Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

Re: Boeing EC-135 Looking Glass aircraft

Expand Messages
  • Xxxxx xxx
    Well the first thing you are missing is The Hunt For Red October and Crimson Tide are acknowledged works of fiction. Red Star Rogue however claims to
    Message 1 of 27 , Nov 2, 2006
    • 0 Attachment
      Well the first thing you are missing is "The Hunt For Red October" and
      "Crimson Tide" are acknowledged works of fiction. "Red Star Rogue"
      however claims to be, and is presented as, historical, accompanied by
      photos, accounts, etc. In 1968 the Soviets used the two code key
      method. The captain had a safe and so did the political officer.
      Both men had to agree. The idea of simply taking over the sub and
      shooting the two men then using their codes never occured to the
      Kremlin planners. The premise of Red Star Rogue is that in 1968, for
      whatever reason, Oznaz elements aboard K-129 imprisoned the bulk of
      the crew in the forward torpedo room area, left the assigned patrol
      area, then attempted to launch a nuclear attack on Pearl Harbor
      without legitimate command authority to do so, from a place where a
      Chinese sub would be the first suspect. Allegedly, the only reason it
      didn't work is because we gave the Soviets Passive Lock technology
      (PAL) a few years before and not all the KGB Oznaz goons aboard for
      that last trip were briefed on all the new failsafe features. This
      "Ooops" caused a boom instead of a wooosh on launch and properly ended
      the attack with the loss of the sub. The alleged aftermath included
      sudden purges, the total removal of nuclear warheads from KGB hands
      and the removal of all launch command capability from the subs.
      Glomar Explorer and all that were just after action investigations and
      nuke retrieval.

      I would agree that a sub surfacing to find a war took place and no one
      invited it would normally have some deterrent value, but not that much
      once someone realized it was dependent on getting all the codecs
      before it could do anything and that the missiles it contained only
      had an 800 mile range. Remember we are talking about the days of
      casette tape computer programming and Golf subs. I challange anyone
      to signal a sub at sea on a secret patrol with a smoke signal from the
      shore. I also am dubious about HAM or military radio operators, in
      what would be left of the former USSR in such a scenario, being
      capable of getting the signal out for very long. Since the subs
      surface erratically, the signal would have to be fairly continuous and
      all by itself the signal would be suspect, its purpose could be
      presumed and the antenna site would probably be deemed worthy of a
      nuke strike of it's very own. Far more likely would be sending a
      fishing trawler to the last known patrol area and having it establish
      contact. Also presumably by week 2 Soviet fishing trawlers would be a
      very endangered species for that very reason.

      BTW, the Fail Deadly (AKA Dr. Strangelove) systems you speak of
      supposedly, if they ever really existed, according to at least one
      speculative account I once read, played a major role in October 1993
      as allegedly there was one such doomsday scenario device actually
      counting down in the basement of the Russian Parliment Building which
      hardliners (including Naval forces as anyone who saw the CNN footage
      knew) had (unknowingly?) seized and occupied and that is why cannon
      fire and tanks were used to quickly provide a bloody end to that
      otherwise pointless stand off, before that clock stopped.



      --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, hooligan@... wrote:
      > snip
      > *******
      > OK, maybe I'm not following something correctly here...
      >
      > Assuming that in *most* scenarios, the Soviet SSBN's would require
      > authenticated orders from higher headquarters to launch their
      strategic nuclear
      > weapons, and of course that handy little tidbit of exactly
      who/what/where to
      > launch them at, and that such info would need to be sent from higher
      headquarters
      > by radio, is it really that much more difficult to also send them
      launch
      > enabling codes (or perhaps more accurately, a code string which
      decodes into the
      > proper enabling codes, stored in a book aboard the SSBN with dozens,
      > hundreds, or thousands of false enabling codes)?
      >
      > If a SSBN surfaces for the first time in 75 days to find out that a
      > nuclear war took place weeks ago & nobody invited them, the captain
      has the duty to
      > try to gather intel & figure out what transpired between who, and if
      there
      > are still any hostile targets left. Meanwhile, that SSBN
      continues to
      > provide a deterrent value, even if they don't have the PALs
      necessary, and as long
      > as it's in the proper format, decodes properly, & is authenticated
      as a valid
      > emergency war order, that emergency action message could be
      transmitted via
      > smoke signals, carrier pigeon, or a ham radio operator.
      >
      > Due to the shaky political history (& however much credence you
      want to
      > give to 'The Hunt for Red October' & 'Red Rogue'), the Soviets
      always tried to
      > keep pretty tight leashes on their forces. They, and the US, played
      > around with some 'fail-deadly' radio systems, where if a signal was
      off the air
      > without prior warning, it'd send the weapon system (like an SSBN)
      into a higher
      > state of alert.
      >
      > US strategic nuclear forces require permissive action link codes
      too.
      > The USN SSBN fleet was brought kicking & screaming into the PAL
      requirement in
      > the 1990s. Their objection to it for a long time had been
      communications
      > connectivity issues, as well as 'special trust & confidence'
      emplaced on Naval
      > Officers & ancient honor issues related to the captain/master of a
      ship.
      >
      > The movie 'Crimson Tide' does a fantastic job of illustrating the
      > communications-connectivity/emergency war orders ("Condition 1SQ") &
      SSBN nuclear
      > weapons release autonomy that did exist for the US Navy during the
      Cold War &
      > towards the 21st century.
      >
      >
      > Tim
      >
      >
      >
      >
      > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      >
    • hooligan@aol.com
      ************* In a message dated 11/2/2006 10:13:17 PM Pacific Standard Time, superc@visuallink.com writes: Well the first thing you are missing is The Hunt
      Message 2 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
      • 0 Attachment
        *************
        In a message dated 11/2/2006 10:13:17 PM Pacific Standard Time,
        superc@... writes:

        Well the first thing you are missing is "The Hunt For Red October" and
        "Crimson Tide" are acknowledged works of fiction.
        *************
        Obviously. However, it seems like you're not familiar with the scenario
        presented in 'Crimson Tide," & how plausible it was. Watch the movie & then if
        you have the ability to present a concise rebuttal to what I wrote, feel
        free to publish it here. And again, it seems like you're not familiar with the
        persistent claims that the basics for 'The Hunt for Red October' have some
        resemblence to the truth, though the context for my mentioning that book/movie
        doesn't try to speculate on the veracity.

        I'm deleting your book report on 'Red Star Rogue' because I haven't read
        the book myself, so I wouldn't be so rude as to challenge your interpretation
        of it. Though you seem to be treading on think ice by (albeit inaccurately)
        trying to malign my mentioning of two other books.

        *************
        I would agree that a sub surfacing to find a war took place and no one
        invited it would normally have some deterrent value, but not that much
        once someone realized it was dependent on getting all the codecs
        before it could do anything and that the missiles it contained only
        had an 800 mile range. Remember we are talking about the days of
        casette tape computer programming and Golf subs.
        *************
        You may be talking specifically about casette tapes, Golfs & 800 mile
        range missiles, but I do remember clearly that I was not and am not.

        ************
        I challange anyone
        to signal a sub at sea on a secret patrol with a smoke signal from the
        shore. I also am dubious about HAM or military radio operators, in
        what would be left of the former USSR in such a scenario, being
        capable of getting the signal out for very long.
        ***********
        The challenge which you missed was that an EAM can be communicated by
        improvised means if necessary, and that as long as the EAM was properly
        formatted, decoded & authenticated, it could constitute a valid EWO, no matter what
        ridiculous means of communication the EAM was sent via. I'm sorry, I didn't
        consider that anyone would take me so literally as to ponder smoke signals...
        A military radio operator (or ham operator with the special caveat just for
        you being that I'm not suggesting a ham radio operator relaying an EAM is
        probable, only possible!) doesn't have to get the signal out for long, just long
        enough for at least one SSBN to get the complete message.


        **************
        Since the subs
        surface erratically, the signal would have to be fairly continuous and
        all by itself the signal would be suspect, its purpose could be
        presumed and the antenna site would probably be deemed worthy of a
        nuke strike of it's very own. Far more likely would be sending a
        fishing trawler to the last known patrol area and having it establish
        contact. Also presumably by week 2 Soviet fishing trawlers would be a
        very endangered species for that very reason.
        **********

        The concept of listening to specific channels at specific times goes back
        many decades, including your beloved 1968. HF burst transmissions also
        existed back then, as did hydoaccoustic methods.


        *************
        BTW, the Fail Deadly (AKA Dr. Strangelove) systems you speak of
        supposedly, if they ever really existed, according to at least one
        speculative account I once read, played a major role in October 1993
        as allegedly there was one such doomsday scenario device actually
        counting down in the basement of the Russian Parliment Building which
        hardliners (including Naval forces as anyone who saw the CNN footage
        knew) had (unknowingly?knew) had (unknowingly?<WBR>) seized and occup
        fire and tanks were used to quickly provide a bloody end to that
        otherwise pointless stand off, before that clock stopped.
        *************

        I was refering more along the lines of a Bellringer/Clarinet Pilgrim type
        system. In your unsubstantiated ("...if they ever really existed..."
        "...speculative..." "...allegedly..." all in one sentence makes me foolish to even
        address it!) discourse, you seem to be referring to the 'Dead Hand' system.
        While I expect that President Yeltsin had his 'Kazbek' nuclear suitcase, as
        did the handful of other senior military leaders, the constitutional crisis &
        near civil war seemed to be between the parliament & Yeltsin, and the known
        facts were enough (at least in Russia) for artillery from tanks to have been
        used, regardless of whether or not there was some sort of Kazbek/Dead Hand
        capability in their parliament building. I tend to think it's just as unlikely
        their parliament had that capability as it would be for the US Congress to
        have it.


        Tim






        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
      • David Lesher
        ... That s Permissive Action Links. Steve Bellovin has studied the history of them:
        Message 3 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
        • 0 Attachment
          Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
          >
          > Allegedly, the only reason it
          > didn't work is because we gave the Soviets Passive Lock technology
          > (PAL) a few years before and not all the KGB Oznaz goons aboard for
          > that last trip were briefed on all the new failsafe features.



          That's Permissive Action Links.

          Steve Bellovin has studied the history of them:

          http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=permissive+action+links+bellovin





          --
          A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@...
          & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
          Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
          is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
        • Xxxxx xxx
          Yes, I saw Crimson Tide, and read and watched The Hunt For... . However I am still ignoring them because they were fictional. I won t dispute both had good
          Message 4 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
          • 0 Attachment
            Yes, I saw Crimson Tide, and read and watched "The Hunt For...".
            However I am still ignoring them because they were fictional. I won't
            dispute both had good plots. Interestingly enough the author of Red
            Star Rogue does mention the Red October plot by simply reminding us it
            never happened. Seems the Soviets never had a sub go missing that
            couldn't be accounted for today, and the raising of K-129 was the only
            time we stole one of their subs. As the subs involved were Golf class
            with casette tape computers and the changes impacted on those diesel
            subs it is appropriate to talk about them when discussing the changes.
            The author gives us no reason to believe Andropov did not switch back
            to the old way of allowing the Captain to have the codes again. He
            simply doesn't discuss events after Brezhnev.

            There were no HAM radio operators in the USSR as we use the term HAM
            here in the US. There were people allowed to have and use shortwave
            radios, but when and how the radios were used was much more regulated
            under that system than are Hams here in the US.

            Yes, the Soviets used coded burst transmissions but we knew about
            those. They did not (in 68) realize just how good our satellite
            coverage was (which is how we learned of the incident). Nor did they
            know enough about our SONUS systems to be as stealthy as they thought
            they were being. Hydro acoustic methods of signalling a nearby sub
            would be what I would expect a nearby trawler to attempt. Frankly, I
            never realized they operated in patrol squares and had assumed once
            they left port it was the Captains call on where to go. Of course in
            those days, no one was telling us (while beating the war drums)
            members of the public that the range of those early missles was really
            limited. Sure, a man in a rowboat with a properly formatted piece of
            paper would also work to deliver the message, but that's not much of a
            deterrent factor in those early Cold War days of diesel subs. My
            point is that removing the Captain's autonomy crippled the concept of
            swift retaliation and I really don't think we (the public) would have
            been quite so paranoid about a third world war in those days if we had
            realized they had limited retaliatory capability back then.

            The author never mentions what the CIA did with the nukes it recovered
            from the K-129 and supposedly they went to DOE for disposal.

            About the events in 1993, if I recall the tale properly the Parliment
            Building had been picked as the perfect building as no natural event
            was likely to disrupt recoding the basement computer terminal
            periodically, kind of like the scenario on ABC's "Lost." A small
            office in the basement of a Soviet govt building, what could go wrong?
            If the input wasn't made, then it had to mean Moscow had been
            obliterated. In the day the building was built a standoff in the
            floors above just wasn't on anyone's mind.

            --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, hooligan@... wrote:
            >
            > snip
          • John Young
            Steve Bellovin s orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead. Archive.org shows it was last archived in December 2005 (up since 1998):
            Message 5 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
            • 0 Attachment
              Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
              Archive.org shows it was last archived in December 2005 (up since 1998):


              <http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-1
              6>http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-16
              0/pal.html

              A related study of arming and fuzing nuclear weapons by Chuck Hansen in
              Swords of Armageddon:


              <http://cryptome.org/nukes-fuze.htm>http://cryptome.org/nukes-fuze.htm

              And the US Air Force offers several document nuclear weapons surety that
              describe some of the safety and arming features. One of them:


              <http://cryptome.org/afi91-111.htm>http://cryptome.org/afi91-111.htm

              These are all from the late 1990s.

              These reports that accidental detonation is a continuing investigation and
              development in response to international and public fears -- and human
              frailty of political leaders, military commanders and personnel handling the
              godawful devices.

              Against these fears is the military's demand that safety systems must not
              interfere with rapid response needs. Chuck Hansen's report discusses
              these conflicting requirements and the technical and educational responses
              to them with increasingly sophisticated mechanical and electronic weapons
              arming controls, and, not least, emulating Oppenheimer's and other atomic
              physicists urgings, to persuade those in charge of nuclear weapons that
              wars cannot be won with them.

              Accidental detonation remains the least of the threat compared to the
              continuing terrorism they engender by official policy as from the first
              days of the atomic doomsday era.

              This brings up a candidate for the reading list to complement that
              of chestbeating kind: American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy
              of J. robert Oppenheimer. This recounts the sad consequence of
              paranoid politicians and power-mad militarists manipulation of
              public fears to overbuild nuclear armaments during the Cold War
              and foster a generation of terrified publics around the globe.

              Today's picayune terrorists are small fry by comparison with
              the giants still robbing national treasuries while spreading fear
              as diversion. Perhaps some day fiction wil catch up to this
              banditry, but that will probably not be done by Tom Clancy and
              others making a bundle off perpetuating the need for heroic
              defenses against chimeras of national security threats, in
              secret and camouflaged by lots of smoke.


              At 10:22 AM 11/3/2006 -0500, you wrote:

              >
              > That's Permissive Action Links.
              >
              > Steve Bellovin has studied the history of them:
              >
              >
              > <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=permissive+action+link
              >
              > s+bellovin>http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=permissive+a
              > ction+links+bellovin
            • David Lesher
              ... Try: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com & no one will talk to a host
              Message 6 of 27 , Nov 3, 2006
              • 0 Attachment
                Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
                >
                > Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
                > Archive.org shows it was last archived in December 2005 (up since 1998):
                >
                >
                > <http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-1
                > 6>http://web.archive.org/web/20050213005156/www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-16
                > 0/pal.html


                Try:

                http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html




                --
                A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@...
                & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
                Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
                is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
              • Xxxxx xxx
                Thank you for that. Interesting to see Bellovin claims the Soviets were not offered PAL technology until 71, while the author of Red Star Rogue claims the
                Message 7 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
                • 0 Attachment
                  Thank you for that. Interesting to see Bellovin claims the Soviets
                  were not offered PAL technology until 71, while the author of Red Star
                  Rogue claims the technology transfer occurred about half a decade earlier.

                  All in all I sleep safer (not!) knowing the devices are now protected
                  by a computerized circuit that is at least as safe and reliable as the
                  sensors and computer chip in my 90s vintage (an yes, it is fairly well
                  maintained) Jeep.

                  If you have ever noticed your car alarm is going off as you drive down
                  the highway, or had a brake or an oxygen sensor go bad and report a
                  problem where non exists, you will understand my concern.

                  Lacking a status board, I would assume the vast majority of PAL
                  malfunctions would go largely unnoticed unless an attempt was being
                  made to fire the weapon, as most would simply dud the unused warhead.
                  This realitization naturally raises questions as to how many deployed
                  warheads are actually functional and how many experience sensor
                  failure issues which no one notices.

                  MTBF, Chaos Theory and Murphy's Law come to mind. I am not sure which
                  scenario is worse. Do you want a non-PAL protected device in the
                  hands of someone who may react in a negative way to a personal crisis?
                  Anyone who knew someone who decided one day to kill themself, but who
                  also gave little external advance notice of rising internal stress
                  levels, should understand the flaw in that scenario. That, and weapon
                  security issues, argue strongly for PAL devices, but the increasing of
                  complexity of such devices creates new reliability problems and
                  concerns.

                  --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
                  >
                  >snip
                  > >
                  > > Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
                  > snip
                  > Try:
                  >
                  > http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html
                  >
                  >
                  > snip
                • John Bass
                  Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the hearts of men and
                  Message 8 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
                  • 0 Attachment
                    Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the hearts of men and women thinking they are doing the right thing for religous, national, and cultural gain. Especially middle east clerics these days, using war to spread their faith, with little regard for other faiths.

                    Until the UN can be replaced with a body that has a mandated charter for human rights, the only thing that stands in the way of major regional wars, are what is left of the cold war infrastructure.

                    John Young <jya@...> wrote:
                    Today's picayune terrorists are small fry by comparison with
                    the giants still robbing national treasuries while spreading fear
                    as diversion. Perhaps some day fiction wil catch up to this
                    banditry, but that will probably not be done by Tom Clancy and
                    others making a bundle off perpetuating the need for heroic
                    defenses against chimeras of national security threats, in
                    secret and camouflaged by lots of smoke.








                    ---------------------------------
                    Cheap Talk? Check out Yahoo! Messenger's low PC-to-Phone call rates.

                    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                  • John Young
                    This topic winds back to coldwarcomm in the matter of distributing access codes for arming nuclear weapons: revisions, updates, spoofs, and other customary
                    Message 9 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
                    • 0 Attachment
                      This topic winds back to coldwarcomm in the matter of distributing
                      access codes for arming nuclear weapons: revisions, updates, spoofs,
                      and other customary means and methods of cloaking the most secure
                      communications, a process never finished, never wholly trustworthy.

                      Whatever NSA or the national labs cook up for this, in particular Sandia
                      at Kirtland AFB, has to be implemented in the weapons storage and
                      distribution systems. At one time Sandia handled most of this, and maybe
                      still does. The nuclear weapons training school is there along with a
                      host of operations connected to storage and handling the devices.
                      That role goes back to the earliest day of the atomic era when the
                      Air Force began to get the weapons into the supply stream after
                      the Los Alamos folks turned over the results of their laboratory
                      work to bomb manufacturers and thence to Kirtland for final arming and
                      securing.

                      The largest nuclear weapons storage area is still at Kirtland AFB,
                      Kirtland Undergound Munitions Storage Complex, with Sandia nearby,
                      and presumably Sandia monitors the condition of the weapons
                      and assures that they are highly secure and ready for use, whether
                      stored or poised for action in silos and on planes, ships and subs.

                      To minimize the hazards always posed by the best of secure communications
                      systems, the distribution pipe is shortened by rigging the weapons at one
                      place and then ship them out to the "nuclear weapons storage areas
                      (NWSAs)" worldwide. Kirtland rigs and ships for the Air Force; for the
                      Navy it is done at the nuclear submarine naval bases at Bangor and
                      Kings Bay. These are guesses based on the multi-volume "Nuclear
                      Weapons Databook."

                      Even so, once the weapons are rigged and sent into the field there are
                      presumably requirements to assure protection of access codes subject to
                      cracking or betrayal or, as noted here, insanity and vainglory, and this
                      presumably involves transmission over communications systems. Remote
                      control of access codes is an intriguing methodology, whether by algorithm
                      or classified means. Dud weapons also pose a threat as real to the public
                      as the real thing.

                      A scientist, William Payne, who worked at Sandia on crypto, inventing devices
                      for uses that are classified but could fit nicely in a nuke, got into a fight
                      with
                      the administration, was canned, and then sued the lab. NSA got into the fight
                      because he worked with an NSA team on the crypto gadgets, and NSA
                      refused him access to his own work during the suit. A lot of info was
                      presented

                      to the judge by NSA in camera and the judge refused to make it public. Payne
                      eventually sued the judge as well as Sandia, and the suit is continuing.

                      A long story to call attention to one example of a crypto wizard who probably
                      could crack PALs, having probably helped build them, if he got angry enough.
                      He claims to have been approached by foreign elements who got wind of his
                      fight with Sandia, and offers were made. Payne says he rebuffed them, not
                      for him to do to the US what it was doing to him. For now.

                      Payne's web site with gobs of documents of the years-long information
                      security tussle (the latest dated yesterday):

                      <http://mywebpages.comcast.net/bpayne37/index.htm>http://mywebpages.comcast
                      .net/bpayne37/index.htm



                      At 06:48 PM 11/4/2006 +0000, you wrote:

                      >
                      > Thank you for that. Interesting to see Bellovin claims the Soviets
                      > were not offered PAL technology until 71, while the author of Red Star
                      > Rogue claims the technology transfer occurred about half a decade earlier.
                      >
                      > All in all I sleep safer (not!) knowing the devices are now protected
                      > by a computerized circuit that is at least as safe and reliable as the
                      > sensors and computer chip in my 90s vintage (an yes, it is fairly well
                      > maintained) Jeep.
                      >
                      > If you have ever noticed your car alarm is going off as you drive down
                      > the highway, or had a brake or an oxygen sensor go bad and report a
                      > problem where non exists, you will understand my concern.
                      >
                      > Lacking a status board, I would assume the vast majority of PAL
                      > malfunctions would go largely unnoticed unless an attempt was being
                      > made to fire the weapon, as most would simply dud the unused warhead.
                      > This realitization naturally raises questions as to how many deployed
                      > warheads are actually functional and how many experience sensor
                      > failure issues which no one notices.
                      >
                      > MTBF, Chaos Theory and Murphy's Law come to mind. I am not sure which
                      > scenario is worse. Do you want a non-PAL protected device in the
                      > hands of someone who may react in a negative way to a personal crisis?
                      > Anyone who knew someone who decided one day to kill themself, but who
                      > also gave little external advance notice of rising internal stress
                      > levels, should understand the flaw in that scenario. That, and weapon
                      > security issues, argue strongly for PAL devices, but the increasing of
                      > complexity of such devices creates new reliability problems and
                      > concerns.
                      >
                      > --- In <mailto:coldwarcomms%40yahoogroups.com>coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com,
                      > David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
                      > >
                      > >snip
                      > > >
                      > > > Steve Bellovin's orginal URL for the PAL crypto study appears dead.
                      > > snip
                      > > Try:
                      > >
                      > >
                      > <http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html>http://www.cs.columbia
                      > edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > snip
                      >
                      >
                    • John Bass
                      I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John John Young
                      Message 10 of 27 , Nov 4, 2006
                      • 0 Attachment
                        I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John



                        John Young <jya@...> wrote: This topic winds back to coldwarcomm in the matter of distributing
                        access codes for arming nuclear weapons: revisions, updates, spoofs,
                        and other customary means and methods of cloaking the most secure
                        communications, a process never finished, never wholly trustworthy.









                        ---------------------------------
                        Check out the New Yahoo! Mail - Fire up a more powerful email and get things done faster.

                        [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                      • tsniffin20902
                        Ok, While John s ending statement may have been off topic, the rest of his post was interesting and consistent with on-going discussion. However, your reply
                        Message 11 of 27 , Nov 5, 2006
                        • 0 Attachment
                          Ok, While John's ending statement may have been off topic, the rest of
                          his post was interesting and consistent with on-going discussion.
                          However, your reply (below)was even further off topic. Let it go..

                          Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                          forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                          understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                          curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                          current PAL/EAS system?

                          TS


                          --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:

                          "Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely
                          without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the
                          hearts of men and women thinking they are doing the right thing for
                          religous, national, and cultural gain. Especially middle east clerics
                          these days, using war to spread their faith, with little regard for
                          other faiths.

                          Until the UN can be replaced with a body that has a mandated charter
                          for human rights, the only thing that stands in the way of major
                          regional wars, are what is left of the cold war infrastructure."

                          --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:
                          >
                          > I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off
                          topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John
                          >
                        • John Bass
                          A lot more than ending statement ... if it s fair game, I ll surely be happy to debate, and rebuke, the politics he presents so strongly. John tsniffin20902
                          Message 12 of 27 , Nov 5, 2006
                          • 0 Attachment
                            A lot more than ending statement ... if it's fair game, I'll surely be happy to debate, and rebuke, the politics he presents so strongly.

                            John

                            tsniffin20902 <TSniffin@...> wrote: Ok, While John's ending statement may have been off topic, the rest of
                            his post was interesting and consistent with on-going discussion.
                            However, your reply (below)was even further off topic. Let it go..

                            Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                            forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                            understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                            curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                            current PAL/EAS system?

                            TS

                            --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:

                            "Anyone that considers major regional, or even global war, unlikely
                            without nukes, needs seriously to consider the evil that lurks in the
                            hearts of men and women thinking they are doing the right thing for
                            religous, national, and cultural gain. Especially middle east clerics
                            these days, using war to spread their faith, with little regard for
                            other faiths.

                            Until the UN can be replaced with a body that has a mandated charter
                            for human rights, the only thing that stands in the way of major
                            regional wars, are what is left of the cold war infrastructure."

                            --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, John Bass <fpga_toys@...> wrote:
                            >
                            > I think your intended debate of weapons policy and deployment is off
                            topic for this group - something of an endless rathole. -- John
                            >






                            ---------------------------------
                            Want to start your own business? Learn how on Yahoo! Small Business.

                            [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
                          • David Lesher
                            ... FWIW: Steve promised me an update Real Soon Now on more PAL goodies. I ll let the list know when it is released. -- A host is a host from coast to
                            Message 13 of 27 , Nov 5, 2006
                            • 0 Attachment
                              Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
                              >
                              >
                              > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                              > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                              > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                              > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                              > current PAL/EAS system?

                              FWIW:
                              Steve promised me an update Real Soon Now on more PAL goodies.
                              I'll let the list know when it is released.



                              --
                              A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@...
                              & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
                              Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
                              is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
                            • Michael Harpe
                              If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the trailer park with a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints along with documents
                              Message 14 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
                              • 0 Attachment
                                If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the trailer park with
                                a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints along with documents
                                on how to bypass the PAL altogether!

                                I'm surprised there hasn't been more discussion of that incident on here.

                                I think we should be discussing LANLs security!

                                Mike Harpe

                                --- David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:

                                > Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
                                > >
                                > >
                                > > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very interesting. It
                                > > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                                > > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                                > > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives to the
                                > > current PAL/EAS system?
                              • Spencer
                                ... trailer park with ... with documents ... on here. ... interesting. It ... to the ... and I thought this was an information, facts, trivia, and topic site
                                Message 15 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
                                • 0 Attachment
                                  --- In coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com, Michael Harpe <mharpe79@...>
                                  wrote:
                                  >
                                  > If the knows that contractor from Los Alamos who lived in the
                                  trailer park with
                                  > a junkie he should be able to get a complete set of prints along
                                  with documents
                                  > on how to bypass the PAL altogether!
                                  >
                                  > I'm surprised there hasn't been more discussion of that incident
                                  on here.
                                  >
                                  > I think we should be discussing LANLs security!
                                  >
                                  > Mike Harpe
                                  >
                                  > --- David Lesher <wb8foz@...> wrote:
                                  >
                                  > > Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
                                  > > >
                                  > > >
                                  > > > Reading through Bellovin's research on PALs was very
                                  interesting. It
                                  > > > forced me to go back through nuc command can control links to
                                  > > > understand the process. Political and social issues aside, I'm
                                  > > > curious to hear what others on the list view as alternatives
                                  to the
                                  > > > current PAL/EAS system?
                                  >
                                  and I thought this was an information, facts, trivia, and topic site
                                  on communications, insted of a forum to promote wacked out, off
                                  topic, views, or debates.

                                  SILLY ME
                                • superc
                                  I would disagree, or add the caveat, only as they applied to the Cold War. What happened or happens after 1992 or so is, in my opinion, beyond the intended
                                  Message 16 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
                                  • 0 Attachment
                                    I would disagree, or add the caveat, only as they applied to the Cold War. What
                                    happened or happens after 1992 or so is, in my opinion, beyond the intended ken of this
                                    Yahoo group. If I write of Golf class diesel subs and Soviet problems with commo and
                                    control of them, or even PAL A devices, that is a Cold War topic. I truly doubt that
                                    anyone here, even if they had some knowledge, would (or should) be willing to discuss
                                    current PALs or current control methodologies. When we write of DES cryptography we are
                                    in Cold War commo methods, when however we discuss triple DES, or modern encryption keys
                                    a decade beyond the capability of the 286 or the 486 that sat on our desks in that era,
                                    or commo in the upper double digit giga band we have left the arena of the Cold War and
                                    are now talking about things we should not talk about.


                                    ---------- Original Message -----------
                                    From: John Young <jya@...>
                                    To: coldwarcomms@yahoogroups.com
                                    Sent: Mon, 06 Nov 2006 11:01:47 -0800
                                    Subject: Re: [coldwarcomms] Re: Boeing EC-135 Looking Glass aircraft

                                    > Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I
                                    > understood this thread was about communications of aircraft,
                                    > their security and reliability, which, if I understand the field, are
                                    > the primary requirements of communications of whatever era
                                    > and field of interest.
                                    > snip
                                  • Michael Harpe
                                    Why shouldn t we talk about them? Mike
                                    Message 17 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
                                    • 0 Attachment
                                      Why shouldn't we talk about them?

                                      Mike
                                      >...we have left the arena of the
                                      > Cold War and
                                      > are now talking about things we should not talk about.
                                    • John Young
                                      Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I understood this thread was about communications of aircraft, their security and reliability,
                                      Message 18 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
                                      • 0 Attachment
                                        Agreed that posts should remain on the topics of the list, but I
                                        understood this thread was about communications of aircraft,
                                        their security and reliability, which, if I understand the field, are
                                        the primary requirements of communications of whatever era
                                        and field of interest.

                                        Nuclear weapons came into the picture as a corollary of
                                        comm security and reliability in the face of increasingly sophisticated
                                        attacks as knowledge of codes, ciphers, implementations and weaknesses
                                        have become widespread with the rise of digital technology and the
                                        Internet. That is, as these technologies came of out the secure, secret
                                        realm, in large part due to the wind down of the Cold War and producers
                                        seeking new markets in the open realm not limited to governments,
                                        the capabilities of cracking and spying came to the market as well,
                                        some to be sure on the black market but treachery, betrayal and
                                        illegality were always a feature of secrecy-driven regimes, indeed
                                        were the primary means nations stole each other's secrets.

                                        Coldwarcomms is an intriguing topic for its contribution to the
                                        liberation of Cold War mentality -- paranoia, compulsive secrecy,
                                        shutting out the public from knowledge of what governments were
                                        doing -- and there have been here an impressive amount of
                                        disclosure of useful information of what worked and what was
                                        snake oil.

                                        9/11 slowed that, even reversed it as information was voluntarily
                                        withdrawn, in some cases by request of national security-related
                                        corporations who joined the reawakened opportunity to reinstitute
                                        Cold War games along with a host of practitioners brought back
                                        into government and business just when they believed the gravy
                                        was gone for good.

                                        Spying is up, way up inside the US, thanks to those who know
                                        what side the moldy bread gets the grease. Keep that a secret, they warn,
                                        or more often they just promote tin-foil-hat ridicule and allege off-topicness
                                        -- both hoary tradecraft for hiding what should not be.

                                        Whether nuclear weapons are secure is a long-lived aspect of
                                        coldwarcomms. Disinfo about the topic was a harem-scarem from
                                        Day One, presaging The Day After.
                                      • Denny B
                                        Can you gents at least change the subject header so we can errr. manage our email better?
                                        Message 19 of 27 , Nov 6, 2006
                                        • 0 Attachment
                                          Can you gents at least change the subject header so we
                                          can errr. manage our email better?

                                          --->
                                        Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.