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Re: [civilwarwest] Re: Was Pemberton Wrong, Bad, Incompetent (Vicksburg Campaign)

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  • William Nolan
    Johnston was not the most aggressive general. The Cavalry was on the Black River in May and was available. It was also trained as Infantry, so it was capable
    Message 1 of 52 , Jan 9, 2013
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      Johnston was not the most aggressive general. The Cavalry was on the Black River in May and was available. It was also trained as Infantry, so it was capable of hitting and staying. Why Johnston did not attack Sherman's rear and force him to fight his way out or surrender. He would have been penned between Pemberton, the Black River and Grant would have had difficulty in maneuver in supporting Sherman. Why was the question. Someone, maybe Davis would not let it happen. Remember he kept his hand in most of the operations. Instead Johnston waited to be attacked by a reinforced Sherman at Jackson after Vicksburg and he had to retreat.
      Bill Nolan   Whitfield Ross Texas Cavalry Brigade



      From: John Lawrence <jlawrence@...>
      To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
      Sent: Wednesday, January 9, 2013 1:53 PM
      Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] Re: Was Pemberton Wrong, Bad, Incompetent (Vicksburg Campaign)

       
      Another way to look at it was this Grant's 7th try and he only had to win once.
      Regards,
      Jack

      Tony tony_gunter@...> wrote:

      >--- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "callicles1" wrote:
      >>
      >> I am of the opinion that Pemberton acquitted himself well enough during the campaign. He just ran up against Grant. I'm just wondering what you folks think.
      >>
      >> 1. Was Grant that good; or
      >>
      >> 2. Was Pemberton that bad; or
      >>
      >> 3. Is it some where in between?
      >>
      >
      >Can I answer this in multiple parts? :)
      >
      >Grant's Yazoo Pass raid, though turned back at Fort Pemberton, had a major impact on Pemberton's ability to defend the interior of Mississippi. When Pemberton learned troops were sailing south through Yazoo pass, he deployed his scouts into the Yazoo River delta where they could not easily be recalled. As a consequence, Pemberton was forced to utilize amateur scouts against Grant's seasoned veterans between Port Gibson / Jackson / Edward's Station. As a result, Gregg assumed he was facing only a brigade at Raymond. This resulted in a complete rout at Raymond, which took Gregg's brigade off the table at Jackson and meant Johnston only had roughly 4000 men to defend Jackson. Complicating matters, Pemberton's cavalry was run ragged and his rail infratructure was compromised by Grierson's raid.
      >
      >GOOD: Grant kept Pemberton on his toes, launching multiple efforts to strike at Pemberton's ability to wage war and open up a path south of Vicksburg. Yazoo Pass Raid, Grierson's raid, Sherman's feigned assault at Snyder's Bluff, Grant's canal, and Lake Providence all kept Pemberton guessing as to Grant's intent and direction of attack.
      >
      >BAD: Pemberton really should have spent some energy developing intel on the area south of the railroad. When the sh*t hit the fan, Pemberton's troops acted like they were the visiting team, often taking the wrong roads and failing to understand the location and direction of Grant's movements.
      >
      >2) Pemberton
      >
      >
      >
      >------------------------------------
      >
      >Yahoo! Groups Links
      >
      >
      >


    • Ned Baldwin
      ... He did receive direction from Halleck; Halleck did not remain Mute. ... Baseless. ... Would there have been a disaster at Holly Springs without the
      Message 52 of 52 , Jan 10, 2013
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        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony" wrote:
        > Starting in early October IIRC, Grant asked repeatedly for direction. What am I to do? What is my objective? How should I proceed. Receiving absolutely no direction from Halleck, Grant outlined a plan: consolidate his force against Holly Springs, drive Pemberton south rebuilding the railroad as he went, take Vicksburg from the interior. Still, Halleck remained mute about Grant's objectives, despite the fact that Halleck was aware that McClernand had bent Lincoln's ear towards a riverine campaign.
        >
        >

        He did receive direction from Halleck; Halleck did not remain Mute.



        > So we have Lincoln stabbing Grant in the back, and Halleck feeding him lies.
        >

        Baseless.


        >
        Would there have been a disaster at Holly Springs without the riverine expedition?
        >

        Absolutely.



        > As far as inventing my own history, go bugger yourself in the earhole.
        >

        Truth hurts huh.
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