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Re: [coldwarcomms] Re: Boeing EC-135 Looking Glass aircraft

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  • David Lesher
    ... That s Permissive Action Links. Steve Bellovin has studied the history of them:
    Message 1 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
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      Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
      >
      > Allegedly, the only reason it
      > didn't work is because we gave the Soviets Passive Lock technology
      > (PAL) a few years before and not all the KGB Oznaz goons aboard for
      > that last trip were briefed on all the new failsafe features.



      That's Permissive Action Links.

      Steve Bellovin has studied the history of them:

      http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=permissive+action+links+bellovin





      --
      A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@...
      & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
      Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
      is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
    • Xxxxx xxx
      Yes, I saw Crimson Tide, and read and watched The Hunt For... . However I am still ignoring them because they were fictional. I won t dispute both had good
      Message 2 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
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        Yes, I saw Crimson Tide, and read and watched "The Hunt For...".
        However I am still ignoring them because they were fictional. I won't
        dispute both had good plots. Interestingly enough the author of Red
        Star Rogue does mention the Red October plot by simply reminding us it
        never happened. Seems the Soviets never had a sub go missing that
        couldn't be accounted for today, and the raising of K-129 was the only
        time we stole one of their subs. As the subs involved were Golf class
        with casette tape computers and the changes impacted on those diesel
        subs it is appropriate to talk about them when discussing the changes.
        The author gives us no reason to believe Andropov did not switch back
        to the old way of allowing the Captain to have the codes again. He
        simply doesn't discuss events after Brezhnev.

        There were no HAM radio operators in the USSR as we use the term HAM
        here in the US. There were people allowed to have and use shortwave
        radios, but when and how the radios were used was much more regulated
        under that system than are Hams here in the US.

        Yes, the Soviets used coded burst transmissions but we knew about
        those. They did not (in 68) realize just how good our satellite
        coverage was (which is how we learned of the incident). Nor did they
        know enough about our SONUS systems to be as stealthy as they thought
        they were being. Hydro acoustic methods of signalling a nearby sub
        would be what I would expect a nearby trawler to attempt. Frankly, I
        never realized they operated in patrol squares and had assumed once
        they left port it was the Captains call on where to go. Of course in
        those days, no one was telling us (while beating the war drums)
        members of the public that the range of those early missles was really
        limited. Sure, a man in a rowboat with a properly formatted piece of
        paper would also work to deliver the message, but that's not much of a
        deterrent factor in those early Cold War days of diesel subs. My
        point is that removing the Captain's autonomy crippled the concept of
        swift retaliation and I really don't think we (the public) would have
        been quite so paranoid about a third world war in those days if we had
        realized they had limited retaliatory capability back then.

        The author never mentions what the CIA did with the nukes it recovered
        from the K-129 and supposedly they went to DOE for disposal.

        About the events in 1993, if I recall the tale properly the Parliment
        Building had been picked as the perfect building as no natural event
        was likely to disrupt recoding the basement computer terminal
        periodically, kind of like the scenario on ABC's "Lost." A small
        office in the basement of a Soviet govt building, what could go wrong?
        If the input wasn't made, then it had to mean Moscow had been
        obliterated. In the day the building was built a standoff in the
        floors above just wasn't on anyone's mind.

        --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, hooligan@... wrote:
        >
        > snip
      • John Young
        Steve Bellovin s orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead. Archive.org shows it was last archived in December 2005 (up since 1998):
        Message 3 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
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          Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
          Archive.org shows it was last archived in December 2005 (up since 1998):


          <http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-1
          6>http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-16
          0/pal.html

          A related study of arming and fuzing nuclear weapons by Chuck Hansen in
          Swords of Armageddon:


          <http://cryptome.org/nukes-fuze.htm>http://cryptome.org/nukes-fuze.htm

          And the US Air Force offers several document nuclear weapons surety that
          describe some of the safety and arming features. One of them:


          <http://cryptome.org/afi91-111.htm>http://cryptome.org/afi91-111.htm

          These are all from the late 1990s.

          These reports that accidental detonation is a continuing investigation and
          development in response to international and public fears -- and human
          frailty of political leaders, military commanders and personnel handling the
          godawful devices.

          Against these fears is the military's demand that safety systems must not
          interfere with rapid response needs. Chuck Hansen's report discusses
          these conflicting requirements and the technical and educational responses
          to them with increasingly sophisticated mechanical and electronic weapons
          arming controls, and, not least, emulating Oppenheimer's and other atomic
          physicists urgings, to persuade those in charge of nuclear weapons that
          wars cannot be won with them.

          Accidental detonation remains the least of the threat compared to the
          continuing terrorism they engender by official policy as from the first
          days of the atomic doomsday era.

          This brings up a candidate for the reading list to complement that
          of chestbeating kind: American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy
          of J. robert Oppenheimer. This recounts the sad consequence of
          paranoid politicians and power-mad militarists manipulation of
          public fears to overbuild nuclear armaments during the Cold War
          and foster a generation of terrified publics around the globe.

          Today's picayune terrorists are small fry by comparison with
          the giants still robbing national treasuries while spreading fear
          as diversion. Perhaps some day fiction wil catch up to this
          banditry, but that will probably not be done by Tom Clancy and
          others making a bundle off perpetuating the need for heroic
          defenses against chimeras of national security threats, in
          secret and camouflaged by lots of smoke.


          At 10:22 AM 11/3/2006 -0500, you wrote:

          >
          > That's Permissive Action Links.
          >
          > Steve Bellovin has studied the history of them:
          >
          >
          > <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=permissive+action+link
          >
          > s+bellovin>http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=permissive+a
          > ction+links+bellovin
        • David Lesher
          ... Try: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com & no one will talk to a host
          Message 4 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
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            Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
            >
            > Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
            > Archive.org shows it was last archived in December 2005 (up since 1998):
            >
            >
            > <http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-1
            > 6>http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-16
            > 0/pal.html


            Try:

            http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html




            --
            A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@...
            & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
            Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
            is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
          • Xxxxx xxx
            Thank you for that. Interesting to see Bellovin claims the Soviets were not offered PAL technology until 71, while the author of Red Star Rogue claims the
            Message 5 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
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              Thank you for that. Interesting to see Bellovin claims the Soviets
              were not offered PAL technology until 71, while the author of Red Star
              Rogue claims the technology transfer occurred about half a decade earlier.

              All in all I sleep safer (not!) knowing the devices are now protected
              by a computerized circuit that is at least as safe and reliable as the
              sensors and computer chip in my 90s vintage (an yes, it is fairly well
              maintained) Jeep.

              If you have ever noticed your car alarm is going off as you drive down
              the highway, or had a brake or an oxygen sensor go bad and report a
              problem where non exists, you will understand my concern.

              Lacking a status board, I would assume the vast majority of PAL
              malfunctions would go largely unnoticed unless an attempt was being
              made to fire the weapon, as most would simply dud the unused warhead.
              This realitization naturally raises questions as to how many deployed
              warheads are actually functional and how many experience sensor
              failure issues which no one notices.

              MTBF, Chaos Theory and Murphy's Law come to mind. I am not sure which
              scenario is worse. Do you want a non-PAL protected device in the
              hands of someone who may react in a negative way to a personal crisis?
              Anyone who knew someone who decided one day to kill themself, but who
              also gave little external advance notice of rising internal stress
              levels, should understand the flaw in that scenario. That, and weapon
              security issues, argue strongly for PAL devices, but the increasing of
              complexity of such devices creates new reliability problems and
              concerns.

              --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
              >
              >snip
              > >
              > > Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
              > snip
              > Try:
              >
              > http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html
              >
              >
              > snip
            • John Bass
              Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the hearts of men and
              Message 6 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
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                Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the hearts of men and women thinking they are doing the right thing for religous, national, and cultural gain. Especially middle east clerics these days, using war to spread their faith, with little regard for other faiths.

                Until the UN can be replaced with a body that has a mandated charter for human rights, the only thing that stands in the way of major regional wars, are what is left of the cold war infrastructure.

                John Young <jya@...> wrote:
                Today's picayune terrorists are small fry by comparison with
                the giants still robbing national treasuries while spreading fear
                as diversion. Perhaps some day fiction wil catch up to this
                banditry, but that will probably not be done by Tom Clancy and
                others making a bundle off perpetuating the need for heroic
                defenses against chimeras of national security threats, in
                secret and camouflaged by lots of smoke.








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              • John Young
                This topic winds back to coldwarcomm in the matter of distributing access codes for arming nuclear weapons: revisions, updates, spoofs, and other customary
                Message 7 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
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                  This topic winds back to coldwarcomm in the matter of distributing
                  access codes for arming nuclear weapons: revisions, updates, spoofs,
                  and other customary means and methods of cloaking the most secure
                  communications, a process never finished, never wholly trustworthy.

                  Whatever NSA or the national labs cook up for this, in particular Sandia
                  at Kirtland AFB, has to be implemented in the weapons storage and
                  distribution systems. At one time Sandia handled most of this, and maybe
                  still does. The nuclear weapons training school is there along with a
                  host of operations connected to storage and handling the devices.
                  That role goes back to the earliest day of the atomic era when the
                  Air Force began to get the weapons into the supply stream after
                  the Los Alamos folks turned over the results of their laboratory
                  work to bomb manufacturers and thence to Kirtland for final arming and
                  securing.

                  The largest nuclear weapons storage area is still at Kirtland AFB,
                  Kirtland Undergound Munitions Storage Complex, with Sandia nearby,
                  and presumably Sandia monitors the condition of the weapons
                  and assures that they are highly secure and ready for use, whether
                  stored or poised for action in silos and on planes, ships and subs.

                  To minimize the hazards always posed by the best of secure communications
                  systems, the distribution pipe is shortened by rigging the weapons at one
                  place and then ship them out to the "nuclear weapons storage areas
                  (NWSAs)" worldwide. Kirtland rigs and ships for the Air Force; for the
                  Navy it is done at the nuclear submarine naval bases at Bangor and
                  Kings Bay. These are guesses based on the multi-volume "Nuclear
                  Weapons Databook."

                  Even so, once the weapons are rigged and sent into the field there are
                  presumably requirements to assure protection of access codes subject to
                  cracking or betrayal or, as noted here, insanity and vainglory, and this
                  presumably involves transmission over communications systems. Remote
                  control of access codes is an intriguing methodology, whether by algorithm
                  or classified means. Dud weapons also pose a threat as real to the public
                  as the real thing.

                  A scientist, William Payne, who worked at Sandia on crypto, inventing devices
                  for uses that are classified but could fit nicely in a nuke, got into a fight
                  with
                  the administration, was canned, and then sued the lab. NSA got into the fight
                  because he worked with an NSA team on the crypto gadgets, and NSA
                  refused him access to his own work during the suit. A lot of info was
                  presented

                  to the judge by NSA in camera and the judge refused to make it public. Payne
                  eventually sued the judge as well as Sandia, and the suit is continuing.

                  A long story to call attention to one example of a crypto wizard who probably
                  could crack PALs, having probably helped build them, if he got angry enough.
                  He claims to have been approached by foreign elements who got wind of his
                  fight with Sandia, and offers were made. Payne says he rebuffed them, not
                  for him to do to the US what it was doing to him. For now.

                  Payne's web site with gobs of documents of the years-long information
                  security tussle (the latest dated yesterday):

                  <http://mywebpages.comcast.net/bpayne37/index.htm>http://mywebpages.comcast
                  .net/bpayne37/index.htm



                  At 06:48 PM 11/4/2006 +0000, you wrote:

                  >
                  > Thank you for that. Interesting to see Bellovin claims the Soviets
                  > were not offered PAL technology until 71, while the author of Red Star
                  > Rogue claims the technology transfer occurred about half a decade earlier.
                  >
                  > All in all I sleep safer (not!) knowing the devices are now protected
                  > by a computerized circuit that is at least as safe and reliable as the
                  > sensors and computer chip in my 90s vintage (an yes, it is fairly well
                  > maintained) Jeep.
                  >
                  > If you have ever noticed your car alarm is going off as you drive down
                  > the highway, or had a brake or an oxygen sensor go bad and report a
                  > problem where non exists, you will understand my concern.
                  >
                  > Lacking a status board, I would assume the vast majority of PAL
                  > malfunctions would go largely unnoticed unless an attempt was being
                  > made to fire the weapon, as most would simply dud the unused warhead.
                  > This realitization naturally raises questions as to how many deployed
                  > warheads are actually functional and how many experience sensor
                  > failure issues which no one notices.
                  >
                  > MTBF, Chaos Theory and Murphy's Law come to mind. I am not sure which
                  > scenario is worse. Do you want a non-PAL protected device in the
                  > hands of someone who may react in a negative way to a personal crisis?
                  > Anyone who knew someone who decided one day to kill themself, but who
                  > also gave little external advance notice of rising internal stress
                  > levels, should understand the flaw in that scenario. That, and weapon
                  > security issues, argue strongly for PAL devices, but the increasing of
                  > complexity of such devices creates new reliability problems and
                  > concerns.
                  >
                  > --- In <mailto:coldwarcomms%40yahoogroups.com>coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com,
                  > David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
                  > >
                  > >snip
                  > > >
                  > > > Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
                  > > snip
                  > > Try:
                  > >
                  > >
                  > <http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html>http://www.cs.columbia
                  > edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > snip
                  >
                  >
                • John Bass
                  I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John John Young
                  Message 8 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
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                    I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John



                    John Young <jya@...> wrote: This topic winds back to coldwarcomm in the matter of distributing
                    access codes for arming nuclear weapons: revisions, updates, spoofs,
                    and other customary means and methods of cloaking the most secure
                    communications, a process never finished, never wholly trustworthy.









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                  • tsniffin20902
                    Ok, While John s ending statement may have been off topic, the rest of his post was interesting and consistent with on-going discussion. However, your reply
                    Message 9 of 27 , Nov 5, 2006
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                      Ok, While John's ending statement may have been off topic, the rest of
                      his post was interesting and consistent with on-going discussion.
                      However, your reply (below)was even further off topic. Let it go..

                      Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                      forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                      understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                      curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                      current PAL/EAS system?

                      TS


                      --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:

                      "Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely
                      without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the
                      hearts of men and women thinking they are doing the right thing for
                      religous, national, and cultural gain. Especially middle east clerics
                      these days, using war to spread their faith, with little regard for
                      other faiths.

                      Until the UN can be replaced with a body that has a mandated charter
                      for human rights, the only thing that stands in the way of major
                      regional wars, are what is left of the cold war infrastructure."

                      --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:
                      >
                      > I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off
                      topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John
                      >
                    • John Bass
                      A lot more than ending statement ... if it s fair game, I ll surely be happy to debate, and rebuke, the politics he presents so strongly. John tsniffin20902
                      Message 10 of 27 , Nov 5, 2006
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                        A lot more than ending statement ... if it's fair game, I'll surely be happy to debate, and rebuke, the politics he presents so strongly.

                        John

                        tsniffin20902 <TSniffin@...> wrote: Ok, While John's ending statement may have been off topic, the rest of
                        his post was interesting and consistent with on-going discussion.
                        However, your reply (below)was even further off topic. Let it go..

                        Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                        forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                        understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                        curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                        current PAL/EAS system?

                        TS

                        --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:

                        "Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely
                        without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the
                        hearts of men and women thinking they are doing the right thing for
                        religous, national, and cultural gain. Especially middle east clerics
                        these days, using war to spread their faith, with little regard for
                        other faiths.

                        Until the UN can be replaced with a body that has a mandated charter
                        for human rights, the only thing that stands in the way of major
                        regional wars, are what is left of the cold war infrastructure."

                        --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:
                        >
                        > I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off
                        topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John
                        >






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                      • David Lesher
                        ... FWIW: Steve promised me an update Real Soon Now on more PAL goodies. I ll let the list know when it is released. -- A host is a host from coast to
                        Message 11 of 27 , Nov 5, 2006
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                          Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
                          >
                          >
                          > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                          > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                          > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                          > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                          > current PAL/EAS system?

                          FWIW:
                          Steve promised me an update Real Soon Now on more PAL goodies.
                          I'll let the list know when it is released.



                          --
                          A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@...
                          & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
                          Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
                          is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
                        • Michael Harpe
                          If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the trailer park with a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints along with documents
                          Message 12 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                            If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the trailer park with
                            a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints along with documents
                            on how to bypass the PAL altogether!

                            I'm surprised there hasn't been more discussion of that incident on here.

                            I think we should be discussing LANLs security!

                            Mike Harpe

                            --- David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:

                            > Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
                            > >
                            > >
                            > > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                            > > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                            > > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                            > > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                            > > current PAL/EAS system?
                          • Spencer
                            ... trailer park with ... with documents ... on here. ... interesting. It ... to the ... and I thought this was an information, facts, trivia, and topic site
                            Message 13 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                              --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, Michael Harpe <mharpe79@...>
                              wrote:
                              >
                              > If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the
                              trailer park with
                              > a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints along
                              with documents
                              > on how to bypass the PAL altogether!
                              >
                              > I'm surprised there hasn't been more discussion of that incident
                              on here.
                              >
                              > I think we should be discussing LANLs security!
                              >
                              > Mike Harpe
                              >
                              > --- David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
                              >
                              > > Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
                              > > >
                              > > >
                              > > > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very
                              interesting. It
                              > > > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                              > > > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                              > > > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives
                              to the
                              > > > current PAL/EAS system?
                              >
                              and I thought this was an information, facts, trivia, and topic site
                              on communications, insted of a forum to promote wacked out, off
                              topic, views, or debates.

                              SILLY ME
                            • superc
                              I would disagree, or add the caveat, only as they applied to the Cold War. What happened or happens after 1992 or so is, in my opinion, beyond the intended
                              Message 14 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                                I would disagree, or add the caveat, only as they applied to the Cold War. What
                                happened or happens after 1992 or so is, in my opinion, beyond the intended ken of this
                                Yahoo group. If I write of Golf class diesel subs and Soviet problems with commo and
                                control of them, or even PAL A devices, that is a Cold War topic. I truly doubt that
                                anyone here, even if they had some knowledge, would (or should) be willing to discuss
                                current PALs or current control methodologies. When we write of DES cryptography we are
                                in Cold War commo methods, when however we discuss triple DES, or modern encryption keys
                                a decade beyond the capability of the 286 or the 486 that sat on our desks in that era,
                                or commo in the upper double digit giga band we have left the arena of the Cold War and
                                are now talking about things we should not talk about.


                                ---------- Original Message -----------
                                From: John Young <jya@...>
                                To: coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com
                                Sent: Mon, 06 Nov 2006 11:01:47 -0800
                                Subject: Re: [coldwarcomms] Re: Boeing EC-135 Looking Glass aircraft

                                > Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I
                                > understood this thread was about communications of aircraft,
                                > their security and reliability, which, if I understand the field, are
                                > the primary requirements of communications of whatever era
                                > and field of interest.
                                > snip
                              • Michael Harpe
                                Why shouldn t we talk about them? Mike
                                Message 15 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                                  Why shouldn't we talk about them?

                                  Mike
                                  >...we have left the arena of the
                                  > Cold War and
                                  > are now talking about things we should not talk about.
                                • John Young
                                  Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I understood this thread was about communications of aircraft, their security and reliability,
                                  Message 16 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
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                                    Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I
                                    understood this thread was about communications of aircraft,
                                    their security and reliability, which, if I understand the field, are
                                    the primary requirements of communications of whatever era
                                    and field of interest.

                                    Nuclear weapons came into the picture as a corollary of
                                    comm security and reliability in the face of increasingly sophisticated
                                    attacks as knowledge of codes, ciphers, implementations and weaknesses
                                    have become widespread with the rise of digital technology and the
                                    Internet. That is, as these technologies came of out the secure, secret
                                    realm, in large part due to the wind down of the Cold War and producers
                                    seeking new markets in the open realm not limited to governments,
                                    the capabilities of cracking and spying came to the market as well,
                                    some to be sure on the black market but treachery, betrayal and
                                    illegality were always a feature of secrecy-driven regimes, indeed
                                    were the primary means nations stole each other's secrets.

                                    Coldwarcomms is an intriguing topic for its contribution to the
                                    liberation of Cold War mentality -- paranoia, compulsive secrecy,
                                    shutting out the public from knowledge of what governments were
                                    doing -- and there have been here an impressive amount of
                                    disclosure of useful information of what worked and what was
                                    snake oil.

                                    9/11 slowed that, even reversed it as information was voluntarily
                                    withdrawn, in some cases by request of national security-related
                                    corporations who joined the reawakened opportunity to reinstitute
                                    Cold War games along with a host of practitioners brought back
                                    into government and business just when they believed the gravy
                                    was gone for good.

                                    Spying is up, way up inside the US, thanks to those who know
                                    what side the moldy bread gets the grease. Keep that a secret, they warn,
                                    or more often they just promote tin-foil-hat ridicule and allege off-topicness
                                    -- both hoary tradecraft for hiding what should not be.

                                    Whether nuclear weapons are secure is a long-lived aspect of
                                    coldwarcomms. Disinfo about the topic was a harem-scarem from
                                    Day One, presaging The Day After.
                                  • Denny B
                                    Can you gents at least change the subject header so we can errr. manage our email better?
                                    Message 17 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
                                    • 0 Attachment
                                      Can you gents at least change the subject header so we
                                      can errr. manage our email better?

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