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Re: [coldwarcomms] Re: Boeing EC-135 Looking Glass aircraft

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  • John Young
    Steve Bellovin s orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead. Archive.org shows it was last archived in December 2005 (up since 1998):
    Message 1 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
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      Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
      Archive.org shows it was last archived in December 2005 (up since 1998):


      <http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-1
      6>http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-16
      0/pal.html

      A related study of arming and fuzing nuclear weapons by Chuck Hansen in
      Swords of Armageddon:


      <http://cryptome.org/nukes-fuze.htm>http://cryptome.org/nukes-fuze.htm

      And the US Air Force offers several document nuclear weapons surety that
      describe some of the safety and arming features. One of them:


      <http://cryptome.org/afi91-111.htm>http://cryptome.org/afi91-111.htm

      These are all from the late 1990s.

      These reports that accidental detonation is a continuing investigation and
      development in response to international and public fears -- and human
      frailty of political leaders, military commanders and personnel handling the
      godawful devices.

      Against these fears is the military's demand that safety systems must not
      interfere with rapid response needs. Chuck Hansen's report discusses
      these conflicting requirements and the technical and educational responses
      to them with increasingly sophisticated mechanical and electronic weapons
      arming controls, and, not least, emulating Oppenheimer's and other atomic
      physicists urgings, to persuade those in charge of nuclear weapons that
      wars cannot be won with them.

      Accidental detonation remains the least of the threat compared to the
      continuing terrorism they engender by official policy as from the first
      days of the atomic doomsday era.

      This brings up a candidate for the reading list to complement that
      of chestbeating kind: American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy
      of J. robert Oppenheimer. This recounts the sad consequence of
      paranoid politicians and power-mad militarists manipulation of
      public fears to overbuild nuclear armaments during the Cold War
      and foster a generation of terrified publics around the globe.

      Today's picayune terrorists are small fry by comparison with
      the giants still robbing national treasuries while spreading fear
      as diversion. Perhaps some day fiction wil catch up to this
      banditry, but that will probably not be done by Tom Clancy and
      others making a bundle off perpetuating the need for heroic
      defenses against chimeras of national security threats, in
      secret and camouflaged by lots of smoke.


      At 10:22 AM 11/3/2006 -0500, you wrote:

      >
      > That's Permissive Action Links.
      >
      > Steve Bellovin has studied the history of them:
      >
      >
      > <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=permissive+action+link
      >
      > s+bellovin>http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=permissive+a
      > ction+links+bellovin
    • David Lesher
      ... Try: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com & no one will talk to a host
      Message 2 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
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        Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
        >
        > Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
        > Archive.org shows it was last archived in December 2005 (up since 1998):
        >
        >
        > <http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-1
        > 6>http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-16
        > 0/pal.html


        Try:

        http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html




        --
        A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@...
        & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
        Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
        is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
      • Xxxxx xxx
        Thank you for that. Interesting to see Bellovin claims the Soviets were not offered PAL technology until 71, while the author of Red Star Rogue claims the
        Message 3 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
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          Thank you for that. Interesting to see Bellovin claims the Soviets
          were not offered PAL technology until 71, while the author of Red Star
          Rogue claims the technology transfer occurred about half a decade earlier.

          All in all I sleep safer (not!) knowing the devices are now protected
          by a computerized circuit that is at least as safe and reliable as the
          sensors and computer chip in my 90s vintage (an yes, it is fairly well
          maintained) Jeep.

          If you have ever noticed your car alarm is going off as you drive down
          the highway, or had a brake or an oxygen sensor go bad and report a
          problem where non exists, you will understand my concern.

          Lacking a status board, I would assume the vast majority of PAL
          malfunctions would go largely unnoticed unless an attempt was being
          made to fire the weapon, as most would simply dud the unused warhead.
          This realitization naturally raises questions as to how many deployed
          warheads are actually functional and how many experience sensor
          failure issues which no one notices.

          MTBF, Chaos Theory and Murphy's Law come to mind. I am not sure which
          scenario is worse. Do you want a non-PAL protected device in the
          hands of someone who may react in a negative way to a personal crisis?
          Anyone who knew someone who decided one day to kill themself, but who
          also gave little external advance notice of rising internal stress
          levels, should understand the flaw in that scenario. That, and weapon
          security issues, argue strongly for PAL devices, but the increasing of
          complexity of such devices creates new reliability problems and
          concerns.

          --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
          >
          >snip
          > >
          > > Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
          > snip
          > Try:
          >
          > http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html
          >
          >
          > snip
        • John Bass
          Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the hearts of men and
          Message 4 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
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            Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the hearts of men and women thinking they are doing the right thing for religous, national, and cultural gain. Especially middle east clerics these days, using war to spread their faith, with little regard for other faiths.

            Until the UN can be replaced with a body that has a mandated charter for human rights, the only thing that stands in the way of major regional wars, are what is left of the cold war infrastructure.

            John Young <jya@...> wrote:
            Today's picayune terrorists are small fry by comparison with
            the giants still robbing national treasuries while spreading fear
            as diversion. Perhaps some day fiction wil catch up to this
            banditry, but that will probably not be done by Tom Clancy and
            others making a bundle off perpetuating the need for heroic
            defenses against chimeras of national security threats, in
            secret and camouflaged by lots of smoke.








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          • John Young
            This topic winds back to coldwarcomm in the matter of distributing access codes for arming nuclear weapons: revisions, updates, spoofs, and other customary
            Message 5 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
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              This topic winds back to coldwarcomm in the matter of distributing
              access codes for arming nuclear weapons: revisions, updates, spoofs,
              and other customary means and methods of cloaking the most secure
              communications, a process never finished, never wholly trustworthy.

              Whatever NSA or the national labs cook up for this, in particular Sandia
              at Kirtland AFB, has to be implemented in the weapons storage and
              distribution systems. At one time Sandia handled most of this, and maybe
              still does. The nuclear weapons training school is there along with a
              host of operations connected to storage and handling the devices.
              That role goes back to the earliest day of the atomic era when the
              Air Force began to get the weapons into the supply stream after
              the Los Alamos folks turned over the results of their laboratory
              work to bomb manufacturers and thence to Kirtland for final arming and
              securing.

              The largest nuclear weapons storage area is still at Kirtland AFB,
              Kirtland Undergound Munitions Storage Complex, with Sandia nearby,
              and presumably Sandia monitors the condition of the weapons
              and assures that they are highly secure and ready for use, whether
              stored or poised for action in silos and on planes, ships and subs.

              To minimize the hazards always posed by the best of secure communications
              systems, the distribution pipe is shortened by rigging the weapons at one
              place and then ship them out to the "nuclear weapons storage areas
              (NWSAs)" worldwide. Kirtland rigs and ships for the Air Force; for the
              Navy it is done at the nuclear submarine naval bases at Bangor and
              Kings Bay. These are guesses based on the multi-volume "Nuclear
              Weapons Databook."

              Even so, once the weapons are rigged and sent into the field there are
              presumably requirements to assure protection of access codes subject to
              cracking or betrayal or, as noted here, insanity and vainglory, and this
              presumably involves transmission over communications systems. Remote
              control of access codes is an intriguing methodology, whether by algorithm
              or classified means. Dud weapons also pose a threat as real to the public
              as the real thing.

              A scientist, William Payne, who worked at Sandia on crypto, inventing devices
              for uses that are classified but could fit nicely in a nuke, got into a fight
              with
              the administration, was canned, and then sued the lab. NSA got into the fight
              because he worked with an NSA team on the crypto gadgets, and NSA
              refused him access to his own work during the suit. A lot of info was
              presented

              to the judge by NSA in camera and the judge refused to make it public. Payne
              eventually sued the judge as well as Sandia, and the suit is continuing.

              A long story to call attention to one example of a crypto wizard who probably
              could crack PALs, having probably helped build them, if he got angry enough.
              He claims to have been approached by foreign elements who got wind of his
              fight with Sandia, and offers were made. Payne says he rebuffed them, not
              for him to do to the US what it was doing to him. For now.

              Payne's web site with gobs of documents of the years-long information
              security tussle (the latest dated yesterday):

              <http://mywebpages.comcast.net/bpayne37/index.htm>http://mywebpages.comcast
              .net/bpayne37/index.htm



              At 06:48 PM 11/4/2006 +0000, you wrote:

              >
              > Thank you for that. Interesting to see Bellovin claims the Soviets
              > were not offered PAL technology until 71, while the author of Red Star
              > Rogue claims the technology transfer occurred about half a decade earlier.
              >
              > All in all I sleep safer (not!) knowing the devices are now protected
              > by a computerized circuit that is at least as safe and reliable as the
              > sensors and computer chip in my 90s vintage (an yes, it is fairly well
              > maintained) Jeep.
              >
              > If you have ever noticed your car alarm is going off as you drive down
              > the highway, or had a brake or an oxygen sensor go bad and report a
              > problem where non exists, you will understand my concern.
              >
              > Lacking a status board, I would assume the vast majority of PAL
              > malfunctions would go largely unnoticed unless an attempt was being
              > made to fire the weapon, as most would simply dud the unused warhead.
              > This realitization naturally raises questions as to how many deployed
              > warheads are actually functional and how many experience sensor
              > failure issues which no one notices.
              >
              > MTBF, Chaos Theory and Murphy's Law come to mind. I am not sure which
              > scenario is worse. Do you want a non-PAL protected device in the
              > hands of someone who may react in a negative way to a personal crisis?
              > Anyone who knew someone who decided one day to kill themself, but who
              > also gave little external advance notice of rising internal stress
              > levels, should understand the flaw in that scenario. That, and weapon
              > security issues, argue strongly for PAL devices, but the increasing of
              > complexity of such devices creates new reliability problems and
              > concerns.
              >
              > --- In <mailto:coldwarcomms%40yahoogroups.com>coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com,
              > David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
              > >
              > >snip
              > > >
              > > > Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
              > > snip
              > > Try:
              > >
              > >
              > <http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html>http://www.cs.columbia
              > edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html
              > >
              > >
              > > snip
              >
              >
            • John Bass
              I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John John Young
              Message 6 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
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                I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John



                John Young <jya@...> wrote: This topic winds back to coldwarcomm in the matter of distributing
                access codes for arming nuclear weapons: revisions, updates, spoofs,
                and other customary means and methods of cloaking the most secure
                communications, a process never finished, never wholly trustworthy.









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              • tsniffin20902
                Ok, While John s ending statement may have been off topic, the rest of his post was interesting and consistent with on-going discussion. However, your reply
                Message 7 of 27 , Nov 5, 2006
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                  Ok, While John's ending statement may have been off topic, the rest of
                  his post was interesting and consistent with on-going discussion.
                  However, your reply (below)was even further off topic. Let it go..

                  Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                  forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                  understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                  curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                  current PAL/EAS system?

                  TS


                  --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:

                  "Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely
                  without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the
                  hearts of men and women thinking they are doing the right thing for
                  religous, national, and cultural gain. Especially middle east clerics
                  these days, using war to spread their faith, with little regard for
                  other faiths.

                  Until the UN can be replaced with a body that has a mandated charter
                  for human rights, the only thing that stands in the way of major
                  regional wars, are what is left of the cold war infrastructure."

                  --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:
                  >
                  > I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off
                  topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John
                  >
                • John Bass
                  A lot more than ending statement ... if it s fair game, I ll surely be happy to debate, and rebuke, the politics he presents so strongly. John tsniffin20902
                  Message 8 of 27 , Nov 5, 2006
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                    A lot more than ending statement ... if it's fair game, I'll surely be happy to debate, and rebuke, the politics he presents so strongly.

                    John

                    tsniffin20902 <TSniffin@...> wrote: Ok, While John's ending statement may have been off topic, the rest of
                    his post was interesting and consistent with on-going discussion.
                    However, your reply (below)was even further off topic. Let it go..

                    Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                    forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                    understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                    curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                    current PAL/EAS system?

                    TS

                    --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:

                    "Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely
                    without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the
                    hearts of men and women thinking they are doing the right thing for
                    religous, national, and cultural gain. Especially middle east clerics
                    these days, using war to spread their faith, with little regard for
                    other faiths.

                    Until the UN can be replaced with a body that has a mandated charter
                    for human rights, the only thing that stands in the way of major
                    regional wars, are what is left of the cold war infrastructure."

                    --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:
                    >
                    > I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off
                    topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John
                    >






                    ---------------------------------
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                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                  • David Lesher
                    ... FWIW: Steve promised me an update Real Soon Now on more PAL goodies. I ll let the list know when it is released. -- A host is a host from coast to
                    Message 9 of 27 , Nov 5, 2006
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                      Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
                      >
                      >
                      > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                      > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                      > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                      > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                      > current PAL/EAS system?

                      FWIW:
                      Steve promised me an update Real Soon Now on more PAL goodies.
                      I'll let the list know when it is released.



                      --
                      A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@...
                      & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
                      Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
                      is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
                    • Michael Harpe
                      If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the trailer park with a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints along with documents
                      Message 10 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                        If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the trailer park with
                        a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints along with documents
                        on how to bypass the PAL altogether!

                        I'm surprised there hasn't been more discussion of that incident on here.

                        I think we should be discussing LANLs security!

                        Mike Harpe

                        --- David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:

                        > Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
                        > >
                        > >
                        > > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                        > > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                        > > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                        > > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                        > > current PAL/EAS system?
                      • Spencer
                        ... trailer park with ... with documents ... on here. ... interesting. It ... to the ... and I thought this was an information, facts, trivia, and topic site
                        Message 11 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                          --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, Michael Harpe <mharpe79@...>
                          wrote:
                          >
                          > If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the
                          trailer park with
                          > a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints along
                          with documents
                          > on how to bypass the PAL altogether!
                          >
                          > I'm surprised there hasn't been more discussion of that incident
                          on here.
                          >
                          > I think we should be discussing LANLs security!
                          >
                          > Mike Harpe
                          >
                          > --- David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
                          >
                          > > Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
                          > > >
                          > > >
                          > > > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very
                          interesting. It
                          > > > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                          > > > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                          > > > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives
                          to the
                          > > > current PAL/EAS system?
                          >
                          and I thought this was an information, facts, trivia, and topic site
                          on communications, insted of a forum to promote wacked out, off
                          topic, views, or debates.

                          SILLY ME
                        • superc
                          I would disagree, or add the caveat, only as they applied to the Cold War. What happened or happens after 1992 or so is, in my opinion, beyond the intended
                          Message 12 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                            I would disagree, or add the caveat, only as they applied to the Cold War. What
                            happened or happens after 1992 or so is, in my opinion, beyond the intended ken of this
                            Yahoo group. If I write of Golf class diesel subs and Soviet problems with commo and
                            control of them, or even PAL A devices, that is a Cold War topic. I truly doubt that
                            anyone here, even if they had some knowledge, would (or should) be willing to discuss
                            current PALs or current control methodologies. When we write of DES cryptography we are
                            in Cold War commo methods, when however we discuss triple DES, or modern encryption keys
                            a decade beyond the capability of the 286 or the 486 that sat on our desks in that era,
                            or commo in the upper double digit giga band we have left the arena of the Cold War and
                            are now talking about things we should not talk about.


                            ---------- Original Message -----------
                            From: John Young <jya@...>
                            To: coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com
                            Sent: Mon, 06 Nov 2006 11:01:47 -0800
                            Subject: Re: [coldwarcomms] Re: Boeing EC-135 Looking Glass aircraft

                            > Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I
                            > understood this thread was about communications of aircraft,
                            > their security and reliability, which, if I understand the field, are
                            > the primary requirements of communications of whatever era
                            > and field of interest.
                            > snip
                          • Michael Harpe
                            Why shouldn t we talk about them? Mike
                            Message 13 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                              Why shouldn't we talk about them?

                              Mike
                              >...we have left the arena of the
                              > Cold War and
                              > are now talking about things we should not talk about.
                            • John Young
                              Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I understood this thread was about communications of aircraft, their security and reliability,
                              Message 14 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                                Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I
                                understood this thread was about communications of aircraft,
                                their security and reliability, which, if I understand the field, are
                                the primary requirements of communications of whatever era
                                and field of interest.

                                Nuclear weapons came into the picture as a corollary of
                                comm security and reliability in the face of increasingly sophisticated
                                attacks as knowledge of codes, ciphers, implementations and weaknesses
                                have become widespread with the rise of digital technology and the
                                Internet. That is, as these technologies came of out the secure, secret
                                realm, in large part due to the wind down of the Cold War and producers
                                seeking new markets in the open realm not limited to governments,
                                the capabilities of cracking and spying came to the market as well,
                                some to be sure on the black market but treachery, betrayal and
                                illegality were always a feature of secrecy-driven regimes, indeed
                                were the primary means nations stole each other's secrets.

                                Coldwarcomms is an intriguing topic for its contribution to the
                                liberation of Cold War mentality -- paranoia, compulsive secrecy,
                                shutting out the public from knowledge of what governments were
                                doing -- and there have been here an impressive amount of
                                disclosure of useful information of what worked and what was
                                snake oil.

                                9/11 slowed that, even reversed it as information was voluntarily
                                withdrawn, in some cases by request of national security-related
                                corporations who joined the reawakened opportunity to reinstitute
                                Cold War games along with a host of practitioners brought back
                                into government and business just when they believed the gravy
                                was gone for good.

                                Spying is up, way up inside the US, thanks to those who know
                                what side the moldy bread gets the grease. Keep that a secret, they warn,
                                or more often they just promote tin-foil-hat ridicule and allege off-topicness
                                -- both hoary tradecraft for hiding what should not be.

                                Whether nuclear weapons are secure is a long-lived aspect of
                                coldwarcomms. Disinfo about the topic was a harem-scarem from
                                Day One, presaging The Day After.
                              • Denny B
                                Can you gents at least change the subject header so we can errr. manage our email better?
                                Message 15 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                                  Can you gents at least change the subject header so we
                                  can errr. manage our email better?

                                  --->
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