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A Marginal Jew, Volume 4: Law and Love

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  • Loren Rosson
    List members,   I blogged a modified version of the following review for John Meier s fourth volume of A Marginal Jew. It s long -- but hopefully not
    Message 1 of 1 , May 11, 2009
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      List members,


      I blogged a modified version of the following review for John Meier's fourth volume of A Marginal Jew. It's long -- but hopefully not


      The mantra of this volume is, "the historical Jesus is the halakic
      Jesus", aligning more with an E.P. Sanders than a John Dominic Crossan,
      yet a Jesus who at least occasionally rescinded the law on his own authority.


      "Here we touch on the real enigma in Jesus' teaching of
      the Law... His approach seems to be neither total rejection of the Law, nor a
      dialectic that embraces yet in effect rejects the Law, nor a total affirmation
      of the Law that simply involves legitimate though debatable interpretations of
      individual practices. The real enigma is how Jesus can at one and the same time
      affirm the Law as a given, as the normative expression of God's will for Israel,
      and yet in a few individual cases or legal areas (e.g., divorce and oaths)
      teach and enjoin what is contrary to the Law, simply on his own
      authority." (p 3)


      Christological ideas about Jesus fulfilling the law, as in
      Mt 5:17 (easily dispensed with as a church creation, pp 41-43) can be of no
      help in resolving this tension, any more than modern anachronistic notions of a
      Jesus who affirmed moral requirements at the expense of cultic ones (pp 43-47).
      Jesus was capable of using dialectical negation as much as a prophet like
      Hosea, but neither were opposed to ritual per se.

      Meier continues using the classic criteria of authenticity to assess what may
      or may not go back to the life of Jesus, as well as the evidence of other
      Jewish and pagan sources. Especially in this volume he critiques attempts to
      get at Jesus mostly on the basis of gospel data in view of Old Testament and
      rabbinic material, while virtually ignoring the Dead Sea Scrolls (especially
      texts from Cave 4), Philo, Josephus, and the OT Pseudepigrapha. He certainly
      doesn't rule out rabbinic material apriori, but treats it as cautiously or
      distrustfully as he does the gospels, sometimes even more given how late the
      material is.

      With this in mind, let's see how Meier assesses Jesus' (alleged) sayings on (1)
      divorce, (2) oaths, (3) sabbath, (4) purity, (5) love, and (6) the Golden Rule.


      The divorce traditions (Mk 10:2-12/Mt 19:3-9; Mt 5:32/Lk
      16:18; I Cor 7:10-11) are a good place to start, and Meier offers a
      thorough background on the subject, from the Torah to the classical prophets to
      the intertestamental writings to the rabbis. What's clear is that men had near
      complete freedom to divorce their wives from the get-go, as in other
      surrounding cultures. The texts of Deut 24:1-4 (forbidding a twice-divorced
      wife to remarry her first husband), Deut 22:13-19 (forbidding a husband who
      falsely accuses his wife of being a virgin to divorce her), Deut 22:28-29
      (commanding a man who rapes or seduces an unbetrothed virgin to marry and never
      divorce her), and Lev 21:7,13014 (forbidding a divorced woman from marrying a
      priest), all presuppose divorce as the norm and attempt to regulate specific

      Looking at Mal 2:16, Meier calls attention to the frequent English
      (mis)translations. "For I hate divorce, says Yahweh the God of
      Israel", is not what the Masoretic Text or other original manuscripts
      actually say. In the MT, the Hebrew reads, confusingly, "For he hated,
      send away," while other manuscripts actually counsel divorce: "But if
      you hate her, send her away." (see pp 81-82). Despite what many of our
      bibles imply, Malachi doesn't provide a precedent for Jesus' sweeping

      In the intertestamental period, Philo (On the Special Laws, 3.5) and
      Josephus (Ant. 4.8.23) hold to the absolute
      divorce rights of a husband. The Essenes forbid polygyny in a way that might
      imply an attack on divorce when followed by remarriage (the Damascus Document),
      though this isn't clear. Only much later than the first century do we find
      actual debates about divorce, in the rabbinic texts, with the House of Shammai
      restricting a husband's power somewhat (his wife has to shame him to warrant a
      divorce), while the House of Hillel holds to "absolute" tradition.
      "Despite the almost universal tendency on the part of NT exegetes to
      explain Jesus' prohibition of divorce against the 'background' of the debate
      between the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel, this tendency may
      actually be a prime example of the anachronistic use of later texts to explain
      earlier ones." (p 95) And so we're left with a sweeping prohibition of
      Jesus that sticks out like a sore thumb in the pre-70 period.

      In Meier's judgment this radical prohibition passes all the criteria of
      authenticity: multiple attestation (with flying colors, since Meier accepts the
      Q hypothesis; but even for Farrer advocates like me it's reasonably secure),
      discontinuity (since nowhere in pre-70 Judaism can we find any debate about
      divorce, let alone a definitive prohibition against the practice),
      embarrassment (as evidenced by the "squirming" of later Christians as
      they created wiggle-room for their Lord's uncompromising commandment -- Paul
      allowing it when a pagan spouse is unable to live in peace with the Christian
      partner, Matthew allowing it in cases of unchastity), coherence (other sayings
      of Jesus make harsh demands that are costly; and celibates like Jesus have an
      easier time forbidding divorce than "realistic" married men, perhaps
      one reason the Catholic clergy continues to preach against it while many Protestants
      make more allowance).

      So while the narrative of Mk 10:2-12/Mt 19:3-9 is a Christian composition, it
      draws on authentic memories about how Jesus debated over divorce (p 124). Using
      Genesis to trump Deuteronomy (Mk 10:6-9/Mt 19:4-6), Jesus claimed that men who
      divorce their wives and remarry commit adultery (Mt 10:11/Mt 19:9, minus the Markan addition about women who
      divorce their husbands, reflecting Greco-Roman practice). These core parts of
      the dispute narrative, along with Mt 5:32/Lk 16:18, I Cor 7:10-11, are judged
      to be generally authentic.

      All fine and well -- and most Jesus-questors agree that Jesus spoke against
      divorce, even if for some blatantly eisegetical reasons. Other than suggesting
      eschatology as a backdrop, Meier doesn't get into the "why" behind
      Jesus' attack on divorce, only "that" he condemned the practice. But
      did this prohibition put him into actual conflict with the Torah?

      E.P. Sanders says no, since Jesus was only forbidding what Moses allowed rather
      than commanded (see Jesus and Judaism, p 256-260). Meier objects to this
      rationale as follows:


      "It is odd to see Sanders play the role of the
      Pharisees in Mk 10:4... To be sure, the Law of Moses did not command divorce in
      the sense of commanding individual men to divorce their wives. But the Law of
      Moses did accept and sanction divorce... By completely forbidding divorce,
      Jesus dares to forbid what the Law allows -- and not in some minor, obscure,
      halakic observance but in one of the most important legal institutions in
      society. He dares to say that a man who duly follows the Law in properly
      divorcing his wife and marrying another woman is in effect committing
      adultery... a serious sin against one of the commandments of the Decalogue...
      The disturbing, even shocking nature of Jesus' total prohibition cannot be
      appreciated unless we understand how unthinkable such a prohibition was in a
      society that (like all ancient Mediterranean societies) considered divorce,
      however regrettable or painful in individual instances, to be the natural and necessary
      course of things." (pp 173 n122, 113)


      I still think Sanders has a valid point, though so does
      Meier. Perhaps the best way of putting it is that while Jesus' prohibition
      against divorce didn’t technically violate a Torah commandment, it nevertheless
      called the Torah into question since doing what Moses permitted caused one to
      sin against the Decalogue. And because the prohibition was so socially
      outrageous, it would have been perceived by many as an attack on the law,
      nuances notwithstanding.


      Building on his two-part article published in The Journal for the Study of the
      Historical Jesus ("Did the Historical Jesus Prohibit All Oaths?",
      Part 1: 5.2, pp 175-204; Part 2: 6.1, pp 3-24), Meier demonstrates that no
      Jewish teaching around the turn of the era prohibits oaths entirely (pp
      196-198). Ben Sira warns against frequent swearing, and Philo says to avoid it
      whenever possible, but even they don't dare forbid what the Torah commands in
      two cases: for a person who loses goods entrusted (Exod 22:9-10) and for a wife
      suspected of adultery (Num 5:11-31). If Jesus prohibited oaths as reported in
      Mt 5:34-27, and as implied in Jas 5:12, then we have another case -- even clearer
      than the one of divorce -- in which Jesus abrogated the Torah.

      For Meier, the prohibition against oath-taking passes the criteria of
      discontinuity with early Judaism (we know of no pre-70 texts prohibiting
      oaths), discontinuity with early Christianity (Paul swears left and right, the
      author of Hebrews presupposes the practice without disapproval, the author of
      Revelation portrays an angel taking an oath), and multiple attestation (Matthew
      and James). I'm not sure what discontinuity with early Christianity proves
      (unlike the case of divorce, it's not as if we see other NT writers coping
      embarrassingly with the saying), and Meier has to jump through a few hoops to get
      Jas 5:12 to qualify as an
      independent source (though I think he's reasonably successful). But it does
      seem that probabilities lie on the side of authenticity.

      So the prohibition of oaths stands as a second example of the historical Jesus'
      revoking individual Torah commandments (p 205). As for motive, eschatology is
      again advanced: Jesus' followers already lived proleptically in the kingdom
      of God (p 206).


      The sabbath accounts in the gospels involve mostly healing controversies,
      posing a serious problem. As Meier demonstrates, there's no indication of any
      pre-70 view that healing illnesses or treating physical deformities was
      prohibited on the sabbath -- not in the Hebrew Bible, the Deuterocanonical
      Books, Jubilees, the Damascus Document, the Qumran Cave 4 fragments, Philo, or
      Josephus. Only by the time of the Mishna do we find passages forbidding certain
      acts of healing or relieving pain on the sabbath, and in Meier's view, they
      reflect post-70 rabbinic innovations (p 251).

      There are, of course, many other sabbath prohibitions listed in the above
      sources, ranging from agricultural work (especially sowing and reaping),
      treading the wine press, loading beasts of burden in order to take things to
      the market, buying and selling, carrying burdens through city gates or out of
      homes, leaving one's place to undertake a journey, lighting a fire, and
      preparing food by cooking. The Essenes were especially strict, even prohibiting
      the rescue of a human being from a pit with a ladder or rope -- one had to use
      a cloak or something that wasn't a tool. (Later rabbinic texts prohibit the
      rescue of only animals, though one could throw it fodder to keep it alive until
      the next day). But again, no healing prohibitions until the rabbinic period.

      Some of Jesus' healings on the sabbath occasion no dispute at all (Mk
      1:23-28/Lk 4:33-37 a public example, Mk 1:29-31/Lk 4:38-39 a private one),
      which is what we would expect. But most of them call forth outrage, and in
      Meier's judgment, not one of these narratives can survive scrutiny. In the case
      of the man with the withered hand (Mk 3:1-6/Mt 12:9-14/Lk 6:6-11), the healing
      itself already received a judgment of non liquet ("not clear")
      in Volume 2, and Jesus' act of speaking in order to heal would not have been
      considered a forbidden work in the pre-70 period (pp 255-256). Ditto for the
      healings of the woman bent over (Lk 13:10-17)
      and the man with dropsy (Lk 14:1-6): each miracle was pronounced non liquet
      in Volume 2, and again, as sabbath controversies they makes no sense (ibid).

      The sabbath healings in John, the paralyzed man (Jn 5:1-9a) and the man born
      blind (Jn 9:1-7), pose a different problem. While Meier gave each the stamp of
      authenticity in Volume 2 as miracles, his reconstruction of the primitive forms
      of the stories don’t retain the sabbath: "The sabbath in each of these two
      chapters functions simply as an artificial literary and theological link,
      connecting what were originally short stories of healing with the lengthy
      Johannine discourses" (p 258). Another dead end.

      A more promising avenue appears in two sayings incorporated in the Matthean
      parallel to the healing of the man with the withered hand, and Luke's account
      of the healing of the man with dropsy. Jesus is reported as saying, "What
      man among you, if he has a sheep that falls into a pit on the sabbath, will not
      take hold of him and draw him up?" (Mt 9:11);
      and "Which of you, if your son or ox falls into a cistern, will not
      immediately pull him out on the sabbath?" (Lk 14:5). In Meier's judgment,
      these secondary sayings may reflect an historical halakic debate behind the
      fictional healing stories.


      "When it comes to the endangered ox, Jesus and ordinary
      Jewish peasants stand on one side of the question (of course, one would do
      that!) while Essenes and Pharisees stand on the other (no, you cannot directly
      draw out the animal yourself). When it comes to endangered human life, Jesus,
      ordinary peasants, and probably the Pharisees stand on one side (of course, you
      can pull your son out!) while the Essenes, perhaps with some discomfort, stand
      on the other (well, maybe you could throw him your cloak, but no direct use of
      a ladder or rope is permitted)... Jesus rhetorically draws his audience to his
      side with the presumption that he and they will agree on these humane measures
      that are so obvious to them as they are to him." (pp 265-266, 263)


      Since sectarians seem to be chiefly targeted here, we have a
      rare instance of Jesus "fighting a battle-at-a-distance with the Essene
      movement (or other sectarian groups in Palestine)
      for the loyalty of ordinary Jews" (p 263). The Pharisees would have
      probably agreed with Jesus about human beings, unless their position was
      opposite their rabbinic successors.

      As for the account of Jesus' disciples plucking grain on the sabbath (Mk 2:23-28/Mt 12:1-8/Lk 6:1-5), Meier finds it
      transparently fictional. Following Sanders, he emphasizes the incredible
      setting: Gestapo-Pharisees suddenly popping up in the middle of a field looks
      like something out of a Broadway musical (p 274). On top of this, says Meier,
      Jesus makes a horse's ass of himself in appealing to scripture. He claims that
      David had companions with him when he came to the priest at Nob, and that David
      gave some of those loaves of the presence to "those with him". In
      fact the priest explicitly asked David, "Why are you alone and no one is
      with you?" (I Sam 21:2) The text of I Sam doesn't even imply that David is
      hungry. Skewering scholars who keep trying to salvage exegetical escape
      hatches, Meier concludes that the entire dispute is incredible:


      "We need to recall the agonistic culture of the ancient
      Mediterranean world, where public debates between contending parties were a
      matter of honor and shame. According to Mark, Jesus has chosen to counter the
      Pharisees' challenge by challenging them on their own knowledge of the text of
      I Sam 21:2-10... Jesus' challenge hopelessly falls to pieces if he immediately
      proceeds to document his own glaring ignorance... If this scene gives us a true
      picture of the scriptural knowledge and teaching skill of the historical Jesus,
      then the natural and very effective response of the Pharisees would have been
      not fierce anger and concerted opposition but gleeful mockery. They would have
      laughed their heads off (and invited the populace to do the same) at this
      uneducated woodworker who insisted on making a fool of himself in public."
      (p 277-278)


      But would the masses have laughed their heads off,
      and was Jesus making a fool of himself? I think the opposite: Jesus'
      appeal to David is an ingenious pieces of one-upmanship. The genius lies in the
      double entendre of Jesus repeating David's deceptions as though they were true
      in his own deceptive argument. David lied to the priest (claiming that
      he was working for Saul, when he was actually fleeing him), and now Jesus lies
      to the Pharisees (claiming that David gave sacred food to his men, when he
      didn't have any men with him). No one is really deceived by this, of course, but
      the "bullshit-within-bullshit" is the whole point. As William Herzog
      puts it, Jesus identifies with "David the fugitive, the coyote figure who
      lives by his wits while others are seeking to destroy him. This is a David
      figure who would be appreciated in the villages." (Jesus, Justice, and
      the Reign of God, p 188) Far from making an ass of himself, Jesus would
      have acquired plenty of honor in the eyes of watching peasants.

      So against Meier, I lean to the historicity of this account. Unlike the healing
      episodes, I have a hard time seeing how the issue of plucking grain would fit
      the agenda of the early church. As Maurice Casey says, these points seem to be
      natural in the life of the historical Jesus, but not afterwards (Writing
      History, Constructing Religion, edited by Crossley, p 132). We don't
      necessarily have to buy the picture of Pharisees out-on-patrol in the fields
      (yes, that's hard to swallow). It could be that legal teachers got wind of what
      of the disciples' were doing and challenged Jesus in another setting.

      As for the conclusion to the grain-plucking story, Meier allows that the Markan
      "sabbath was made for man" saying (Mk 2:27) could go back to Jesus
      (as cohering with the leniency urged in Mt 12:11/Lk 14:5, the sabbath being a
      gift from God grounded in creation, which should be interpreted humanely),
      while arguing that the "Son of Man is lord of the sabbath" saying (Mk
      2:28/Mt 12:8/Lk 6:5) is too Christological to be trusted. Both judgments are
      reasonable, though the latter gets into complex issues surrounding the
      "Son of Man" title which Meier will be treating at greater length in
      Volume 5.

      So despite the abundance of sabbath incidents spread across the gospels, Meier
      finds very little (almost nothing, in fact) that's historical. None of the sabbath-healing
      accounts which call forth dispute are reliable. At best, we get a window onto
      the historical Jesus in the traditions of Mt 12:11/Lk
      14:5, and Mk 2:27. When it came to endangered animals, the historical Jesus
      sided with peasants against the Essenes and (possibly) the Pharisees. When it
      came to endangered people, he sided with peasants against a murky position of
      the Essenes (or other sectarian influence). As for motive, Meier again appeals
      to eschatology: "the roots of the sabbath lie in creation itself, but a
      creation that is meant to serve the good of humanity created by God in the
      beginning and now restored by him in the last days" (p 296). I largely
      agree with Meier, but would maintain that most of the grain-plucking episode is
      historical too.


      Meier begins this section by distinguishing different forms of impurity
      regulated in the Hebrew Bible: ritual impurity, a temporary and
      contagious condition resulting from birth, disease, sexual activity, and death
      -- not sinful itself, but requiring immersion-plus-sunset before one can enter
      the temple or handle sacred things; moral impurity, a more permanent and
      non-contagious condition resulting from sinful acts like murder, incest,
      homosexuality, bestiality, and idolatry -- requiring the offender to be
      "cut off" from God's people (whether by execution or banishment) or
      to have the impurity purged by temple sacrifice; and then dietary impurity,
      often associated with the former, but in truth somewhere between it and the

      The third category concerns us in the famous passage of Mk 7:1-23/Mt 15:1-20.
      In a lengthy treatment of the Markan text, Meier concludes, "almost
      against his will" (p 17), that it tells us nothing about the historical
      Jesus, with the possible exception of the qorban saying of Mk 7:10-12. Let's see why.

      Mk 7:1-5. This part is actually treated last, shown to be inauthentic by
      what follows. Since almost all of 7:6-23 is unhistorical (see below), the
      introduction to the narrative has to be. Also notably, there is no clear evidence
      for any Jewish group in the pre-70 period urging laypeople to wash their hands
      before eating meals.

      Mk 7:6-8. Here we have the citation of Isa 29:13, but Jesus is reported
      as quoting the Septuagint version, not the Hebraic. Since Jesus spoke Aramaic
      and the line of argument in Mk 7:1-13 requires the Greek version, it’s an
      uphill battle for those who claim this goes back to Jesus: "What was in
      the Hebrew simply a denunciation of mechanical, routine liturgy in the
      Jerusalem temple now expands in the LXX into a denunciation of merely human
      teaching that implicitly is set over against the true teaching of God that is
      Torah" (p 372). In the Markan narrative, the Pharisees and scribes
      complain that Jesus' disciples don't observe the traditions of the elders, and
      Jesus parries by saying that the commandments and teachings of men denounced by
      Isa 29:13 are precisely the traditions of those elders. Jesus' line of argument
      makes no sense on the assumption that he originally appealed to the Hebrew

      Mk 7:9-13. Since this section serves as a concrete example of the
      Isaianic denunciation in 7:6-8, it must also be unhistorical, or at least as it
      stands in the gospel. Meier thinks the qorban saying of Mk 7:10-12 could
      reflect some halakic teaching of the historical Jesus (p 378). (Qorban
      was the vow to dedicate one's possessions to the temple, which prevented that
      wealth from being used to help people in need, in this case one's parents.)
      Various streams of Judaism at the turn of the era were debating oaths and vows,
      and, as we've seen, Jesus had no use for them. Using the criterion of
      coherence, the saying of Mk 7:10-12 aligns not only with Jesus' position on
      oaths, but divorce:


      "There is a remarkable similarity here with Jesus'
      approach to divorce in Mk 10:2-12. In the case of the specific institution of
      divorce, Jesus appeals back to the more basic and primordial institution of the
      union of man and woman ordained by the Creator in Genesis 2-3. In the case of
      the specific institution of qorban, Jesus appeals back to the more basic
      and primordial commandment of the Decalogue. Apparently Jesus operated at least
      implicitly with the conviction that there were certain fundamental commandments
      and institutions in the Mosaic Torah that overrode or annulled any secondary
      obligations or institutions that came into conflict with them." (p 379)


      Whether or not the vow of qorban was being enforced
      in the manner attributed to the Pharisees is unclear, but the evidence of CD
      16, Philo, and Mk 7:11 suggest that there was considerable debate around the
      turn of the era about this vow which could deprive one's parents or neighbors
      of vital support (p 381). Jesus may well have debated it too, in a context now
      lost to us.

      Mk 7:14-15. One of the most prized passages of Christian theology gets
      axed from Meier's historical portrait, convincingly, thoroughly, and one might
      hope finally. But is this fair? In view of the way Jesus rescinded the Torah
      elsewhere, why couldn't he have effectively declared all foods clean? Meier
      explains (pp 391-392) that while Jesus' total prohibition of divorce would have
      been outrageous, in practice it would have effected only some Jews at some
      point in their lives, not every Jew every day. Ditto for oath-taking: Moses
      commanded it in two cases (goods entrusted to someone then lost, and the wife
      suspected of adultery), but these weren't everyday occurrences for most people.
      Food laws, on the other hand, governed everyone’s daily living, and to abolish
      them would have obliterated the basic distinction between clean and unclean,
      not to mention an essential part of Jewish identity.

      Add to this the fact that no gospel ever reports Jesus or the disciples eating
      forbidden food, and a case for the authenticity of Mk 7:15 becomes yet another
      uphill battle. If Jesus had revoked the Torah's food laws, he would have been
      hated and distrusted by almost everyone. And as we know, Paul is unable to cite
      Jesus in a case like Rom 14:14
      ("we know that no food is unclean in itself"), unlike the case of
      divorce. Meier suggests, as others before him, that Mk 7:15 is influenced by
      Rom 14:14, rather than vice-versa
      (pp 395-396).

      Mk 7:17-23. Since this section is an extended explanation of Mk 7:14-15,
      it can be no more historical than what came before, and Meier regards the whole
      of Mk 7:14-23 as fiction.

      So much for Mk 7. The qorban saying can be salvaged, but nothing else.
      But before leaving this subject, it's amusing to contrast the judgment of
      Meier's unpapal conclave with that of the Jesus Seminar. What's
      "pink" for Funk & Co. (Mk 7:14-15)
      is "black" for Meier; and what's "black" for them (Mk 7:10-12) is "pink" for Meier. (See The
      Five Gospels, pp 67-70). Fantasy conclaves seem to work better than real


      No sooner is this filthy four-letter word invoked than it summons up dated
      caricatures and useless abstractions. But thankfully Meier isn't concerned with
      everything Jesus ever said about love, forgiveness, and compassion (which would
      have been shared by many of his opponents anyway), but, in keeping with the spirit
      of Volume 4, individual commandments or prohibitions that relate to
      the Torah. There are three relevant sayings: the double command to love God and
      one's neighbor (Mk 12:28-34/Mt 22:34-40/Lk 10:25-28),
      the command to love enemies (Mt 5:44b/Lk 6:27b), and the command to love one
      another (Jn 13:34, 15:12,17).

      While none of these commandments enjoy multiple attestation, Meier thinks there
      are good reasons to view the synoptic sayings as historical. The third is
      judged to be a product of John.

      The Command to Love God and Neighbor. Jesus joins two different
      scripture texts (Deut 6:4-5 and Lev 19:18b) and sets them above every other
      commandment in the Torah. Meier thinks they satisfy the criterion of
      discontinuity (joining Deut 6:4-5 with Lev 19:18b is unparalleled in Jewish
      thought), and coherence (fitting Jesus’ mission of regathering a scattered Israel
      in the last days: the first command could have naturally begotten the second in
      such a context). Later we apparently see a taming of the double command in Gal
      5:14, Rom 13:8-10, Jas 2:8, Mt 5:43b, 19:19,
      all of which cite "love of neighbor" but not the Shema of
      Deuteronomy. As later Christians dealt with problems in their communities (Jews
      vs. Gentiles, rich vs. poor, etc.), it was inevitable that the "neighbor"
      half of Jesus' double command took over. But as Meier says, the halakic Jesus
      originally emphasized that love of God couldn't be reduced to love of one's
      neighbor, far less collapsed into it (p 494). They were explicitly distinct and
      ordered: God first, neighbor second.

      The Command to Love Enemies. Like the double command, this one satisfies
      the criterion of discontinuity ("love your enemies" is unparalleled
      in Jewish thought), and coherence (Jesus went out of his way to express
      inflammatory teachings in blunt formulations, like "let the dead bury the
      dead", "you cannot serve God and Mammon", "whoever loses
      his life will save it", and "this is my body"). As a hard
      selfless command, it almost shouts Jesus' autograph.

      The Command to Love One Another. Unlike the synoptic commands, delivered
      in public and to all Jews, John's command is directed to the disciples alone
      and in private, and it implicitly opposes loving one's neighbors and enemies:
      "Love for one's friends is proclaimed to the be the greatest love that can
      exist, period. No greater love than self-sacrifice for one's friends exists on
      John's theological radar screen. Put more bluntly: love of [neighbors and
      enemies] does not exist on the radar screen." (p 567). Meier rightly
      judges this to reflect the Johannine sectarian ethic, not to mention a
      reciprocal one (like the Golden Rule, as we'll see, it contrasts with the
      historical Jesus' intolerance for reciprocity). Though the criterion of
      discontinuity might look promising, "the lack of parallels in Jewish and
      pagan literature is best explained by the thoroughly Johannine character of
      this love command" (p 573), something not true of the synoptic commands.

      Meier's emphasis bears repeating: that Jesus ranked love of God and then
      neighbor above all other commandments doesn't mean he thought they were
      virtually the only commandments necessary. "For Jesus you need the Torah
      as a whole. Nothing could be more foreign to this Palestinian Jew than a facile
      antithesis between Law and love." (p 576) That's why I call
      "love" the filthy four-letter word of the NT. The vulgar Paul
      maintained that the law was obsolete (the best it ever had to offer was now
      available by another route, the spirit) even as it was fulfilled by love. But
      there's little evidence that the historical Jesus was anti-nomian.

      The Golden Rule

      First things first: the Golden Rule isn't a "love" commandment, just
      because scholars say it is, nor does it apply particularly to enemies --
      certainly not in Matthew (7:12), though Luke (6:31) makes a closer connection.
      There's nothing especially radical about the saying at all, in fact; it was
      common pagan wisdom, usually expressed in the more negative form, "Don’t
      do to others what you wouldn’t want done to you." Essentially, a person decided
      how he or she wanted to be treated and then made that the standard for treating
      others. It's wonderful secular wisdom, not requiring a belief in God, and a
      favorite of atheists and Unitarians like myself.

      Too bad for us, because as Meier shows, the Golden Rule doesn't meet any of the
      criteria of authenticity, least of all discontinuity, enjoying a wide
      reputation in the Greco-Roman world, going back as far as Herodotus and the
      sophists. In the NT the saying is only singularly attested (in Q according to
      Meier, in Matthew according to Farrer-advocates) and seems to have been placed
      on the lips of Jesus by those who revered him as an ethical master (pre-Q or Q,
      according to Meier; pre-Matthew or Matthew, I would say), attributing common
      wisdom to him.

      The Golden Rule is inconsistent with Jesus' demands stated elsewhere, and thus
      unable to meet even the criterion of coherence. Jesus criticized the ethic of
      reciprocity left and right ("if you love those who love you, what credit
      do you gain?", "if you give loans to those from whom you hope to
      receive payment, what credit do you gain?", etc.), and the Golden Rule is
      all about reciprocity. It just doesn't square with the preachings of an
      uncompromising apocalyptic. "The clash between the Golden Rule and Jesus'
      withering blast against a morality of 'I'll scratch your back if you scratch
      mine' is as astounding as it is little noted by Christians" (p 556). Yes,
      Jesus could have been inconsistent, but there are understandable
      inconsistencies and not-so-understandable ones, and this one, to me, smacks of
      the latter.

      It may be objected that just because the philosophers applied the rule
      reciprocally doesn't mean that Jesus did. On my blog, for instance, James
      McGrath comments that "the Golden Rule does seem rather distinctive... and
      doesn’t seem to reflect an ethic of reciprocity. As attributed to Jesus, the
      meaning seems to clearly be to do to others what we would want them to
      do to us, not what they have done nor what we expect them to do."
      But one could say the same for the pagan versions. As Meier reminds us, the
      rule never made the reciprocal expectation explicit, but it was always
      clarified that way: the person following the rule hoped or expected that his
      behavior would call forth similar behavior in others (see p 553). It could be
      that later Christian ethicists co-opted the saying in the less reciprocal
      manner suggested by McGrath, but it's unsound to claim that Jesus made this
      move with quicksand under our feet. As a secularist who warms to the Golden
      Rule, I regretfully agree with Meier that we're wise to leave it out of our
      reconstruction of the historical Jesus.

      For amusement's sake, it's worth examining the Jesus Seminar's take on the
      Golden Rule, because Funk and Co. are almost as skeptical as Meier, though for
      different reasons. The Seminar voted it "gray", on grounds that while
      Jesus wouldn't necessarily have been hostile to the rule, it "veils a
      calculating egoism", suggesting that "one should not go beyond


      "It calls for making oneself the standard of the
      treatment of others, rather than making the other the standard of that
      treatment. Had the golden rule taken this form, 'Treat people in the way they
      want to be treated,' it would have come closer to Jesus' perspective. In its
      traditional form, the golden rule expresses nothing that cuts against the
      common grain." (The Five Gospels, pp 296, 156)


      Seminar is actually describing the 20th-century Platinum Rule ("do unto
      others as they want done to them"), but while I agree that this is superior
      to the Golden Rule, I think it unreasonable to expect Jesus to have anticipated
      George Bernard Shaw (who advised: "do not do unto others as you would want
      done unto you, for their tastes may not be the same"). That's a rather
      eisegetical dismissal. By ancient standards, the Golden Rule was progressive
      wisdom. It just doesn't seem to have been Jesus' wisdom.


      A Marginal Jew has remained consistent in methodology over the past 18
      years, retaining the air of an earlier period when questors were putting Jesus
      into one of a zillion boxes ("rabbi", "cynic",
      "magician", "social prophet", whatever). Meier's box isn't
      so small that it chokes out unwanted data in favor of a pet theory, and for
      that reason alone will probably stand the test of time as a worthy reference
      series. His Jesus remains, in general terms, the eschatological figure who was
      heralding a new age, speaking for people on the margins of society.


      Meier's results confirm something I often make a point of: the mistake of
      distinguishing too sharply between the Torah and interpretations of it. Reality
      doesn't break down so neatly or cater to our Cartesian sensibilities. Jesus
      evidently thought he was Torah-observant -- despite even his sweeping
      prohibitions against divorce and oath-taking -- though his opponents could
      easily refute that. There was no monolithic view of the Torah or how it should
      be followed, and recognizing the simple point helps us come to terms with the
      "enigma", as Meier puts it, of Jesus' various stances to the law.

      Finally, a word about criteria. In recent years I've become more skeptical
      about using the the classic criteria to get at sure results, but if one takes
      them as a premise for proceeding, Meier applies them more impressively than
      most, and without fearing where the road takes him. For a moderately
      conservative priest, he reaches some remarkably "minimalist"
      conclusions in this book (which is stamped with a Vatican Imprimatur like the
      other volumes), often evidently against his will. I think the criteria can be
      useful, but suspect that methodologies which rely on them heavily are nearing their end.


      sum: Meier's unpapal conclave is still a fine muse. Its mantra in this volume
      is, "the historical Jesus is the halakic Jesus", but that Jesus will
      leave Jew, Catholic, Protestant, and agnostic alike nonplussed in the knowledge
      that most boxes will be too small for him.
      Loren Rosson IIINashua NHhttp://lorenrosson.blogspot.com

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