drug sales to Pena Gomez's campaign finance efforts.

      Now the CIA wanted more. Lawrence wanted the informant's name and his
      Dominican province of origin. He did not say why.

      McLaughlin wrote in his diary, "CIA Agent Lawrence was adamant about getting
      this information as he was agitated when BNI personnel refused the request."
      McLaughlin added that he and his crew "feared for the life of the informant
      and his family if this information was revealed because if the informant
      disappeared there would be no problem for the Clinton administration."

      For months, Lawrence and other CIA agents based here and elsewhere had
      warned McLaughlin and his colleagues that Pena Gomez was the favored
      presidential candidate of the Clinton administration. The CIA people
      cautioned them that any move to confiscate Pena Gomez's drug money would
      have to be cleared with the U.S. State Department first, with the DEA as an

      Now, in what would prove to be their last meeting with David Lawrence, the
      CIA agent was leaving in a huff.

      Two days later, with Pena Gomez making the fundraising rounds in New York,
      McLaughlin, Micewski, McCaffery and Eggles headed up the Turnpike, intent on
      seizing Pena Gomez's money. During their second night there, however, the
      operation was aborted by the DEA. With no jurisdiction in New York, the BNI
      agents stepped back while Pena Gomez left for home with an estimated
      $500,000 in U.S. currency in his bags.

      And then, two weeks later, prosecutors in Philadelphia unilaterally stopped
      taking BNI cases, claiming that some or all of the agents had been involved
      in questionable drug arrests. Once the news hit the papers, McLaughlin,
      McKeefery, Micewski and Eggles were all but washed up as drug agents. And
      although they've never been convicted of a crime or even disciplined
      internally for misconduct, their credibility as witnesses has been
      permanently compromised.

      This story, gleaned from thousands of pages of public court filings,
      McLaughlin's diary and official documents, details a clash of competing
      conspiracy theories.

      On the one hand, the Pennsylvania BNI agents claim in a federal lawsuit that
      only the CIA and the Clinton-Gore State Department would have had both the
      influence and the authority to stop the Pena Gomez investigation cold while
      killing the agents' careers in the process.

      On the other hand, Philadelphia's two chief criminal prosecutors insist that
      they took the unusual step of setting free dozens of accused and convicted
      drug defendants - in some cases sending dangerous felons back to the streets
      even after they'd pled guilty - because they feared the BNI agents might be
      colluding to fabricate details in arrest reports and provide false testimony
      in court.

      On April 29, 1996, Mike Lutz sent off a four-page memo to his superiors at
      BNI. A soft-spoken career cop, Lutz was a BNI supervisor who oversaw the
      work done by McLaughlin, McKeefery, Micewski and Eggles (soon to become
      known as the Bastard Squad). Lutz's memo is an amazing specimen of
      bureaucratic polemic, an angry, indignant litany of complaints mixed with
      bitter and sarcastic swipes at Philadelphia's legal and political

      "The accusations made against this office are not even factual, they are
      allegations!" Lutz wrote. "Despite this, we are ostracized from the entire
      Law Enforcement Community in Philadelphia. It is unfair and unjust."

      Just a few weeks earlier, with almost no warning, the bureau had been told
      that Philadelphia's prosecutors no longer wanted anything to do with
      BNI-related cases.

      On April 10 and 11, in separate meetings, representatives of the
      Philadelphia District Attorney and the U.S. Attorney had told officials from
      the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office that they would never again
      handle arrests by McLaughlin and his crew. Every pending criminal case
      requiring court testimony from McLaughlin and McKeefery in particular would
      be withdrawn from prosecution, or "nol-prossed." Some of these cases had
      been previously approved for prosecution and many of the arrests had been
      made with the close cooperation of other state and federal agencies.
      Convicted felons, some of them dangerous criminals caught with firearms,
      would go free as a result.

      Cops who can't get their arrests prosecuted aren't cops for very long.

      Just like that, the crime-fighting careers of McLaughlin, Micewski,
      McKeefery and Eggles were over. Feeling like heroes just a few weeks
      earlier, they became known thereafter as the Bastard Squad - an Army term
      for a misfit unit detached from its battalion. As if by fiat, the move by
      the prosecutors was tantamount to locking up the BNI's Essington Avenue
      office and turning out the lights.

      State officials would later gripe that the prosecutors, to justify this
      drastic decision, had offered only vague suspicions of wrongdoing on the
      part of BNI agents. Eric Noonan, a deputy attorney general who submitted an
      internal case study of BNI's files, wrote that "despite repeated contact
      with representatives of the U.S. Attorney's Office and the DA's Office, no
      one was able to provide any specifics other than a general 'gut feeling' of

      A search through the court records and depositions made available to City
      Paper reveals perhaps three specific instances in which prosecutors
      suggested BNI agents might have falsified search warrants and arrest
      reports. That's only three out of approximately 500 cases that the agents
      worked on.

      Nonetheless, in his response memo, Mike Lutz agreed that any such misconduct
      charges certainly required investigation. But he expressed disbelief that
      none of BNI's arrests would be prosecuted in the meantime. "No matter what,
      our agency should not be precluded from arresting drug dealers. while the
      investigation is going on," Lutz continued, pointing out that BNI was among
      the very few law enforcement agencies in Philadelphia that had never been
      tainted by criminal corruption indictments. "To close our doors is extreme
      and ridiculous."

      The believability of law enforcement officers on the witness stand is
      particularly important in narcotics cases. Unlike rape or robbery cases, in
      which victims are the key witnesses, drug cases are often a contest between
      the cops' testimony and the defendant's. The typical defense strategy in
      such cases is to pull apart the police account of the arrest, and sometimes
      those efforts succeed. Every day, then, prosecutors put cops on the witness
      stand who, in the past, may have had some testimony or an arrest report
      thrown out over questions of accuracy, proper procedure or truthfulness.

      But the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office never resorts to dropping
      cases en masse unless their law enforcement witnesses have themselves been
      charged with crimes. For officers with clean records to have all their cases
      dumped is not only rare - it may well be unprecedented. Donald Bailey, a
      Harrisburg lawyer and former Congressman who represents McLaughlin and the
      others, swears he can find no example of anything like it, anywhere in

      "It smacks of political sabotage," wrote Lutz, who suggested that the
      District Attorney and the U.S. Attorney were Democrats out to embarrass the
      Republican-controlled Attorney General's Office. But the lawsuit Bailey
      would later file advanced a more far-reaching theory:

      "[W]hen the plaintiffs were reticent to provide federal agencies with
      certain sources in the PRD, they were suddenly ostraci[z]ed and became the
      targets of vicious unfounded attacks on their [credibility] and career by
      the federal government (with the marionetted support of the Philadelphia
      District Attorney's Office and the Attorney General of Pennsylvania.)"

      It sounds far-fetched, and the defendants tend to regard the suit with
      derision and contempt. Michael P. Stiles, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
      District of Pennsylvania, has denounced the charges in a deposition as
      "preposterous" and "offensive." His attorney, Mary Catherine Fry, dismisses
      the allegations as "a fairy tale," while Kevin Harley, a spokesman for state
      Attorney General Michael Fisher, similarly deems them "rather bizarre." The
      Philadelphia DA's office has offered no comment.

      But, as Don Bailey has said in depositions of defendants in this suit, he
      believes his clients have been victimized by either a "cover-up" or by an
      effort to intimidate them, because he has never seen prosecutors behave this
      way before.

      The problem is this: If the prosecutors were convinced that BNI's search and
      seizure practices were improper, they would have faced only two
      possibilities - that the BNI agents were operating either carelessly or
      criminally. The men were either bending the rules or breaking the law. They
      needed either disciplinary action - or handcuffs and leg irons.

      Under the first supposition, the prosecutors should have alerted the
      Attorney General's internal affairs office in Harrisburg. On the other hand,
      if indeed the prosecutors suspected McLaughlin and McKeefery of running
      roughshod over the U.S. Constitution with a squad of crooked cops, then they
      arguably had a sworn duty to take their misgivings to the FBI. Better than
      anyone, prosecutors know that the surest way to lock up rogue cops is to
      keep them working the streets until the FBI catches them red-handed.

      But the prosecutors did neither. Instead, Stiles and Arnold Gordon,
      Philadelphia's first assistant district attorney, simply pulled the plug on
      all of BNI's investigations by announcing their refusal to prosecute any new
      arrests by McLaughlin and his crew. According to Stiles, the two offices
      arrived at these decisions independently.

      "Plaintiffs also allege," says the lawsuit, "that in furtherance of the
      unlawful policy of protecting the large-scale distributors of illegal
      narcotics to largely captive center city populations, the defendants have
      utilized the offices of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District
      of Pennsylvania and the FBI to pursue an oppressive threatening
      investigation of the plaintiffs in an effort to destroy their credibility."

      It is an outrageous allegation, that the CIA and the State Department were
      so intent on protecting the Dominican drug traffickers in the PRD that they
      used the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office to destroy the careers of four
      Pennsylvania narcotics agents.


      But it's also fair to ask why, when faced with two tried-and-true options
      for addressing their worries about BNI's credibility, the District Attorney
      and the U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia independently chose to take all of the
      pending BNI cases and, as the cops might say, "shit-can" them. It was a
      unique, scorched-earth approach that was also, the BNI agents claim, the
      only prosecutorial measure that would ensure a quick and permanent demise
      for BNI's investigation of Dominican narco-politics.

      Neither Stiles nor Gordon would comment for this story. Both, however, have
      given accounts of their actions under oath, either through sworn depositions
      or in criminal hearings.

      Arnold Gordon, however, had a history of being dissatisfied with certain BNI
      cases, one that pre-dated the bureau's problems with the CIA and Pena Gomez.
      Gordon had complained about BNI arrests to Attorney General officials on at
      least two occasions in early 1995, raising questions about the facts
      concerning a total of eight separate cases. In April of 1995, McLaughlin's
      diary records that Gordon had asked for disciplinary charges against
      McKeefery, alleging he had admitted in open court to searching two drug
      houses without a warrant. The subsequent internal investigation cleared

      Then, in May 1995, Gordon sent a letter to the then-acting Attorney General,
      requesting a review of seven cases that prosecutors for both his office and
      the U.S. Attorney's office found troubling. Five of the cases directly
      involved McLaughlin, McKeefery, Micewski and Eggles.

      In one case, Eggles and McLaughlin had arrested a man caught running with a
      kilo of cocaine, and the assistant U.S. attorney assigned to the case
      expressed fears that the arrest had been too simple and, therefore, not
      credible. Another case had been thrown out because the judge found no
      probable cause for searching a property where drugs were found.

      Although the May 1995 letter would later be used by defense attorneys as
      evidence that the BNI agents lacked credibility, Gordon has never invoked
      the cases mentioned in that letter as a reason for his April 1996 decision
      to nol-pros every case involving McLaughlin and McKeefery.

      At a preliminary hearing in November 1996, after he agreed to drop 53
      BNI-related cases, Gordon explained to a judge "the reason for nol-prossing
      these fifty-three cases was because Officer McLaughlin did something which
      one could characterize as lying in a search warrant.. We chose not [to put
      McLaughlin on the stand] solely because of what had occurred with regard to
      that one search warrant."

      A month later, before a different judge, Gordon claimed he was only using
      "his best prosecutorial judgment" in deciding to drop all of McLaughlin's
      and McKeefery's cases. "Although I've taken this action, I may be wrong and
      they may be right. In other words, I don't know that those officers lied in
      a search warrant. In fact, I may be unfairly stigmatizing them, by the
      action I've taken in these cases."

      In February 1995, just a few months before Gordon's first complaint against
      McKeefery, a federal grand jury had indicted five Philadelphia police
      officers, charging them with planting drugs on defendants and stealing from
      them. Less then a month later, the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office
      started dropping charges against people convicted on the five officers'
      testimony. The 39th District scandal, which ended up freeing more than 100
      defendants, was supremely embarrassing to the District Attorney's Office.
      Then, in the spring of 1996, just weeks before Gordon announced his decision
      to stop taking BNI cases, the five police officers were all convicted and
      received prison sentences up to 13 years.

      News of the district attorney's dumping of BNI cases broke on KYW-TV Channel
      3 on April 23, 1996, followed by a front-page Inquirer story the day after.
      Both reports, as well as follow-up news accounts, were quick to draw lines
      of similarities between BNI and the 39th District scandal. It was an unfair
      comparison, which became increasingly obvious as the months went by, since
      the BNI agents had never been charged with anything.

      Just the week before, five rogue police officers from North Philadelphia's
      39th District had been given sentences of up to 13 years for offenses that
      included framing suspects, beating them and extorting money from them. More
      than 100 cases involving the five officers had already been overturned - but
      only after they had been indicted and charged with crimes. Reporters
      focusing on the similarities of the tossed-out cases could just as easily
      have pointed out the district attorney's sudden interest in not prosecuting
      cases of officers who hadn't been charged with anything.

      Instead, the newspapers quoted unnamed law enforcement sources as stating
      that the joint city-FBI corruption probe that caught the 39th District
      police was now expanding to include the Bureau of Narcotics Investigation.
      By May 16, the head of BNI's Philadelphia office was replaced and
      McLaughlin, Micewski, McKeefery and Eggles were all reassigned to desk jobs.

      In late June, the State Senate's Judiciary Committee rushed to Philadelphia
      for hearings that had promised to examine why so many drug arrests by a
      state agency were being nullified by federal and local prosecutors. However,
      by the scheduled date, June 21, it had already been well established that
      the FBI was looking into BNI's Philadelphia office. The prosecutors and the
      Attorney General's Office begged off on attending the hearings, stating they
      were duty-bound not to discuss matters under criminal investigation.

      Rather than shed light on the decisions of the District Attorney and the
      U.S. Attorney, the hearing became a one-sided affair in which defense
      attorneys complained vocally about the persistent problem of police
      "corruption," lumping together BNI's problems with the criminal behavior of
      the 39th District cops.

      At the hearing, Miguel Torres gave teary-eyed testimony accusing McLaughlin
      of beating him and stealing cash. He did not, however, accuse McLaughlin of
      planting drugs on him.

      State Sen. Vince Fumo grabbed that day's headlines by imploring Torres to
      sue the state for McLaughlin's alleged conduct. He was quoted as saying, "I
      hope you hit us for at least a couple million bucks."

      (Years later, Torres would sue, but he would never get his day in court.
      Appeals courts denied he had grounds for a false arrest complaint and just
      this year the Supreme Court refused to hear his final appeal. McLaughlin had
      long since passed a polygraph test clearing him of Torres' charges.)

      Meanwhile, in the Dominican Republic, Jose Francisco Pena Gomez won the
      first round of elections on May 21. News reports considered him the leading
      candidate for the final runoff election on July 1.

      Two very different kinds of lawyers represent narcotics defendants in the
      Philadelphia justice system.

      Defendants with no money get public defenders assigned to them by the
      courts. On the other hand, defendants who can afford to pay for a defense
      hire counsel from among a small coterie of experienced local criminal
      lawyers. Among Dominican drug defendants, one of the top attorneys of choice
      is Guy Sciolla.

      Guy Sciolla doesn't do TV ads. He has a tiny one-line entry in the Yellow
      Pages. If you've never heard of him, then you're probably not the type of
      person who'll ever need him.

      Years ago Sciolla was on the other side of the fence, as a prosecutor in the
      Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. Back then he counted among his
      colleagues in the homicide unit the very two prosecutors who would shut down
      the BNI crew - Michael P. Stiles and Arnold Gordon. The Philadelphia legal
      community is a very small place.

      In the weeks and months before Stiles and Gordon decided to stop taking BNI
      cases, Guy Sciolla was working up a motion to spring a former BNI arrestee
      from federal prison.

      Miguel Tapia had been caught by McLaughlin and Eggles with a brick of
      cocaine in his car. Tapia had been set up by one of BNI's informants, who
      told the agents to wait for Tapia to make a delivery at a corner store at
      Fourth and Annsbury Streets. Tapia drove up in an Oldsmobile, parked and
      entered, where McLaughlin was waiting for him. Eggles later testified that
      he, meanwhile, recovered a brick of cocaine from the floor of the car, after
      spotting it peeking out from under a newspaper. Tapia was arrested on the
      spot, though it would be some hours before it was revealed he had lied about
      his identity and that his real name was Anci Liriano.

      Eggles was able to seize the cocaine without a warrant under the "plain
      view" provisions of search and seizure law, which allows police to take
      action when they see something they can "reasonably suspect" is a controlled
      substance. The informant's tip was critical to the legality of the arrest
      since it provided the reasonable suspicion needed to look inside the car. A
      jury found Tapia/Liriano guilty and a judge gave him a 63-month federal
      prison sentence.

      Sciolla's legal brief on behalf of Tapia was filed just two weeks after news
      of the BNI scandal hit the papers. It made no claim that Tapia/Liriano was
      innocent of anything. It did not allege that the agents had planted the
      cocaine in his car.

      If anything, Sciolla's Tapia brief is a somewhat unique court document in
      that it drips with innuendo and sarcasm. It backhandedly doubted Eggles'
      credibility by claiming that a series of past BNI arrest reports, few of
      which even involved Eggles, displayed "remarkable and repeated fact
      patterns." It went on to question the very existence of BNI's confidential

      Years later, in a sworn deposition, U.S. Attorney Michael Stiles would
      recall the Tapia case as one of the main reasons he determined the entire
      Bureau of Narcotics Investigation was unfit for future federal prosecutions.
      In recounting the facts of the Tapia case, Stiles' version was similar to
      Sciolla's, in which doubt was cast on whether McLaughlin and Eggles'
      informant had ever existed and little connection was found between Tapia and
      the Oldsmobile. But other investigative agencies, including the DEA, had
      long ago confirmed they were using the same individual as an informant, and
      a civilian witness in the store had testified for the prosecution that Tapia
      tried to throw away the keys to the car.

      (Tapia was set free in July 1996. Seven months later, Delaware State Police
      records show he was stopped for speeding on I-95 and that $31,000 was found
      hidden in his car's false-bottomed gas tank. The car and the money were
      seized, but Tapia was let go.)


      As the summer of 1996 wore on, Philadelphia's small community of criminal
      defense attorneys smelled blood in the water when it came to getting old BNI
      cases overturned. In a frenzy of filings, one motion followed another in
      rapid succession, each requesting that a past conviction be thrown out and a
      prisoner released because the individual's arrest had been tainted by the
      mere presence of BNI personnel at the scene.

      When the District Attorney's Office did not contest the motions, the
      convicts went free. Before it was all over, by McLaughlin's estimation, 85
      defendants had been let go, people from whom BNI had confiscated a total of
      $1.2 million worth of heroin, crack and cocaine, not to mention dozens of
      illegal firearms and motor vehicles.

      Another attorney who has frequently handled drug cases, Louis Savino, showed
      remarkable candor about the situation when he told the Inquirer, "It made my
      job easier. I don't know about the general public. They're just letting
      people skate.. These are allegations of significant amounts of drugs." Most
      other defense attorneys were more sanctimonious, making public claims about
      their clients' innocence, even when their court motions merely claimed they
      had been caught improperly.

      The scandal hit at a time when the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office
      was already in a state of general turmoil. The elected AG, Ernie Preate, had
      gone to prison for campaign finance corruption. The acting AG, Thomas
      Corbett, was a lame duck, a mere seat warmer who would be replaced in early
      1997 by the winner of the November 1996 election.

      Nonetheless, soon after the prosecutors started dumping BNI cases, Corbett
      appointed his deputy attorney general Eric Noonan to review the cases and
      file a report on fixing the problems with the Philadelphia BNI office.

      Noonan's report was never made public, but a draft has been obtained by City
      Paper. In it, Noonan's exasperation is evident as he lays out the inability
      of the prosecutors to articulate just what they found so offensive about
      McLaughlin and his crew. This is where he accused the prosecutors of failing
      to provide any specifics beyond "a general 'gut feeling' of discomfort" with
      BNI cases.

      As best as Noonan could tell, the prosecutors had three very general
      criticisms of the arrests made by McLaughlin, Micewski, McKeefery and
      Eggles: The BNI agents often entered houses without warrants, they reported
      seeing drugs in plain view with a frequency that defied credibility and the
      "recurring fact patterns" in their cases, as claimed by Guy Sciolla, raised
      suspicions that they were making stuff up.

      As head of the Drug Strike Force Legal Services section, Noonan was already
      well versed in search and seizure law. After reviewing hundreds of BNI
      files, however, he concluded that while the bureau could sharpen up some of
      its procedures, he could find nothing about its work that was improper or
      not credible.

      For one thing, law officers can enter a house without a warrant if they
      reasonably suspect contraband may be in danger of being destroyed. The
      allowable procedure is to "secure" the property first and then request a
      warrant to actually search the building. Noonan found BNI agents had always
      given their explicit reasons for such "prior entries" in their search
      warrant requests, and had never tried to conceal them.

      To test the credibility of the "plain view" arrests that the prosecutors
      complained about, Noonan took a tour of the Dominican-controlled drug
      corners where the BNI agents had done so much of their work. "During
      slightly more than an hour of driving through the various neighborhoods, our
      vehicle was approached no fewer than three times by street corner dealers
      who readily displayed various types of drugs to the driver." Noonan
      witnessed five other drug transactions, some within view of uniformed police
      officers who "had very little impact on these street dealers' temerity..
      [B]ased on the foregoing, it appears their recurring ability for such plain
      view observations is quite believable."

      Finally, on the matter of Sciolla's "recurring fact patterns," Noonan wrote
      that he found no such patterns that were "incredible due to their
      frequency." Forced to state the obvious, Noonan wrote that some recurring
      patterns are "not unforeseeable" with drug arrests, given the organized and
      routine nature of narcotics dealing and trafficking.

      Although Noonan's report made some suggestions about how BNI agents and
      supervisors could improve their reporting methods, he found nothing that
      would warrant the treatment that McLaughlin, Micewski, McKeefery and Eggles
      received at the hands of the prosecutors.

      The report, completed in July 1996, would have given Philadelphia's BNI crew
      some much-needed moral support, but no portion of it was ever made public.

      Instead, acting AG Tom Corbett continued to make occasional disparaging
      remarks about the agents, perhaps attempting to put the bureau's past behind
      it. McLaughlin, Micewski, McKeefery and Eggles were pulled from the streets
      for good, and a new supervisor was assigned. On May 17, 1996, with the four
      agents no longer permitted to make arrests, the District Attorney's Office
      announced it would start handling BNI cases once again.

      On July 1, 1996, Dr. Jose Francisco Pena Gomez lost the runoff election for
      the Dominican presidency. But he and his Dominican Revolutionary Party didn'
      t have to worry about drug investigations any more. Soon after Pena Gomez's
      fundraising visit to New York several months earlier, the DEA had shut down
      its investigation.

      And Pena Gomez's supporters kept active in politics. In October 1996,
      prominent members of Dominican drug trafficking organizations - people
      assigned special DEA identity numbers - attended a fundraiser for the New
      York Democratic Party at an Upper West Side tavern.

      The guest of honor that night was Vice President Al Gore.

      In the fall of 1997, when they filed their federal civil rights lawsuit, the
      careers of McLaughlin, McKeefery, Micewski and Eggles were mere shadows of
      what they had been 18 months earlier.

      For more than a year McLaughlin had been reassigned to a desk job, while
      McKeefery worked in the motor pool, signing out vehicles. Micewski was
      reassigned to do paperwork in a BNI office in northeastern Pennsylvania,
      while Eggles took an extended leave, eventually deciding to retire.

      All were still officially under investigation by the FBI.

      In September, a Housing Authority police officer named Harry Fernandez
      called McLaughlin to tell him he had FBI troubles of his own. Fernandez had
      worked frequently with McLaughlin's BNI crew on drug investigations in the
      past. Now he was facing federal charges for lying about a search he did on a
      car in 1994. He had recovered more than three pounds of cocaine in what was
      said to be the largest street bust in city history, but he had falsified
      some details in the search and some fellow housing officers had given him

      Fernandez told McLaughlin that the FBI was offering him immunity in exchange
      for information about the BNI. But it wasn't until Fernandez's 1998 trial,
      when he got a transcript of Fernandez's Sept. 23, 1997 FBI interview, that
      McLaughlin could see just how badly they wanted to nail the Bastard Squad.

      FBI: Look, let's cut the shit. You know those guys at BNI are dirty. They
      planted drugs on people[,] stole their money. We want you to tell us about

      Fernandez: I'll tell you whatever I know, but if you're looking for illegal
      shit that those guys did. I do not know anything about it.

      FBI: Why do you keep protecting these guys?

      Fernandez: I'm not protecting them but if I don't know anything illegal
      about them how can I say anything?

      FBI: This is your only way out. Do you understand that anything you say here
      can't be used against you[?] No matter what illegal thing you did and tell
      us we can't use it against you. That's a hell of a break.

      Fernandez: I would tell you if I know. I'd give up anybody in order to
      benefit me. But unless you want me to lie I don't know anything.

      Fernandez was eventually acquitted of three of the four charges against him.
      He received a two-and-a-half-year sentence for lying to a federal officer.

      The lawsuit filed on October 17, 1997, with all four Bastard Squad members
      as plaintiffs, listed 16 co-defendants including Stiles, Gordon, a State
      Department assistant secretary, three CIA employees, two FBI detectives,
      five members of the Attorney General's chain of command, two New York drug
      traffickers and, finally, the candidate himself, Pena Gomez. Pena Gomez has
      since died, and several other defendants, including Arnold Gordon, have
      successfully sought to be dropped from the case via a summary judgment.
      Gordon was covered by prosecutorial immunity, which forbids people from
      suing prosecutors for their legal decisions. Stiles, however, has had his
      summary judgment request denied by a judge, partly because there is some
      evidence he encouraged the Attorney General's Office to order all the
      Bastard Squad members removed from the Essington Avenue office.

      In 1998, Donald Bailey filed a second lawsuit on behalf of McLaughlin,
      McKeefery and Micewski, alleging that Attorney General officials had
      responded to the first lawsuit by retaliating with "harsh, uncompromising
      employment and travel burdens, all in order to punish the plaintiffs for
      using the civil rights laws to protect their rights and redress their
      grievances." (Eggles, having retired, was not a plaintiff in the second

      Not until October 1998 did Stiles inform the Attorney General's Office that
      the FBI investigation of the Bastard Squad would not result in any
      indictments. He finally made the announcement that the FBI investigation was
      complete in February 1999, nearly three years after it started.

      Although the number of convicted felons set free in the BNI scandal rivals
      that of the 39th District scandal, there remain some serious differences
      between the two affairs. In the 39th, the city eventually paid out $3.5
      million in settlements to falsely arrested defendants. By contrast, none of
      the civil cases filed against the Bastard Squad was settled, and none ever
      made it to trial. Each was thrown out by an appellate judge, including one
      who noted tartly that "Plaintiff does not dispute the basic facts. that he
      was driving an automobile which contained over 2,000 vials of crack

      And yet, just two weeks ago, another repeat offender drug dealer, one who
      was serving four to seven years in state prison, was granted a new trial
      simply because the arresting officer was Sparky McLaughlin. The District
      Attorney's Office immediately moved to nol-pros, and the man, who is still
      awaiting trial on two unrelated assault charges, went free.

      McLaughlin, Micewski, McKeefery and Eggles remain possibly the only
      unindicted law officers anywhere to be essentially blackballed by the
      prosecutors they were obliged to work with. But they are no longer the only
      cops to have their investigative careers interrupted or destroyed under
      strange circumstances involving Dominican drug traffickers and their pricey
      private lawyers.

      One highly effective Philadelphia Police narcotics squad was suddenly shut
      down and pulled off the streets in 1997. They were told death threats had
      been made against them. Only later did they learn the FBI was investigating
      them because lawyers for Dominican drug dealers were complaining the squad
      was making unconstitutional searches. After three years, the FBI had nothing
      to show for their trouble. But the narcotics squad, which had been arresting
      an average of 30 dealers a week, was dismantled. Some have filed formal
      grievances against the police department for unfairly reassigning them to
      desk jobs.

      Two other cases in New York City follow a similar pattern in which
      successful teams of narcotics agents have been pulled from duty after drug
      lawyers made allegations of misconduct that inevitably proved groundless.

      Could it be that the attorneys for Dominican drug traffickers have hit upon
      a reliable method of undermining the entire justice system by simply driving
      a wedge of suspicion between the cops and the prosecutors (two cultures
      which are prone to mutual mistrust in even the best of circumstances)?

      Way back in April 1996, that's exactly what BNI supervisor Mike Lutz thought
      had happened to McLaughlin, McKeefery, Micewski and Eggles. That eloquent
      memorandum defending the men who would soon become the Bastard Squad
      contained this very well-reasoned paragraph:

      "Is it not our agency alone that is making a consistent pattern of arrests,
      confiscating large amounts of drugs, money, cars and guns in these areas?
      How best to defeat the efforts of the Law Enforcement Agency that is
      wreaking havoc against this organized drug ring[?] Put the spotlight on
      them. Put them in retreat. Initiate an investigation. Make false and
      unfounded allegations. It will stop them in their tracks. And it did.

      "The scheme worked, [the Dominican drug traffickers and their lawyers]
      paralyzed an entire Law Enforcement Agency and at the same time ruined [its]
      credibility. How in God's name could their broad brush associate us. with
      the 39th District scandal? They did."

      --------------end forwarded article------------------

      The only policy that will enable this corruption and skullduggery to be
      resolved is by a "Truth Commission Amnesty" program analogous to what
      happened in South Africa after the end of apartheid where instead of
      prosecuting as war criminals the perpetrators of apartheid genocidal
      policies, those who accepted corrected ethic, renouced their previous
      actions, and agreed to work together for the good of the nation -- these
      people were pardoned and were able to apply their positions of power and
      influence towards creating a better nation in the future.

      In America, not only should the nonviolent victims of the drug war now
      imprisoned be pardoned, but also the murderous corrupt perpetrators of the
      bogus drug war must also be given the chance to change the errors of their
      ways and acknowledge the truth of their misdeeds and reapply their talents
      and skills to solving today's global social and environmental problems
      before it is too late to save all life on Earth from otherwise impending
      destruction not only from accelerated climate change and the dangers of
      nuclear conflagration but from the increasing ozone layer depletion that
      1988 Project Earth climate modeling predictions deemed on-target as of 1997
      say will destroy all the oceanic phytoplankton (over half of Earth's oxygen
      supply) by solar irradiation by the year 2008. http://www.projectearth.com

      To solve this emergency we must quickly move away from fossil fuel power
      towards the suppressed and available new-energy ("free-energy") technologies
      such as cold fusion, LENR, ZPE, rotating magnetic systems, oscillating
      magnetic systems, etc etc, that can provide power without fuel by mechanisms
      demonstrated but yet to be fully understood due to corporate media and
      government scientific suppression. We need a New Manhattan Project, but an
      open public one, to quickly implement this new energy economy as per Science
      and Technology in Society and Public Policy list posts at url below.

      Very important we also need to revive on a global emergency scale level the
      USDA 1941-45 Hemp for Victory program to grow this most useful and
      bioefficient plant everywhere possible on Earth as soon as possible for its
      economic value and its superior bioefficiency per acre for biofuels
      applications to replace fossil fuels, to save the forests and heal the
      atmosphere reducing carbon dioxide and reoxygenating it to enable the ozone
      layer made from atmospheric oxygen to be replenished in time.

      This is an essential Global Emergency Alert Response.

      David Crockett Williams, C.L.U.
      Tehachapi, CA 661-822-3309
      Chartered Life Underwriter
      Activist, Scientist, Promoter

      Global Peace Walk 2000
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