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Re: Retreat and Fall Back

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  • william
    My question has always been: why was Holly Springs left so vulnerable to a Calvary raid, considering its strategic importance? Bill Bruner
    Message 1 of 30 , Jan 1, 2011
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      My question has always been: why was Holly Springs left so vulnerable to a Calvary raid, considering its strategic importance?

      Bill Bruner

      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@...> wrote:
      >
      >
      > very good synopsis.
      >
      > In some ways this is similar to Lee's treatment of Pope along the Rappahannock prior to the battle of 2nd Manassas.
      >
      > This time Hood (in the role of Lee) is trying to prevent/destroy Schofield (in the role of Pope) from combining with Thomas (in the role of McClellan) in the Nashville defenses (playing the role of Washington DC).
      >
      > Of course, Lee then split his army (he had that habit) sending Jackson on an end-run and Little Mac was farther away than Thomas.
      >
      >
      > HankC
      >
      >
      >
      > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, DORR64OVI@ wrote:
      > >
      > > Once Thomas determines that Hoods intention is to fight his army and not
      > > follow Sherman into GA, Old Paps plan is to concentrate his forces. Until
      > > Hood shows his hand about where he intends to move, either toward Knoxville
      > > or northward into Ky, Thomas prepares to check him either at Murfreesboro or
      > > Chattanooga.
      > > Thomas orders Schofield to move gradually back from Pulaski to Columbia
      > > in case Hoods moves this way. When the telegraph lines get cut between
      > > Thomas and Schofield, Thomas believes at this point that Hoods objective is
      > > Nashville and not Chattanooga.
      > > At Columbia Schofield is fooled by the appearance of Hoods artillery.
      > > He fails to see that it is a trick to hold him in place while Hood crosses
      > > the Duck River and move to cut him off at Spring Hill. After delaying for
      > > 12 some hours, Wilsons cavalry patrols reveal Hoods intentions and
      > > Schofield sends the 4th Corps hastily up the Columbia Pike. Only Hoods own blunder
      > > at Spring Hill in failling to attack saves Schofield from capture and the
      > > Federals march past Hoods campfires on the retreat to Franklin and
      > > Nashville.
      > > When Thomas gets the word that Hood has crossed the Duck River and is
      > > moving north, it is at this point that he orders his forces to concentrate
      > > at Nashville. Schofield is slowly retreating to Franklin where he must
      > > cross the Harpeth River. Thomas orders him to defend Franklin while crossing
      > > and hopes Schofield can hold for three days to allow Smiths reeinforcements
      > > to arrive at Nashville. Schofield replies that he cant hold Franklin and
      > > Thomas then orders him to pull his army back to Nashville.
      > > Approaching Franklin, Hood orders a frontal assault which is repulsed
      > > with heavy losses. Schofield continues his retreat to Nashville after dark
      > > and reaches the cities defenses on Dec 1. Hood follows Schofield to
      > > Nashville, but his losses have weakened his force so that it cannot attack
      > > Thomas. Hood has now lost the critical element of initiative and Thomas has
      > > time to strengthen his forces especially his cavalry. Despite fears of Hoods
      > > intentions and ability to move by Washington and Grant, Thomas waits out
      > > the Dec weather and finally attacks Hood, smashing him over the course of
      > > two days.
      > > So it appears that Schofields moves are a retreat which ultimately
      > > reveal Hoods intentions.
      > >
      > > Kent Dorr
      > >
      > > In a message dated 12/27/2010 10:14:01 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
      > > clarkc@ writes:
      > >
      > >
      > > Of course, in Schofield's mind (and his men) there is no withdrawal or
      > > fall back.
      > >
      > > Nashville is his destination from the beginning of the move from Atlanta.
      > >
      > > Thomas considers moving forward to Brentwood but decides to wait for
      > > Smith's divisions and remains concentrated at Nashville - especially with
      > > Forrest's whereabouts unknown.
      > >
      > > A number of garrisons at Chattanooga and northern Alabama are also ordered
      > > to concentrate toward Murfreesboro. These units had been placed to provide
      > > early warning and delay of such a move as Hood's. Once the move is
      > > discovered and well-developed, their mission is over md they are free to be
      > > re-deployed. Whether the new move is backward, forward or sideways is situation
      > > dependent.
      > >
      > > HankC
      > >
      >
    • hank9174
      The garrison at Holly Springs is about 1500. That s a pretty significant force, leading to the conclusion that the local commander is not diligent enough.
      Message 2 of 30 , Jan 1, 2011
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        The garrison at Holly Springs is about 1500. That's a pretty significant force, leading to the conclusion that the local commander is not diligent enough.

        Grant send warnings on the 19th that Van Dorn was on the loose with an unknown destination.

        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "william" <banbruner@...> wrote:
        >
        > My question has always been: why was Holly Springs left so vulnerable to a Calvary raid, considering its strategic importance?
        >
        > Bill Bruner
        >
        > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@> wrote:
        > >
        > >
        > > very good synopsis.
        > >
        > > In some ways this is similar to Lee's treatment of Pope along the Rappahannock prior to the battle of 2nd Manassas.
        > >
        > > This time Hood (in the role of Lee) is trying to prevent/destroy Schofield (in the role of Pope) from combining with Thomas (in the role of McClellan) in the Nashville defenses (playing the role of Washington DC).
        > >
        > > Of course, Lee then split his army (he had that habit) sending Jackson on an end-run and Little Mac was farther away than Thomas.
        > >
        > >
        > > HankC
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, DORR64OVI@ wrote:
        > > >
        > > > Once Thomas determines that Hoods intention is to fight his army and not
        > > > follow Sherman into GA, Old Paps plan is to concentrate his forces. Until
        > > > Hood shows his hand about where he intends to move, either toward Knoxville
        > > > or northward into Ky, Thomas prepares to check him either at Murfreesboro or
        > > > Chattanooga.
        > > > Thomas orders Schofield to move gradually back from Pulaski to Columbia
        > > > in case Hoods moves this way. When the telegraph lines get cut between
        > > > Thomas and Schofield, Thomas believes at this point that Hoods objective is
        > > > Nashville and not Chattanooga.
        > > > At Columbia Schofield is fooled by the appearance of Hoods artillery.
        > > > He fails to see that it is a trick to hold him in place while Hood crosses
        > > > the Duck River and move to cut him off at Spring Hill. After delaying for
        > > > 12 some hours, Wilsons cavalry patrols reveal Hoods intentions and
        > > > Schofield sends the 4th Corps hastily up the Columbia Pike. Only Hoods own blunder
        > > > at Spring Hill in failling to attack saves Schofield from capture and the
        > > > Federals march past Hoods campfires on the retreat to Franklin and
        > > > Nashville.
        > > > When Thomas gets the word that Hood has crossed the Duck River and is
        > > > moving north, it is at this point that he orders his forces to concentrate
        > > > at Nashville. Schofield is slowly retreating to Franklin where he must
        > > > cross the Harpeth River. Thomas orders him to defend Franklin while crossing
        > > > and hopes Schofield can hold for three days to allow Smiths reeinforcements
        > > > to arrive at Nashville. Schofield replies that he cant hold Franklin and
        > > > Thomas then orders him to pull his army back to Nashville.
        > > > Approaching Franklin, Hood orders a frontal assault which is repulsed
        > > > with heavy losses. Schofield continues his retreat to Nashville after dark
        > > > and reaches the cities defenses on Dec 1. Hood follows Schofield to
        > > > Nashville, but his losses have weakened his force so that it cannot attack
        > > > Thomas. Hood has now lost the critical element of initiative and Thomas has
        > > > time to strengthen his forces especially his cavalry. Despite fears of Hoods
        > > > intentions and ability to move by Washington and Grant, Thomas waits out
        > > > the Dec weather and finally attacks Hood, smashing him over the course of
        > > > two days.
        > > > So it appears that Schofields moves are a retreat which ultimately
        > > > reveal Hoods intentions.
        > > >
        > > > Kent Dorr
        > > >
        > > > In a message dated 12/27/2010 10:14:01 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
        > > > clarkc@ writes:
        > > >
        > > >
        > > > Of course, in Schofield's mind (and his men) there is no withdrawal or
        > > > fall back.
        > > >
        > > > Nashville is his destination from the beginning of the move from Atlanta.
        > > >
        > > > Thomas considers moving forward to Brentwood but decides to wait for
        > > > Smith's divisions and remains concentrated at Nashville - especially with
        > > > Forrest's whereabouts unknown.
        > > >
        > > > A number of garrisons at Chattanooga and northern Alabama are also ordered
        > > > to concentrate toward Murfreesboro. These units had been placed to provide
        > > > early warning and delay of such a move as Hood's. Once the move is
        > > > discovered and well-developed, their mission is over md they are free to be
        > > > re-deployed. Whether the new move is backward, forward or sideways is situation
        > > > dependent.
        > > >
        > > > HankC
        > > >
        > >
        >
      • william
        I ve been trying to find the strength of the garrison. I have seen that 1500 were captured but I m thinking many more may have escaped. R. C. Murphy the
        Message 3 of 30 , Jan 1, 2011
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          I've been trying to find the strength of the garrison. I have seen that 1500 were captured but I'm thinking many more may have escaped.

          R. C. Murphy the commander had proven himself to be incompetent and or a coward at Iuka. ISTM that the importance and nearness of Holly Springs to the main army that reinforcements could have easily been sent in time for Van Dorn's raid.

          Bill Bruner

          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@...> wrote:
          >
          > The garrison at Holly Springs is about 1500. That's a pretty significant force, leading to the conclusion that the local commander is not diligent enough.
          >
          > Grant send warnings on the 19th that Van Dorn was on the loose with an unknown destination.
          >
          > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "william" <banbruner@> wrote:
          > >
          > > My question has always been: why was Holly Springs left so vulnerable to a Calvary raid, considering its strategic importance?
          > >
          > > Bill Bruner
          > >
          > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@> wrote:
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > very good synopsis.
          > > >
          > > > In some ways this is similar to Lee's treatment of Pope along the Rappahannock prior to the battle of 2nd Manassas.
          > > >
          > > > This time Hood (in the role of Lee) is trying to prevent/destroy Schofield (in the role of Pope) from combining with Thomas (in the role of McClellan) in the Nashville defenses (playing the role of Washington DC).
          > > >
          > > > Of course, Lee then split his army (he had that habit) sending Jackson on an end-run and Little Mac was farther away than Thomas.
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > HankC
          > > >
          > > >
          > > >
          > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, DORR64OVI@ wrote:
          > > > >
          > > > > Once Thomas determines that Hoods intention is to fight his army and not
          > > > > follow Sherman into GA, Old Paps plan is to concentrate his forces. Until
          > > > > Hood shows his hand about where he intends to move, either toward Knoxville
          > > > > or northward into Ky, Thomas prepares to check him either at Murfreesboro or
          > > > > Chattanooga.
          > > > > Thomas orders Schofield to move gradually back from Pulaski to Columbia
          > > > > in case Hoods moves this way. When the telegraph lines get cut between
          > > > > Thomas and Schofield, Thomas believes at this point that Hoods objective is
          > > > > Nashville and not Chattanooga.
          > > > > At Columbia Schofield is fooled by the appearance of Hoods artillery.
          > > > > He fails to see that it is a trick to hold him in place while Hood crosses
          > > > > the Duck River and move to cut him off at Spring Hill. After delaying for
          > > > > 12 some hours, Wilsons cavalry patrols reveal Hoods intentions and
          > > > > Schofield sends the 4th Corps hastily up the Columbia Pike. Only Hoods own blunder
          > > > > at Spring Hill in failling to attack saves Schofield from capture and the
          > > > > Federals march past Hoods campfires on the retreat to Franklin and
          > > > > Nashville.
          > > > > When Thomas gets the word that Hood has crossed the Duck River and is
          > > > > moving north, it is at this point that he orders his forces to concentrate
          > > > > at Nashville. Schofield is slowly retreating to Franklin where he must
          > > > > cross the Harpeth River. Thomas orders him to defend Franklin while crossing
          > > > > and hopes Schofield can hold for three days to allow Smiths reeinforcements
          > > > > to arrive at Nashville. Schofield replies that he cant hold Franklin and
          > > > > Thomas then orders him to pull his army back to Nashville.
          > > > > Approaching Franklin, Hood orders a frontal assault which is repulsed
          > > > > with heavy losses. Schofield continues his retreat to Nashville after dark
          > > > > and reaches the cities defenses on Dec 1. Hood follows Schofield to
          > > > > Nashville, but his losses have weakened his force so that it cannot attack
          > > > > Thomas. Hood has now lost the critical element of initiative and Thomas has
          > > > > time to strengthen his forces especially his cavalry. Despite fears of Hoods
          > > > > intentions and ability to move by Washington and Grant, Thomas waits out
          > > > > the Dec weather and finally attacks Hood, smashing him over the course of
          > > > > two days.
          > > > > So it appears that Schofields moves are a retreat which ultimately
          > > > > reveal Hoods intentions.
          > > > >
          > > > > Kent Dorr
          > > > >
          > > > > In a message dated 12/27/2010 10:14:01 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
          > > > > clarkc@ writes:
          > > > >
          > > > >
          > > > > Of course, in Schofield's mind (and his men) there is no withdrawal or
          > > > > fall back.
          > > > >
          > > > > Nashville is his destination from the beginning of the move from Atlanta.
          > > > >
          > > > > Thomas considers moving forward to Brentwood but decides to wait for
          > > > > Smith's divisions and remains concentrated at Nashville - especially with
          > > > > Forrest's whereabouts unknown.
          > > > >
          > > > > A number of garrisons at Chattanooga and northern Alabama are also ordered
          > > > > to concentrate toward Murfreesboro. These units had been placed to provide
          > > > > early warning and delay of such a move as Hood's. Once the move is
          > > > > discovered and well-developed, their mission is over md they are free to be
          > > > > re-deployed. Whether the new move is backward, forward or sideways is situation
          > > > > dependent.
          > > > >
          > > > > HankC
          > > > >
          > > >
          > >
          >
        • William Nolan
          There were essentially three units at Holly Springs. One at the supply depot, one down town and a lite(not fully manned) Cavalry regiment at the fair grounds.
          Message 4 of 30 , Jan 3, 2011
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            There were essentially three units at Holly Springs. One at the supply depot, one down town and a lite(not fully manned) Cavalry regiment at the fair grounds. Roughly half the Cavalry was captured while the other half chrged itself free and escaped. A few others hid and were not captured but about 1500 were rounded up, processed and paroled. The union thought 2500 men were there, but some were spread out on guard and other postings.
             
            Grant had left the depot the a day or so earlier and was south of the depot between the enemy and Holly Springs. He had ordered the Cavalry regiment in Holly Springs to find the Raiding Force, and they were up ready to move when the raid hit. That is why they were able to fight their way out.  Van Dorn was spoted east of Holly Spring and word was sent to Grant, but neither soldier sent made it to Report. Grant had earlier sent another Cavalry to find the raid, but that provided another reluctand leader.
             
            Griffith the acting commander of The Whitfield Brigade, the author of the raid had enough intelligence from Cavalry recon that he knew the depot was ripe for picking. He was also an excellent cavalry leader having a militia unit in the south Dallas area before the war that was always ready to chase the local Indians. He had also been involved in the planning of Ross' raid before Pea Ridgee and a highly successful charge in the Indian territory. He was the right leader at the right time as was Van Dorn, who let Griffith lead the charge into Holly Springs.    Bill Nolan Kerrville, TX
             
             
            Fom: william banbruner@...
            To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
            Sent: Sat, January 1, 2011 1:48:43 PM
            Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Retreat and Fall Back

             

            My question has always been: why was Holly Springs left so vulnerable to a Calvary raid, considering its strategic importance?

            Bill Bruner

            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@...> wrote:
            >
            >
            > very good synopsis.
            >
            > In some ways this is similar to Lee's treatment of Pope along the Rappahannock prior to the battle of 2nd Manassas.
            >
            > This time Hood (in the role of Lee) is trying to prevent/destroy Schofield (in the role of Pope) from combining with Thomas (in the role of McClellan) in the Nashville defenses (playing the role of Washington DC).
            >
            > Of course, Lee then split his army (he had that habit) sending Jackson on an end-run and Little Mac was farther away than Thomas.
            >
            >
            > HankC
            >
            >
            >
            > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, DORR64OVI@ wrote:
            > >
            > > Once Thomas determines that Hoods intention is to fight his army and not
            > > follow Sherman into GA, Old Paps plan is to concentrate his forces. Until
            > > Hood shows his hand about where he intends to move, either toward Knoxville
            > > or northward into Ky, Thomas prepares to check him either at Murfreesboro or
            > > Chattanooga.
            > > Thomas orders Schofield to move gradually back from Pulaski to Columbia
            > > in case Hoods moves this way. When the telegraph lines get cut between
            > > Thomas and Schofield, Thomas believes at this point that Hoods objective is
            > > Nashville and not Chattanooga.
            > > At Columbia Schofield is fooled by the appearance of Hoods artillery.
            > > He fails to see that it is a trick to hold him in place while Hood crosses
            > > the Duck River and move to cut him off at Spring Hill. After delaying for
            > > 12 some hours, Wilsons cavalry patrols reveal Hoods intentions and
            > > Schofield sends the 4th Corps hastily up the Columbia Pike. Only Hoods own blunder
            > > at Spring Hill in failling to attack saves Schofield from capture and the
            > > Federals march past Hoods campfires on the retreat to Franklin and
            > > Nashville.
            > > When Thomas gets the word that Hood has crossed the Duck River and is
            > > moving north, it is at this point that he orders his forces to concentrate
            > > at Nashville. Schofield is slowly retreating to Franklin where he must
            > > cross the Harpeth River. Thomas orders him to defend Franklin while crossing
            > > and hopes Schofield can hold for three days to allow Smiths reeinforcements
            > > to arrive at Nashville. Schofield replies that he cant hold Franklin and
            > > Thomas then orders him to pull his army back to Nashville.
            > > Approaching Franklin, Hood orders a frontal assault which is repulsed
            > > with heavy losses. Schofield continues his retreat to Nashville after dark
            > > and reaches the cities defenses on Dec 1. Hood follows Schofield to
            > > Nashville, but his losses have weakened his force so that it cannot attack
            > > Thomas. Hood has now lost the critical element of initiative and Thomas has
            > > time to strengthen his forces especially his cavalry. Despite fears of Hoods
            > > intentions and ability to move by Washington and Grant, Thomas waits out
            > > the Dec weather and finally attacks Hood, smashing him over the course of
            > > two days.
            > > So it appears that Schofields moves are a retreat which ultimately
            > > reveal Hoods intentions.
            > >
            > > Kent Dorr
            > >
            > > In a message dated 12/27/2010 10:14:01 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
            > > clarkc@ writes:
            > >
            > >
            > > Of course, in Schofield's mind (and his men) there is no withdrawal or
            > > fall back.
            > >
            > > Nashville is his destination from the beginning of the move from Atlanta.
            > >
            > > Thomas considers moving forward to Brentwood but decides to wait for
            > > Smith's divisions and remains concentrated at Nashville - especially with
            > > Forrest's whereabouts unknown.
            > >
            > > A number of garrisons at Chattanooga and northern Alabama are also ordered
            > > to concentrate toward Murfreesboro. These units had been placed to provide
            > > early warning and delay of such a move as Hood's. Once the move is
            > > discovered and well-developed, their mission is over md they are free to be
            > > re-deployed. Whether the new move is backward, forward or sideways is situation
            > > dependent.
            > >
            > > HankC
            > >
            >

          • william
            Thank you Bill, that was very helpful. Bill Bruner
            Message 5 of 30 , Jan 3, 2011
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              Thank you Bill, that was very helpful.

              Bill Bruner

              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, William Nolan <sixtxcavrgtcsa@...> wrote:
              >
              > There were essentially three units at Holly Springs. One at the supply depot,
              > one down town and a lite(not fully manned) Cavalry regiment at the fair grounds.
              > Roughly half the Cavalry was captured while the other half chrged itself free
              > and escaped. A few others hid and were not captured but about 1500 were rounded
              > up, processed and paroled. The union thought 2500 men were there, but some were
              > spread out on guard and other postings.
              >  
              > Grant had left the depot the a day or so earlier and was south of the depot
              > between the enemy and Holly Springs. He had ordered the Cavalry regiment in
              > Holly Springs to find the Raiding Force, and they were up ready to move when the
              > raid hit. That is why they were able to fight their way out.  Van Dorn was
              > spoted east of Holly Spring and word was sent to Grant, but neither soldier sent
              > made it to Report. Grant had earlier sent another Cavalry to find the raid, but
              > that provided another reluctand leader.
              >  
              > Griffith the acting commander of The Whitfield Brigade, the author of the raid
              > had enough intelligence from Cavalry recon that he knew the depot was ripe for
              > picking. He was also an excellent cavalry leader having a militia unit in the
              > south Dallas area before the war that was always ready to chase the local
              > Indians. He had also been involved in the planning of Ross' raid before Pea
              > Ridgee and a highly successful charge in the Indian territory. He was the right
              > leader at the right time as was Van Dorn, who let Griffith lead the charge into
              > Holly Springs.    Bill Nolan Kerrville, TX
              >  
              >  
              > Fom: william banbruner@...
              > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
              > Sent: Sat, January 1, 2011 1:48:43 PM
              > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Retreat and Fall Back
              >
              >  
              > My question has always been: why was Holly Springs left so vulnerable to a
              > Calvary raid, considering its strategic importance?
              >
              > Bill Bruner
              >
              > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@> wrote:
              > >
              > >
              > > very good synopsis.
              > >
              > > In some ways this is similar to Lee's treatment of Pope along the Rappahannock
              > >prior to the battle of 2nd Manassas.
              > >
              > >
              > > This time Hood (in the role of Lee) is trying to prevent/destroy Schofield (in
              > >the role of Pope) from combining with Thomas (in the role of McClellan) in the
              > >Nashville defenses (playing the role of Washington DC).
              > >
              > >
              > > Of course, Lee then split his army (he had that habit) sending Jackson on an
              > >end-run and Little Mac was farther away than Thomas.
              > >
              > >
              > > HankC
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, DORR64OVI@ wrote:
              > > >
              > > > Once Thomas determines that Hoods intention is to fight his army and not
              > > > follow Sherman into GA, Old Paps plan is to concentrate his forces. Until
              > > > Hood shows his hand about where he intends to move, either toward Knoxville
              > > > or northward into Ky, Thomas prepares to check him either at Murfreesboro or
              >
              > > > Chattanooga.
              > > > Thomas orders Schofield to move gradually back from Pulaski to Columbia
              > > > in case Hoods moves this way. When the telegraph lines get cut between
              > > > Thomas and Schofield, Thomas believes at this point that Hoods objective is
              > > > Nashville and not Chattanooga.
              > > > At Columbia Schofield is fooled by the appearance of Hoods artillery.
              > > > He fails to see that it is a trick to hold him in place while Hood crosses
              > > > the Duck River and move to cut him off at Spring Hill. After delaying for
              > > > 12 some hours, Wilsons cavalry patrols reveal Hoods intentions and
              > > > Schofield sends the 4th Corps hastily up the Columbia Pike. Only Hoods own
              > >blunder
              > >
              > > > at Spring Hill in failling to attack saves Schofield from capture and the
              > > > Federals march past Hoods campfires on the retreat to Franklin and
              > > > Nashville.
              > > > When Thomas gets the word that Hood has crossed the Duck River and is
              > > > moving north, it is at this point that he orders his forces to concentrate
              > > > at Nashville. Schofield is slowly retreating to Franklin where he must
              > > > cross the Harpeth River. Thomas orders him to defend Franklin while crossing
              >
              > > > and hopes Schofield can hold for three days to allow Smiths reeinforcements
              > > > to arrive at Nashville. Schofield replies that he cant hold Franklin and
              > > > Thomas then orders him to pull his army back to Nashville.
              > > > Approaching Franklin, Hood orders a frontal assault which is repulsed
              > > > with heavy losses. Schofield continues his retreat to Nashville after dark
              > > > and reaches the cities defenses on Dec 1. Hood follows Schofield to
              > > > Nashville, but his losses have weakened his force so that it cannot attack
              > > > Thomas. Hood has now lost the critical element of initiative and Thomas has
              > > > time to strengthen his forces especially his cavalry. Despite fears of Hoods
              >
              > > > intentions and ability to move by Washington and Grant, Thomas waits out
              > > > the Dec weather and finally attacks Hood, smashing him over the course of
              > > > two days.
              > > > So it appears that Schofields moves are a retreat which ultimately
              > > > reveal Hoods intentions.
              > > >
              > > > Kent Dorr
              > > >
              > > > In a message dated 12/27/2010 10:14:01 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
              > > > clarkc@ writes:
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > Of course, in Schofield's mind (and his men) there is no withdrawal or
              > > > fall back.
              > > >
              > > > Nashville is his destination from the beginning of the move from Atlanta.
              > > >
              > > > Thomas considers moving forward to Brentwood but decides to wait for
              > > > Smith's divisions and remains concentrated at Nashville - especially with
              > > > Forrest's whereabouts unknown.
              > > >
              > > > A number of garrisons at Chattanooga and northern Alabama are also ordered
              > > > to concentrate toward Murfreesboro. These units had been placed to provide
              > > > early warning and delay of such a move as Hood's. Once the move is
              > > > discovered and well-developed, their mission is over md they are free to be
              > > > re-deployed. Whether the new move is backward, forward or sideways is
              > >situation
              > >
              > > > dependent.
              > > >
              > > > HankC
              > > >
              > >
              >
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