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Re: [civilwarwest] The Situation at Vicksburg

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  • David Woodbury
    ... This doesn t really strike me as an order for Pemberton to stay in Vicksburg and defend it at the cost of an entire army. The way I read it, it s no
    Message 1 of 2 , Apr 7, 2000
      >At 9:55 AM -0700 4/7/00, Don Plezia wrote:
      >Want of transportation of supplies must compel the enemy to seek a
      >junction with their fleet after a few days' absence from it. To hold
      >both Vicksburg and Port Hudson is necessary to a connection with
      >Trans-Mississippi. You may expect whatever is in my power to do.

      This doesn't really strike me as an order for Pemberton to stay in
      Vicksburg and defend it at the cost of an entire army. The way I read
      it, it's no different than Davis saying "the enemy must not be
      allowed" to do this or that, which suggests a vigorous effort be made
      to stop them, but leaves room for good judgment. Still, you can see
      how Pemberton might have understood it to be an order.

      And I disagree that this ambiguity was a part of the culture, or
      military parlance of that age. Davis was a lot more specific with Joe
      Johnston later, with Atlanta hanging in the balance.

      -David
    • David Woodbury
      ... This doesn t really strike me as an order for Pemberton to stay in Vicksburg and defend it at the cost of an entire army. The way I read it, it s no
      Message 2 of 2 , Apr 7, 2000
        >At 9:55 AM -0700 4/7/00, Don Plezia wrote:
        >Want of transportation of supplies must compel the enemy to seek a
        >junction with their fleet after a few days' absence from it. To hold
        >both Vicksburg and Port Hudson is necessary to a connection with
        >Trans-Mississippi. You may expect whatever is in my power to do.

        This doesn't really strike me as an order for Pemberton to stay in
        Vicksburg and defend it at the cost of an entire army. The way I read
        it, it's no different than Davis saying "the enemy must not be
        allowed" to do this or that, which suggests a vigorous effort be made
        to stop them, but leaves room for good judgment. Still, you can see
        how Pemberton might have understood it to be an order.

        And I disagree that this ambiguity was a part of the culture, or
        military parlance of that age. Davis was a lot more specific with Joe
        Johnston later, with Atlanta hanging in the balance.

        -David
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