Loading ...
Sorry, an error occurred while loading the content.

Theophilus Holmes and Hindman

Expand Messages
  • Carl Williams
    The Shelby book I m reading definitely has some things to say about these two gentlemen. As far as Hindman goes, more later perhaps, but it seems that tangle
    Message 1 of 27 , Mar 21 7:54 AM
    • 0 Attachment
      The Shelby book I'm reading definitely has some things to say about
      these two gentlemen.

      As far as Hindman goes, more later perhaps, but it seems that tangle
      with Blunt at Prairie Grove etc, well, blunted his career and the book
      makes the case that it was unfortunate for the CSA he didn't stay in
      command.

      Certainly, the author comes down like a ton of bricks on Holmes, who
      took command and who seems to have had no idea what to do with what
      resources he had. In particular, the charge is made that the Feds
      should not have been able to get away with putting small garrisons in
      Helena, Arkansas. That place potentially should have just been denied
      to the Yankees short of a decision to put major resources there. It is
      easy to believe that a contest for Helena would have long delayed the
      campaign for Vicksburg, and the author makes the case that Holmes had
      the thousands of troops that would be needed pretty much ready to go;
      but he did nothing for the longest. This seems to have resulted in
      allowing the Union to really turn the place into a formidable redoubt.

      Holmes and Magruder had just been sent to their new posts after
      disappointing Lee during the Seven Days battles. It would seem
      Magruder had some contributions to make, but Holmes was a different
      story, I'm gathering.

      Just throwing this out there to see if anyone comments.
    • guitarmandanga
      Interesting, although I would have to disagree with the contention that Holmes was to blame for the Federals occupation of Helena, since I don t think he had
      Message 2 of 27 , Mar 21 3:20 PM
      • 0 Attachment
        Interesting, although I would have to disagree with the contention
        that Holmes was to blame for the Federals' occupation of Helena,
        since I don't think he had even reached the Trans-Mississippi by
        that time (July, 1862). Hindman would have been the local
        commander, so the blame is more rightly charged to his stead.
        Although considering that Hindman had to create an army literally
        from scratch (thanks to Van Dorn's abandonment of the state in early
        1862), it is doubtful whether or not he could have prevented Curtis
        from occupying Helena. As to whether the Confederates should have
        made any and every attempt possible to recapture it, I cannot
        comment, since I'm not familiar with the operations around that city.

        Dan


        >
        > The Shelby book I'm reading definitely has some things to say about
        > these two gentlemen.
        >
        > As far as Hindman goes, more later perhaps, but it seems that
        tangle
        > with Blunt at Prairie Grove etc, well, blunted his career and the
        book
        > makes the case that it was unfortunate for the CSA he didn't stay
        in
        > command.
        >
        > Certainly, the author comes down like a ton of bricks on Holmes,
        who
        > took command and who seems to have had no idea what to do with what
        > resources he had. In particular, the charge is made that the Feds
        > should not have been able to get away with putting small garrisons
        in
        > Helena, Arkansas. That place potentially should have just been
        denied
        > to the Yankees short of a decision to put major resources there.
        It is
        > easy to believe that a contest for Helena would have long delayed
        the
        > campaign for Vicksburg, and the author makes the case that Holmes
        had
        > the thousands of troops that would be needed pretty much ready to
        go;
        > but he did nothing for the longest. This seems to have resulted in
        > allowing the Union to really turn the place into a formidable
        redoubt.
        >
        > Holmes and Magruder had just been sent to their new posts after
        > disappointing Lee during the Seven Days battles. It would seem
        > Magruder had some contributions to make, but Holmes was a different
        > story, I'm gathering.
        >
        > Just throwing this out there to see if anyone comments.
        >
      • Carl Williams
        ... Dan, the book doesnt say that he was to blame for the occupation, but that Holmes did nothing to contest continued occupation. And goes on to say the time
        Message 3 of 27 , Mar 22 6:17 AM
        • 0 Attachment
          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "guitarmandanga"
          <iceman1977_01@...> wrote:
          >
          > Interesting, although I would have to disagree with the contention
          > that Holmes was to blame for the Federals' occupation of Helena,


          Dan, the book doesnt say that he was to blame for the occupation, but
          that Holmes did nothing to contest continued occupation. And goes on
          to say the time was ripe many occasions, due to the Feds stripping the
          area for operations elsewhere.



          > since I don't think he had even reached the Trans-Mississippi by
          > that time (July, 1862). Hindman would have been the local
          > commander, so the blame is more rightly charged to his stead.
          > Although considering that Hindman had to create an army literally
          > from scratch (thanks to Van Dorn's abandonment of the state in early
          > 1862),


          I think you can say he doesnt get enough credit for that!


          > it is doubtful whether or not he could have prevented Curtis
          > from occupying Helena. As to whether the Confederates should have
          > made any and every attempt possible to recapture it,


          yes, that's the rub, and I'm not sure either ... when they finally
          tried [4th of July 1863 again!] it was a disaster


          >I cannot
          > comment, since I'm not familiar with the operations around that city.
          >
          > Dan

          http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/battles/ar008.htm
        • William H Keene
          ... Interesting issue. Was the problem that Holmes/Hindman allocated most of their force/effort to the northwestern part of Arkansas?
          Message 4 of 27 , Mar 22 6:44 PM
          • 0 Attachment
            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Williams" <carlw4514@...>
            wrote:
            >
            > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "guitarmandanga"
            > <iceman1977_01@> wrote:
            > >
            > > Interesting, although I would have to disagree with the contention
            > > that Holmes was to blame for the Federals' occupation of Helena,
            >
            >
            > Dan, the book doesnt say that he was to blame for the occupation, but
            > that Holmes did nothing to contest continued occupation. And goes on
            > to say the time was ripe many occasions, due to the Feds stripping the
            > area for operations elsewhere.

            Interesting issue. Was the problem that Holmes/Hindman allocated most
            of their force/effort to the northwestern part of Arkansas?
          • Ronald black
            Consider that the problem was firstly too little resources, secondly being ignored by the Richmond government since the Trans-Mississippi was considered as
            Message 5 of 27 , Mar 23 4:53 AM
            • 0 Attachment
              Consider that the problem was firstly too little resources, secondly being ignored by the Richmond government since the Trans-Mississippi was considered as fourth in line of importance, thirdly too many federals, fourthly better union generals, fifthly General  T H Holmes too old too unqualified should have been retired not sent west to Trans-Mississippi. 
              Ron  
              ----- Original Message -----
              Sent: Saturday, March 22, 2008 9:44 PM
              Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Theophilus Holmes and Hindman

              --- In civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com, "Carl Williams" <carlw4514@. ..>
              wrote:
              >
              > --- In civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com, "guitarmandanga"
              > <iceman1977_ 01@> wrote:
              > >
              > > Interesting, although I would have to disagree with the contention
              > > that Holmes was to blame for the Federals' occupation of Helena,
              >
              >
              > Dan, the book doesnt say that he was to blame for the occupation, but
              > that Holmes did nothing to contest continued occupation. And goes on
              > to say the time was ripe many occasions, due to the Feds stripping the
              > area for operations elsewhere.

              Interesting issue. Was the problem that Holmes/Hindman allocated most
              of their force/effort to the northwestern part of Arkansas?


              No virus found in this incoming message.
              Checked by AVG.
              Version: 7.5.519 / Virus Database: 269.21.8/1339 - Release Date: 3/22/2008 4:43 PM
            • Carl Williams
              Hindman certainly did initially waste effort in the wrong place, IMHO ... tasked with rebuilding something after Van Dorn left with all the goodies, he
              Message 6 of 27 , Mar 23 10:24 AM
              • 0 Attachment
                Hindman certainly did initially waste effort in the wrong place, IMHO
                ... tasked with rebuilding something after Van Dorn left with all the
                goodies, he probably can be accused of failing to follow the dictum of
                'choosing the time and place of one's battles.' He was fighting like
                the dickens over nonstrategic ground, completely disadvantaged as to
                roads etc. IMO, he should have lured in Blunt further into Akansas
                away from his depots into a situation where the Union forces would
                have to worry about maintaining supply lines over those same lousy
                roads and rough terrain. The Feds were the ones who were going to be
                unable maintain supply lines once they got too far from Fayetteville.
                In fact for these reasons, I believe, they were unable to really do
                anything with following up on their victory at Prairie Grove, except
                taking some positions on the Arkansas River at the Indian Territory
                border that they later gave up [I think] and certainly got no further
                than that.


                --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@...>
                wrote:
                >

                >
                > Interesting issue. Was the problem that Holmes/Hindman allocated most
                > of their force/effort to the northwestern part of Arkansas?
                >
              • Carl Williams
                I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in the Trans-Miss were so hampered as all that. For one thing, Curtis certainly found out at Pea Ridge
                Message 7 of 27 , Mar 23 10:39 AM
                • 0 Attachment
                  I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in the Trans-Miss
                  were so hampered as all that. For one thing, Curtis certainly found
                  out at Pea Ridge that a considerable army was capable of being formed
                  in that neck of the woods by the Rebels, and the fact that the whole
                  kit and kaboodle got stripped out of there, leaving a mess, shouldnt
                  mean that something permanent necessarily changed. Furthermore what
                  Confederate forces there were got sufficient supply to put up a good
                  stand, as evidenced by the fact that not all battles were won by the
                  Union and in fact none of the CS states ever got 'finished off.' The
                  final attempt to do so, the 1864 Red River campaign, ran up against
                  disaster, and no small part of the fact that it did was that the Rebs
                  again put together an effective, *supplied* counter-force.

                  It seems millions of dollars in supplies came through Texan and
                  Mexican ports; the fact that it may have been hard to get those same
                  supplies to Lee in the East doesnt mean they couldnt be used closer at
                  hand. Banks wasnt run out of Louisiana, and Steele out of South
                  Arkansas, by hillbillies throwing rocks and spears.


                  [snip]
                  --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Ronald black" <rblack0981@...>
                  wrote:
                  >
                  > Consider that the problem was firstly too little resources, secondly
                  being ignored by the Richmond government since the Trans-Mississippi
                  was considered as fourth in line of importance ...
                • Carl Williams
                  ... agree this was a problem, but just pointing out that if nothing came across the Mississippi, supply was still available ... at times, notably to begin with
                  Message 8 of 27 , Mar 23 10:48 AM
                  • 0 Attachment
                    --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Ronald black" <rblack0981@...>
                    wrote:
                    >secondly being ignored by the Richmond government since the
                    >Trans-Mississippi was considered as fourth in line of importance,


                    agree this was a problem, but just pointing out that if nothing came
                    across the Mississippi, supply was still available


                    >thirdly too many federals,


                    at times, notably to begin with in Missouri. Always a victory of sorts
                    to have those Feds have to send those resources when they were needed
                    elsewhere, especially if they could be foiled


                    >fourthly better union generals,


                    you might elaborate


                    > fifthly General T H Holmes too old too unqualified should have been
                    retired not sent west to Trans-Mississippi.
                    > Ron
                    >


                    absolutely agree with that. Apparently thought that his job was to do
                    nothing and wait to be attacked. At Helena, for example, just
                    threatening to take the place would have been worthwhile.
                  • Chet Diestel
                    While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often antiquated and the commands
                    Message 9 of 27 , Mar 23 11:16 AM
                    • 0 Attachment
                         While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often antiquated and the commands certainly lacked in artillery and transport when compared to its Northern counterparts.
                         This did not mean that the Confederate forces were not able to put up often successful defenses, it does mean that throughout the war the Trans-Mississippi was very much left up to its own resources and devices.
                         Indeed, even the troops that fought at Pea Ridge were largely transferred to east of the Mississippi shortly thereafter and were lost to the department. Moreover, and quite understandably, arms, munitions and other war materials that came in either by blockade runner or across the Mexican border were largely transported to the main Southern armies in the eastern theaters as were many of the units raised in the Trans-Mississippi states.
                         Both sides considered the Trans-Mississippi to be a backwater command and indeed Sherman had no interest in having Banks move up the Red River in the spring of 1864 but wanted him to move east against Mobile instead.
                         The Confederate command did an excellent job in husbanding the resources they had and making do with what was available that allowed them to check several Union advances, but never to clear a state nor win a decisive victory.
                         And there were shortages, one only has to take a look at the number of men who rode into Missouri with Sterling Price in the summer of 1864 who were unarmed with the aspect of achieving weapons from captured federal depots.
                         In large part, for the South military activities in the Trans-Mississippi were conducted on a shoestring which didn't break in large part because, with few exceptions, the North did not consider it a vital avenue of military operations.
                          With regards,
                             Chet

                      Carl Williams <carlw4514@...> wrote:
                      I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in the Trans-Miss
                      were so hampered as all that. For one thing, Curtis certainly found
                      out at Pea Ridge that a considerable army was capable of being formed
                      in that neck of the woods by the Rebels, and the fact that the whole
                      kit and kaboodle got stripped out of there, leaving a mess, shouldnt
                      mean that something permanent necessarily changed. Furthermore what
                      Confederate forces there were got sufficient supply to put up a good
                      stand, as evidenced by the fact that not all battles were won by the
                      Union and in fact none of the CS states ever got 'finished off.' The
                      final attempt to do so, the 1864 Red River campaign, ran up against
                      disaster, and no small part of the fact that it did was that the Rebs
                      again put together an effective, *supplied* counter-force.

                      It seems millions of dollars in supplies came through Texan and
                      Mexican ports; the fact that it may have been hard to get those same
                      supplies to Lee in the East doesnt mean they couldnt be used closer at
                      hand. Banks wasnt run out of Louisiana, and Steele out of South
                      Arkansas, by hillbillies throwing rocks and spears.

                      [snip]
                      --- In civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com, "Ronald black" <rblack0981@ ...>
                      wrote:
                      >
                      > Consider that the problem was firstly too little resources, secondly
                      being ignored by the Richmond government since the Trans-Mississippi
                      was considered as fourth in line of importance ...



                      Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them fast with Yahoo! Search.

                    • Carl Williams
                      Of course I hedged my remarks, Chet, by saying the Confederates were not so hampered as all that, but I accepted what you say below as the Gospel when
                      Message 10 of 27 , Mar 23 1:36 PM
                      • 0 Attachment
                        Of course I hedged my remarks, Chet, by saying the Confederates were
                        not so hampered "as all that," but I accepted what you say below as
                        the Gospel when hearing/reading about it before and am no longer so
                        sure. That's not to say that what you write isn't substantially
                        correct, and for that matter maybe it is unintended by you and others
                        for me to get the idea that it got to the point that Reb ball and
                        powder could hardly be found (as previously I tended to grasp from this).

                        I think it is possible to get the concept that Richmond could cut off
                        support and leave the T-miss hapless; I just don't think this is so. I
                        don't think the Red River Campaign was turned back with *any* help
                        from the East, for example.

                        To the degree we disagree, which may not be as much as all that, I'll
                        have to concede that your argument is much more generally accepted.

                        Carl

                        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Chet Diestel <agatematt@...> wrote:
                        >
                        > While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the
                        Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often
                        antiquated and the commands certainly lacked in artillery and
                        transport when compared to its Northern counterparts.
                        > This did not mean that the Confederate forces were not able to
                        put up often successful defenses, it does mean that throughout the war
                        the Trans-Mississippi was very much left up to its own resources and
                        devices.
                        > Indeed, even the troops that fought at Pea Ridge were largely
                        transferred to east of the Mississippi shortly thereafter and were
                        lost to the department. Moreover, and quite understandably, arms,
                        munitions and other war materials that came in either by blockade
                        runner or across the Mexican border were largely transported to the
                        main Southern armies in the eastern theaters as were many of the units
                        raised in the Trans-Mississippi states.
                        > Both sides considered the Trans-Mississippi to be a backwater
                        command and indeed Sherman had no interest in having Banks move up the
                        Red River in the spring of 1864 but wanted him to move east against
                        Mobile instead.
                        > The Confederate command did an excellent job in husbanding the
                        resources they had and making do with what was available that allowed
                        them to check several Union advances, but never to clear a state nor
                        win a decisive victory.
                        > And there were shortages, one only has to take a look at the
                        number of men who rode into Missouri with Sterling Price in the summer
                        of 1864 who were unarmed with the aspect of achieving weapons from
                        captured federal depots.
                        > In large part, for the South military activities in the
                        Trans-Mississippi were conducted on a shoestring which didn't break in
                        large part because, with few exceptions, the North did not consider it
                        a vital avenue of military operations.
                        > With regards,
                        > Chet
                        >
                        > Carl Williams <carlw4514@...> wrote:
                        > I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in
                        the Trans-Miss
                        > were so hampered as all that. ...
                      • Chet Diestel
                        In so many ways --- militarily, logistically and even politically, with the fall of Vicksburg and Port. Hudson the Confederacy for all practical purposes
                        Message 11 of 27 , Mar 23 1:46 PM
                        • 0 Attachment
                            In so many ways --- militarily, logistically and even politically, with the fall of Vicksburg and Port. Hudson the Confederacy for all practical purposes became two nations neither of which could lend any type of significant or coordinated support to the other.
                             From mid-1863 onwards the Trans-Mississippi was on it own.
                                With regards,
                                    Chet

                          Carl Williams <carlw4514@...> wrote:
                          Of course I hedged my remarks, Chet, by saying the Confederates were
                          not so hampered "as all that," but I accepted what you say below as
                          the Gospel when hearing/reading about it before and am no longer so
                          sure. That's not to say that what you write isn't substantially
                          correct, and for that matter maybe it is unintended by you and others
                          for me to get the idea that it got to the point that Reb ball and
                          powder could hardly be found (as previously I tended to grasp from this).

                          I think it is possible to get the concept that Richmond could cut off
                          support and leave the T-miss hapless; I just don't think this is so. I
                          don't think the Red River Campaign was turned back with *any* help
                          from the East, for example.

                          To the degree we disagree, which may not be as much as all that, I'll
                          have to concede that your argument is much more generally accepted.

                          Carl

                          --- In civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com, Chet Diestel <agatematt@. ..> wrote:
                          >
                          > While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the
                          Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often
                          antiquated and the commands certainly lacked in artillery and
                          transport when compared to its Northern counterparts.
                          > This did not mean that the Confederate forces were not able to
                          put up often successful defenses, it does mean that throughout the war
                          the Trans-Mississippi was very much left up to its own resources and
                          devices.
                          > Indeed, even the troops that fought at Pea Ridge were largely
                          transferred to east of the Mississippi shortly thereafter and were
                          lost to the department. Moreover, and quite understandably, arms,
                          munitions and other war materials that came in either by blockade
                          runner or across the Mexican border were largely transported to the
                          main Southern armies in the eastern theaters as were many of the units
                          raised in the Trans-Mississippi states.
                          > Both sides considered the Trans-Mississippi to be a backwater
                          command and indeed Sherman had no interest in having Banks move up the
                          Red River in the spring of 1864 but wanted him to move east against
                          Mobile instead.
                          > The Confederate command did an excellent job in husbanding the
                          resources they had and making do with what was available that allowed
                          them to check several Union advances, but never to clear a state nor
                          win a decisive victory.
                          > And there were shortages, one only has to take a look at the
                          number of men who rode into Missouri with Sterling Price in the summer
                          of 1864 who were unarmed with the aspect of achieving weapons from
                          captured federal depots.
                          > In large part, for the South military activities in the
                          Trans-Mississippi were conducted on a shoestring which didn't break in
                          large part because, with few exceptions, the North did not consider it
                          a vital avenue of military operations.
                          > With regards,
                          > Chet
                          >
                          > Carl Williams <carlw4514@. ..> wrote:
                          > I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in
                          the Trans-Miss
                          > were so hampered as all that. ...



                          Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. Try it now.

                        • William H Keene
                          I disagree with the point about Sherman. He was part an advcate for the Red River campaign and had wanted to lead it hnimself. He did want --- In
                          Message 12 of 27 , Mar 23 2:58 PM
                          • 0 Attachment
                            I disagree with the point about Sherman. He was part an advcate for
                            the Red River campaign and had wanted to lead it hnimself.

                            He did want --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Chet Diestel
                            <agatematt@...> wrote:
                            >
                            > While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the
                            Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often
                            antiquated and the commands certainly lacked in artillery and
                            transport when compared to its Northern counterparts.
                            > This did not mean that the Confederate forces were not able to
                            put up often successful defenses, it does mean that throughout the
                            war the Trans-Mississippi was very much left up to its own resources
                            and devices.
                            > Indeed, even the troops that fought at Pea Ridge were largely
                            transferred to east of the Mississippi shortly thereafter and were
                            lost to the department. Moreover, and quite understandably, arms,
                            munitions and other war materials that came in either by blockade
                            runner or across the Mexican border were largely transported to the
                            main Southern armies in the eastern theaters as were many of the
                            units raised in the Trans-Mississippi states.
                            > Both sides considered the Trans-Mississippi to be a backwater
                            command and indeed Sherman had no interest in having Banks move up
                            the Red River in the spring of 1864 but wanted him to move east
                            against Mobile instead.
                            > The Confederate command did an excellent job in husbanding the
                            resources they had and making do with what was available that allowed
                            them to check several Union advances, but never to clear a state nor
                            win a decisive victory.
                            > And there were shortages, one only has to take a look at the
                            number of men who rode into Missouri with Sterling Price in the
                            summer of 1864 who were unarmed with the aspect of achieving weapons
                            from captured federal depots.
                            > In large part, for the South military activities in the Trans-
                            Mississippi were conducted on a shoestring which didn't break in
                            large part because, with few exceptions, the North did not consider
                            it a vital avenue of military operations.
                            > With regards,
                            > Chet
                            >
                            > Carl Williams <carlw4514@...> wrote:
                            > I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in
                            the Trans-Miss
                            > were so hampered as all that. For one thing, Curtis certainly found
                            > out at Pea Ridge that a considerable army was capable of being
                            formed
                            > in that neck of the woods by the Rebels, and the fact that the whole
                            > kit and kaboodle got stripped out of there, leaving a mess, shouldnt
                            > mean that something permanent necessarily changed. Furthermore what
                            > Confederate forces there were got sufficient supply to put up a good
                            > stand, as evidenced by the fact that not all battles were won by the
                            > Union and in fact none of the CS states ever got 'finished off.' The
                            > final attempt to do so, the 1864 Red River campaign, ran up against
                            > disaster, and no small part of the fact that it did was that the
                            Rebs
                            > again put together an effective, *supplied* counter-force.
                            >
                            > It seems millions of dollars in supplies came through Texan and
                            > Mexican ports; the fact that it may have been hard to get those same
                            > supplies to Lee in the East doesnt mean they couldnt be used closer
                            at
                            > hand. Banks wasnt run out of Louisiana, and Steele out of South
                            > Arkansas, by hillbillies throwing rocks and spears.
                            >
                            > [snip]
                            > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Ronald black" <rblack0981@>
                            > wrote:
                            > >
                            > > Consider that the problem was firstly too little resources,
                            secondly
                            > being ignored by the Richmond government since the Trans-Mississippi
                            > was considered as fourth in line of importance ...
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            >
                            > ---------------------------------
                            > Looking for last minute shopping deals? Find them fast with Yahoo!
                            Search.
                            >
                          • Tony Gunter
                            ... In fact, the idea for the Red River Campaign appears to have originated with Sherman, who suggested it to Halleck via letter in mid-to-late 1863.
                            Message 13 of 27 , Mar 24 2:47 AM
                            • 0 Attachment
                              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@...>
                              wrote:
                              >
                              > I disagree with the point about Sherman. He was part an advcate for
                              > the Red River campaign and had wanted to lead it hnimself.
                              >

                              In fact, the idea for the Red River Campaign appears to have originated
                              with Sherman, who suggested it to Halleck via letter in mid-to-late
                              1863.
                            • Ronald black
                              I agree with Chet that after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the Trans-Mississippi became isolated totally from the rest of the country. The only
                              Message 14 of 27 , Mar 24 10:24 AM
                              • 0 Attachment
                                I agree with Chet that after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the Trans-Mississippi became isolated totally from the rest of the country.  The only exception was any supplies or couriers that could cross the Mississippi River in a small boat.  These boats could not carry supplies in any quantity.  The union navy controlled the river and closed this avenue of access.  The Trans-Mississippi was on their own. 
                                Ron
                                 
                                ----- Original Message -----
                                Sent: Sunday, March 23, 2008 4:46 PM
                                Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] Re: Trans-miss Resources

                                  In so many ways --- militarily, logistically and even politically, with the fall of Vicksburg and Port. Hudson the Confederacy for all practical purposes became two nations neither of which could lend any type of significant or coordinated support to the other.
                                   From mid-1863 onwards the Trans-Mississippi was on it own.
                                      With regards,
                                          Chet

                                Carl Williams <carlw4514@yahoo. com> wrote:
                                Of course I hedged my remarks, Chet, by saying the Confederates were
                                not so hampered "as all that," but I accepted what you say below as
                                the Gospel when hearing/reading about it before and am no longer so
                                sure. That's not to say that what you write isn't substantially
                                correct, and for that matter maybe it is unintended by you and others
                                for me to get the idea that it got to the point that Reb ball and
                                powder could hardly be found (as previously I tended to grasp from this).

                                I think it is possible to get the concept that Richmond could cut off
                                support and leave the T-miss hapless; I just don't think this is so. I
                                don't think the Red River Campaign was turned back with *any* help
                                from the East, for example.

                                To the degree we disagree, which may not be as much as all that, I'll
                                have to concede that your argument is much more generally accepted.

                                Carl

                                --- In civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com, Chet Diestel &t;agatematt@. ..> wrote:
                                >
                                > While hardly armed with sticks and stones, the weaponry of the
                                Southern troops, particularly at the start of the war, was often
                                antiquated and the commands certainly lacked in artillery and
                                transport when compared to its Northern counterparts.
                                > This did not mean that the Confederate forces were not able to
                                put up often successful defenses, it does mean that throughout the war
                                the Trans-Mississippi was very much left up to its own resources and
                                devices.
                                > Indeed, even the troops that fought at Pea Ridge were largely
                                transferred to east of the Mississippi shortly thereafter and were
                                lost to the department. Moreover, and quite understandably, arms,
                                munitions and other war materials that came in either by blockade
                                runner or across the Mexican border were largely transported to the
                                main Southern armies in the eastern theaters as were many of the units
                                raised in the Trans-Mississippi states.
                                > Both sides considered the Trans-Mississippi to be a backwater
                                command and indeed Sherman had no interest in having Banks move up the
                                Red River in the spring of 1864 but wanted him to move east against
                                Mobile instead.
                                > The Confederate command did an excellent job in husbanding the
                                resources they had and making do with what was available that allowed
                                them to check several Union advances, but never to clear a state nor
                                win a decisive victory.
                                > And there were shortages, one only has to take a look at the
                                number of men who rode into Missouri with Sterling Price in the summer
                                of 1864 who were unarmed with the aspect of achieving weapons from
                                captured federal depots.
                                > In large part, for the South military activities in the
                                Trans-Mississippi were conducted on a shoestring which didn't break in
                                large part because, with few exceptions, the North did not consider it
                                a vital avenue of military operations.
                                > With regards,
                                > Chet
                                >
                                > Carl Williams <carlw4514@. ..> wrote:
                                > I no longer hold to the idea that Confederate forces in
                                the Trans-Miss
                                > were so hampered as all that. ...



                                Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. Try it now.


                                No virus found in this incoming message.
                                Checked by AVG.
                                Version: 7.5.519 / Virus Database: 269.21.8/1339 - Release Date: 3/22/2008 4:43 PM
                              • William H Keene
                                ... originated ... Halleck was thinking about it long before that. In the November 9, 1862 order that assigned Banks to command the Department of the Gulf,
                                Message 15 of 27 , Mar 25 7:07 AM
                                • 0 Attachment
                                  --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@...>
                                  wrote:
                                  > ...
                                  > In fact, the idea for the Red River Campaign appears to have
                                  originated
                                  > with Sherman, who suggested it to Halleck via letter in mid-to-late
                                  > 1863.

                                  Halleck was thinking about it long before that. In the November 9,
                                  1862 order that assigned Banks to command the Department of the Gulf,
                                  Halleck suggested a Red River campaign as a good follow-up to the
                                  Vicksburg camapaign.
                                • Carl Williams
                                  Was this a bad idea from the get-go, or was Banks just the wrong man for the job? Note that Steele in the counterpart Camden Expedition also came to grief.
                                  Message 16 of 27 , Mar 26 6:09 AM
                                  • 0 Attachment
                                    Was this a bad idea from the get-go, or was Banks just the wrong man
                                    for the job? Note that Steele in the counterpart "Camden Expedition"
                                    also came to grief.

                                    Seems to me the unreliability of the navigability of the Red River was
                                    overlooked; and Steele came off as inexperienced in maintaining
                                    overland supply. But one factor I am thinking has been largely
                                    unacknowledged is that the "rebs-are-operating-on-shoestring" notion
                                    also did not pan out, and that the vigorous, *supplied* defense in
                                    both cases was a surprise.


                                    --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@...>
                                    wrote:

                                    >
                                    > Halleck was thinking about it long before that. In the November 9,
                                    > 1862 order that assigned Banks to command the Department of the Gulf,
                                    > Halleck suggested a Red River campaign as a good follow-up to the
                                    > Vicksburg camapaign.
                                    >
                                  • Tony Gunter
                                    ... I m not sure that anyone could have predicted the historic low river stage that year ... but overall it made little strategic sense to clear out the Red
                                    Message 17 of 27 , Mar 26 8:16 AM
                                    • 0 Attachment
                                      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Williams" <carlw4514@...>
                                      wrote:
                                      >
                                      > Was this a bad idea from the get-go, or was Banks just the wrong man
                                      > for the job? Note that Steele in the counterpart "Camden Expedition"
                                      > also came to grief.
                                      >
                                      > Seems to me the unreliability of the navigability of the Red
                                      > River was overlooked;

                                      I'm not sure that anyone could have predicted the historic low river
                                      stage that year ... but overall it made little strategic sense to clear
                                      out the Red River watershed. The link to the trans-Mississippi was
                                      completely severed by Union possession of Vicksburg.
                                    • keeno2@aol.com
                                      In a message dated 3/26/2008 10:18:13 A.M. Central Daylight Time, tony_gunter@yahoo.com writes: ... but overall it made little strategic sense to clear out
                                      Message 18 of 27 , Mar 26 8:31 AM
                                      • 0 Attachment
                                        In a message dated 3/26/2008 10:18:13 A.M. Central Daylight Time, tony_gunter@... writes:
                                        ... but overall it made little strategic sense to clear out the Red River watershed. 
                                        Wasn't there an element of threatening Texas involved in the strategy?
                                         
                                        ken




                                        Create a Home Theater Like the Pros. Watch the video on AOL Home.
                                      • Carl Williams
                                        Absolutely! the idea was to finish off Arkansas and Louisiana and then work on Texas. Texas, and then on to Mexico to depose Maximilian if necessary. The
                                        Message 19 of 27 , Mar 26 9:22 AM
                                        • 0 Attachment
                                          Absolutely! the idea was to finish off Arkansas and Louisiana and then
                                          work on Texas. Texas, and then on to Mexico to depose Maximilian if
                                          necessary. The Mexico problem continued to be pursued in a different
                                          manner after these other plans game to grief.

                                          Abe was not too happy with French colonization ideas. Here's what
                                          wikipedia says about that:

                                          "American President Abraham Lincoln had supported the republicans
                                          under Juárez, but was unable to intervene due to the American Civil
                                          War. Immediately after the end of the war, in 1865, United States Army
                                          General Philip Sheridan, under the supervision of President Andrew
                                          Johnson and General Ulysses S. Grant, assembled 50,000 troops, and
                                          dispatched them to the border between Mexico and the United States.
                                          There, his corps ran patrols to visibly threaten intervention against
                                          the French, and also supplied arms to Juárez's forces.[1] The US
                                          Congress had unanimously passed a resolution which opposed the
                                          establishment of the Mexican monarchy on 4 April 1864. On 12 February
                                          1866, the US demanded the French withdraw their forces from Mexico,
                                          moved soldiers to positions along the Rio Grande, and set up a naval
                                          blockade to prevent French reinforcements from landing..."

                                          http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_intervention_in_Mexico#U.S._intervention

                                          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, keeno2@... wrote:
                                          >
                                          >
                                          > Wasn't there an element of threatening Texas involved in the strategy?
                                          >
                                          > ken
                                          >
                                          >
                                          >
                                        • William H Keene
                                          ... Bad idea from the get go. The logistics of such an expedition were not properly planned for and the timetable was unrealistic.
                                          Message 20 of 27 , Mar 26 12:14 PM
                                          • 0 Attachment
                                            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Williams" <carlw4514@...>
                                            wrote:
                                            >
                                            > Was this a bad idea from the get-go, or was Banks just the wrong man
                                            > for the job?

                                            Bad idea from the get go. The logistics of such an expedition were not
                                            properly planned for and the timetable was unrealistic.
                                          • William H Keene
                                            ... Though the river was exceptionally low that year, it always did get drop as the summer approached and could not be relied on all year round for naval and
                                            Message 21 of 27 , Mar 26 2:12 PM
                                            • 0 Attachment
                                              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@...>
                                              wrote:
                                              > ...
                                              > > Seems to me the unreliability of the navigability of the Red
                                              > > River was overlooked;
                                              >
                                              > I'm not sure that anyone could have predicted the historic low river
                                              > stage that year ...

                                              Though the river was exceptionally low that year, it always did get
                                              drop as the summer approached and could not be relied on all year round
                                              for naval and supply vessels.
                                            • Tony Gunter
                                              ... river ... IIRC, Red River levels usually begin to peak around the time that the river started to drop that year.
                                              Message 22 of 27 , Mar 26 6:36 PM
                                              • 0 Attachment
                                                --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@...>
                                                wrote:
                                                >
                                                > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@>
                                                > wrote:
                                                > > ...
                                                > > > Seems to me the unreliability of the navigability of the Red
                                                > > > River was overlooked;
                                                > >
                                                > > I'm not sure that anyone could have predicted the historic low
                                                river
                                                > > stage that year ...
                                                >
                                                > Though the river was exceptionally low that year, it always did
                                                > drop as the summer approached

                                                IIRC, Red River levels usually begin to peak around the time that the
                                                river started to drop that year.
                                              • M. E. Heatherington
                                                As I understand the La. expedition -- drawing on Lowell H. Johnson, Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War. 2nd ed. Kent, OH, and London:
                                                Message 23 of 27 , Mar 27 4:33 PM
                                                • 0 Attachment
                                                  As I understand the La. expedition -- drawing on Lowell H. Johnson,  Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War.  2nd ed. Kent, OH , and London : Kent State University Press, 1993 (1958); and Harold D. Woodman,  King Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and Marketing the Cotton Crop of the South, 18001925.  Columbia , South Carolina : University of South Carolina Press, 1990 (1968) -- Halleck and Banks, and perhaps to a lesser extent Sherman, were completely besotted by the idea of purloining Texas cotton and cleaning up on the black market.  They made no allowances for the river's level, or the presence of Confederates, but simply charged ahead, so bedazzled by greed that they didn't exercise even their minimal skills in planning.  The wonder of it is that Banks escaped with so few losses.
                                                  Regards,
                                                  Madelon
                                                • keeno2@aol.com
                                                  In a message dated 3/27/2008 6:41:34 P.M. Central Daylight Time, meheath@main.nc.us writes: purloining Texas cotton and cleaning up on the black market. Did
                                                  Message 24 of 27 , Mar 27 5:26 PM
                                                  • 0 Attachment
                                                    In a message dated 3/27/2008 6:41:34 P.M. Central Daylight Time, meheath@... writes:
                                                    purloining Texas cotton and cleaning up on the black market.
                                                    Did your sources really say that? Or did they just include confiscating cotton on their agenda. Seems it would be a bit difficult to seize cotton during a major campaign and then sneak it to market.
                                                     
                                                    ken




                                                    Create a Home Theater Like the Pros. Watch the video on AOL Home.
                                                  • Carl Williams
                                                    ... confiscating ... cotton during ... wasn t there some kind of provision in which a Union General could legally benefit from this, without using the black
                                                    Message 25 of 27 , Mar 28 5:10 AM
                                                    • 0 Attachment
                                                      >
                                                      > Did your sources really say that? Or did they just include
                                                      confiscating
                                                      > cotton on their agenda. Seems it would be a bit difficult to seize
                                                      cotton during
                                                      > a major campaign and then sneak it to market.
                                                      >
                                                      > ken


                                                      wasn't there some kind of provision in which a Union General could
                                                      legally benefit from this, without using the black market?
                                                    • William H Keene
                                                      ... There was for the navy but not for the army. Naval officers would receive a cut of the sale money of seized cotton. Porter was motivate by this and the
                                                      Message 26 of 27 , Mar 28 7:25 AM
                                                      • 0 Attachment
                                                        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Carl Williams" <carlw4514@...>
                                                        wrote:
                                                        >
                                                        >
                                                        > >
                                                        > > Did your sources really say that? Or did they just include
                                                        > confiscating
                                                        > > cotton on their agenda. Seems it would be a bit difficult to seize
                                                        > cotton during
                                                        > > a major campaign and then sneak it to market.
                                                        > >
                                                        > > ken
                                                        >
                                                        >
                                                        > wasn't there some kind of provision in which a Union General could
                                                        > legally benefit from this, without using the black market?

                                                        There was for the navy but not for the army. Naval officers would
                                                        receive a cut of the sale money of seized cotton. Porter was motivate
                                                        by this and the navy was very ative in sezing cotton during the
                                                        campaign.

                                                        Regarding Banks' poilicy toward cotton, Lowell H. Johnson's book
                                                        says "The intention underlying them was the general's desire to act in
                                                        the best interest of the country, and though circumstances forced a
                                                        number of changes in policy, there is no evidence to show that Banks
                                                        ever allowed personal considerations to overcome his prudence."
                                                      • DPowell334@AOL.COM
                                                        In a message dated 3/28/2008 8:26:40 AM Central Standard Time, wh_keene@yahoo.com writes: There was for the navy but not for the army. Naval officers would
                                                        Message 27 of 27 , Mar 28 7:53 AM
                                                        • 0 Attachment
                                                          In a message dated 3/28/2008 8:26:40 AM Central Standard Time, wh_keene@... writes:
                                                          There was for the navy but not for the army. Naval officers would
                                                          receive a cut of the sale money of seized cotton. Porter was motivate
                                                          by this and the navy was very ative in sezing cotton during the
                                                          campaign.
                                                          The navy  could take advantage of existing prize law. No such laws existed for the army.
                                                           
                                                          Dave Powell 




                                                          Create a Home Theater Like the Pros. Watch the video on AOL Home.
                                                        Your message has been successfully submitted and would be delivered to recipients shortly.