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Re: Retreat and Fall Back

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  • william
    Thank you Bill, that was very helpful. Bill Bruner
    Message 1 of 30 , Jan 3, 2011
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      Thank you Bill, that was very helpful.

      Bill Bruner

      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, William Nolan <sixtxcavrgtcsa@...> wrote:
      >
      > There were essentially three units at Holly Springs. One at the supply depot,
      > one down town and a lite(not fully manned) Cavalry regiment at the fair grounds.
      > Roughly half the Cavalry was captured while the other half chrged itself free
      > and escaped. A few others hid and were not captured but about 1500 were rounded
      > up, processed and paroled. The union thought 2500 men were there, but some were
      > spread out on guard and other postings.
      >  
      > Grant had left the depot the a day or so earlier and was south of the depot
      > between the enemy and Holly Springs. He had ordered the Cavalry regiment in
      > Holly Springs to find the Raiding Force, and they were up ready to move when the
      > raid hit. That is why they were able to fight their way out.  Van Dorn was
      > spoted east of Holly Spring and word was sent to Grant, but neither soldier sent
      > made it to Report. Grant had earlier sent another Cavalry to find the raid, but
      > that provided another reluctand leader.
      >  
      > Griffith the acting commander of The Whitfield Brigade, the author of the raid
      > had enough intelligence from Cavalry recon that he knew the depot was ripe for
      > picking. He was also an excellent cavalry leader having a militia unit in the
      > south Dallas area before the war that was always ready to chase the local
      > Indians. He had also been involved in the planning of Ross' raid before Pea
      > Ridgee and a highly successful charge in the Indian territory. He was the right
      > leader at the right time as was Van Dorn, who let Griffith lead the charge into
      > Holly Springs.    Bill Nolan Kerrville, TX
      >  
      >  
      > Fom: william banbruner@...
      > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
      > Sent: Sat, January 1, 2011 1:48:43 PM
      > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Retreat and Fall Back
      >
      >  
      > My question has always been: why was Holly Springs left so vulnerable to a
      > Calvary raid, considering its strategic importance?
      >
      > Bill Bruner
      >
      > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@> wrote:
      > >
      > >
      > > very good synopsis.
      > >
      > > In some ways this is similar to Lee's treatment of Pope along the Rappahannock
      > >prior to the battle of 2nd Manassas.
      > >
      > >
      > > This time Hood (in the role of Lee) is trying to prevent/destroy Schofield (in
      > >the role of Pope) from combining with Thomas (in the role of McClellan) in the
      > >Nashville defenses (playing the role of Washington DC).
      > >
      > >
      > > Of course, Lee then split his army (he had that habit) sending Jackson on an
      > >end-run and Little Mac was farther away than Thomas.
      > >
      > >
      > > HankC
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, DORR64OVI@ wrote:
      > > >
      > > > Once Thomas determines that Hoods intention is to fight his army and not
      > > > follow Sherman into GA, Old Paps plan is to concentrate his forces. Until
      > > > Hood shows his hand about where he intends to move, either toward Knoxville
      > > > or northward into Ky, Thomas prepares to check him either at Murfreesboro or
      >
      > > > Chattanooga.
      > > > Thomas orders Schofield to move gradually back from Pulaski to Columbia
      > > > in case Hoods moves this way. When the telegraph lines get cut between
      > > > Thomas and Schofield, Thomas believes at this point that Hoods objective is
      > > > Nashville and not Chattanooga.
      > > > At Columbia Schofield is fooled by the appearance of Hoods artillery.
      > > > He fails to see that it is a trick to hold him in place while Hood crosses
      > > > the Duck River and move to cut him off at Spring Hill. After delaying for
      > > > 12 some hours, Wilsons cavalry patrols reveal Hoods intentions and
      > > > Schofield sends the 4th Corps hastily up the Columbia Pike. Only Hoods own
      > >blunder
      > >
      > > > at Spring Hill in failling to attack saves Schofield from capture and the
      > > > Federals march past Hoods campfires on the retreat to Franklin and
      > > > Nashville.
      > > > When Thomas gets the word that Hood has crossed the Duck River and is
      > > > moving north, it is at this point that he orders his forces to concentrate
      > > > at Nashville. Schofield is slowly retreating to Franklin where he must
      > > > cross the Harpeth River. Thomas orders him to defend Franklin while crossing
      >
      > > > and hopes Schofield can hold for three days to allow Smiths reeinforcements
      > > > to arrive at Nashville. Schofield replies that he cant hold Franklin and
      > > > Thomas then orders him to pull his army back to Nashville.
      > > > Approaching Franklin, Hood orders a frontal assault which is repulsed
      > > > with heavy losses. Schofield continues his retreat to Nashville after dark
      > > > and reaches the cities defenses on Dec 1. Hood follows Schofield to
      > > > Nashville, but his losses have weakened his force so that it cannot attack
      > > > Thomas. Hood has now lost the critical element of initiative and Thomas has
      > > > time to strengthen his forces especially his cavalry. Despite fears of Hoods
      >
      > > > intentions and ability to move by Washington and Grant, Thomas waits out
      > > > the Dec weather and finally attacks Hood, smashing him over the course of
      > > > two days.
      > > > So it appears that Schofields moves are a retreat which ultimately
      > > > reveal Hoods intentions.
      > > >
      > > > Kent Dorr
      > > >
      > > > In a message dated 12/27/2010 10:14:01 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
      > > > clarkc@ writes:
      > > >
      > > >
      > > > Of course, in Schofield's mind (and his men) there is no withdrawal or
      > > > fall back.
      > > >
      > > > Nashville is his destination from the beginning of the move from Atlanta.
      > > >
      > > > Thomas considers moving forward to Brentwood but decides to wait for
      > > > Smith's divisions and remains concentrated at Nashville - especially with
      > > > Forrest's whereabouts unknown.
      > > >
      > > > A number of garrisons at Chattanooga and northern Alabama are also ordered
      > > > to concentrate toward Murfreesboro. These units had been placed to provide
      > > > early warning and delay of such a move as Hood's. Once the move is
      > > > discovered and well-developed, their mission is over md they are free to be
      > > > re-deployed. Whether the new move is backward, forward or sideways is
      > >situation
      > >
      > > > dependent.
      > > >
      > > > HankC
      > > >
      > >
      >
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