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Re: Grant's apparent "jealousy"

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  • clarkc@missouri.edu
    joseph, ... I ve lost something in the thread here. What would be the point of Hooker s forces replacing Sherman s forces? Hooker has been on the ground and is
    Message 1 of 19 , Jun 29, 2001
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      joseph,

      > Hooker's three divisions, however, had
      > horses which could pull his own batteries, if his men were ordered
      > to
      > replace Sherman.

      I've lost something in the thread here.

      What would be the point of Hooker's forces replacing Sherman's forces?

      Hooker has been on the ground and is guarding the supply line. Sherman
      has just come up and occupied the left of the USA line. Are you
      suggesting that they switch places merely so that someone besides
      Sherman gets to attack the CSA right flank?

      (Moving units around is not as simple as unit A going to point B and
      unit B going to point A. It's more like one of those children's toys
      with a grid, one open space and tiles that are shifted around to make
      a picture.)

      Cheers,
      HankC
    • clarkc@missouri.edu
      joseph, ... Just for the record, would you say that Grant s priorities were: 1) get Sherman promoted, 2) defeat the CSA armies ? I suppose it is too much to
      Message 2 of 19 , Jun 29, 2001
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        joseph,

        > If Grant was seriously thinking about the good of the war effort,
        > and
        > not in promoting his friends, he would have chosen Thomas.
        >

        Just for the record, would you say that Grant's priorities were:

        1) get Sherman promoted,
        2) defeat the CSA armies

        ?

        I suppose it is too much to expect a yes or no answer?


        Cheers,
        HankC
      • clarkc@missouri.edu
        joseph, ... Just for the record, would you say that Grant s priorities were: 1) get Sherman promoted, 2) defeat the CSA ? Cheers, HankC
        Message 3 of 19 , Jun 29, 2001
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          joseph,

          > If Grant was seriously thinking about the good of the war effort,
          >and
          > not in promoting his friends, he would have chosen Thomas.


          Just for the record, would you say that Grant's priorities were:

          1) get Sherman promoted,
          2) defeat the CSA

          ?

          Cheers,

          HankC
        • josepharose@yahoo.com
          Hank, It certainly seems to me that Grant allowed his personal feelings to interfere with his military decision-making. Sherman s promotion is definitely a
          Message 4 of 19 , Jun 29, 2001
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            Hank,

            It certainly seems to me that Grant allowed his personal feelings to
            interfere with his military decision-making. Sherman's promotion is
            definitely a good example of that.

            Eric told me that, in reviewing an historical situation, one
            shouldn't use what happened afterwards as a factor--which is, of
            course, an intelligent observation.

            Therefore, when Sherman was promoted after Chattanooga, his history
            included several positive acts, but too many failures. Just quickly,
            I would say he gets credit for (with an * for important actions):
            Fighting at Shiloh
            Meridian
            Heavy marching

            I would say he deserves discredit for:
            Bull Run
            Kentucky
            Pre-battle Shiloh
            Chickasaw Bluffs*
            Chattanooga*

            Compared to Thomas, this seems to be no contest, as Thomas should
            recieve kudos for:
            Mill Springs*
            Murfreesboro
            Chickamauga*
            Chattanooga

            Sherman didn't have that much fighting to do in the final Vicksburg
            campaign. I won't count the assaults of 5/19 and 5/22 against him as
            he was ordered to do so by Grant. His chasing Johnston twice out of
            Jackson also doesn't rise to creditable status, in this little
            review. I know that these are all arguable points, but there you
            have it.

            Joseph




            From: clarkc@m...
            Date: Fri Jun 29, 2001 10:32 am
            Subject: Re: Grant's apparent "jealousy"

            joseph,

            > If Grant was seriously thinking about the good of the war effort,
            >and
            > not in promoting his friends, he would have chosen Thomas.

            Just for the record, would you say that Grant's priorities were:

            1) get Sherman promoted,
            2) defeat the CSA

            ?

            Cheers,

            HankC
          • josepharose@yahoo.com
            Eric, In this little what-if scenario, you seem to forget that Sherman s four divisions were traveling with the supply trains following their respective
            Message 5 of 19 , Jun 29, 2001
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              Eric,

              In this little what-if scenario, you seem to forget that Sherman's
              four divisions were traveling with the supply trains following their
              respective divisions. (Sherman's goof here contradicts your
              assertion: "Sherman had shown he could move troops over hundreds of
              miles and bring them into battle.") This strung-out the column of
              march and slowed it down immensely. The only division that wouldn't
              be slowed was the first in line, as that had no wagons in front of it.

              As I remember, Thomas suggested using Hooker's three divisions
              instead of Sherman's in the amphibious assault. These troops could
              start crossing at Brown's Ferry even before Sherman's first division
              entered Lookout Valley. Once the first division took up their
              positions to protect the Cracker Line, Hooker's last units could move
              over the pontoon bridge. They could be in position behind the hills
              on the right bank while much of Sherman's column was still en route
              to Lookout Valley.

              Logistically, instead of Sherman's animals pulling their own
              artillery, as well as crossing into Chattanooga to take some of
              Thomas', Hooker's animals would follow the same route. There would
              be no difference.

              Because Hooker's divisions were rather small, Davis' division as well
              as another from the AotC could be sent over to reinforce the
              assaulting units. That would still leave three divisions for
              Chattanooga's defense.

              As time was of the essence, this plan would surely hurry things
              forward, as opposed to waiting for Sherman's men.

              Joseph

              P.S. You correctly assert that: "Civil war battles, with only handful
              of exceptions, were bloody indecisive affairs, most of which had very
              little impact on the end of the war." That is one of the reasons why
              Thomas was such a good commander. At Nashville, Grant would have
              been satisfied with a drawn battle. Thomas was going for the
              decisive victory. Guess what. He did it.




              From: theme_music@y...
              Date: Fri Jun 29, 2001 4:23 am
              Subject: Re: Grant's apparent "jealousy"

              --- In civilwarwest@y..., josepharose@y... wrote:
              > Eric,
              >
              > No "logistical nightmare" ... the same number of troops and
              batteries
              > would cross the pontoons and the same number of troops would end up
              > in the assigned places: Lookout Valley, Chattanooga, and across
              from
              > the South Chickamauga. Just different troops and different
              batteries.

              You clearly haven't thought this through.

              Grant's plan:

              1) Howard crosses at Brown's Ferry, and then into Chattanooga.

              2) Sherman crosses at Brown's Ferry, moves up stream and crosses
              again near the mouth of Chickamauga creek.


              Note that the condition of the bridges delayed the motions of these
              few troops.

              Your plan:

              1) Hooker and Howard are stripped of their horses, thus leaving them
              immobile in Lookout Valley. These horses then cross at Brown's ferry
              and again into Chattanooga to pick up Thomas' artillery.

              2) Thomas, who according to you was completely immobilized on 11/8,
              now mustnow endeavour to cross at Chattanooga and move into position
              upstream. This however leaves Chattanooga completely unguarded,
              since we know (from your postings) Thomas would never attack without
              maximizing his advantage. Therefore:

              3) Shermans troops must cross at Brown's Ferry and then into
              Chattanooga, co-ordinating with Thomas' exit to keep the defenses
              manned.

              4) Shermans troops had already moved hundreds of miles overland (for
              which you give him zero credit) 10-15 more make little difference
              other the time to travel those miles. Very little effort is involved
              in supplying these troops whether in Lookout Valley or at the mouth
              of the Chickamauga. Your plan, on the other hand involves organizing
              a supply train for either Hooker or Thomas, both of whom are very
              short on transportation


              > What you get is a day or two less delay in launching the attack and
              > Hooker's troops would be fresher than Sherman's which had been
              > marching since Corinth or so.

              But you already gave away their artillery horses to your help your
              favorite, Thomas.

              Not unless you strip away the forces in Lookout Valley prior to
              Shermans arrival there. I know you never consider supply as an
              isssue, but please remember that Hooker's forces were keeping open
              the "Cracker line." Your plan leaves open supply depots to rebel
              raids, Grant's kept them well-protected.

              I'd like to remind remind you, Joseph, that Chattanooga was huge and
              one-sided victory for the Union. You seem to forget that fact, amid
              your fascination wiht petty bickering and minutia, which is
              absolutely the most important one.


              > If, as you say, "I believe we should base our analysis on Grant's
              > decisions prior to 11/24/63 only on the information that would have
              > been available to him at that time," then after the battle there
              > should have been no question as to who should be chosen to succeed
              > Grant. Thomas, at the end of 1863, had an unbroken string of
              > impressive results in battle. Sherman didn't--far from it. This
              was
              > made quite clear by Sherman's actions at Chattanooga.
              > If Grant was seriously thinking about the good of the war effort,
              and
              > not in promoting his friends, he would have chosen Thomas.


              Sherman had shown he could move troops over hundreds of miles and
              bring them into battle. Something Thomas, never at any time during
              the war, proved he could do as a commander. Only by completely
              ignoring, in amateuristic fashion, all issues of logistics, supply,
              and strategic forward motion, can one conclude that Thomas outshines
              Sherman. It can only be the desire to play favorites that would
              cause one to evaluate army commanders in this fashion.

              Grant and Sherman both in knew in 1864 what you still haven't figured
              out today. Civil war battles, with only handful of exceptions, were
              bloody indecisive affairs, most of which had very little impact on
              the end of the war. Success was realized only through successful
              management of strategic campaigns. The South was not defeated by
              tactical actions on the battlefield, but rather by the large scale
              strategic stranglehold put on them by Grant and Sherman, in
              conjuction with the Navy. Focusing on battle tactics (and petty
              bickering) results in a skewed and inaccurate view of the war and its
              key players.

              We know for a fact that Sherman eventually got the job done. That
              Thomas would have done better is only an opinion, despite your
              efforts and wishes to present it as fact. To my line of thinking
              facts trump opinion. Your wish, apparently is for opinion to trump
              facts.

              Eric
            • Dave Smith
              ... snips But Joseph, have you ever worked in the business world? Had people report to you, and been in a position of responsibility? For better or worse,
              Message 6 of 19 , Jun 29, 2001
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                --- In civilwarwest@y..., josepharose@y... wrote:
                > Hank,
                >
                > It certainly seems to me that Grant allowed his personal feelings
                > to interfere with his military decision-making. Sherman's
                > promotion is definitely a good example of that.
                >
                > Eric told me that, in reviewing an historical situation, one
                > shouldn't use what happened afterwards as a factor--which is, of
                > course, an intelligent observation.
                >
                snips

                But Joseph, have you ever worked in the business world? Had people
                report to you, and been in a position of responsibility?

                For better or worse, you're most aware of the people that work with
                you, and (obviously) less so with the people in other organizations.
                If it comes time to promote someone inside the company, and you (as a
                recent promotee) get to choose, is it that strange that you can't
                help but look more favorably upon someone whom you respect, and feel
                the most qualified candidate?

                Grant saw and judged the worth of Sherman on a day-to-day basis, and
                only would have had small understanding of the value of Thomas.

                Is it right? Grant was probably within his rights. Was he in
                error? I'm not sure.

                Is it favoritism? Probably so, but it's a normal, built-in kind of
                favortism.

                Dave

                Dave Smith
                Villa Hills, KY
              • dbowman@radford.edu
                Well, here s my attempt to engage the tar baby. To me, the following line captures the essence of this exercise in speculative history. ... So, it is your
                Message 7 of 19 , Jun 29, 2001
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                  Well, here's my attempt to engage the tar baby.

                  To me, the following line captures the essence of this exercise in
                  speculative history.

                  > If Grant was seriously thinking about the good of the war effort, and
                  > not in promoting his friends, he would have chosen Thomas.

                  So, it is your opinion that the war would have been over faster and
                  with less bloodshed had Thomas ascended? OK, please elaborate.

                  Joe, here is an opportunity to take the offensive, that critical aspect
                  of warfighting for which Buell, Rosecrans, Thomas and the AofC is
                  synonomous. Here is the chance for you on their behalf to take bold
                  aggressive action. Here is the opportunity for you on their behalf to
                  seize the initiative and tell me how shelving the relentless,
                  unflappable, creative Grant and his partner, the fiesty, risk-taking,
                  master logistician Sherman, would altered the course of the American
                  Civil War.

                  Again, how would Thomas as full Western Theater commander and with the
                  AofC as lead army have made the war end faster, and with less
                  bloodshed?

                  I'll get you started: Through Snake Creek Gap like a raging flood, a
                  50K-man torrent of aggressive AofC campaigners flow with newly-named
                  Lieutenant General Thomas in the van. They cut Johnston off from
                  Atlanta and pin him in the mountains. Ol' Joe turns to fight? What does
                  the new command team of Thomas and fighting Joe Hooker, laurels fresh
                  yet from their magic at Chattanooga, do then – besides send those two
                  pretenders Grant and Sherman out to pasture?


                  don
                • josepharose@yahoo.com
                  Don, Is this a trick question? You ve made it too easy. Thomas, having cut off the Confederates supply line and finding that Ol Joe turns to fight , merely
                  Message 8 of 19 , Jun 29, 2001
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                    Don,

                    Is this a trick question? You've made it too easy.

                    Thomas, having cut off the Confederates supply line and finding
                    that "Ol' Joe turns to fight", merely has to fortify a good,
                    defensible position. There would seem to be a probability that
                    Johnston stupidly shatters his army against Thomas' lines and,
                    consequently invites an annihilating counterattack. Otherwise, the
                    Confederates might try to withdraw through the mountains, leaving
                    behind trains and artillery (not to mention some of their morale).

                    If Sherman had won with McPherson's maneuver, then he would have
                    shortened the war. On the day after he passed through it, Thomas
                    offered to send Hooker's Corps after it. If Sherman had done this
                    soon enough and McPherson was perhaps a little more bold, Johnston
                    still could have been cut off.

                    I read today that Johnston did send down three divisions on the tenth
                    which, finding that McPherson had retreated back to the gap's mouth,
                    themselves withdrew northward.

                    Joseph



                    From: dbowman@r...
                    Date: Fri Jun 29, 2001 2:41 pm
                    Subject: Re: Grant's apparent "jealousy"

                    Well, here's my attempt to engage the tar baby.

                    To me, the following line captures the essence of this exercise in
                    speculative history.

                    > If Grant was seriously thinking about the good of the war effort,
                    and
                    > not in promoting his friends, he would have chosen Thomas.

                    So, it is your opinion that the war would have been over faster and
                    with less bloodshed had Thomas ascended? OK, please elaborate.

                    Joe, here is an opportunity to take the offensive, that critical
                    aspect
                    of warfighting for which Buell, Rosecrans, Thomas and the AofC is
                    synonomous. Here is the chance for you on their behalf to take bold
                    aggressive action. Here is the opportunity for you on their behalf to
                    seize the initiative and tell me how shelving the relentless,
                    unflappable, creative Grant and his partner, the fiesty, risk-taking,
                    master logistician Sherman, would altered the course of the American
                    Civil War.

                    Again, how would Thomas as full Western Theater commander and with
                    the
                    AofC as lead army have made the war end faster, and with less
                    bloodshed?

                    I'll get you started: Through Snake Creek Gap like a raging flood, a
                    50K-man torrent of aggressive AofC campaigners flow with newly-named
                    Lieutenant General Thomas in the van. They cut Johnston off from
                    Atlanta and pin him in the mountains. Ol' Joe turns to fight? What
                    does
                    the new command team of Thomas and fighting Joe Hooker, laurels fresh
                    yet from their magic at Chattanooga, do then – besides send those two
                    pretenders Grant and Sherman out to pasture?


                    don
                  • dmercado@worldnet.att.net
                    ... Joe, that was too easy. Try something tougher. Let s see what Lt. General Thomas (has a nice ring) does according to Donn Piatt (General George H. Thomas
                    Message 9 of 19 , Jun 29, 2001
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                      --- In civilwarwest@y..., josepharose@y... wrote:
                      > Thomas, having cut off the Confederates supply line and finding
                      > that "Ol' Joe turns to fight", merely has to fortify a good,
                      > defensible position.

                      Joe, that was too easy.

                      Try something tougher. Let's see what Lt. General Thomas (has a
                      nice ring) does according to Donn Piatt (General George H. Thomas A
                      Critical Biography, Robert Clarke & Co, 1893):

                      "Had General Thomas been intrusted with the command given Grant he
                      would have placed Rosecrans or Buell in command of a force large
                      enough to cover Washington, and transported the Army of the Potomac
                      to Tennessee. This would have forced Lee to evacuate Virginia and
                      concentrate his forces in the cotton states. We would then have had
                      the immense advantage of but one army of invasion and that with its
                      base in the very heart of the Confederacy where our fleet could have
                      co-operated in not only keeping open the Mississippi, but menacing
                      the coast of both the Atlantic and the Gulf. This would have been
                      the intelligent warfare on our part that General Thomas saw in the
                      beginning and kept in view until the end."

                      Actually, not being a Lt. General myself I have no idea if this would
                      work, but it is fun to speculate. Also, while Piatt did have several
                      conversations with Thomas, no one else including Thomas has mentioned
                      this `theory' as far as I know. Best regards, Dave
                    • theme_music@yahoo.com
                      ... their ... wouldn t  be slowed was the first in line, as that had no wagons in front of it. That misses the point entirely. Sherman already had
                      Message 10 of 19 , Jun 30, 2001
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                        --- In civilwarwest@y..., josepharose@y... wrote:
                        > Eric,
                        >
                        > In this little what-if scenario, you seem to forget that Sherman's
                        > four divisions were traveling with the supply trains following
                        their
                        > respective divisions. (Sherman's goof here contradicts your
                        > assertion: "Sherman had shown he could move troops over hundreds of
                        > miles and bring them into battle.") This strung-out the column of
                        > march and slowed it down immensely. The only division that
                        wouldn't
                         be slowed was the first in line, as that had no wagons in front of
                        it.

                        That misses the point entirely. Sherman already had organized and
                        fully functional supply trains. Hooker did not. To move Hooker (or
                        Thomas) you first need to organize supply. Just one part of the
                        logistics your plan fails to consider. I get from your posts that
                        consider this trivial but, Grant couldn't and didn't.

                        Sherman did fail to revise his marching orders, which had actually
                        served him quite well over the course of march. This did slow his
                        advance from Bridgeport. However, in order to contradict the
                        statement the statement "Sherman had shown he could move troops over
                        hundreds of miles and bring them into battle" you must
                        prove "Sherman had shown he could NOT move troops over hundreds of
                        miles and bring them into battle." If accuracy was your wish you
                        might state "Sherman had shown he could move troops over hundreds of
                        miles and bring them into battle with a delay of several days."


                        > As I remember, Thomas suggested using Hooker's three divisions
                        > instead of Sherman's in the amphibious assault. These troops could
                        > start crossing at Brown's Ferry even before Sherman's first
                        division
                        > entered Lookout Valley. Once the first division took up their
                        > positions to protect the Cracker Line, Hooker's last units could
                        move
                        > over the pontoon bridge. They could be in position behind the hills
                        > on the right bank while much of Sherman's column was still en route
                        > to Lookout Valley.


                        Your plan exposes the Cracker Line. Grant's did not. If sufficient
                        force is left behind to guard the Cracker Line until Sherman arrives,
                        no time is saved.

                        Your plan requires moving two large bodies of troops. Grant's
                        required moving only one.

                        And why don't we hold to our standard of merit based on past
                        performance. In Grant's eyes, and Thomas', if truly possessed of the
                        military acumen you've attached to him, Sherman,s men would have to
                        have been considered the better choice. Surely your jealousy of
                        Sherman and his troops is not a good enough reason in and of itself
                        to choose Hooker, especially given the more complex and tactically
                        inferior planning required.


                        > Logistically, instead of Sherman's animals pulling their own
                        > artillery, as well as crossing into Chattanooga to take some of
                        > Thomas', Hooker's animals would follow the same route. There would
                        > be no difference.

                        In this scenario, you are depriving Hooker of the ability to move his
                        artillery. Grant's plan did not, which had the advantage of enabling
                        Hooker's move over Lookout and through Rossville Gap. Your plan
                        forces Hooker to sit immobile in Lookout Valley.

                        Your plan exposes Chattanooga. Grant's did not.

                        Your plan requires Thomas to organize a supply train and cross it
                        over the river along with his troops. Grant's did not.

                        Let's take a look at what you consider to be no different: Orders
                        are issued to all batteries under Hooker, a detail sent to collect
                        all the horses and bring them into Chattanooga. Orders issued and a
                        detail to assign horses to Thomas artillery. Additional forage must
                        be provided (don't forget that Sherman's supply trains take care of
                        this in Grant's plan)to Thomas. Given your previous statements about
                        Thomas' immobility we must also assume that a supply of wagons,
                        limbers, harness, caissons etc must be brought up. You believe this
                        is the same as leaving Hooker's artillery as it was??

                        It should be obvious, then, that the plan Grant enacted, and I might
                        add with the assistance and co-operation of Thomas, is superior in
                        many, many, ways to either of the scenarios you have proposed.
                        Simply put Grant required Hooker and Thomas to stay where they were
                        while Sherman got into position. Either of your scenarios requires
                        putting a second body of troops in motion. No significant time is
                        saved by either of your scenarios since Sherman must arrive and place
                        his troops in position before the attack can get underway.



                        > Because Hooker's divisions were rather small, Davis' division as
                        well
                        > as another from the AotC could be sent over to reinforce the
                        > assaulting units. That would still leave three divisions for
                         Chattanooga's defense.

                        I' m hoping you realize that you keeping shifting back and forth
                        between two entirely different, and mutually exclusive scenarios.
                        I'll assume you know this, but I'm becoming less and less certain.

                        At any rate, Grant's plan clearly allowed for troops to be shifted
                        around based on need, or on the bridges being out of action, as it
                        was done several times.

                        >
                        > As time was of the essence, this plan would surely hurry things
                         forward, as opposed to waiting for Sherman's men.

                        If you don't wait for Sherman, Chattanooga or the Cracker Line is
                        left undefended. I am sure Grant, Thomas and Hooker would all
                        consider this a fatal flaw to any proposed plan. If you wait for
                        Sherman, you don't gain any measurable time.

                        I see no advantages to either scenario your have presented, other
                        than filling the need to enhance one commander at the expense of
                        another. The persuasiveness of the many, many keystrokes expended in
                        arguments bemoaning favoritism, is belied by the obvious fact that
                        you have failed to convince yourself.

                        >
                        > Joseph
                        >
                        > P.S. You correctly assert that: "Civil war battles, with only
                        handful
                        > of exceptions, were bloody indecisive affairs, most of which had
                        very
                        > little impact on the end of the war." That is one of the reasons
                        why
                        > Thomas was such a good commander. At Nashville, Grant would have
                        > been satisfied with a drawn battle. Thomas was going for the
                        > decisive victory. Guess what. He did it.
                        >

                        Hood's army was ill-led, poorly supplied, demoralized, out numbered,
                        starved and freezing in a ridiculous position outside Nashville. I
                        would hope that a battle which was the rough equivalent of Mike Tyson
                        taking on a malnourished, dim-witted, one armed, one legged man is
                        not the only claim to fame of a truly great commander. You can't be
                        the best until you've beaten the best, know what I mean?

                        Eric
                      • brooksdsimpson@yahoo.com
                        ... Would highlighting the irony here be excessive? :) ... numbered, ... I ... Tyson ... Eric is right on the mark here. To celebrate Thomas as being a great
                        Message 11 of 19 , Jun 30, 2001
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                          --- In civilwarwest@y..., theme_music@y... wrote:
                          > --- In civilwarwest@y..., josepharose@y... wrote:
                          > I see no advantages to either scenario your have presented, other
                          > than filling the need to enhance one commander at the expense of
                          > another.

                          Would highlighting the irony here be excessive? :)

                          > > At Nashville, Grant would have
                          > > been satisfied with a drawn battle. Thomas was going for the
                          > > decisive victory. Guess what. He did it.
                          > >
                          >
                          > Hood's army was ill-led, poorly supplied, demoralized, out
                          numbered,
                          > starved and freezing in a ridiculous position outside Nashville.
                          I
                          > would hope that a battle which was the rough equivalent of Mike
                          Tyson
                          > taking on a malnourished, dim-witted, one armed, one legged man is
                          > not the only claim to fame of a truly great commander.

                          Eric is right on the mark here. To celebrate Thomas as being a great
                          commander because of Nashville is like elevating James H. Wilson over
                          Forrest because of Selma. Just as Forrest's weakness helps to
                          explain Wilson's success, John Bell Hood's performance at Franklin
                          goes far to explain what happened at Nashville--indeed, it is the
                          most significant variable.
                        • josepharose@yahoo.com
                          Eric, I m sorry, but in explaining my thoughts, it appears that I evidently have not been able to do so sufficiently for your understanding. That being the
                          Message 12 of 19 , Jun 30, 2001
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                            Eric,

                            I'm sorry, but in explaining my thoughts, it appears that I evidently
                            have not been able to do so sufficiently for your understanding.
                            That being the case, it would unfortunately be fruitless to attempt
                            an answer to your post.

                            Joseph
                          • redpepper@searchcentralonline.com
                            I suppose that it would also be excessive to highlight the irony of the whining about Sherman s delay at Chattanooga and the repeated attempts to justify and
                            Message 13 of 19 , Jul 1 4:59 AM
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                              I suppose that it would also be excessive to highlight the irony of
                              the whining about Sherman's delay at Chattanooga and the repeated
                              attempts to justify and even glorify Thomas' foot dragging at
                              Nashville.
                              Red
                            • redpepper@searchcentralonline.com
                              ... evidently ... LOL. Sorry but I think everyone understood exactly what your concept was and that Eric simply and cogently debunked it. However I do
                              Message 14 of 19 , Jul 1 5:06 AM
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                                --- In civilwarwest@y..., josepharose@y... wrote:
                                > Eric,
                                >
                                > I'm sorry, but in explaining my thoughts, it appears that I
                                evidently
                                > have not been able to do so sufficiently for your understanding.
                                > That being the case, it would unfortunately be fruitless to attempt
                                > an answer to your post.
                                >
                                > Joseph

                                LOL. Sorry but I think everyone understood exactly what your concept
                                was and that Eric simply and cogently debunked it. However I do
                                certainly agree that it would be fruitless for you to attempt to
                                answer Eric's post.
                                Red
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