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Sherman's deployment at Chattanooga

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  • josepharose@yahoo.com
    Concerning the issue of Sherman s use of non-AotT troops at Chattanooga: On Page 189 of Life of Major General George H. Thomas by Thomas Van Horne (I think
    Message 1 of 198 , Jul 1 7:38 PM
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      Concerning the issue of Sherman's use of non-AotT troops at
      Chattanooga:

      On Page 189 of "Life of Major General George H. Thomas" by Thomas Van
      Horne (I think the citation is correct), the author wrote: "The three
      [divisions] that were under Sherman, two regiments excepted, were in
      the, battle only as quiet reserves. Davis' division was in the rear
      of Sherman's fighting forces and Howard's corps was between
      Missionary Ridge and Chickamauga Creek at rest and undeployed.
      General Davis, chafing under enforced inaction, requested permission
      to turn the enemy's right flank by moving his division to its rear,
      but this movement, which might have produced decisive results;
      especially if Howard's corps, or part of it, had participated, was
      forbidden by General Sherman. This movement would have supported the
      direct attack most effectively, since there were no defenses on the
      east side of the ridge, and the slope on that side was far from
      steep. Besides it would have harmonized with Grant's plan of
      dislodging the enemy by simultaneous attacks in two directions
      closely cooperative."

      It does appear that Mr. Van Horne was incorrect as there were three,
      not two, non-AotT regiments utilized by Sherman (authors do make
      mistakes sometimes). Otherwise, Van Horne describes an opportunity
      which Sherman didn't deem worthy of trying.

      Joseph





      From: josepharose@y...
      Date: Thu Jun 28, 2001 3:55 pm
      Subject: Re: Sherman's "jealousy" of the AotT

      Eric,

      Having failed to take Tunnel Hill the day before--when he could have
      occupied it without undue fuss--Sherman still could have achieved
      this objective without unreasonable casualties, if he had acted with
      dispatch and fortitude.

      He was ordered to attack at early dawn. He had his three divisions
      and Bushbeck's (I spelled his name incorrectly in a previous post)
      brigade at hand. These 16,000-or-so men faced 4000. Only one
      Confederate brigade (elite, as it may have been) was atop Tunnel
      Hill. Sherman had another division, Davis', within supporting
      distance. The remainder of Howard's corps was his for the asking.
      Instead, Sherman belatedly sent forward his first wave--about 1100
      men. Loomis' brigade, advancing next, received the highly unusual
      order that "under no circumstances" was he to bring on a general
      engagement. What was Sherman thinking? Wasn't he watching when
      Thomas attacked Orchard Knob with an overwhelming force?

      In fact, Sherman seems to have had some of his troops entrenching--
      and wasting their energy--as late as 8:00 AM on 11/25. This was 90
      minutes after the assault should have started. If he had started
      sooner, than the enemy would not have been as well-entrenched.

      Sherman not only faced Confederates atop Tunnel Hill. He could have
      extended the battle to his left, stretching the Rebel resources. One
      of his brigades was marching in that very direction, but was called
      back before engaging. No other effort was made on that side of the
      field.

      I do abhor, in general, frontal assaults against prepared positions--
      unless there are other factors which make success reasonably certain
      and keep casualties to a minimum. With his overwhelming force,
      started early in the day, Sherman was in a position to "swamp" the
      defenders on the 25th, forgetting about his failure of the previous
      day which might also have been due, in part, by his jealousy.

      You made no mention of Sherman's decision-making at Snake Creek Gap
      and at the Battle of Atlanta. Do you have any opinions about this?

      Joseph

      P.S. Thank you for the unintentional compliment implied in your
      phrase, "frequently flawed analyses." Doesn't that mean that at
      least a few of my opinions aren't flawed?
    • GnrlJEJohnston@aol.com
      In a message dated 9/4/2005 10:37:14 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, dan6764@yahoo.com writes: An 1866 document produced by laborers locating bodies on the
      Message 198 of 198 , Sep 4, 2005
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        In a message dated 9/4/2005 10:37:14 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, dan6764@... writes:
        An 1866 document produced by laborers locating bodies on the battlefield stated that the heaviest concentrations of dead lay on the eastern and western sections of the field and that the dead were fairly light in the center where the Hornets Nest was located.. 
        This may be true Dan, but remember, as soon as the battle ended, Union troops started gathering up their dead as well as Confederate dead.  Those that might have been found after the war was over, were most likely those that were killed in the brush and bramble of the battlefield, whereas, the Hornet's Nest was quite open and bodies were easily found there following the battle.
        Just a thought of common sense with only documentation of them finding and burying the dead following the battle.  IIRC, Grant denied Beauregard  access to Confederate dead, since they already had been gathered up and buried.
         
        JEJ
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