Re: John Bell Hood and you thought Bragg was bad.
I did some rereading, and found that you are correct. Hood did, in
fact, order another assault for the morning. This order was given
sometime after midnight. However, I would have to disagree with you
about him knowing the full extent of his losses. A large part of the
carnage occurred after dark, and though he had to know that it was
bad, I still don't think he knew just HOW bad.
His corps commanders didn't have actual casualty figures yet, and
told Hood that their divisions were "cut to pieces". But I have read
enough to know that the phrase can mean quite different things than
reality. At Franklin, the sunrise would have brought that reality
home. When Hood rode in to the town next day he stopped at the
breastworks to survey the horrors, and wept like a baby.
--- In civilwarwest@y..., "Jim Elliot" <jrayelliot@a...> wrote:
> I wonder if Hood would have realized the fruitlessness if that had
> happened. Some time around midnight he had issued orders for
> another > major frontal assault to take place the following
> morning. This was long after the extent of the casulties were
> Had Schofield elected to stay and fight Hood would have simply
> lined the rest of SD Lee's corp up with the remains of Cheathams
> and Stewarts Corps and the Army of Tennessee would have been
> destroyed on that long gentle slope.
> --- In civilwarwest@y..., hartshje@a... wrote:
> > I agree with you completely! The ironic thing is, if the attack
> > had, in fact, been "blasted to rags" prior to reaching the Union
> > lines, the casualty count probably would have been a lot less
> > without the hours of face to face combat at the works. And the
> > fruitlessness of the situation would have been realized a whole
> > lot sooner.
> > - Joe
> > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Jim Elliot" <jrayelliot@a...> wrote:
> > >
> > > I think it was a combination of both. Hood's greatest moments
> > > had come in East during a part of the War when engagements were
> > > still pretty well standup and face the foe affairs. Sharpsville
> > > for example.
> > >
> > > Had he witnessed Picket's assault I do not think he would have
> > > repeated the mistake at Franklin. The long gentle slope at
> > > Franklin very much resembles the ground at Gettysburg. The
> > > exception is instead of a stone wall, Jacob Cox was strongly
> > > fortified.
> > >
> > > You mention had Opedyke not been where he was Hood's fortunes
> > > may have been different. If Opedyke's boss Waggoner had not
> > > disobeyed orders and attempted to have his troops stand and
> > > fight Hood, creating the rout and allowing Cleaburne's and
> > > Cheatham's troops to follow the routed federals right up to the
> > > breastworks. Waggoner's troops prevented the federal army from
> > > opening on the rebs until Waggoner's men came within the lines.
> > > Had they retired as they were supposed to do Hood's grand
> > > charge would have been blasted to rags long before they came
> > > close the outer works must less breaching the lines in front of
> > > the Carter House..
> > >
> > > --- In civilwarwest@y..., hartshje@a... wrote:
> > > >
> > > > As bad as Hood's judgement was at Franklin, I don't think it
> > > > was his ego doing the talking. Let us not forget that Hood
> > > > had a reputation for straight, head-on fighting, which had
> > > > been quite a successful (though costly) tactic for whatever
> > > > unit he commanded (R.E. Lee: "Texans ALWAYS move them!"). I
> > > > think his wound at Gettysburg cost him much more than a
> > > > useless arm. It cost him the eyewitness experience of the
> > > > bloody Confederate repulse on July 3rd. Of course, I'm sure
> > > > he read about it, and talked about it with others, but
> > > > that's not quite the same thing as seeing it first-hand.
> > > > Lee certainly never tried anything like THAT again. So Hood
> > > > still believed that Southern spirit and courage could carry
> > > > the day against anything. And who knows, if Opdyke's brigade
> > > > hadn't been in the right spot at the right time, the Union
> > > > line gets split in half, each half flanked out of their
> > > > strong breastworks, and possibly the whole lot is bagged
> > > > south of the Harpeth River. Then Hood goes down in history
> > > > as another Lee or Napoleon. Never-the-less, the whole thing
> > > > was still a very bad idea.
> > > >
- One of the functions of cavalry is gathering intelligence on the
position of the enemy. McCook must have accomplished this at least.
Did this not put the attack in jeoparday? (I'm asking, I don't know)
PS: ngeorgia.com doesnt seem to have much on Cassville, and unless I
am greatly mistaken you are a contributor there. Of course, it was the
battle that never happened. Am I missing what they have on it?
--- In civilwarwest@y..., FLYNSWEDE@A... wrote:
> That cavalry force that was approaching <there has been some
> McCook's boys were not even aware of Hood being so close> was a
> and if Hood dispatched a small portion of his Corp's to either deal
> to lead them away from his planned theater of battle, there is
> probable cause that JEJ's plan of battle would have been successful.
> think that Hood got rattled too much when told of a cavalry force
> approaching. Since when was cavalry going to get the best of
> Ed Bearrs and others have the same thought as above. At least that
> impression when we discussed this at a seminar in January 1999,
> McMurray <who took up for Hood>, Wiley Sword, and other notables.