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Re: Battle of Raymond Walking Trail Completed, Interpretive Markers Installed

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  • Tony Gunter
    ... This description is based on the Ed Bearss assertion that the battle lines broke down into individual companies scrambling around in the woods, and that
    Message 1 of 4 , Jan 5, 2007
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      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@...> wrote:
      >
      > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@>
      > wrote:
      > >
      > > I haven't dropped by since the markers have been added, but I did
      > > notice on this website that one of the stops is titled "A Soldier's
      > > Battle," a description with which I very much disagree.
      > >
      >
      > Why do you disagree?

      This description is based on the Ed Bearss assertion that the battle
      lines broke down into individual companies scrambling around in the
      woods, and that each soldier's world collapsed into a 10 ft radius
      circle of visibility, inside of which each soldier waged his own
      battle.

      There were some gaps in command and control during the battle, most
      notably:

      1) The Confederate left wing and right wing were out of supporting
      distance of each other for two hours and consequently were each
      defeated in detail.

      2) Col. Manning Force of the 20th Ohio panicked, and ordered his men to
      charge into the creek bed from which they could neither advance nor
      retreat. This left him exposed 100 yards in front of the Union battle
      line, and required great sacrifice on the part of the 20th Ill. to
      reconnect the battle line.

      3) Gen. John Stevenson, commanding the reserve, over-pursued the
      Confederate left wing with his two remaining regiments. This exposed
      the 7th MO to a route by the 10/30th TN as they attempted to reorganize
      after emerging from the woods.

      Interestingly enough, Bearss likes to use Raymond as a case study in
      the dangers of a Corps commander being overly hesitant, when really all
      of the serious gaffes in the battle resulted when regimental and
      brigade commanders became overly aggressive.
    • jay1997us
      ... did ... Soldier s ... battle ... men to ... battle ... exposed ... reorganize ... in ... all ... Tony You make excellent points. I ve studied the
      Message 2 of 4 , Jan 21, 2007
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        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@...>
        wrote:
        >
        > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "hank9174" <clarkc@> wrote:
        > >
        > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@>
        > > wrote:
        > > >
        > > > I haven't dropped by since the markers have been added, but I
        did
        > > > notice on this website that one of the stops is titled "A
        Soldier's
        > > > Battle," a description with which I very much disagree.
        > > >
        > >
        > > Why do you disagree?
        >
        > This description is based on the Ed Bearss assertion that the
        battle
        > lines broke down into individual companies scrambling around in the
        > woods, and that each soldier's world collapsed into a 10 ft radius
        > circle of visibility, inside of which each soldier waged his own
        > battle.
        >
        > There were some gaps in command and control during the battle, most
        > notably:
        >
        > 1) The Confederate left wing and right wing were out of supporting
        > distance of each other for two hours and consequently were each
        > defeated in detail.
        >
        > 2) Col. Manning Force of the 20th Ohio panicked, and ordered his
        men to
        > charge into the creek bed from which they could neither advance nor
        > retreat. This left him exposed 100 yards in front of the Union
        battle
        > line, and required great sacrifice on the part of the 20th Ill. to
        > reconnect the battle line.
        >
        > 3) Gen. John Stevenson, commanding the reserve, over-pursued the
        > Confederate left wing with his two remaining regiments. This
        exposed
        > the 7th MO to a route by the 10/30th TN as they attempted to
        reorganize
        > after emerging from the woods.
        >
        > Interestingly enough, Bearss likes to use Raymond as a case study
        in
        > the dangers of a Corps commander being overly hesitant, when really
        all
        > of the serious gaffes in the battle resulted when regimental and
        > brigade commanders became overly aggressive.

        Tony

        You make excellent points. I've studied the Vicksburg campaign for
        years, and have read and re-read Bearss many times. I wonder if his
        point about McPherson being overly hesitant means that McPherson
        didn't exercise much control over his corps during the fight. It
        does seem that the lower-level commanders exercised the initiative
        without much guidance from above. Just a thought. Bearss' trilogy
        is impressive and loaded with detail, but like most books it's not
        infallible. Plus, they were written more than 20 years ago. The
        scholarship on Raymond has evolved since then, I think. Anyway, good
        points!
        >
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