Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

Re: Trans-miss Resources

Expand Messages
  • Carl Williams
    I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in the Trans-Miss were so hampered as all that. For one thing, Curtis certainly found out at Pea Ridge
    Message 1 of 27 , Mar 23, 2008
    • 0 Attachment
      I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in the Trans-Miss
      were so hampered as all that. For one thing, Curtis certainly found
      out at Pea Ridge that a considerable army was capable of being formed
      in that neck of the woods by the Rebels, and the fact that the whole
      kit and kaboodle got stripped out of there, leaving a mess, shouldnt
      mean that something permanent necessarily changed. Furthermore what
      Confederate forces there were got sufficient supply to put up a good
      stand, as evidenced by the fact that not all battles were won by the
      Union and in fact none of the CS states ever got 'finished off.' The
      final attempt to do so, the 1864 Red River campaign, ran up against
      disaster, and no small part of the fact that it did was that the Rebs
      again put together an effective, *supplied* counter-force.

      It seems millions of dollars in supplies came through Texan and
      Mexican ports; the fact that it may have been hard to get those same
      supplies to Lee in the East doesnt mean they couldnt be used closer at
      hand. Banks wasnt run out of Louisiana, and Steele out of South
      Arkansas, by hillbillies throwing rocks and spears.


      [snip]
      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Ronald black" <rblack0981@...>
      wrote:
      >
      > Consider that the problem was firstly too little resources, secondly
      being ignored by the Richmond government since the Trans-Mississippi
      was considered as fourth in line of importance ...
    • Carl Williams
      ... agree this was a problem, but just pointing out that if nothing came across the Mississippi, supply was still available ... at times, notably to begin with
      Message 2 of 27 , Mar 23, 2008
      • 0 Attachment
        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Ronald black" <rblack0981@...>
        wrote:
        >secondly being ignored by the Richmond government since the
        >Trans-Mississippi was considered as fourth in line of importance,


        agree this was a problem, but just pointing out that if nothing came
        across the Mississippi, supply was still available


        >thirdly too many federals,


        at times, notably to begin with in Missouri. Always a victory of sorts
        to have those Feds have to send those resources when they were needed
        elsewhere, especially if they could be foiled


        >fourthly better union generals,


        you might elaborate


        > fifthly General T H Holmes too old too unqualified should have been
        retired not sent west to Trans-Mississippi.
        > Ron
        >


        absolutely agree with that. Apparently thought that his job was to do
        nothing and wait to be attacked. At Helena, for example, just
        threatening to take the place would have been worthwhile.
      • Chet Diestel
        While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often antiquated and the commands
        Message 3 of 27 , Mar 23, 2008
        • 0 Attachment
             While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often antiquated and the commands certainly lacked in artillery and transport when compared to its Northern counterparts.
             This did not mean that the Confederate forces were not able to put up often successful defenses, it does mean that throughout the war the Trans-Mississippi was very much left up to its own resources and devices.
             Indeed, even the troops that fought at Pea Ridge were largely transferred to east of the Mississippi shortly thereafter and were lost to the department. Moreover, and quite understandably, arms, munitions and other war materials that came in either by blockade runner or across the Mexican border were largely transported to the main Southern armies in the eastern theaters as were many of the units raised in the Trans-Mississippi states.
             Both sides considered the Trans-Mississippi to be a backwater command and indeed Sherman had no interest in having Banks move up the Red River in the spring of 1864 but wanted him to move east against Mobile instead.
             The Confederate command did an excellent job in husbanding the resources they had and making do with what was available that allowed them to check several Union advances, but never to clear a state nor win a decisive victory.
             And there were shortages, one only has to take a look at the number of men who rode into Missouri with Sterling Price in the summer of 1864 who were unarmed with the aspect of achieving weapons from captured federal depots.
             In large part, for the South military activities in the Trans-Mississippi were conducted on a shoestring which didn't break in large part because, with few exceptions, the North did not consider it a vital avenue of military operations.
              With regards,
                 Chet

          Carl Williams <carlw4514@...> wrote:
          I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in the Trans-Miss
          were so hampered as all that. For one thing, Curtis certainly found
          out at Pea Ridge that a considerable army was capable of being formed
          in that neck of the woods by the Rebels, and the fact that the whole
          kit and kaboodle got stripped out of there, leaving a mess, shouldnt
          mean that something permanent necessarily changed. Furthermore what
          Confederate forces there were got sufficient supply to put up a good
          stand, as evidenced by the fact that not all battles were won by the
          Union and in fact none of the CS states ever got 'finished off.' The
          final attempt to do so, the 1864 Red River campaign, ran up against
          disaster, and no small part of the fact that it did was that the Rebs
          again put together an effective, *supplied* counter-force.

          It seems millions of dollars in supplies came through Texan and
          Mexican ports; the fact that it may have been hard to get those same
          supplies to Lee in the East doesnt mean they couldnt be used closer at
          hand. Banks wasnt run out of Louisiana, and Steele out of South
          Arkansas, by hillbillies throwing rocks and spears.

          [snip]
          --- In civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com, "Ronald black" <rblack0981@ ...>
          wrote:
          >
          > Consider that the problem was firstly too little resources, secondly
          being ignored by the Richmond government since the Trans-Mississippi
          was considered as fourth in line of importance ...



          Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them fast with Yahoo! Search.

        • Carl Williams
          Of course I hedged my remarks, Chet, by saying the Confederates were not so hampered as all that, but I accepted what you say below as the Gospel when
          Message 4 of 27 , Mar 23, 2008
          • 0 Attachment
            Of course I hedged my remarks, Chet, by saying the Confederates were
            not so hampered "as all that," but I accepted what you say below as
            the Gospel when hearing/reading about it before and am no longer so
            sure. That's not to say that what you write isn't substantially
            correct, and for that matter maybe it is unintended by you and others
            for me to get the idea that it got to the point that Reb ball and
            powder could hardly be found (as previously I tended to grasp from this).

            I think it is possible to get the concept that Richmond could cut off
            support and leave the T-miss hapless; I just don't think this is so. I
            don't think the Red River Campaign was turned back with *any* help
            from the East, for example.

            To the degree we disagree, which may not be as much as all that, I'll
            have to concede that your argument is much more generally accepted.

            Carl

            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Chet Diestel <agatematt@...> wrote:
            >
            > While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the
            Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often
            antiquated and the commands certainly lacked in artillery and
            transport when compared to its Northern counterparts.
            > This did not mean that the Confederate forces were not able to
            put up often successful defenses, it does mean that throughout the war
            the Trans-Mississippi was very much left up to its own resources and
            devices.
            > Indeed, even the troops that fought at Pea Ridge were largely
            transferred to east of the Mississippi shortly thereafter and were
            lost to the department. Moreover, and quite understandably, arms,
            munitions and other war materials that came in either by blockade
            runner or across the Mexican border were largely transported to the
            main Southern armies in the eastern theaters as were many of the units
            raised in the Trans-Mississippi states.
            > Both sides considered the Trans-Mississippi to be a backwater
            command and indeed Sherman had no interest in having Banks move up the
            Red River in the spring of 1864 but wanted him to move east against
            Mobile instead.
            > The Confederate command did an excellent job in husbanding the
            resources they had and making do with what was available that allowed
            them to check several Union advances, but never to clear a state nor
            win a decisive victory.
            > And there were shortages, one only has to take a look at the
            number of men who rode into Missouri with Sterling Price in the summer
            of 1864 who were unarmed with the aspect of achieving weapons from
            captured federal depots.
            > In large part, for the South military activities in the
            Trans-Mississippi were conducted on a shoestring which didn't break in
            large part because, with few exceptions, the North did not consider it
            a vital avenue of military operations.
            > With regards,
            > Chet
            >
            > Carl Williams <carlw4514@...> wrote:
            > I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in
            the Trans-Miss
            > were so hampered as all that. ...
          • Chet Diestel
            In so many ways --- militarily, logistically and even politically, with the fall of Vicksburg and Port. Hudson the Confederacy for all practical purposes
            Message 5 of 27 , Mar 23, 2008
            • 0 Attachment
                In so many ways --- militarily, logistically and even politically, with the fall of Vicksburg and Port. Hudson the Confederacy for all practical purposes became two nations neither of which could lend any type of significant or coordinated support to the other.
                 From mid-1863 onwards the Trans-Mississippi was on it own.
                    With regards,
                        Chet

              Carl Williams <carlw4514@...> wrote:
              Of course I hedged my remarks, Chet, by saying the Confederates were
              not so hampered "as all that," but I accepted what you say below as
              the Gospel when hearing/reading about it before and am no longer so
              sure. That's not to say that what you write isn't substantially
              correct, and for that matter maybe it is unintended by you and others
              for me to get the idea that it got to the point that Reb ball and
              powder could hardly be found (as previously I tended to grasp from this).

              I think it is possible to get the concept that Richmond could cut off
              support and leave the T-miss hapless; I just don't think this is so. I
              don't think the Red River Campaign was turned back with *any* help
              from the East, for example.

              To the degree we disagree, which may not be as much as all that, I'll
              have to concede that your argument is much more generally accepted.

              Carl

              --- In civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com, Chet Diestel <agatematt@. ..> wrote:
              >
              > While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the
              Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often
              antiquated and the commands certainly lacked in artillery and
              transport when compared to its Northern counterparts.
              > This did not mean that the Confederate forces were not able to
              put up often successful defenses, it does mean that throughout the war
              the Trans-Mississippi was very much left up to its own resources and
              devices.
              > Indeed, even the troops that fought at Pea Ridge were largely
              transferred to east of the Mississippi shortly thereafter and were
              lost to the department. Moreover, and quite understandably, arms,
              munitions and other war materials that came in either by blockade
              runner or across the Mexican border were largely transported to the
              main Southern armies in the eastern theaters as were many of the units
              raised in the Trans-Mississippi states.
              > Both sides considered the Trans-Mississippi to be a backwater
              command and indeed Sherman had no interest in having Banks move up the
              Red River in the spring of 1864 but wanted him to move east against
              Mobile instead.
              > The Confederate command did an excellent job in husbanding the
              resources they had and making do with what was available that allowed
              them to check several Union advances, but never to clear a state nor
              win a decisive victory.
              > And there were shortages, one only has to take a look at the
              number of men who rode into Missouri with Sterling Price in the summer
              of 1864 who were unarmed with the aspect of achieving weapons from
              captured federal depots.
              > In large part, for the South military activities in the
              Trans-Mississippi were conducted on a shoestring which didn't break in
              large part because, with few exceptions, the North did not consider it
              a vital avenue of military operations.
              > With regards,
              > Chet
              >
              > Carl Williams <carlw4514@. ..> wrote:
              > I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in
              the Trans-Miss
              > were so hampered as all that. ...



              Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. Try it now.

            • William H Keene
              I disagree with the point about Sherman. He was part an advcate for the Red River campaign and had wanted to lead it hnimself. He did want --- In
              Message 6 of 27 , Mar 23, 2008
              • 0 Attachment
                I disagree with the point about Sherman. He was part an advcate for
                the Red River campaign and had wanted to lead it hnimself.

                He did want --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Chet Diestel
                <agatematt@...> wrote:
                >
                > While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the
                Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often
                antiquated and the commands certainly lacked in artillery and
                transport when compared to its Northern counterparts.
                > This did not mean that the Confederate forces were not able to
                put up often successful defenses, it does mean that throughout the
                war the Trans-Mississippi was very much left up to its own resources
                and devices.
                > Indeed, even the troops that fought at Pea Ridge were largely
                transferred to east of the Mississippi shortly thereafter and were
                lost to the department. Moreover, and quite understandably, arms,
                munitions and other war materials that came in either by blockade
                runner or across the Mexican border were largely transported to the
                main Southern armies in the eastern theaters as were many of the
                units raised in the Trans-Mississippi states.
                > Both sides considered the Trans-Mississippi to be a backwater
                command and indeed Sherman had no interest in having Banks move up
                the Red River in the spring of 1864 but wanted him to move east
                against Mobile instead.
                > The Confederate command did an excellent job in husbanding the
                resources they had and making do with what was available that allowed
                them to check several Union advances, but never to clear a state nor
                win a decisive victory.
                > And there were shortages, one only has to take a look at the
                number of men who rode into Missouri with Sterling Price in the
                summer of 1864 who were unarmed with the aspect of achieving weapons
                from captured federal depots.
                > In large part, for the South military activities in the Trans-
                Mississippi were conducted on a shoestring which didn't break in
                large part because, with few exceptions, the North did not consider
                it a vital avenue of military operations.
                > With regards,
                > Chet
                >
                > Carl Williams <carlw4514@...> wrote:
                > I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in
                the Trans-Miss
                > were so hampered as all that. For one thing, Curtis certainly found
                > out at Pea Ridge that a considerable army was capable of being
                formed
                > in that neck of the woods by the Rebels, and the fact that the whole
                > kit and kaboodle got stripped out of there, leaving a mess, shouldnt
                > mean that something permanent necessarily changed. Furthermore what
                > Confederate forces there were got sufficient supply to put up a good
                > stand, as evidenced by the fact that not all battles were won by the
                > Union and in fact none of the CS states ever got 'finished off.' The
                > final attempt to do so, the 1864 Red River campaign, ran up against
                > disaster, and no small part of the fact that it did was that the
                Rebs
                > again put together an effective, *supplied* counter-force.
                >
                > It seems millions of dollars in supplies came through Texan and
                > Mexican ports; the fact that it may have been hard to get those same
                > supplies to Lee in the East doesnt mean they couldnt be used closer
                at
                > hand. Banks wasnt run out of Louisiana, and Steele out of South
                > Arkansas, by hillbillies throwing rocks and spears.
                >
                > [snip]
                > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Ronald black" <rblack0981@>
                > wrote:
                > >
                > > Consider that the problem was firstly too little resources,
                secondly
                > being ignored by the Richmond government since the Trans-Mississippi
                > was considered as fourth in line of importance ...
                >
                >
                >
                >
                >
                >
                > ---------------------------------
                > Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them fast with Yahoo!
                Search.
                >
              • Tony Gunter
                ... In fact, the idea for the Red River Campaign appears to have originated with Sherman, who suggested it to Halleck via letter in mid-to-late 1863.
                Message 7 of 27 , Mar 24, 2008
                • 0 Attachment
                  --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@...>
                  wrote:
                  >
                  > I disagree with the point about Sherman. He was part an advcate for
                  > the Red River campaign and had wanted to lead it hnimself.
                  >

                  In fact, the idea for the Red River Campaign appears to have originated
                  with Sherman, who suggested it to Halleck via letter in mid-to-late
                  1863.
                • Ronald black
                  I agree with Chet that after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the Trans-Mississippi became isolated totally from the rest of the country. The only
                  Message 8 of 27 , Mar 24, 2008
                  • 0 Attachment
                    I agree with Chet that after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the Trans-Mississippi became isolated totally from the rest of the country.  The only exception was any supplies or couriers that could cross the Mississippi River in a small boat.  These boats could not carry supplies in any quantity.  The union navy controlled the river and closed this avenue of access.  The Trans-Mississippi was on their own. 
                    Ron
                     
                    ----- Original Message -----
                    Sent: Sunday, March 23, 2008 4:46 PM
                    Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] Re: Trans-miss Resources

                      In so many ways --- militarily, logistically and even politically, with the fall of Vicksburg and Port. Hudson the Confederacy for all practical purposes became two nations neither of which could lend any type of significant or coordinated support to the other.
                       From mid-1863 onwards the Trans-Mississippi was on it own.
                          With regards,
                              Chet

                    Carl Williams <carlw4514@yahoo. com> wrote:
                    Of course I hedged my remarks, Chet, by saying the Confederates were
                    not so hampered "as all that," but I accepted what you say below as
                    the Gospel when hearing/reading about it before and am no longer so
                    sure. That's not to say that what you write isn't substantially
                    correct, and for that matter maybe it is unintended by you and others
                    for me to get the idea that it got to the point that Reb ball and
                    powder could hardly be found (as previously I tended to grasp from this).

                    I think it is possible to get the concept that Richmond could cut off
                    support and leave the T-miss hapless; I just don't think this is so. I
                    don't think the Red River Campaign was turned back with *any* help
                    from the East, for example.

                    To the degree we disagree, which may not be as much as all that, I'll
                    have to concede that your argument is much more generally accepted.

                    Carl

                    --- In civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com, Chet Diestel &t;agatematt@. ..> wrote:
                    >
                    > While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the
                    Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often
                    antiquated and the commands certainly lacked in artillery and
                    transport when compared to its Northern counterparts.
                    > This did not mean that the Confederate forces were not able to
                    put up often successful defenses, it does mean that throughout the war
                    the Trans-Mississippi was very much left up to its own resources and
                    devices.
                    > Indeed, even the troops that fought at Pea Ridge were largely
                    transferred to east of the Mississippi shortly thereafter and were
                    lost to the department. Moreover, and quite understandably, arms,
                    munitions and other war materials that came in either by blockade
                    runner or across the Mexican border were largely transported to the
                    main Southern armies in the eastern theaters as were many of the units
                    raised in the Trans-Mississippi states.
                    > Both sides considered the Trans-Mississippi to be a backwater
                    command and indeed Sherman had no interest in having Banks move up the
                    Red River in the spring of 1864 but wanted him to move east against
                    Mobile instead.
                    > The Confederate command did an excellent job in husbanding the
                    resources they had and making do with what was available that allowed
                    them to check several Union advances, but never to clear a state nor
                    win a decisive victory.
                    > And there were shortages, one only has to take a look at the
                    number of men who rode into Missouri with Sterling Price in the summer
                    of 1864 who were unarmed with the aspect of achieving weapons from
                    captured federal depots.
                    > In large part, for the South military activities in the
                    Trans-Mississippi were conducted on a shoestring which didn't break in
                    large part because, with few exceptions, the North did not consider it
                    a vital avenue of military operations.
                    > With regards,
                    > Chet
                    >
                    > Carl Williams <carlw4514@. ..> wrote:
                    > I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in
                    the Trans-Miss
                    > were so hampered as all that. ...



                    Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. Try it now.


                    No virus found in this incoming message.
                    Checked by AVG.
                    Version: 7.5.519 / Virus Database: 269.21.8/1339 - Release Date: 3/22/2008 4:43 PM
                  • William H Keene
                    ... originated ... Halleck was thinking about it long before that. In the November 9, 1862 order that assigned Banks to command the Department of the Gulf,
                    Message 9 of 27 , Mar 25, 2008
                    • 0 Attachment
                      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@...>
                      wrote:
                      > ...
                      > In fact, the idea for the Red River Campaign appears to have
                      originated
                      > with Sherman, who suggested it to Halleck via letter in mid-to-late
                      > 1863.

                      Halleck was thinking about it long before that. In the November 9,
                      1862 order that assigned Banks to command the Department of the Gulf,
                      Halleck suggested a Red River campaign as a good follow-up to the
                      Vicksburg camapaign.
                    • Carl Williams
                      Was this a bad idea from the get-go, or was Banks just the wrong man for the job? Note that Steele in the counterpart Camden Expedition also came to grief.
                      Message 10 of 27 , Mar 26, 2008
                      • 0 Attachment
                        Was this a bad idea from the get-go, or was Banks just the wrong man
                        for the job? Note that Steele in the counterpart "Camden Expedition"
                        also came to grief.

                        Seems to me the unreliability of the navigability of the Red River was
                        overlooked; and Steele came off as inexperienced in maintaining
                        overland supply. But one factor I am thinking has been largely
                        unacknowledged is that the "rebs-are-operating-on-shoestring" notion
                        also did not pan out, and that the vigorous, *supplied* defense in
                        both cases was a surprise.


                        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@...>
                        wrote:

                        >
                        > Halleck was thinking about it long before that. In the November 9,
                        > 1862 order that assigned Banks to command the Department of the Gulf,
                        > Halleck suggested a Red River campaign as a good follow-up to the
                        > Vicksburg camapaign.
                        >
                      • Tony Gunter
                        ... I m not sure that anyone could have predicted the historic low river stage that year ... but overall it made little strategic sense to clear out the Red
                        Message 11 of 27 , Mar 26, 2008
                        • 0 Attachment
                          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Williams" <carlw4514@...>
                          wrote:
                          >
                          > Was this a bad idea from the get-go, or was Banks just the wrong man
                          > for the job? Note that Steele in the counterpart "Camden Expedition"
                          > also came to grief.
                          >
                          > Seems to me the unreliability of the navigability of the Red
                          > River was overlooked;

                          I'm not sure that anyone could have predicted the historic low river
                          stage that year ... but overall it made little strategic sense to clear
                          out the Red River watershed. The link to the trans-Mississippi was
                          completely severed by Union possession of Vicksburg.
                        • keeno2@aol.com
                          In a message dated 3/26/2008 10:18:13 A.M. Central Daylight Time, tony_gunter@yahoo.com writes: ... but overall it made little strategic sense to clear out
                          Message 12 of 27 , Mar 26, 2008
                          • 0 Attachment
                            In a message dated 3/26/2008 10:18:13 A.M. Central Daylight Time, tony_gunter@... writes:
                            ... but overall it made little strategic sense to clear out the Red River watershed. 
                            Wasn't there an element of threatening Texas involved in the strategy?
                             
                            ken




                            Create a Home Theater Like the Pros. Watch the video on AOL Home.
                          • Carl Williams
                            Absolutely! the idea was to finish off Arkansas and Louisiana and then work on Texas. Texas, and then on to Mexico to depose Maximilian if necessary. The
                            Message 13 of 27 , Mar 26, 2008
                            • 0 Attachment
                              Absolutely! the idea was to finish off Arkansas and Louisiana and then
                              work on Texas. Texas, and then on to Mexico to depose Maximilian if
                              necessary. The Mexico problem continued to be pursued in a different
                              manner after these other plans game to grief.

                              Abe was not too happy with French colonization ideas. Here's what
                              wikipedia says about that:

                              "American President Abraham Lincoln had supported the republicans
                              under Juárez, but was unable to intervene due to the American Civil
                              War. Immediately after the end of the war, in 1865, United States Army
                              General Philip Sheridan, under the supervision of President Andrew
                              Johnson and General Ulysses S. Grant, assembled 50,000 troops, and
                              dispatched them to the border between Mexico and the United States.
                              There, his corps ran patrols to visibly threaten intervention against
                              the French, and also supplied arms to Juárez's forces.[1] The US
                              Congress had unanimously passed a resolution which opposed the
                              establishment of the Mexican monarchy on 4 April 1864. On 12 February
                              1866, the US demanded the French withdraw their forces from Mexico,
                              moved soldiers to positions along the Rio Grande, and set up a naval
                              blockade to prevent French reinforcements from landing..."

                              http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_intervention_in_Mexico#U.S._intervention

                              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, keeno2@... wrote:
                              >
                              >
                              > Wasn't there an element of threatening Texas involved in the strategy?
                              >
                              > ken
                              >
                              >
                              >
                            • William H Keene
                              ... Bad idea from the get go. The logistics of such an expedition were not properly planned for and the timetable was unrealistic.
                              Message 14 of 27 , Mar 26, 2008
                              • 0 Attachment
                                --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Williams" <carlw4514@...>
                                wrote:
                                >
                                > Was this a bad idea from the get-go, or was Banks just the wrong man
                                > for the job?

                                Bad idea from the get go. The logistics of such an expedition were not
                                properly planned for and the timetable was unrealistic.
                              • William H Keene
                                ... Though the river was exceptionally low that year, it always did get drop as the summer approached and could not be relied on all year round for naval and
                                Message 15 of 27 , Mar 26, 2008
                                • 0 Attachment
                                  --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@...>
                                  wrote:
                                  > ...
                                  > > Seems to me the unreliability of the navigability of the Red
                                  > > River was overlooked;
                                  >
                                  > I'm not sure that anyone could have predicted the historic low river
                                  > stage that year ...

                                  Though the river was exceptionally low that year, it always did get
                                  drop as the summer approached and could not be relied on all year round
                                  for naval and supply vessels.
                                • Tony Gunter
                                  ... river ... IIRC, Red River levels usually begin to peak around the time that the river started to drop that year.
                                  Message 16 of 27 , Mar 26, 2008
                                  • 0 Attachment
                                    --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@...>
                                    wrote:
                                    >
                                    > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@>
                                    > wrote:
                                    > > ...
                                    > > > Seems to me the unreliability of the navigability of the Red
                                    > > > River was overlooked;
                                    > >
                                    > > I'm not sure that anyone could have predicted the historic low
                                    river
                                    > > stage that year ...
                                    >
                                    > Though the river was exceptionally low that year, it always did
                                    > drop as the summer approached

                                    IIRC, Red River levels usually begin to peak around the time that the
                                    river started to drop that year.
                                  • M. E. Heatherington
                                    As I understand the La. expedition -- drawing on Lowell H. Johnson, Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War. 2nd ed. Kent, OH, and London:
                                    Message 17 of 27 , Mar 27, 2008
                                    • 0 Attachment
                                      As I understand the La. expedition -- drawing on Lowell H. Johnson,  Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War.  2nd ed. Kent, OH , and London : Kent State University Press, 1993 (1958); and Harold D. Woodman,  King Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and Marketing the Cotton Crop of the South, 18001925.  Columbia , South Carolina : University of South Carolina Press, 1990 (1968) -- Halleck and Banks, and perhaps to a lesser extent Sherman, were completely besotted by the idea of purloining Texas cotton and cleaning up on the black market.  They made no allowances for the river's level, or the presence of Confederates, but simply charged ahead, so bedazzled by greed that they didn't exercise even their minimal skills in planning.  The wonder of it is that Banks escaped with so few losses.
                                      Regards,
                                      Madelon
                                    • keeno2@aol.com
                                      In a message dated 3/27/2008 6:41:34 P.M. Central Daylight Time, meheath@main.nc.us writes: purloining Texas cotton and cleaning up on the black market. Did
                                      Message 18 of 27 , Mar 27, 2008
                                      • 0 Attachment
                                        In a message dated 3/27/2008 6:41:34 P.M. Central Daylight Time, meheath@... writes:
                                        purloining Texas cotton and cleaning up on the black market.
                                        Did your sources really say that? Or did they just include confiscating cotton on their agenda. Seems it would be a bit difficult to seize cotton during a major campaign and then sneak it to market.
                                         
                                        ken




                                        Create a Home Theater Like the Pros. Watch the video on AOL Home.
                                      • Carl Williams
                                        ... confiscating ... cotton during ... wasn t there some kind of provision in which a Union General could legally benefit from this, without using the black
                                        Message 19 of 27 , Mar 28, 2008
                                        • 0 Attachment
                                          >
                                          > Did your sources really say that? Or did they just include
                                          confiscating
                                          > cotton on their agenda. Seems it would be a bit difficult to seize
                                          cotton during
                                          > a major campaign and then sneak it to market.
                                          >
                                          > ken


                                          wasn't there some kind of provision in which a Union General could
                                          legally benefit from this, without using the black market?
                                        • William H Keene
                                          ... There was for the navy but not for the army. Naval officers would receive a cut of the sale money of seized cotton. Porter was motivate by this and the
                                          Message 20 of 27 , Mar 28, 2008
                                          • 0 Attachment
                                            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Williams" <carlw4514@...>
                                            wrote:
                                            >
                                            >
                                            > >
                                            > > Did your sources really say that? Or did they just include
                                            > confiscating
                                            > > cotton on their agenda. Seems it would be a bit difficult to seize
                                            > cotton during
                                            > > a major campaign and then sneak it to market.
                                            > >
                                            > > ken
                                            >
                                            >
                                            > wasn't there some kind of provision in which a Union General could
                                            > legally benefit from this, without using the black market?

                                            There was for the navy but not for the army. Naval officers would
                                            receive a cut of the sale money of seized cotton. Porter was motivate
                                            by this and the navy was very ative in sezing cotton during the
                                            campaign.

                                            Regarding Banks' poilicy toward cotton, Lowell H. Johnson's book
                                            says "The intention underlying them was the general's desire to act in
                                            the best interest of the country, and though circumstances forced a
                                            number of changes in policy, there is no evidence to show that Banks
                                            ever allowed personal considerations to overcome his prudence."
                                          • DPowell334@AOL.COM
                                            In a message dated 3/28/2008 8:26:40 AM Central Standard Time, wh_keene@yahoo.com writes: There was for the navy but not for the army. Naval officers would
                                            Message 21 of 27 , Mar 28, 2008
                                            • 0 Attachment
                                              In a message dated 3/28/2008 8:26:40 AM Central Standard Time, wh_keene@... writes:
                                              There was for the navy but not for the army. Naval officers would
                                              receive a cut of the sale money of seized cotton. Porter was motivate
                                              by this and the navy was very ative in sezing cotton during the
                                              campaign.
                                              The navy  could take advantage of existing prize law. No such laws existed for the army.
                                               
                                              Dave Powell 




                                              Create a Home Theater Like the Pros. Watch the video on AOL Home.
                                            Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.