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CIVIL WAR AUCTION Feb. 16

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  • lilsteve68@aol.com
    http://www.goldenmemoriesauctions.com/CivilWar.html
    Message 1 of 9 , Feb 11, 2002
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    • FLYNSWEDE@AOL.COM
      Speaking of auctions. Today on the TV program At the Auction some guy brought in an excellent condition Confederate dragoon pistol. I thought they said a
      Message 2 of 9 , Feb 11, 2002
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        Speaking of auctions. Today on the TV program "At the Auction" some guy
        brought in an excellent condition Confederate dragoon pistol. I thought they
        said a Danville Dragoon pistol ????? but it look like it was a Leech and
        Rigdon more than anything else from the pics I have of Confederate weapons.
        The interesting thing was it was appraised for $40,000.

        Wayne
      • carlw4514
        Talking to someone in a chatroom, I erroneously (I see) said that Bragg did not cross the Cumberland river in his 62 invasion. see:
        Message 3 of 9 , Feb 12, 2002
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          Talking to someone in a chatroom, I erroneously (I see) said that
          Bragg did not cross the Cumberland river in his '62 invasion.
          see:
          www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL16.htm
          I think I am correct in saying that he used the communications/supply
          line that EK Smith set up through the Cumberland Gap, though. Can
          anyone help me out here?
          Carl

          www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL16.htm


          this hyperlink wont work i bet:
          http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/AcivilwarPages/acwL16.ht
          m
          the m needs to be on the end with no space is all
        • hartshje
          ... Carl, Just by looking at the map, I think it would have been quite impractical for Bragg to rely on Smith s supply line. It was too far to the east of
          Message 4 of 9 , Feb 13, 2002
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            --- In civilwarwest@y..., "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...> wrote:
            >
            > I think I am correct in saying that he (Bragg) used the
            > communications/supply line that EK Smith set up through the
            > Cumberland Gap, though. Can anyone help me out here?
            > Carl
            >

            Carl,

            Just by looking at the map, I think it would have been quite
            impractical for Bragg to rely on Smith's supply line. It was too far
            to the east of Bragg's northward line of march. In practical terms,
            there was so little cooperation from Smith as it was, that I doubt
            very many supplies would even get to Bragg's army via that route.
            Bragg brought his wagon trains with him, which were already
            inadequate for the job, and many of these were loaded with weapons
            for the "supposed" Kentucky recruits that never materialized. Bragg
            was forced to do a lot of foraging. By the time Bragg had captured
            Munfordville he was down to three day's supply. He asked Smith to
            forward supplies to Bardstown, and to join forces with him there, but
            Smith did neither.

            Regards,
            Joe
          • carlw4514
            Instead of chasing Bragg to Louisville, etc, why didn t Beull just move out of Nashville and cut Braggs supply line while having his own fairly sheltered by
            Message 5 of 9 , Feb 13, 2002
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              Instead of chasing Bragg to Louisville, etc, why didn't Beull just
              move out of Nashville and cut Braggs supply line while having his own
              fairly sheltered by the Cumberland river?

              --- In civilwarwest@y..., "hartshje" <Hartshje@a...> wrote:

              > Just by looking at the map, I think it would have been quite
              > impractical for Bragg to rely on Smith's supply line. It was too
              far
              > to the east of Bragg's northward line of march. In practical terms,
              > there was so little cooperation from Smith as it was, that I doubt
              > very many supplies would even get to Bragg's army via that route.
              > Bragg brought his wagon trains with him, which were already
              > inadequate for the job, and many of these were loaded with weapons
              > for the "supposed" Kentucky recruits that never materialized. Bragg
              > was forced to do a lot of foraging. By the time Bragg had captured
              > Munfordville he was down to three day's supply. He asked Smith to
              > forward supplies to Bardstown, and to join forces with him there,
              but
              > Smith did neither.
              >
              > Regards,
              > Joe
            • hartshje
              ... Actually, Buell was getting into a jam. His supply line running from Louisville to Nashville had been badly disrupted by Confederate cavalry raids. Also,
              Message 6 of 9 , Feb 14, 2002
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                --- In civilwarwest@y..., "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...> wrote:
                > Instead of chasing Bragg to Louisville, etc, why didn't Beull just
                > move out of Nashville and cut Braggs supply line while having his
                > own fairly sheltered by the Cumberland river?
                >

                Actually, Buell was getting into a jam. His supply line running
                from Louisville to Nashville had been badly disrupted by Confederate
                cavalry raids. Also, Buell thought Bragg was manouvering to capture
                Nashville, so Buell had already moved his army to Murfreesboro and
                towards Nashville when he received information that Bragg had gone
                north into Kentucky. Throughout the war, the idea of a Confederate
                army successfully reaching the banks of the Ohio River was a perpetual
                nightmare for the North, and a frustrated fantasy for the South. You
                asked why Buell did not move to cut Bragg's supply line. I guess the
                best answer to that would be, if two armies go after each other's
                line of supply, which one will be worse off if the other side is
                successful? If Bragg's line was cut, he would still be in friendly
                territory, with freedom of movement. If Buell's line was cut, he is
                left deep in enemy territory with very limited options of where he
                can go. The reason the North got away with this in late 1864 when
                Hood went north and Sherman went south was simply because by then the
                North was so numerically superior. Even so, the administration still
                threw fits about Hood.

                Best Regards, Joe
              • aot1952
                Another factor in this equation was that the Cumberland River was a somewhat fickle supply line route. It was subject to closure during the dry seasons,
                Message 7 of 9 , Feb 15, 2002
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                  Another factor in this equation was that the Cumberland River was a
                  somewhat fickle supply line route. It was subject to closure during
                  the dry seasons, because the water level would drop below navigatable
                  levels. I do not know for sure but I suspect that because the late
                  summer and fall of 1862 were noted for their dryness in Kentucky and
                  Tennessee the Cumberland was during this campaign season not
                  navigativable all the way to Nashville.
                  The suggested strategy of going for Bragg's supply line in exchange
                  for exposure or abandonment of his own logistical line simply called
                  for the type of aggressiveness that Buell did not possess or display
                  at anytime during his career. Buell was not the type of commander to
                  think seriously of trying to live off the land. Also the areas that
                  we are discussing Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky were certainly not
                  the type of territories that seemed conducive to such a live off the
                  land strategy. To put it mildly these areas were not lush
                  agricultural areas with large surplus agricultural bounty-- totally
                  unlike the areas of Central Mississippi or Georgia.
                  It is interesting to note that following the 1862 Kentucky Campaign,
                  during the Buell Court of Inquiry George H. Thomas was called as a
                  witness for the prosecution IIRC. Thomas in his testimony made it
                  very clear that he at least felt that Bragg's northward advance could
                  and should have been contested by the federal forces under Buell in
                  the Sparta Tennesee area. Thomas' testimony IIRC was pretty clear
                  that Buell disagreed and refused to follow Thomas' suggestion. I
                  realize that it is just me but I feel that this testimony made
                  Thomas' subsequent 'passing' on taking command from Buell subject to
                  a less than flattering spin regarding Thomas' true motivation. This
                  line of thinking has been discussed in the past and I will probably
                  regret 'opening this can of worms' again.
                  Of course I could be wrong-
                  Wakefield
                • hartshje
                  Wakefield, You are absolutely right about the low water levels, not only in the Cumberland but also in the Tennessee River. Ships could not get to Buell via
                  Message 8 of 9 , Feb 15, 2002
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                    Wakefield,

                    You are absolutely right about the low water levels, not only in the
                    Cumberland but also in the Tennessee River. Ships could not get to
                    Buell via the rivers in the summer of '62. Also, Ormsby Mitchel had
                    earlier destroyed the RR bridge at Decatur, which severely hampered
                    Buell's supply when he reached that city on his eastward advance from
                    Corinth. In regards to living off the land, Buell was old school. He
                    was opposed to bringing war upon the civilian population.

                    As far as Thomas' motivation for turning down command, it would seem
                    to me (opinion only of course) that he didn't want it to appear as
                    though he undermined Buell to take his place. I think that is rather
                    more noble than not. Like you, I don't want to get into THAT can of
                    worms again either.

                    Best Regards,
                    Joe

                    --- In civilwarwest@y..., "aot1952" <wakefield1952@m...> wrote:
                    > Another factor in this equation was that the Cumberland River was a
                    > somewhat fickle supply line route. It was subject to closure during
                    > the dry seasons, because the water level would drop below navigable
                    > levels. I do not know for sure but I suspect that because the late
                    > summer and fall of 1862 were noted for their dryness in Kentucky
                    > and Tennessee the Cumberland was during this campaign season not
                    > navigable all the way to Nashville.
                    > The suggested strategy of going for Bragg's supply line in exchange
                    > for exposure or abandonment of his own logistical line simply
                    > called for the type of aggressiveness that Buell did not possess or
                    > display at anytime during his career. Buell was not the type of
                    > commander to think seriously of trying to live off the land. Also
                    > the areas that we are discussing Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky
                    > were certainly not the type of territories that seemed conducive to
                    > such a live off the land strategy. To put it mildly these areas
                    > were not lush agricultural areas with large surplus agricultural
                    > bounty - totally unlike the areas of Central Mississippi or Georgia.
                    > It is interesting to note that following the '62 Kentucky Campaign,
                    > during the Buell Court of Inquiry George H. Thomas was called as a
                    > witness for the prosecution IIRC. Thomas in his testimony made it
                    > very clear that he at least felt that Bragg's northward advance
                    > could and should have been contested by the federal forces under
                    > Buell in the Sparta Tennesee area. Thomas' testimony IIRC was
                    > pretty clear that Buell disagreed and refused to follow Thomas'
                    > suggestion. I realize that it is just me but I feel that this
                    > testimony made Thomas' subsequent 'passing' on taking command from
                    > Buell subject to a less than flattering spin regarding Thomas' true
                    > motivation. This line of thinking has been discussed in the past
                    > and I will probably regret 'opening this can of worms' again.
                    > Of course I could be wrong-
                    > Wakefield
                  • carlw4514
                    I think the both of ya s have figured this out and given the answer, the condition of the river and Beull s lack of initiative, combined with the horror of the
                    Message 9 of 9 , Feb 15, 2002
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                      I think the both of ya's have figured this out and given the answer,
                      the condition of the river and Beull's lack of initiative, combined
                      with the horror of the idea of a (however unrealistic) Rebel defensive
                      line on the Ohio.
                      Re those rivers, Sherman was running a supply line, apparently out of
                      necessity, which stretched overland to the Tennessee river fairly
                      near the Kentucky line in '64 where Forrest had such a grand day
                      blowing up a zillion dollars worth of supplies at a depot there...
                      having as much to do with Sherman "marching to the sea" as anything
                      Carl
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