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Steele Bayou / Yazoo Pass overview

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  • carlw4514@yahoo.com
    As a continuance of the threads we were exploring some time back , I thought I d post some of the travails the Union went through as the anniversary of the
    Message 1 of 23 , Jul 1, 2001
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      As a continuance of the threads we were exploring some time
      back , I thought I'd post some of the travails the Union went through
      as the anniversary of the fall of Vicksburg on July 4th 1863 is at
      hand. [I had promised Eric a continuance] This overview of the
      situation will be part one. [map:
      http://www.nps.gov/vick/maps/brochure/mp_cmpgnm.htm ] [larger, with
      broader subject, site (Shotgun's):
      http://www.civilwarhome.com/vicksburg.htm ]

      Confederate Vicksburg , touted as a Rebel Gibraltar, offered
      considerable natural defenses against attack from many directions.
      Union military planners soon concluded that the correct way to take
      the city would not be too much different than the way so many other
      Confederate fortresses were reduced: interdiction of the supply line.
      Encirclement of the enemy as a way to victory has been know
      since ancient times. The battle of Cannae in 216 BC was a classic
      case of encirclement, Hannibal prevailing against 2 to 1 odds through
      these means. By the time of the Civil War, certainly, it had become
      recognized that complete encirclement was not necessary; just
      threatening this supply line could throw the opponent into panic. An
      army does not march on its feet but crawls on its stomach, noted
      Napoleon, but additionally the American Civil War, often called the
      first modern war, had battles that consumed vast amounts of
      munitions, exceeding what could ever be provided except for constant
      resupply. Pope had become a Union hero in the western theater thanks
      to his clear understanding of the key to taking Island no. 10,
      springing his own Cannae on the Mississippi via strangulation of the
      supply line; Farragut did something not too much different to the
      fortresses which were to have protected New Orleans. In both cases,
      the act of bypassing the fortresses, however harrowing, meant making
      them soon helpless through inability to resupply.
      The lessons learned could hardly have escaped the notice of
      Union nor Confederate war planners. When plans to take Vicksburg were
      afoot, it seems clear that it soon was decided that the correct
      approach to get "behind" Vicksburg would be from the east, creating a
      trap for any forces that would stay there. Proper supply would be
      difficult for Vicksburg from the south, and it would be easy for the
      Union to shut off supply from the north and west with its naval
      superiority. In addition, there was an excellent chance for complete
      envelopment, which is in fact what happened in mid-1863. The
      difficult part for any plan, however, was the requirement that the
      attacker have his own secure supply mechanism. [I am indebted to Eric
      and Dave Smith for just recently helping me understand the
      following:] Outside of failed plans to build canals and such to allow
      transports to operate unmolested below Vicksburg, every plan that was
      otherwise devised ultimately depended on Union supply being furnished
      by creating a depot that would be set up just above Vicksburg
      somewhere on the Chickasaw Bluffs . The Federals through naval
      superiority were able to control a sufficient portion of the Yazoo
      river to access this area. The problem seemed to be the need to carve
      off a piece of hotly defended Rebel turf on the high side of the
      bluffs.
      The problem of assault from the east and cutting off supply -
      while in supply oneself- proved to be a hard nut to crack. Foote
      lists 7 failures by Grant to crack this nut: 1) by coming directly
      down mid-state Mississippi with a trailing supply line back into
      Tennessee 2) by the abortive amphibious assault at Chickasaw Bayou by
      Sherman, above Vicksburg 3) by digging a canal to bypass Vicksburg
      below the city 4) by making Lake Providence La. totally navigable to
      the Mississippi below Vicksburg 5) by creating a pass through the
      levees to make the upper Yazoo accessible to the Mississippi above
      Vicksburg 6) by making Steele Bayou and interconnections navigable
      above Vicksburg 7) by digging a differently located canal to reach
      the Mississippi below Vicksburg. [Attempts 5 and 6 will be explored
      in the next post.]
      Eventually the depot above Vicksburg proved to be the only
      viable possibility, and it is a credit to Grant that he realized he
      would be able to grab the essential piece of turf by a long flanking
      movement coming up from the Louisiana side below Vicksburg and living
      off the land until the flanking movement could be completed. This was
      a risky movement which could have failed; Admiral Porter for one
      warned Grant that once the transports got below Vicksburg there would
      be no getting them back past the Vicksburg batteries against the
      current. Had the "Yazoo pass" (through the upper levees) or the
      "Steele Bayou expedition" succeeded either would have placed the army
      essentially at this same spot as early as March 1863, without nearly
      the risk.
      Stay tuned for the next post.
      Carl
    • theme_music@yahoo.com
      Carl, Nice work! Hope we can generate some interest in this aspect of the Western Camapigns. I m just about Chattanooga d out. One quibble, which is actually
      Message 2 of 23 , Jul 2, 2001
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        Carl,

        Nice work! Hope we can generate some interest in this aspect of the
        Western Camapigns. I'm just about Chattanooga'd out.

        One quibble, which is actually with Shelby Foote. I don't believe
        Grant seriously planned moving all the way to Vicksburg or Jackson
        along the Mississippi Central RR. (ie #1 and #2 are actually the same
        plan) He wanted to get to Grenada. If Sherman had captured
        Vicksburg, or established a supply base up the Yazoo, he planned to
        march quickly overland, giving up the rail line. Another option was
        returning to Memphis by rail and linking up with Sherman by water.

        Keep it up!

        Eric


        --- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
        >
        > As a continuance of the threads we were exploring some time
        > back , I thought I'd post some of the travails the Union went
        through
        > as the anniversary of the fall of Vicksburg on July 4th 1863 is at
        > hand. [I had promised Eric a continuance] This overview of the
        > situation will be part one. [map:
        > http://www.nps.gov/vick/maps/brochure/mp_cmpgnm.htm ] [larger, with
        > broader subject, site (Shotgun's):
        > http://www.civilwarhome.com/vicksburg.htm ]
        >
        > Confederate Vicksburg , touted as a Rebel Gibraltar, offered
        > considerable natural defenses against attack from many directions.
        > Union military planners soon concluded that the correct way to take
        > the city would not be too much different than the way so many other
        > Confederate fortresses were reduced: interdiction of the supply
        line.
        > Encirclement of the enemy as a way to victory has been know
        > since ancient times. The battle of Cannae in 216 BC was a classic
        > case of encirclement, Hannibal prevailing against 2 to 1 odds
        through
        > these means. By the time of the Civil War, certainly, it had become
        > recognized that complete encirclement was not necessary; just
        > threatening this supply line could throw the opponent into panic.
        An
        > army does not march on its feet but crawls on its stomach, noted
        > Napoleon, but additionally the American Civil War, often called the
        > first modern war, had battles that consumed vast amounts of
        > munitions, exceeding what could ever be provided except for
        constant
        > resupply. Pope had become a Union hero in the western theater
        thanks
        > to his clear understanding of the key to taking Island no. 10,
        > springing his own Cannae on the Mississippi via strangulation of
        the
        > supply line; Farragut did something not too much different to the
        > fortresses which were to have protected New Orleans. In both cases,
        > the act of bypassing the fortresses, however harrowing, meant
        making
        > them soon helpless through inability to resupply.
        > The lessons learned could hardly have escaped the notice of
        > Union nor Confederate war planners. When plans to take Vicksburg
        were
        > afoot, it seems clear that it soon was decided that the correct
        > approach to get "behind" Vicksburg would be from the east, creating
        a
        > trap for any forces that would stay there. Proper supply would be
        > difficult for Vicksburg from the south, and it would be easy for
        the
        > Union to shut off supply from the north and west with its naval
        > superiority. In addition, there was an excellent chance for
        complete
        > envelopment, which is in fact what happened in mid-1863. The
        > difficult part for any plan, however, was the requirement that the
        > attacker have his own secure supply mechanism. [I am indebted to
        Eric
        > and Dave Smith for just recently helping me understand the
        > following:] Outside of failed plans to build canals and such to
        allow
        > transports to operate unmolested below Vicksburg, every plan that
        was
        > otherwise devised ultimately depended on Union supply being
        furnished
        > by creating a depot that would be set up just above Vicksburg
        > somewhere on the Chickasaw Bluffs . The Federals through naval
        > superiority were able to control a sufficient portion of the Yazoo
        > river to access this area. The problem seemed to be the need to
        carve
        > off a piece of hotly defended Rebel turf on the high side of the
        > bluffs.
        > The problem of assault from the east and cutting off supply -
        > while in supply oneself- proved to be a hard nut to crack. Foote
        > lists 7 failures by Grant to crack this nut: 1) by coming directly
        > down mid-state Mississippi with a trailing supply line back into
        > Tennessee 2) by the abortive amphibious assault at Chickasaw Bayou
        by
        > Sherman, above Vicksburg 3) by digging a canal to bypass Vicksburg
        > below the city 4) by making Lake Providence La. totally navigable
        to
        > the Mississippi below Vicksburg 5) by creating a pass through the
        > levees to make the upper Yazoo accessible to the Mississippi above
        > Vicksburg 6) by making Steele Bayou and interconnections navigable
        > above Vicksburg 7) by digging a differently located canal to reach
        > the Mississippi below Vicksburg. [Attempts 5 and 6 will be explored
        > in the next post.]
        > Eventually the depot above Vicksburg proved to be the only
        > viable possibility, and it is a credit to Grant that he realized he
        > would be able to grab the essential piece of turf by a long
        flanking
        > movement coming up from the Louisiana side below Vicksburg and
        living
        > off the land until the flanking movement could be completed. This
        was
        > a risky movement which could have failed; Admiral Porter for one
        > warned Grant that once the transports got below Vicksburg there
        would
        > be no getting them back past the Vicksburg batteries against the
        > current. Had the "Yazoo pass" (through the upper levees) or the
        > "Steele Bayou expedition" succeeded either would have placed the
        army
        > essentially at this same spot as early as March 1863, without
        nearly
        > the risk.
        > Stay tuned for the next post.
        > Carl
      • carlw4514@yahoo.com
        yes, I think you are right, he was using as much of the RR as he could stand; he seems to have had to get started right away doing something in order to keep
        Message 3 of 23 , Jul 2, 2001
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          yes, I think you are right, he was using as much of the RR as he could
          stand; he seems to have had to get started right away doing something
          in order to keep McClerndan (sp?)out of the way, so he seems to have
          taken off from Memphis without a good plan, then pounced on the idea
          of Sherman's amphibious assault.
          --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
          [snipped]
          "...
          > One quibble, which is actually with Shelby Foote. I don't believe
          > Grant seriously planned moving all the way to Vicksburg or Jackson
          > along the Mississippi Central RR. (ie #1 and #2 are actually the
          same
          > plan) He wanted to get to Grenada. If Sherman had captured
          > Vicksburg, or established a supply base up the Yazoo, he planned to
          > march quickly overland, giving up the rail line. Another option was
          > returning to Memphis by rail and linking up with Sherman by water.
          ..."
        • theme_music@yahoo.com
          ... could ... I like the way you phrased that. I think Grant was very happy to get out of the railroad business and back on the rivers. The Union cause had
          Message 4 of 23 , Jul 3, 2001
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            --- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
            > yes, I think you are right, he was using as much of the RR as he
            could
            > stand;

            I like the way you phrased that. I think Grant was very happy to get
            out of the railroad business and back on the rivers. The Union cause
            had advanced substantially when Grant operated from steamboats,
            whereas the last last six months of 1862 were pretty much a waste. I
            call this time frame "The Stupid Part of the War" Grant's mission
            boils down to guarding the railroad so he get supplies to the troops
            guarding the railroad so he get supplies to the troops guarding the
            railroad so he get supplies......oh yeah and export some cotton,
            let's not forget about that!!

            He should have sent Forrest a thank you card!!


            >he seems to have had to get started right away doing something
            > in order to keep McClerndan (sp?)out of the way, so he seems to
            have
            > taken off from Memphis without a good plan, then pounced on the
            idea
            > of Sherman's amphibious assault.


            I could be wrong but I think the plan was underway when Grant learned
            of McClernand's "Presidential Commission."

            Let me check on that and get back.

            Eric
          • carlw4514@yahoo.com
            I am not clear on this Grant / McClernand competition; I have a foggy notion that McC. was already set to take on Vicksburg just as G. was being redeemed after
            Message 5 of 23 , Jul 3, 2001
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              I am not clear on this Grant / McClernand competition; I have a foggy
              notion that McC. was already set to take on Vicksburg just as G. was
              being redeemed after Halleck's lackluster performance.... I am
              getting the post on Yazoo Pass/ Steele Bayou together... your input
              on the Grant/ McC. deal would be appreciated.
              carl
              --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
              ". . . I could be wrong but I think the plan was underway when Grant
              learned
              > of McClernand's "Presidential Commission."
              >
              > Let me check on that and get back.
              >
              > Eric
            • theme_music@yahoo.com
              ... foggy ... was ... I went back and reviewed this and was surprised to learn how large a role Halleck played. Grant floated a number of proposals to the
              Message 6 of 23 , Jul 11, 2001
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                --- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
                > I am not clear on this Grant / McClernand competition; I have a
                foggy
                > notion that McC. was already set to take on Vicksburg just as G.
                was
                > being redeemed after Halleck's lackluster performance.... I am
                > getting the post on Yazoo Pass/ Steele Bayou together... your input
                > on the Grant/ McC. deal would be appreciated.
                > carl

                I went back and reviewed this and was surprised to learn how large a
                role Halleck played. Grant floated a number of proposals to the
                general in chief, but the plan and timetable seems to have been sent
                down from Washington. Any corrections are welcomed. Snippage from
                the OR is appended.

                10/27 Halleck orders reinforcements sent to Grant.

                11/1 Grant issues orders beginnging the move south along
                the Mississippi Central RR. Move begins 11/3.

                11/11 Halleck clarifies the command status with regards to
                McClernand.

                11/15 Halleck denies Grant permission to rebuild the
                railroad from Memphis to Grenada, stating the advance on Vicksburg
                must be made by water.

                12/5 Halleck sets 12/20 as the date troops should be at
                Memphis ready to debark for Vicksburg.


                Why 12/20?

                Eric



                WAR DEPARTMENT,
                Washington, October 27, 1862.
                Major-General GRANT, Jackson, Tenn.:
                The Governor of Illinois has been directed to send you as many troops
                as possible. General Curtis is begging for re-enforcements to be sent
                to Helena. Be prepared to concentrate your troops in case of an
                attack.
                For a cartel-ship to receive deserters is a violation of the laws of
                war.
                H. W. HALLECK,
                General-in. Chief.
                -----
                WAR DEPARTMENT,
                Washington, November 11, 1862.
                Major-General GRANT, La Grange, Tenn.:
                You have command of all troops sent to your department, and have
                permission to fight the enemy where you please.
                H. W. HALLECK,
                -----

                WAR DEPARTMENT,
                Washington, November 15, 1862.
                Major-General GRANT, La Grange, Tenn.:
                Twelve additional locomotives cannot be sent to you. They cannot be
                procured without seriously deranging other lines. It is not advisable
                to put railroads in operation south of Memphis. Operations in
                Northern Mississippi must be limited to rapid marches upon any
                collected forces of the enemy, feeding as far as possible upon the
                country. The enemy must be turned by a movement down the river from
                Memphis as soon as sufficient force can be collected.
                H. W. HALLECK,
                General-in-Chief.
                -----
                WAR DEPARTMENT,
                Washington, December 5, 1862.
                Major-General GRANT, Abbeville, Miss.:
                Destroy the Mobile road, as you propose. It would also be well to
                disable the others, if possible, to Grenada; but I think you should
                not attempt to hold the country south of the Tallahatchie. The troops
                for Vicksburg should be back to Memphis by the 20th. If possible,
                collect at that place, for that purpose, as many as 25,000. More will
                be added from Helena, &c. Your main object will be to hold the line
                from Memphis to Corinth with as small a force as possible, while the
                largest number possible is thrown upon Vicksburg with the gunboats.
                Keep me as fully advised as you can about Bragg's movements. He may
                cross at Decatur and attack Corinth.
                H. W. HALLECK,
              • carlw4514@yahoo.com
                thanx, eric! the snip below seems to be the order Grant was waiting for , somehow this meant McClernand s role was being undercut. What you have found seems to
                Message 7 of 23 , Jul 11, 2001
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                  thanx, eric! the snip below seems to be the order Grant was waiting
                  for , somehow this meant McClernand's role was being undercut. What
                  you have found seems to indicate Grant at this stage served at the
                  pleasure of Mr. Halleck. McCleranand's star was waning and I don't
                  remember why.
                  --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:

                  "...> WAR DEPARTMENT,
                  > Washington, November 11, 1862.
                  > Major-General GRANT, La Grange, Tenn.:
                  > You have command of all troops sent to your department, and have
                  > permission to fight the enemy where you please.
                  > H. W. HALLECK,
                  > -----"
                • theme_music@yahoo.com
                  ... It s plain from their correspondance that Grant and McClernand, by June 1862, just plain didn t like each other. McC was relieved in July, IIRC, and went
                  Message 8 of 23 , Jul 11, 2001
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                    --- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
                    > thanx, eric! the snip below seems to be the order Grant was waiting
                    > for , somehow this meant McClernand's role was being undercut. What
                    > you have found seems to indicate Grant at this stage served at the
                    > pleasure of Mr. Halleck. McCleranand's star was waning and I don't
                    > remember why.
                    > --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:

                    It's plain from their correspondance that Grant and McClernand, by
                    June 1862, just plain didn't like each other. McC was relieved in
                    July, IIRC, and went to Washington to lobby for a command. He shows
                    up in some of those photographs taken after Antietam of Lincoln
                    visiting McClellan in the field. By October he was back in Illinois
                    recruiting.

                    On 11/9 Gen Tuttle, forwarding these troops up from Cairo wired
                    Grant "...I find some regiments with a kind of loose order to report
                    to Gen. McClernand...McClernand is not here & I have heard nothing
                    from him.."

                    This piqued Grant's interest, and he made inquiries as which
                    regiments where they were being sent etc. Eventually this resulted
                    in the message from Halleck previously posted.

                    Previously I wondered why Halleck wanted 12/20 as the send off date
                    for the expedition to sail from Memphis. Was he aware McClernand was
                    getting married, in Illinois, on the 23rd? Some authors have blamed
                    Grant and Sherman, IINM, for this , but clearly Halleck was in on it,
                    if there indeed was something to be in on.

                    Eric
                  • clarkc@missouri.edu
                    McClernand was an Illinois Democrat and a great recruiter. As he filled regiments they were sent South. McClernand was lead to believe that they would be
                    Message 9 of 23 , Jul 12, 2001
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                      McClernand was an Illinois Democrat and a great recruiter.

                      As he filled regiments they were sent South. McClernand was lead to
                      believe that they would be waiting for him when he reached Memphis and
                      he would command. Grant, Halleck and Sherman conspired (my term) to
                      keep the troops moving ahead of McClernard and incorporate them into
                      Sherman's command leaving McC high and dry.

                      McC was relieved for disobeying orders. The infraction was one that
                      probably would have been overlooked if he weren't in Grant's
                      doghouse...

                      This is off the top of my head and could ALL be wrong.


                      Cheers,
                      HankC

                      --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
                      > --- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
                      > > thanx, eric! the snip below seems to be the order Grant was
                      waiting
                      > > for , somehow this meant McClernand's role was being undercut.
                      What
                      > > you have found seems to indicate Grant at this stage served at the
                      > > pleasure of Mr. Halleck. McCleranand's star was waning and I don't
                      > > remember why.
                      > > --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
                      >
                      > It's plain from their correspondance that Grant and McClernand, by
                      > June 1862, just plain didn't like each other. McC was relieved in
                      > July, IIRC, and went to Washington to lobby for a command. He shows
                      > up in some of those photographs taken after Antietam of Lincoln
                      > visiting McClellan in the field. By October he was back in Illinois
                      > recruiting.
                      >
                      > On 11/9 Gen Tuttle, forwarding these troops up from Cairo wired
                      > Grant "...I find some regiments with a kind of loose order to report
                      > to Gen. McClernand...McClernand is not here & I have heard nothing
                      > from him.."
                      >
                      > This piqued Grant's interest, and he made inquiries as which
                      > regiments where they were being sent etc. Eventually this resulted
                      > in the message from Halleck previously posted.
                      >
                      > Previously I wondered why Halleck wanted 12/20 as the send off date
                      > for the expedition to sail from Memphis. Was he aware McClernand
                      was
                      > getting married, in Illinois, on the 23rd? Some authors have blamed
                      > Grant and Sherman, IINM, for this , but clearly Halleck was in on
                      it,
                      > if there indeed was something to be in on.
                      >
                      > Eric
                    • FLYNSWEDE@AOL.COM
                      In a message dated 7/12/01 10:34:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time, clarkc@missouri.edu writes:
                      Message 10 of 23 , Jul 12, 2001
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                        In a message dated 7/12/01 10:34:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
                        clarkc@... writes:

                        << McC was relieved for disobeying orders. The infraction was one that
                        probably would have been overlooked if he weren't in Grant's
                        doghouse...

                        This is off the top of my head and could ALL be wrong.
                        >>
                        IMO you are correct about this. Apparently Grant and Sherman's dislike for
                        McClernand's ability to command started back at Shiloh. McClernand was
                        ambitious and used his political clout in trying to have his own command that
                        would not come under Grant's auspices. True, he was a good recruiter,
                        however he did so in trying to eleviate his own personal desires.
                        Grant saw through this ruse and got rid of him.

                        Wayne
                      • carlw4514@yahoo.com
                        didn t McC also muff something, an assault that got bogged down or simply never materialized? *hoping someone knows, won t have a chance to look it up today*
                        Message 11 of 23 , Jul 12, 2001
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                          didn't McC also muff something, an assault that got bogged down or
                          simply never materialized? *hoping someone knows, won't have a chance
                          to look it up today*
                          --- In civilwarwest@y..., FLYNSWEDE@A... wrote:
                          > In a message dated 7/12/01 10:34:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
                          > clarkc@m... writes:
                          >
                          > << McC was relieved for disobeying orders. The infraction was one
                          that
                          > probably would have been overlooked if he weren't in Grant's
                          > doghouse...
                          >
                          > This is off the top of my head and could ALL be wrong.
                          > >>
                          > IMO you are correct about this. Apparently Grant and Sherman's
                          dislike for
                          > McClernand's ability to command started back at Shiloh. McClernand
                          was
                          > ambitious and used his political clout in trying to have his own
                          command that
                          > would not come under Grant's auspices. True, he was a good
                          recruiter,
                          > however he did so in trying to eleviate his own personal desires.
                          > Grant saw through this ruse and got rid of him.
                          >
                          > Wayne
                        • William Henry Keene
                          McC muffed the second assult on the works around Vicksburg by claiming that his units were achieving greater success then they were, leading Grant to continue
                          Message 12 of 23 , Jul 12, 2001
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                            McC muffed the second assult on the works around Vicksburg by
                            claiming that his units were achieving greater success then they
                            were, leading Grant to continue the assualt even though it wasn't
                            gaining ground (or something along those lines).

                            In my opinion McC also did a poor job at Champion Hill and Port
                            Gibson.


                            ~Will

                            --- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
                            > didn't McC also muff something, an assault that got bogged down or
                            > simply never materialized? *hoping someone knows, won't have a
                            chance
                            > to look it up today*
                            > --- In civilwarwest@y..., FLYNSWEDE@A... wrote:
                            > > In a message dated 7/12/01 10:34:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
                            > > clarkc@m... writes:
                            > >
                            > > << McC was relieved for disobeying orders. The infraction was one
                            > that
                            > > probably would have been overlooked if he weren't in Grant's
                            > > doghouse...
                            > >
                            > > This is off the top of my head and could ALL be wrong.
                            > > >>
                            > > IMO you are correct about this. Apparently Grant and Sherman's
                            > dislike for
                            > > McClernand's ability to command started back at Shiloh.
                            McClernand
                            > was
                            > > ambitious and used his political clout in trying to have his own
                            > command that
                            > > would not come under Grant's auspices. True, he was a good
                            > recruiter,
                            > > however he did so in trying to eleviate his own personal desires.
                            > > Grant saw through this ruse and got rid of him.
                            > >
                            > > Wayne
                          • theme_music@yahoo.com
                            ... chance ... I think you are referring to Champion s Hill. The Union left, McClernand s corps, was not particulatly active. Had they been it was quite
                            Message 13 of 23 , Jul 12, 2001
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                              --- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
                              > didn't McC also muff something, an assault that got bogged down or
                              > simply never materialized? *hoping someone knows, won't have a
                              chance
                              > to look it up today*

                              I think you are referring to Champion's Hill. The Union left,
                              McClernand's corps, was not particulatly active. Had they been it
                              was quite likely they could have cut off the retreat of the rebels.

                              McClernand, during the 5/22 assault on Vicksburg, claimed a lodgement
                              on the fortifications that was exaggerated. His claims led to
                              Grant's orders to Sherman and MacPherson to renew/continue assaults
                              rather than calling it off.

                              What finally got McClernand relieved was the publication of a
                              congratulatory order in a the Memphis Evening Bulletin and the
                              Missouri Democrat. This order had not been passed through proper
                              military channels, and was the excuse Grant was looking for. I think
                              it was Wilson who quoted McClernand's remark upon receiving the order:

                              "Well, sir. I am relieved! By god, we are both relieved!"

                              McClernand's battlefield record, other than the cases noted above,
                              was generally good. According to JH Wilson, John Rawlins in 11/62
                              praised the former congressman's "courage but denounced his ambition,
                              his jealousy, and his disposition to intrigue with the politicians in
                              Washington." He could easily have been a Jack Logan, or a Frank
                              Blair, if he mad merely holstered his pen and kept his mouth shut a
                              little more often.

                              McClernand never quite understood or followed the concept of chain of
                              command, sometimes writing one battle report to file with Grant, and
                              another, grander one, to file with Lincoln.


                              McClernand's reports on Fort Donelson and Shiloh were accompanied by
                              these notes from Grant.

                              HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
                              Pittsburg Landing, April 21, 1862.
                              I transmit herewith the report of the action of the First Division at
                              the battle of Fort Donelson. I have no special comments to make on
                              it, further than that the report is a little highly colored as to the
                              conduct of the First Division, and I failed to hear the suggestions
                              spoken of about the propriety of attacking the enemy all around the
                              lines on Saturday. No suggestions were made by General McClernand at
                              the time spoken of.
                              U.S. GRANT,
                              Major-General

                              HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
                              In Field, Shiloh, April 29, 1862.
                              Herewith I forward the report of Maj. Gen. McClernand, of the First
                              Division, which closes the reports of the Army of the Tennessee in
                              the battle of Shiloh on the 6th and 7th instant.
                              The report is faulty in two particulars: First, in giving the idea
                              that General Prentiss was surprised and taken prisoner in the
                              morning, whereas he was not taken until a late hour in the afternoon;
                              and, second, in reporting too much of other divisions remote from the
                              First, and from which reports are received conflicting somewhat with
                              his statements.
                              U.S. GRANT,
                              Major-General.

                              In a report made directly to President Lincoln McClernand claimed
                              that "Among the killed is General A. S. Johnston (said to be), who
                              fell within 30 yards of my tent."


                              Another, somewhat murkier aspect, is that many of the "Grant is a
                              drunkard" stories came from friends, associates and supporters of
                              McClernand.

                              Eric
                            • ParrotheadDan@avenew.com
                              Hank, Well, if your recollection is incorrect, so is mine. That is how I remember it also....................Dan
                              Message 14 of 23 , Jul 12, 2001
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                                                              Hank,

                                            Well, if your recollection is incorrect, so is mine. That is how I remember it also....................Dan

                                clarkc@... wrote:

                                 
                                McClernand was an Illinois Democrat and a great recruiter.

                                As he filled regiments they were sent South. McClernand was lead to
                                believe that they would be waiting for him when he reached Memphis and
                                he would command. Grant, Halleck and Sherman conspired (my term) to
                                keep the troops moving ahead of McClernard and incorporate them into
                                Sherman's command leaving McC high and dry.

                                McC was relieved for disobeying orders. The infraction was one that
                                probably would have been overlooked if he weren't in Grant's
                                doghouse...

                                This is off the top of my head and could ALL be wrong.
                                 

                                Cheers,
                                HankC

                                --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
                                > --- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
                                > > thanx, eric! the snip below seems to be the order Grant was
                                waiting
                                > > for , somehow this meant McClernand's role was being undercut.
                                What
                                > > you have found seems to indicate Grant at this stage served at the
                                > > pleasure of Mr. Halleck. McCleranand's star was waning and I don't
                                > > remember why.
                                > > --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
                                >
                                > It's plain from their correspondance that Grant and McClernand, by
                                > June 1862, just plain didn't like each other.  McC was relieved in
                                > July, IIRC, and went to Washington to lobby for a command.  He shows
                                > up in some of those photographs taken after Antietam of Lincoln
                                > visiting McClellan in the field.  By October he was back in Illinois
                                > recruiting.
                                >
                                > On 11/9 Gen Tuttle, forwarding these troops up from Cairo wired
                                > Grant "...I find some regiments with a kind of loose order to report
                                > to Gen. McClernand...McClernand is not here & I have heard nothing
                                > from him.."
                                >
                                > This piqued Grant's interest, and he made inquiries as which
                                > regiments where they were being sent etc.  Eventually this resulted
                                > in the message from Halleck previously posted.
                                >
                                > Previously I wondered why Halleck wanted 12/20 as the send off date
                                > for the expedition to sail from Memphis.  Was he aware McClernand
                                was
                                > getting married, in Illinois, on the 23rd?  Some authors have blamed
                                > Grant and Sherman, IINM, for this , but clearly Halleck was in on
                                it,
                                > if there indeed was something to be in on.
                                >
                                > Eric
                                 

                                Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

                              • M. E. Heatherington
                                McC, besides being ambitious and a backstabber, whom Lincoln shuffled away as soon as the elections were over (and hence McC was no longer of political use to
                                Message 15 of 23 , Jul 12, 2001
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                                  McC, besides being ambitious and a backstabber, whom Lincoln shuffled away
                                  as soon as the elections were over (and hence McC was no longer of political
                                  use to AL), claimed greater success than he achieved in the, I think, second
                                  assault on Vbg. But what Grant fired him for was releasing news of his
                                  so-called 'achievement' to the press without clearing the release through
                                  Grant.
                                  Regards,
                                  Madelon


                                  ----Original Message Follows----
                                  From: carlw4514@...
                                  Reply-To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                  Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Steele Bayou / Yazoo Pass overview /McClernand
                                  Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2001 16:44:27 -0000

                                  didn't McC also muff something, an assault that got bogged down or
                                  simply never materialized? *hoping someone knows, won't have a chance
                                  to look it up today*
                                  --- In civilwarwest@y..., FLYNSWEDE@A... wrote:
                                  > In a message dated 7/12/01 10:34:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
                                  > clarkc@m... writes:
                                  >
                                  > << McC was relieved for disobeying orders. The infraction was one
                                  that
                                  > probably would have been overlooked if he weren't in Grant's
                                  > doghouse...
                                  >
                                  > This is off the top of my head and could ALL be wrong.
                                  > >>
                                  > IMO you are correct about this. Apparently Grant and Sherman's
                                  dislike for
                                  > McClernand's ability to command started back at Shiloh. McClernand
                                  was
                                  > ambitious and used his political clout in trying to have his own
                                  command that
                                  > would not come under Grant's auspices. True, he was a good
                                  recruiter,
                                  > however he did so in trying to eleviate his own personal desires.
                                  > Grant saw through this ruse and got rid of him.
                                  >
                                  > Wayne


                                  _________________________________________________________________
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                                • Dave Smith
                                  ... He was a politician first, and a general second. For some inexplicable, goofy reason, he (McClernand) seemed to think that the two should co-exist, and
                                  Message 16 of 23 , Jul 17, 2001
                                  • 0 Attachment
                                    --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:

                                    > It's plain from their correspondance that Grant and McClernand, by
                                    > June 1862, just plain didn't like each other. McC was relieved in
                                    > July, IIRC, and went to Washington to lobby for a command. He
                                    > shows up in some of those photographs taken after Antietam of
                                    > Lincoln visiting McClellan in the field. By October he was back in
                                    > Illinois recruiting.

                                    He was a politician first, and a general second. For some
                                    inexplicable, goofy reason, he (McClernand) seemed to think that the
                                    two should co-exist, and the former hold as much esteem and rights as
                                    the latter - while he was engaged in the job of a general.

                                    Kiper's bio of McClernand, in spite of its perceived faults, did one
                                    clear thing for me - it showed beyond anything I'd ever imagined the
                                    massive amount of correspondence McClernand sent over the heads of
                                    his superiors, to politicians (and generals) in Washington. And
                                    seemed to think nothing of it, rather more as a "right" of his.
                                    >
                                    > On 11/9 Gen Tuttle, forwarding these troops up from Cairo wired
                                    > Grant "...I find some regiments with a kind of loose order to
                                    > report to Gen. McClernand...McClernand is not here & I have heard
                                    > nothing from him.."
                                    >
                                    > This piqued Grant's interest, and he made inquiries as which
                                    > regiments where they were being sent etc. Eventually this resulted
                                    > in the message from Halleck previously posted.

                                    I think we ought to be careful not to read too much into the early
                                    stages of the Grant / McClernand dislike. I think that as a
                                    professional, Grant was more disposed to congregate towards other
                                    professionals, and in his actions, McClernand was less than a
                                    professional military man. I think, however, that much of this
                                    continued to fester, and get worse, the longer their command
                                    relationship continued, and the more messages McC sent to Lincoln and
                                    others, over Grant's head.
                                    >
                                    > Previously I wondered why Halleck wanted 12/20 as the send off date
                                    > for the expedition to sail from Memphis. Was he aware McClernand
                                    > was getting married, in Illinois, on the 23rd? Some authors have
                                    > blamed Grant and Sherman, IINM, for this , but clearly Halleck was
                                    > in on it, if there indeed was something to be in on.

                                    I don't get the impression that there was anything overt going on
                                    between the triumvirate of Grant, Sherman and Halleck, and McClernand
                                    and the Mississippi River leadership thing. Clearly, however,
                                    Halleck was playing both ends against the middle, and siding with
                                    Grant while trying to deal with Lincoln and McClernand. As a
                                    military professional, Halleck must have been taken back with
                                    McClernand's willingness to go over the head of his superior.

                                    And as much as Halleck may or may not have liked Grant, he liked
                                    Sherman, and it was Sherman who was to get the Mississippi River
                                    command while serving under Grant.

                                    I suspect that Halleck was able, from Washington, to have a feel for
                                    the timing of the situation and did his best to play against the
                                    chances of McClernand assuming command.

                                    What's your take, Brooks?

                                    Dave

                                    Dave Smith
                                    Villa Hills, KY
                                  • Dave Smith
                                    ... McClernand reported taking a part of the enemy s works (at Railroad Redoubt) and asked for support. Given the nature of the terrain, it was a slow and
                                    Message 17 of 23 , Jul 17, 2001
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                                      --- In civilwarwest@y..., "William Henry Keene" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
                                      > McC muffed the second assult on the works around Vicksburg by
                                      > claiming that his units were achieving greater success then they
                                      > were, leading Grant to continue the assualt even though it wasn't
                                      > gaining ground (or something along those lines).

                                      McClernand reported taking a part of the enemy's works (at Railroad
                                      Redoubt) and asked for support. Given the nature of the terrain, it
                                      was a slow and laborious process to move troops from one area to
                                      another.

                                      McClernand didn't fight his front too well, since he left himself no
                                      reserve with which to exploit his success.

                                      Grant didn't have a lot of choice; his subordinate reported a break,
                                      and he had to respond. I believe, in his memoirs, Grant suggests
                                      that he could see from his headquarters that McClernand wasn't
                                      achieving what he claimed, but Ed Bearss has said that this claim
                                      could not be true, given the relative heights of the ridges between
                                      Grant and McClernand.

                                      In any event, McClernand fought better, and achieved more, than did
                                      Sherman and McPherson (IMO).
                                      >
                                      > In my opinion McC also did a poor job at Champion Hill and Port
                                      > Gibson.

                                      I'm curious. Why?

                                      Dave

                                      Dave Smith
                                      Villa Hills, KY
                                      >
                                    • Dave Smith
                                      ... I would agree that McClernand didn t perform as well as he could have at Champion Hill. Grant had told him not to bring on a serious engagement, with his
                                      Message 18 of 23 , Jul 17, 2001
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                                        --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
                                        > --- In civilwarwest@y..., carlw4514@y... wrote:
                                        > > didn't McC also muff something, an assault that got bogged down
                                        > > or simply never materialized? *hoping someone knows, won't have a
                                        > > chance to look it up today*
                                        >
                                        > I think you are referring to Champion's Hill. The Union left,
                                        > McClernand's corps, was not particulatly active. Had they been it
                                        > was quite likely they could have cut off the retreat of the rebels.

                                        I would agree that McClernand didn't perform as well as he could have
                                        at Champion Hill. Grant had told him not to bring on a serious
                                        engagement, with his forces scattered across three roads.

                                        Once engaged, however, McClernand didn't seize opportunity during the
                                        retreat, preferring to wait for Grant to direct him to move against
                                        Loring's division.

                                        One wonders how much subsequent discussions led McClernand into his
                                        actions on May 22, and his request for reinforcements.

                                        "What do I have to do to please that guy? First, I'm not aggressive
                                        enough. Then I"m too aggressive . . ."
                                        >
                                        > McClernand, during the 5/22 assault on Vicksburg, claimed a
                                        > lodgement on the fortifications that was exaggerated. His claims
                                        > led to Grant's orders to Sherman and MacPherson to renew/continue
                                        > assaults rather than calling it off.

                                        I don't see McClernand's report as being exaggerated. Perhaps overly
                                        optimistic, and perhaps tinged with a bit of "payback," but
                                        reasonable none the less.

                                        snips

                                        Dave
                                      • ParrotheadDan@avenew.com
                                        Dave, I think you ve provided an excellent analysis of Mc Clernand. His attitude of politico - general being consistent was - in my opinion -common enough at
                                        Message 19 of 23 , Jul 18, 2001
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                                                                Dave,
                                           
                                                   I think you've provided an excellent analysis of Mc Clernand. His attitude of politico - general being consistent was - in my opinion -common enough at the time.As were the disasters some of them precipitated.
                                                  I also agree with you about Halleck. "Old  Brains " didn't seem to be much in the field, some of  his ideas were outdated,but he certainly knew the rules for intrigue, and self - preservation in Washington. Proving once again, that the U.S. government does have some influence in Washington D.C.-------Thanx again.    Dan

                                          Dave Smith wrote:

                                          --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:

                                          > It's plain from their correspondance that Grant and McClernand, by
                                          > June 1862, just plain didn't like each other.  McC was relieved in
                                          > July, IIRC, and went to Washington to lobby for a command.  He
                                          > shows up in some of those photographs taken after Antietam of
                                          > Lincoln visiting McClellan in the field.  By October he was back in
                                          > Illinois recruiting.

                                          He was a politician first, and a general second.  For some
                                          inexplicable, goofy reason, he (McClernand) seemed to think that the
                                          two should co-exist, and the former hold as much esteem and rights as
                                          the latter - while he was engaged in the job of a general.

                                          Kiper's bio of McClernand, in spite of its perceived faults, did one
                                          clear thing for me - it showed beyond anything I'd ever imagined the
                                          massive amount of correspondence McClernand sent over the heads of
                                          his superiors, to politicians (and generals) in Washington.  And
                                          seemed to think nothing of it, rather more as a "right" of his.
                                          >
                                          > On 11/9 Gen Tuttle, forwarding these troops up from Cairo wired
                                          > Grant "...I find some regiments with a kind of loose order to
                                          > report to Gen. McClernand...McClernand is not here & I have heard
                                          > nothing from him.."
                                          >
                                          > This piqued Grant's interest, and he made inquiries as which
                                          > regiments where they were being sent etc.  Eventually this resulted
                                          > in the message from Halleck previously posted.

                                          I think we ought to be careful not to read too much into the early
                                          stages of the Grant / McClernand dislike.  I think that as a
                                          professional, Grant was more disposed to congregate towards other
                                          professionals, and in his actions, McClernand was less than a
                                          professional military man.  I think, however, that much of this
                                          continued to fester, and get worse, the longer their command
                                          relationship continued, and the more messages McC sent to Lincoln and
                                          others, over Grant's head.
                                          >
                                          > Previously I wondered why Halleck wanted 12/20 as the send off date
                                          > for the expedition to sail from Memphis.  Was he aware McClernand
                                          > was getting married, in Illinois, on the 23rd?  Some authors have
                                          > blamed Grant and Sherman, IINM, for this , but clearly Halleck was
                                          > in on it, if there indeed was something to be in on.

                                          I don't get the impression that there was anything overt going on
                                          between the triumvirate of Grant, Sherman and Halleck, and McClernand
                                          and the Mississippi River leadership thing.  Clearly, however,
                                          Halleck was playing both ends against the middle, and siding with
                                          Grant while trying to deal with Lincoln and McClernand.  As a
                                          military professional, Halleck must have been taken back with
                                          McClernand's willingness to go over the head of his superior.

                                          And as much as Halleck may or may not have liked Grant, he liked
                                          Sherman, and it was Sherman who was to get the Mississippi River
                                          command while serving under Grant.

                                          I suspect that Halleck was able, from Washington, to have a feel for
                                          the timing of the situation and did his best to play against the
                                          chances of McClernand assuming command.

                                          What's your take, Brooks?

                                          Dave

                                          Dave Smith
                                          Villa Hills, KY
                                           

                                          Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service.

                                        • theme_music@yahoo.com
                                          ... have ... Yes, the 5:40am: Don t bring on a general engagement till we are entirely prepared. McClernand s inactivity continued for hours after what was
                                          Message 20 of 23 , Jul 18, 2001
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                                            --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Dave Smith" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
                                            > I would agree that McClernand didn't perform as well as he could
                                            have
                                            > at Champion Hill. Grant had told him not to bring on a serious
                                            > engagement, with his forces scattered across three roads.

                                            Yes, the 5:40am:

                                            "Don't bring on a general engagement till we are entirely prepared."

                                            McClernand's inactivity continued for hours after what was
                                            undoubtedly a general engagment was underway.

                                            Thus at 12:35pm:

                                            "As soon as your command is all in hand, throw forward skirmishers
                                            and feel the enemy, and attack him in force if an opportunity occurs.
                                            I am with Hovey and McPherson, and will see that they fully co-
                                            operate."



                                            > Once engaged, however, McClernand didn't seize opportunity during
                                            the
                                            > retreat, preferring to wait for Grant to direct him to move against
                                            > Loring's division.
                                            >
                                            > One wonders how much subsequent discussions led McClernand into his
                                            > actions on May 22, and his request for reinforcements.
                                            >
                                            > "What do I have to do to please that guy? First, I'm not
                                            aggressive
                                            > enough. Then I"m too aggressive . . ."
                                            > >
                                            > > McClernand, during the 5/22 assault on Vicksburg, claimed a
                                            > > lodgement on the fortifications that was exaggerated. His claims
                                            > > led to Grant's orders to Sherman and MacPherson to renew/continue
                                            > > assaults rather than calling it off.
                                            >
                                            > I don't see McClernand's report as being exaggerated. Perhaps
                                            overly
                                            > optimistic, and perhaps tinged with a bit of "payback," but
                                            > reasonable none the less.

                                            Maybe "exaggerated" wasn't the best adjective. How does "inaccurate"
                                            sound?

                                            Given the co-operation Grant always got from Sherman, MacPherson and
                                            Porter, McClernand must have seemed like the bad wheel on Grant's
                                            wagon. I'm just finishing the Vicksburg seige in Papers of USG, and
                                            this really stands out.

                                            Eric
                                          • theme_music@yahoo.com
                                            ... the ... as ... one ... the ... I thought Kiper did a pretty good job. Could I get to elaborate on the perceived faults? ... and ... Right on, with the
                                            Message 21 of 23 , Jul 18, 2001
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                                              --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Dave Smith" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
                                              >
                                              > He was a politician first, and a general second. For some
                                              > inexplicable, goofy reason, he (McClernand) seemed to think that
                                              the
                                              > two should co-exist, and the former hold as much esteem and rights
                                              as
                                              > the latter - while he was engaged in the job of a general.
                                              >
                                              > Kiper's bio of McClernand, in spite of its perceived faults, did
                                              one
                                              > clear thing for me - it showed beyond anything I'd ever imagined
                                              the
                                              > massive amount of correspondence McClernand sent over the heads of
                                              > his superiors, to politicians (and generals) in Washington. And
                                              > seemed to think nothing of it, rather more as a "right" of his.

                                              I thought Kiper did a pretty good job. Could I get to elaborate on
                                              the perceived faults?


                                              > I think we ought to be careful not to read too much into the early
                                              > stages of the Grant / McClernand dislike. I think that as a
                                              > professional, Grant was more disposed to congregate towards other
                                              > professionals, and in his actions, McClernand was less than a
                                              > professional military man. I think, however, that much of this
                                              > continued to fester, and get worse, the longer their command
                                              > relationship continued, and the more messages McC sent to Lincoln
                                              and
                                              > others, over Grant's head.

                                              Right on, with the inclusion McClernand's connections to the
                                              newspapers.


                                              >
                                              > I don't get the impression that there was anything overt going on
                                              > between the triumvirate of Grant, Sherman and Halleck, and
                                              McClernand
                                              > and the Mississippi River leadership thing.

                                              <snips>

                                              I just sometimes wonder about the timing between Sherman's leaving
                                              Memphis (set at 12/20 by Halleck) and McClernand's wedding (12/23).
                                              Co-incidence or Oliver Stone Movie?

                                              I also wonder if McClernand's presence in Washington enhanced or
                                              detracted from Halleck's opinion of him.

                                              Eric
                                            • Dave Smith
                                              ... Better. But certainly he made a lodgement in the Railroad Redoubt, and it was by far the largest breakthrough of any achieved by Grant s forces. ... I
                                              Message 22 of 23 , Jul 19, 2001
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                                                --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
                                                > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Dave Smith" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:

                                                > Maybe "exaggerated" wasn't the best adjective. How
                                                > does "inaccurate" sound?

                                                Better. But certainly he made a lodgement in the Railroad Redoubt,
                                                and it was by far the largest breakthrough of any achieved by Grant's
                                                forces.
                                                >
                                                > Given the co-operation Grant always got from Sherman, MacPherson
                                                > and Porter, McClernand must have seemed like the bad wheel on
                                                > Grant's wagon. I'm just finishing the Vicksburg seige in Papers of
                                                > USG, and this really stands out.

                                                I think the descriptor "bad wheel" is quite appropriate. It's clear
                                                that Grnat absolutely felt that way about McClernand, and that
                                                feeling was, I'm sure, enhanced by buddies Sherman and McPherson (and
                                                even more enhanced by Porter, who hated McClernand).

                                                And I don't doubt that Grant was fully sincere in his belief, and in
                                                many ways, justified. But McClernand has a really bad rap as a
                                                military commander, and I simply don't think it's as deserved as
                                                we're led to believe. He wasn't great, but he didn't stink as bad as
                                                other political generals. Combined with his less than stellar
                                                personality, though, and coupled with his trio of West Pointers, he
                                                was the odd man out.

                                                Dave

                                                Dave Smith
                                                Villa Hills, KY
                                              • Dave Smith
                                                ... snip ... I had one, single major problem with Kiper, and when I see it, it drives me to distraction. Perhaps it had to do with a lack of original subject
                                                Message 23 of 23 , Jul 19, 2001
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                                                  --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
                                                  > --- In civilwarwest@y..., "Dave Smith" <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
                                                  > >
                                                  snip
                                                  >
                                                  McClernand Bio:
                                                  > I thought Kiper did a pretty good job. Could I get to elaborate on
                                                  > the perceived faults?

                                                  I had one, single major problem with Kiper, and when I see it, it
                                                  drives me to distraction. Perhaps it had to do with a lack of
                                                  original subject matter, or perhaps with dealing with a less-than-
                                                  stellar subject, but Kiper spends way too much time justifying
                                                  McClernand by dragging down others to his level - viz Sherman, Grant,
                                                  Halleck, etc.

                                                  Rowland does that in his recent book on McClellan. Hallock was
                                                  simply awful with this in her second volume of the McWhiney Bragg
                                                  bio. And Kiper didn't need to do it - he had a rich, fascinating
                                                  subject. But I guess the ingrained need to drag others down, if one
                                                  cannot find a way to elevate one's subject, is too hard to overcome.
                                                  >
                                                  snip

                                                  > I just sometimes wonder about the timing between Sherman's leaving
                                                  > Memphis (set at 12/20 by Halleck) and McClernand's wedding
                                                  > (12/23). Co-incidence or Oliver Stone Movie?

                                                  I have trouble reading a "smoking gun" in a situation where the
                                                  record doesn't suggest it. Perhaps Halleck knew of McC's impending
                                                  nuptials, without knowing a date. But certainly Halleck knew the
                                                  longer there was delay, the more certain McC was to show up.
                                                  >
                                                  > I also wonder if McClernand's presence in Washington enhanced or
                                                  > detracted from Halleck's opinion of him.

                                                  It had to detract, don't you think? Halleck considered himself a
                                                  professional in a city of politicians, and here was a political
                                                  general obviously in his element. How else could Halleck perceive it?

                                                  Dave

                                                  Dave Smith
                                                  Villa Hills, KY
                                                  >
                                                  > Eric
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