Re: [coldwarcomms] Re: Boeing EC-135 Looking Glass aircraft
- If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the trailer park with
a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints along with documents
on how to bypass the PAL altogether!
I'm surprised there hasn't been more discussion of that incident on here.
I think we should be discussing LANLs security!
--- David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
> Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
> > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
> > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
> > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
> > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
> > current PAL/EAS system?
- --- In email@example.com, Michael Harpe <mharpe79@...>
>trailer park with
> If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the
> a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints alongwith documents
> on how to bypass the PAL altogether!on here.
> I'm surprised there hasn't been more discussion of that incident
> I think we should be discussing LANLs security!
> Mike Harpe
> --- David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
> > Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
> > >
> > >
> > > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very
> > > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links toto the
> > > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
> > > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives
> > > current PAL/EAS system?and I thought this was an information, facts, trivia, and topic site
on communications, insted of a forum to promote wacked out, off
topic, views, or debates.
- I would disagree, or add the caveat, only as they applied to the Cold War. What
happened or happens after 1992 or so is, in my opinion, beyond the intended ken of this
Yahoo group. If I write of Golf class diesel subs and Soviet problems with commo and
control of them, or even PAL A devices, that is a Cold War topic. I truly doubt that
anyone here, even if they had some knowledge, would (or should) be willing to discuss
current PALs or current control methodologies. When we write of DES cryptography we are
in Cold War commo methods, when however we discuss triple DES, or modern encryption keys
a decade beyond the capability of the 286 or the 486 that sat on our desks in that era,
or commo in the upper double digit giga band we have left the arena of the Cold War and
are now talking about things we should not talk about.
---------- Original Message -----------
From: John Young <jya@...>
Sent: Mon, 06 Nov 2006 11:01:47 -0800
Subject: Re: [coldwarcomms] Re: Boeing EC-135 Looking Glass aircraft
> Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I
> understood this thread was about communications of aircraft,
> their security and reliability, which, if I understand the field, are
> the primary requirements of communications of whatever era
> and field of interest.
- Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I
understood this thread was about communications of aircraft,
their security and reliability, which, if I understand the field, are
the primary requirements of communications of whatever era
and field of interest.
Nuclear weapons came into the picture as a corollary of
comm security and reliability in the face of increasingly sophisticated
attacks as knowledge of codes, ciphers, implementations and weaknesses
have become widespread with the rise of digital technology and the
Internet. That is, as these technologies came of out the secure, secret
realm, in large part due to the wind down of the Cold War and producers
seeking new markets in the open realm not limited to governments,
the capabilities of cracking and spying came to the market as well,
some to be sure on the black market but treachery, betrayal and
illegality were always a feature of secrecy-driven regimes, indeed
were the primary means nations stole each other's secrets.
Coldwarcomms is an intriguing topic for its contribution to the
liberation of Cold War mentality -- paranoia, compulsive secrecy,
shutting out the public from knowledge of what governments were
doing -- and there have been here an impressive amount of
disclosure of useful information of what worked and what was
9/11 slowed that, even reversed it as information was voluntarily
withdrawn, in some cases by request of national security-related
corporations who joined the reawakened opportunity to reinstitute
Cold War games along with a host of practitioners brought back
into government and business just when they believed the gravy
was gone for good.
Spying is up, way up inside the US, thanks to those who know
what side the moldy bread gets the grease. Keep that a secret, they warn,
or more often they just promote tin-foil-hat ridicule and allege off-topicness
-- both hoary tradecraft for hiding what should not be.
Whether nuclear weapons are secure is a long-lived aspect of
coldwarcomms. Disinfo about the topic was a harem-scarem from
Day One, presaging The Day After.