--- In email@example.com, "James W. Durney" <JWD2044@...> wrote:
> The question on Cozzens' treatment of Grant, in another group,
> started me thinking about this battle. I have often thought that in
> no battle do so many strong feelings play out about the generals
> involved. On one hand, we have the Thomas fan club upset over him
> being superseded by Grant. In addition, the anti-Sherman group has a
> field day with Tunnel Hill. To top things off, this seems to be one
> of Grant's poorer efforts and that releases the anti-Grant groups.
> Hooker, still smarting from summer is the joker in the deck.
> Thomas seems to have slighted Grant from when he showed up; failing
> to show him the respect due a commanding officer. His actions seem
> to be much less than what is expected as basic kindness.
> Sherman, favored by Grant, is stuck with problems that no one
> understood or expected. The tactical problems of the Tunnel Hill
> complex is made worse by facing one of the few real fighting
> divisions in the AoT.
> Grant seems passive during the battle, almost content to wait until
> Sherman works out his problems. Later, when pressed by Sherman,
> Grant sends Thomas into a demonstration attack
> Hooker is having a good time of it pushing the AoT off Lookout Mt.
> He may be the first Union general to realize that the AoT is falling
> apart. However, he seems unable to take advantage of it.
> Bragg is in an impossible task having lost total control of his army
> and unable to move forward or fall back.
The question on Cozzens' treatment of Grant, in another group,started me thinking about this battle. I have often thought that in no battle do so many strong feelings play out about the generals involved. On one hand, we have the Thomas fan club upset over him being superseded by Grant.
No one that I know of has ever reported that they thought Thomas should have been named commander of the Division of the Mississippi rather than Grant. Many of Thomas' contemporaries thought so because of Thomas' seniority and infinitly better battle performances. But, even they realized Shermy had his nose buried so deep it was a foregone conclusion.
In addition, the anti-Sherman group has a field day with Tunnel Hill.
Well, Sherman continued his unmilitary bumbling at MR. He was slow getting his troops into position, Slow advancing them (Had he attacked immediately he would have found no resistance). Slow in making a reconnaissance (Made it just before he was to attack), and found he was a hill short of his target. He seems to have learned his strategy from Butler and Burnside.
To top things off, this seems to be one of Grant's poorer efforts and that releases the anti-Grant groups.
You've established a new standard by indicating Grant had a poor day. Congratulations!
Hooker, still smarting from summer is the joker in the deck.
Hooker performed brilliantly on the Rebels left.
Thomas seems to have slighted Grant from when he showed up; failing to show him the respect due a commanding officer. His actions seem to be much less than what is expected as basic kindness.
You are correct! Thomas seems! This legend was started by James Harrison Wilson and is the only mention of this incident extant. Porter echoes Wilson's statement but is a poor witness since he came with Baldy Smith after the alleged "insult" occurred and could not have been witness.
Sherman, favored by Grant, is stuck with problems that no one understood or expected. The tactical problems of the Tunnel Hillcomplex is made worse by facing one of the few real fightingdivisions in the AoT.
Sorry! He was faced with no one if he had not been so slow. Don't understand the tactical problems you mention. He could have flanked the Rebel position and threatened Chickamauga Station, where Bragg had his stores. That would have grabbed the Reb's by the short hairs. Cleburne did not have his whole division up. He had some of it plus a couple other brigades. Against Sherman's uninspired straight-up charges, that's all he needed. Sherman had 5 or 6 division's and Thomas cavalry and still couldn't get `er done!
Grant seems passive during the battle, almost content to wait until Sherman works out his problems.
I'm not sure I agree that Grant was passive. He knew he was in trouble because of Sherman's inactivity. He also thought, as did everyone else that Bragg was shifting troops to Sherman's flank (Which he was not). He immediately took steps to implement changes to his battle plan to make it work. He took some suggestions from Thomas, and brought Hooker into the plan and was able to connect both his flanks. Hooker, always a fighting general started the roll-up of the Rebels left.
Later, when pressed by Sherman, Grant sends Thomas into a demonstration attack
That's all he intended. At least that's what his order's were.
Hooker is having a good time of it pushing the AoT off Lookout Mt. He may be the first Union general to realize that the AoT is falling apart. However, he seems unable to take advantage of it.
I agree with your realization characterization. He deployed his divisions so he could take as many prisoners as possible. And he did, despite Grant's sneering remarks to the contrary.
Bragg is in an impossible task having lost total control of his army and unable to move forward or fall back.
I thought he fell back to Dalton, Ga.
- Thnk you, I was under the impression that Cleburne was pretty much alone in the defence of the northern end.
--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, SDE80@... wrote:
> Well, the whole point of Sherman assaulting the north end of the Ridge was
> to both capture Chickamauga Station and cut Bragg off from Longstreet at
> Knoxville. That, too, would have made MR untenable. Bragg properly
> discerned that was Grant's main effort and concentrated 4 divisions in a
> relatively small area. He counted on the natural strength and defensibility of MR
> to try to hold the rest of it with three divisions. A. P. Stewart's
> division basically had responsibility for three miles of ridge with only enough
> men in a single rank to hold a little over a mile.
> Sam Elliott
> In a message dated 10/25/2010 3:45:37 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> banbruner@... writes:
> I was thinking also of Sherman's force to the north which was much larger
> and much closer to Chickamauga Station.
> Bill Bruner
> --- In email@example.com_ (mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org)
> , SDE80@ wrote:
> > Bragg would have indeed had a hard time holding MR with a Federal corps
> > (Hooker's "column" had three divisions" at Rossville. Of course, Grant's
> > original plan did not contemplate Hooker being a part of the attack, or
> > having more than one division.
> > Sam Elliott
> > In a message dated 10/25/2010 10:35:20 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> > banbruner@ writes:
> > I am looking forward to a trip in Nov. celebrating the Battle of
> > Chattanooga.
> > Looking the map in preparation, a peculiar thought occurred to me.
> > That once Lookout Mountain and Rossville had been taken Braggs position
> > Missionary Ridge was untenable. With both Lookout and Chattanooga
> > in union control and large forces on both north and southern flanks in
> > position to move to his (Braggs) rear and cut his communications and
> > of retreat he would have been forced to retire after dark on the 15th
> > if no charge had been made on his front.
> > I'm wondering if this analysis has been put forth before or if I am
> > completely wrongheaded.
> > Bill Bruner