It was not a good day for command, control and large unit cohesion in
the Army of the Cumberland.
Regiments of the same brigade went in different directions; brigades
in the same division were assaulting and falling back simultaneously;
divisions advanced at the initial salvo - others did not; infantry
corps commanders were directing artillery fire
However, the mass effects of the 2 days maneuvering all came to bear
at the CSA's weakest point...
--- In email@example.com
, John Beatty <jdbeatty.geo@y...>
> >Isn't it possible that while the Union assault was
> not ordered, the troops found themselves at the bottom
> of the ridge and considered their choices: "I can
> retreat and get cut down by Rebel artillery; I can
> stay here and die, or I can move forward and probably
> die, but at least I'll take some Rebs with me."
> Faced with these choices, some chose to move forward
> and their comrades followed.
> Not only possible but probable. From what I can tell
> there were no _written_ orders for a general advance,
> there was no _plan_ for a general advance, and there
> was no _guidance_ for a general advance if it happened
> (and from Grant's perspective it wasn't exactly
> desired because he wanted his pal Sherman to win the
> show), but there were no instructions _forbidding_
> one. Grant just assumed that Thomas would follow
> instructions (he did) and the troops would act as an
> extension of his mind (they didn't).
> John D. Beatty, Milwaukee Wisconsin
> "History is the only test for the consequences of ideas"
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