Re: General Shelby and Maximillian
- Pretty good book to read, so far. Not an uninterrupted string of
dubious statements, in other words. But another assertion that I will
have to check out, though, is that Lincoln and advisors , hoping for a
"new war" that would unite all Americans, did not oppose Shelby's
cavalry going into Mexico well armed. Supposedly stopped Sheridan from
interfering for that reason. The assumption being that Shelby would
agree to cooperate with the "republican" forces trying to get rid of
all this was an opening teaser, though... I have to get further into
the book to get more on that
- Uh...are we talking about the same thing here?
--- In email@example.com, "Carl Williams" <carlw4514@...>
> INteresting that this seems to have been a well circulated myth.
> Historians would certainly know it was wrong, so probably survived
> with other writers like this author.
> Sometimes shows its age ... written in 1954 by a Richmond writer,
> statements aren't too PC for today. But readability is good.in "The
> > William C. Davis mentioned a figure like this in an essay
> > Cause Lost: Myths and Realities of the Confederacy", concerningthe
> > Trans-Mississippi Theater. The argument he was addressing wasabandoned it
> > whether or not the Confederacy could---or should---have
> > and at least attempteded to move these forces east of thepointed
> > Mississippi to help with the more decisive campaigns. He
> > out that, of the 60,000 men, likely less than half were presentfor
> > duty, and of the remaining 30,000, even assuming that themajority
> > of them would have wanted to leave to help their comrades inarms
> > across the River---a far-from-foregone conclusion---the means tolikely
> > concentrate them effectively into a large fighting force, even
> > within the Trans-MS, were simply not there (very little
> > infrastructure, almost no consolidation of supply departments,
> > etc.), to say nothing of trying to get them into Mississippi or
> > Louisiana. Plus there was the political fallout that would
> > have resulted from this sort of "abandonment". So they weresort of
> > stuck: they had a sizeable army in the Trans-MS in terms ofnumbers,
> > but they couldn't bring it altogether in one place for acampaign
> > there, nor could they move it elsewhere.
- I think so. I have gone back to referring to the book that quoted the
60,000 man army bit; you may have missed that original message, and of
course it is bad form on my part not to make it clear what I am
referring to, sorry.
That book is "General Jo Shelby: Undefeated Rebel" by Daniel O'Flaherty
--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "guitarmandanga"
> Uh...are we talking about the same thing here?
- --- In email@example.com, "Carl Williams" <carlw4514@...>
>Sounds right for the entire force in the Trans-Miss, including all
> well, if we've slowed down a bit, reading a book about Shelby and
> looks like will be able to post here some stuff. ["General Jo Shelby:
> Undefeated Rebel"]
> Already have come across a statement that I'll have to check out: a
> claim that the CS Army of the Trans-miss was 60,000 strong at its
> peak. That sound right?
garrisons and subcommands. In the spring of 1864, the number was
41,000 as enumerated by Steven Newton in the book "Lost For The
Cause". Problem was that the force was so widely distributed that
around 15,000 was the most ever brought into any battle in the tRans-
- Reading "Jo Shelby, Undefeated Rebel," now adding to the list of "I
didn't know that" is Shelby's capture of the QUEEN CITY tinclad,
reminiscent of some of Forrest's feats (I always enjoy reading about
the surprise capture of Fed gunboats).
here is an account:
Seems the White River in Arkansas was an unlucky place for the Union
Navy, they also lost the City Class MOUND CITY there IIRC.