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  • josepharose@yahoo.com
    Does anyone know what the URL is of the US Grant Message Board? I ve run across it, but never bookmarked it. When I looked at some of the posts, I thought
    Message 1 of 12 , Apr 26, 2001
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      Does anyone know what the URL is of the US Grant Message Board?

      I've run across it, but never bookmarked it. When I looked at some of
      the posts, I thought that I saw a few "facts" that needed to be corrected.

      But you all know that I wouldn't say anything that reflected badly on
      old Sam. Well...maybe I would.

      Thanks in advance.

      Joseph
    • jones@pitton.com
      Hi Joseph, Is this the URL you seek? http://www.mscomm.com/~ulysses/ Scroll down the page and you ll find the link for message board in the middle section.
      Message 2 of 12 , Apr 26, 2001
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        Hi Joseph,

        Is this the URL you seek? http://www.mscomm.com/~ulysses/ Scroll
        down the page and you'll find the link for message board in the
        middle section.

        Now don't be too unkind to HUG. After all, today *is* his
        birthday! ;)

        Best regards.

        Pat
        --- In civilwarwest@y..., josepharose@y... wrote:
        > Does anyone know what the URL is of the US Grant Message Board?
        >
        > I've run across it, but never bookmarked it. When I looked at some
        of
        > the posts, I thought that I saw a few "facts" that needed to be
        corrected.
        >
        > But you all know that I wouldn't say anything that reflected badly
        on
        > old Sam. Well...maybe I would.
        >
        > Thanks in advance.
        >
        > Joseph
      • josepharose@yahoo.com
        Pat, That was it. Thanks very much. I ve read through the U. S. Grant Home Page (www.mscomm.com/~ulysses/) before and found it to be sensational...in the
        Message 3 of 12 , Apr 27, 2001
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          Pat,

          That was it. Thanks very much.

          I've read through the U. S. Grant Home Page (www.mscomm.com/~ulysses/)
          before and found it to be sensational...in the worst sense of the
          word. In my fight against hagiography, I will rest for one day at
          least while Grant's birthday is celebrated. After that, however, it
          is open season.

          Have you seen many of its articles? What was your opinion.

          Joseph
        • Robert Taubman
          And many happy returns of the day to Gen. Grant. While not being a big fan of Grant, in order to keep balance in my ACW readings, I am going to start reading
          Message 4 of 12 , Apr 27, 2001
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            And many happy returns of the day to Gen. Grant. While not being a
            big fan of Grant, in order to keep balance in my ACW readings, I am
            going to start reading Brooks Simpson's Ulysses S. Grant, Triumph over
            Adversity, 1822-1865.

            Has anyone read this book and care to comment?

            Thanx.

            Bob Taubman
            ----- Original Message -----
            From: <josepharose@...>
            To: <civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com>
            Sent: Friday, April 27, 2001 11:03 AM
            Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: US Grant Message Board


            > Pat,
            >
            > That was it. Thanks very much.
            >
            > I've read through the U. S. Grant Home Page
            (www.mscomm.com/~ulysses/)
            > before and found it to be sensational...in the worst sense of the
            > word. In my fight against hagiography, I will rest for one day at
            > least while Grant's birthday is celebrated. After that, however, it
            > is open season.
            >
            > Have you seen many of its articles? What was your opinion.
            >
            > Joseph
            >
            >
            >
            > ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups
            Sponsor ---------------------~-~>
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            celebrating Moms! Join today - it's free - and get your chance to win
            > in our $5,000 Family Vacation Sweepstakes!
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            > --------------------------------------------------------------------
            -_->
            >
            >
            >
            > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
            http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
            >
            >
          • josepharose@yahoo.com
            Robert Taubman stated that he was going to start reading Brooks Simpson s Ulysses S. Grant, Triumph over Adversity, 1822-1865 and asked whether others could
            Message 5 of 12 , Apr 28, 2001
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              Robert Taubman stated that he was "going to start reading Brooks
              Simpson's Ulysses S. Grant, Triumph over Adversity, 1822-1865" and
              asked whether others could recommend it.

              I haven't read the whole book, only certain chapters concerning the
              events of which I'm most knowledgeable. If you've been reading many
              anti-Grant tracts, this book offer the opposite perspective. I found
              it typically biased in favor of the general. It does have many direct
              quotes from Grant demonstrating his frequent misspellings, but in most
              cases Simpson stays away from a thorough critical analysis of Grant's
              leadership. The map of Chattanooga also has the arrows indicating
              Hooker's, Sherman's and Thomas' attacks rotated 180 degrees. Among
              the questionable statements concerning the battles around Chattanooga
              which I came across are:

              Regarding Grant's peremptory order for Thomas to attack the northern
              end of Missionary Ridge on 11/7/63, Simpson writes, "Smith, who had
              urged Grant to order the attack...." Baldy Smith did no such thing;
              he had suggested a movement to Citico Creek which would only threaten
              the end of the ridge. Smith and Thomas worked together to get Grant
              to countermand this senseless order.

              He wrote that "Grant ordered Thomas to advance against the first
              Confederate line..." in the direction of Orchard Knob. Instead,
              Grant's order read, "The truth or falsity of the deserters who came in
              last night, stating that Bragg had fallen back, should be ascertained
              at once. If he is really falling back, Sherman can commence at once
              laying his pontoon trains, and we can save a day." Grant left it up
              to Thomas to determine how this was to be done.

              He wrote that Sherman had "no serious resistance" at the bridgehead
              over the Tennessee. His soldiers easily captured all but one of the
              sentries by calling out "Relief." Unless one considers the farmer who
              complained about the intrusion, there was no resistance whatsoever.

              Much worse, the book appears to make no mention of the AotT's march to
              the "hill too near." Simpson goes no further than asserting that "a
              deep ravine ... had escaped Union observation" and that, "[f]or the
              moment, the Yankees had stumbled." This apparently absolves Sherman
              of one of the two major Federal blunders in the battle (the other
              being Sherman's failed assault on the 25th).

              Simspon accurately but misleadingly notes about Bragg's stripping of
              his center to reinforce the right: "Whether this was in fact true, a
              point to be much debated in the years to come...." Yes, it was
              debated. But now, there is general agreement that troops did not come
              from Bragg's center to oppose Sherman. Simpson doesn't bother to
              mention that.

              The author writes that, "Grant had in mind a two-stage assault [by
              Thomas' AotC on Missionary Ridge] ... perhaps in coordination with
              Hooker or Sherman." If Grant was really going to have the troops hang
              out in the rifle-pits being shelled and shot at from above while he
              figured out what was happening on the flanks, he was a worse general
              than I thought. But there's little evidence for and much against
              Grant having planned a two-stage assault in the first place. In the
              early afternoon of the 25th, with Sherman's assault petering out and
              Hooker's three divisions still out of sight, Grant had the following
              conversation with General Wood, according to the latter:
              Grant : General Sherman seems to be having a hard time.
              Wood: He does seem to be meeting with rough usage.
              Grant : I think we ought to try something to help him.
              Wood: I think so too, General, and whatever you order we will try to
              do.
              Grant : I think if you and Sheridan were to advance your divisions and
              carry the rifle pits at the base of the Ridge, it would so threaten
              Bragg's center that he would draw enough troops from the right, to
              secure his center, to insure the success of General Sherman's attack.
              Even if Grant had two stages in mind, he told no one else about it.

              To provide evidence that the advance on the rifle-pits made military
              sense, the author speculates that "should the situation change,
              [Grant] could call off the intended strike against the crest."
              Communicating any orders--whether to ascend or retreat--to units in
              action over a two-mile front, having initially failed to tell them
              more than to seize the rifle-pits, seems ridiculously difficult and
              would have guaranteed a profusion of unnecessary casualties.

              Lastly, Simpson somehow knows that "Thomas grew queasy with concern"
              and that "Grant told him to calm down." From almost all that I have
              read, if anything, it was the other way around.

              Brooks Simpson goes pretty easy on Grant for Shiloh and seemingly
              dismisses accounts of any alcoholic debilitation. From what I read,
              this book isn't fit for recommendation.

              Joseph
            • Robert Taubman
              Joseph, Thank you very much for your detailed analysis. I will approach my reading with all these points in mind. Bob Taubman ... From:
              Message 6 of 12 , Apr 29, 2001
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                Joseph,

                Thank you very much for your detailed analysis. I will approach my reading with
                all these points in mind.

                Bob Taubman
                ----- Original Message -----
                From: <josepharose@...>
                To: <civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com>
                Sent: Saturday, April 28, 2001 11:07 PM
                Subject: [civilwarwest] Brooks Simpson's Ulysses S. Grant


                | Robert Taubman stated that he was "going to start reading Brooks
                | Simpson's Ulysses S. Grant, Triumph over Adversity, 1822-1865" and
                | asked whether others could recommend it.
                |
                | I haven't read the whole book, only certain chapters concerning the
                | events of which I'm most knowledgeable. If you've been reading many
                | anti-Grant tracts, this book offer the opposite perspective. I found
                | it typically biased in favor of the general. It does have many direct
                | quotes from Grant demonstrating his frequent misspellings, but in most
                | cases Simpson stays away from a thorough critical analysis of Grant's
                | leadership. The map of Chattanooga also has the arrows indicating
                | Hooker's, Sherman's and Thomas' attacks rotated 180 degrees. Among
                | the questionable statements concerning the battles around Chattanooga
                | which I came across are:
                |
                | Regarding Grant's peremptory order for Thomas to attack the northern
                | end of Missionary Ridge on 11/7/63, Simpson writes, "Smith, who had
                | urged Grant to order the attack...." Baldy Smith did no such thing;
                | he had suggested a movement to Citico Creek which would only threaten
                | the end of the ridge. Smith and Thomas worked together to get Grant
                | to countermand this senseless order.
                |
                | He wrote that "Grant ordered Thomas to advance against the first
                | Confederate line..." in the direction of Orchard Knob. Instead,
                | Grant's order read, "The truth or falsity of the deserters who came in
                | last night, stating that Bragg had fallen back, should be ascertained
                | at once. If he is really falling back, Sherman can commence at once
                | laying his pontoon trains, and we can save a day." Grant left it up
                | to Thomas to determine how this was to be done.
                |
                | He wrote that Sherman had "no serious resistance" at the bridgehead
                | over the Tennessee. His soldiers easily captured all but one of the
                | sentries by calling out "Relief." Unless one considers the farmer who
                | complained about the intrusion, there was no resistance whatsoever.
                |
                | Much worse, the book appears to make no mention of the AotT's march to
                | the "hill too near." Simpson goes no further than asserting that "a
                | deep ravine ... had escaped Union observation" and that, "[f]or the
                | moment, the Yankees had stumbled." This apparently absolves Sherman
                | of one of the two major Federal blunders in the battle (the other
                | being Sherman's failed assault on the 25th).
                |
                | Simspon accurately but misleadingly notes about Bragg's stripping of
                | his center to reinforce the right: "Whether this was in fact true, a
                | point to be much debated in the years to come...." Yes, it was
                | debated. But now, there is general agreement that troops did not come
                | from Bragg's center to oppose Sherman. Simpson doesn't bother to
                | mention that.
                |
                | The author writes that, "Grant had in mind a two-stage assault [by
                | Thomas' AotC on Missionary Ridge] ... perhaps in coordination with
                | Hooker or Sherman." If Grant was really going to have the troops hang
                | out in the rifle-pits being shelled and shot at from above while he
                | figured out what was happening on the flanks, he was a worse general
                | than I thought. But there's little evidence for and much against
                | Grant having planned a two-stage assault in the first place. In the
                | early afternoon of the 25th, with Sherman's assault petering out and
                | Hooker's three divisions still out of sight, Grant had the following
                | conversation with General Wood, according to the latter:
                | Grant : General Sherman seems to be having a hard time.
                | Wood: He does seem to be meeting with rough usage.
                | Grant : I think we ought to try something to help him.
                | Wood: I think so too, General, and whatever you order we will try to
                | do.
                | Grant : I think if you and Sheridan were to advance your divisions and
                | carry the rifle pits at the base of the Ridge, it would so threaten
                | Bragg's center that he would draw enough troops from the right, to
                | secure his center, to insure the success of General Sherman's attack.
                | Even if Grant had two stages in mind, he told no one else about it.
                |
                | To provide evidence that the advance on the rifle-pits made military
                | sense, the author speculates that "should the situation change,
                | [Grant] could call off the intended strike against the crest."
                | Communicating any orders--whether to ascend or retreat--to units in
                | action over a two-mile front, having initially failed to tell them
                | more than to seize the rifle-pits, seems ridiculously difficult and
                | would have guaranteed a profusion of unnecessary casualties.
                |
                | Lastly, Simpson somehow knows that "Thomas grew queasy with concern"
                | and that "Grant told him to calm down." From almost all that I have
                | read, if anything, it was the other way around.
                |
                | Brooks Simpson goes pretty easy on Grant for Shiloh and seemingly
                | dismisses accounts of any alcoholic debilitation. From what I read,
                | this book isn't fit for recommendation.
                |
                | Joseph
                |
                |
                |
                |
                |
                | Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                |
                |
              • Bob Huddleston
                For an opposing view, I am pasting below the review from the New York Times. Robert Remini is the reviewer. Take care, Bob Judy and Bob Huddleston 10643 Sperry
                Message 7 of 12 , Apr 30, 2001
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                  For an opposing view, I am pasting below the review from the New York Times.

                  Robert Remini is the reviewer.

                  Take care,

                  Bob

                  Judy and Bob Huddleston
                  10643 Sperry Street
                  Northglenn, CO 80234-3612
                  303.451.6276 Adco@...

                  March 12, 2000, Late Edition - Final By Robert V. Remini

                  Ulysses S. Grant : Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865. By Brooks D. Simpson.
                  Illustrated. 533 pp. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. $35.

                  The presidency of Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was a near-total disaster. So bad,
                  in fact, that the American people did not elect another professional soldier
                  to lead this country until 1952, when they placed Dwight D. Eisenhower in
                  the White House. Historians who are regularly invited to rate the presidents
                  invariably place Grant toward the bottom of the list, a notch or two above
                  the likes of James Buchanan and Warren G. Harding.

                  Grant’s earlier, antebellum career as a farmer, businessman and clerk in his
                  father's general store was hardly better. He struggled desperately but with
                  little success to earn a living, provide for his family and escape
                  dependence on his father and father-in-law.

                  Then came the Civil War, which plucked him out of his wretchedness and
                  obscurity. Grant rose to become the general in chief of the Armies of the
                  United States and win the lasting affection and gratitude of Unionists
                  around the country for bringing the war to a triumphal conclusion after four
                  long and excruciating years of national suffering. Brooks D. Simpson, a
                  professor of history and humanities at Arizona State University who has
                  written extensively on the Civil War and Reconstruction, seeks to explain in
                  this first of a projected two-volume biography how such a phenomenal
                  reversal of personal fortune occurred and how a man so dogged by failure,
                  depression and self-doubt managed to surmount them and become the nation's
                  hero and savior.

                  As Simpson tells us in Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865,
                  Grant, after a relatively uneventful life growing up in Ohio, won
                  appointment to West Point and graduated in 1843, standing 21st in a class of
                  39. He served honorably in the Mexican War but resigned his commission as a
                  captain in 1854 because of loneliness, depression and a desperate need to be
                  reunited with his wife and children. However, suspicions immediately arose
                  and were regularly repeated throughout his career that he had been drummed
                  out of the service under threat of a court-martial for habitual drunkenness.

                  For the next seven years he led a hardscrabble life, with only his own
                  fierce determination and his wife's unshakable love and belief in his
                  ultimate success to keep him going. Upon the outbreak of the Civil War Grant
                  returned to the only career he really loved. “I know,” his father, Jesse,
                  once said, “that Ulyss was never worth anything in business; it’s because he
                  ’s all soldier, Ulyss is.”

                  This book comes alive the moment Grant enters the war. Simpson delights in
                  narrating the several battles by which Grant slowly but steadily rose to
                  total command of the Union armies. He is even better at detailing the
                  conniving and the backstabbing that went on among civilian and professional
                  officers to win advancement and block the progress of potential rivals. The
                  military career of Ulysses S. Grant is truly an exceptional story of
                  courage, intelligence and determination, and the author tells it with
                  obvious sympathy and feeling, but with appropriate historical objectivity
                  and balance.

                  Grant rejoined the service in late April 1861, when Gov. Richard Yates of
                  Illinois offered him a post working as a captain in the adjutant general's
                  office to help organize Illinois volunteers. Within two months, by dint of
                  outstanding ability, he won command of a regiment and the rank of colonel.
                  As his career progressed and promotions followed, he had to contend
                  constantly with rebels in front and enemies to the rear. Yet, despite the
                  incompetence of a number of subordinate officers, the missed opportunities
                  of others, the regular and frequently wrongheaded intrusions of superiors
                  like Gen. Henry W. Halleck and the occasional interference by President
                  Lincoln, who was concerned about his re-election and made some questionable
                  military appointments for political reasons, Grant put together a carefully
                  planned and coordinated campaign that ultimately forced the surrender of
                  Robert E. Lee. In a concluding chapter Simpson makes clear his doubts that
                  any other general could have achieved that victory.

                  To a large extent Grant’s military success resulted from what he claimed was
                  a simple formula on the art of war: find the enemy, attack him immediately,
                  hit him as hard and as often as possible and then move on. More to the
                  point, Simpson credits Grant's victories to his common-sensical approach to
                  generalship, his emphasis on coordination and cooperation, his calmness
                  under pressure, his almost demonic determination to achieve his goals, his
                  resourcefulness, his perseverance in overcoming obstacles of terrain and
                  climate, and his decisiveness and energy in action.

                  The human carnage resulting from his military operations at Shiloh,
                  Vicksburg, Chattanooga, the Wilderness, Cold Harbor and Petersburg was
                  staggering, and brought angry howls of protest from his enemies, and
                  sometimes his friends. “Great confidence is felt in Grant,” Gideon Welles,
                  Lincoln’s secretary of the Navy, declared, “but the immense slaughter of our
                  brave men chills and sickens us all.” Grant was regularly accused of
                  mounting mindless frontal assaults against an entrenched enemy without any
                  thought of their cost in lives, of being simply a bloodthirsty butcher. But
                  better than most, the general understood that war is a filthy business in
                  which a great many men get killed, a fact he accepted as unavoidable.

                  His drinking was another cause for complaint, giving rise to the much quoted
                  statement of Lincoln about finding out the brand the general drank so that
                  he could send a barrel of it to his other, less successful generals. It was
                  said that Grant needed the constant presence of his wife to keep him sober.
                  His problem really came down to the fact that he could not hold his liquor,
                  no matter the amount he drank. One glass of whiskey or wine would
                  immediately show in his slurred speech and erratic behavior; two or three
                  glasses, as a fellow officer observed, ''would make him stupid.''

                  Simpson’s detailed analyses of Grant's drinking problem and the development
                  of his character traits are among the more distinctive and valuable features
                  of this book. In addition, he provides interesting new information about the
                  relationship between the general and the president, how well Grant
                  understood Lincoln's objectives in emancipating slaves and employing them in
                  the war effort, and his plan for reconstructing the nation once the fighting
                  ended.

                  Simpson also supplies full coverage of Grant'’s domestic life and his
                  devotion to his wife and children. In 1848, at the age of 26, he wed Julia
                  Dent, the daughter of a slave-owning planter in Missouri. Her immense pride
                  in him and unquestioning support were among the few mainstays in his life.
                  She was certainly no beauty and suffered from strabismus, which frequently
                  caused her right eye to glance upward. When he became a national figure, she
                  looked into having her eye fixed in an operation so she would be more
                  presentable. But after she was told that it was too late, Grant was there to
                  console her. “Did I not see you and fall in love with you with these same
                  eyes?” he wrote her. “I like them just as they are.”

                  Unfortunately, what Simpson fails to do in this book is adequately place
                  Grant in the context of his times. The narrative is too tightly focused on
                  its subject. Only those people and events that directly cross the general's
                  life receive any appreciable attention. Thus, with the exception of slavery,
                  little mention is given to national events or issues during the first 38
                  years of Grant’s life. Several times Simpson states that Grant discussed
                  politics with others and even commented on European affairs. But he does not
                  explain what those events were or how they affected or influenced him. Even
                  though the disruptive quarrels and the intense turbulence of the 1840's and
                  50's that finally pitched the nation into mortal combat apparently produced
                  from Grant few recorded reactions worth mentioning, Simpson seems in too
                  great a rush to hurry past the early life to get to the Civil War.

                  Still, Simpson has done a masterly job for the most part. He has given us a
                  detailed and exciting narrative of how one man succeeded, where so many
                  others had failed, in pinning the Union back together again, albeit with a
                  bloody bayonet.
                • CashG79@aol.com
                  In a message dated 4/30/2001 9:23:24 PM Pacific Daylight Time, josepharose@yahoo.com writes:
                  Message 8 of 12 , Apr 30, 2001
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                    In a message dated 4/30/2001 9:23:24 PM Pacific Daylight Time,
                    josepharose@... writes:

                    << I just found this review of Professor Simpson's book on Amazon.com and
                    I'm completely speechless (although I can still type).

                    "[5 of 5 stars] Brilliant Treatment of the Grant-Thomas Relationship!,
                    September 7, 2000
                    Reviewer: Bob Redman from cyberspace, USA
                    I came to this book a bit skeptical about anything on Ulysses S.
                    Grant. You see, I adore George H. Thomas, and that means I must
                    question Grant's claims to greatness. But this book has set me
                    straight. The author's deft touch, his skillful handling of
                    controversy, and his evenhanded treatment of Thomas have won me over."

                    What's going on here?

                    I myself have digested good chunks of this book and, on the topic of
                    the Grant-Thomas Relationship, I thought that it wasn't very fair to
                    General Thomas. I'm very surprised that Mr. Redman came to a
                    different conclusion.

                    Joseph >>

                    Now does that sound like the Bob Redman we all know and love?

                    I think not.

                    : )

                    Regards,
                    Cash
                  • basecat1@aol.com
                    In a message dated 5/1/2001 12:23:41 AM Eastern Daylight Time, ... Joseph....I checked the review in full at Amazon as well....and was shocked by what was
                    Message 9 of 12 , Apr 30, 2001
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                      In a message dated 5/1/2001 12:23:41 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
                      josepharose@... writes:


                      I myself have digested good chunks of this book and, on the topic of
                      the Grant-Thomas Relationship, I thought that it wasn't very fair to
                      General Thomas.  I'm very surprised that Mr. Redman came to a
                      different conclusion.

                      Joseph


                      Joseph....I checked the review in full at Amazon as well....and was shocked
                      by what was written...considering the posts that used to appear here.  I have
                      not read the book....but have it here...I'll be honest....I find HUG
                      fascinating...but even I am tired of the lack of new scholarship on Thomas.  
                      It seems that everytime I walk into the bookstore....a new book appears on
                      Grant.   Is a big discussion in the us-civilwar chat room.....Many feel that
                      Rosy and GHT are ignored...and I agree....BTW...Our chat room muster will be
                      at Chickamauga and Chattanooga this June....If you are interested....check
                      out the Muster home page   http://www.angelfire.com/fl2/map1863/index.html    
                      Regards from the Garden State.  Steve.
                    • CashG79@aol.com
                      In a message dated 4/30/2001 10:14:45 PM Pacific Daylight Time, basecat1@aol.com writes: I do
                      Message 10 of 12 , Apr 30, 2001
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                        In a message dated 4/30/2001 10:14:45 PM Pacific Daylight Time,
                        basecat1@... writes:

                        << Many feel that
                        Rosy and GHT are ignored...and I agree... >>


                        I do too. There are what? Five books on Thomas? Plus a smattering of
                        magazine articles? And only a couple of books and some articles on Rosey
                        that I know of. These two definitely could use more scholarship devoted to
                        them.

                        Regards,
                        Cash
                      • Bob Huddleston
                        A good scholarly biography of Thomas would be very welcome. However, I suspect part of the problem is that he was not at Gettysburg! Unfortunately the only
                        Message 11 of 12 , May 1 9:20 PM
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                          A good scholarly biography of Thomas would be very welcome.
                           
                          However, I suspect part of the problem is that he was not at Gettysburg!
                           
                          Unfortunately the only thing that happened in the Civil War west of the Shenandoah Valley was that USG won a bunch of battles. How many decent and recent books are there on western battles, while the East and GB in particular, groan under the weight of the scholarship.
                           
                          I suspect that the only biographies from the west that would sell are books on USG and Uncle Billy. And the only battle that matters is Vicksburg.
                           
                          And that is a shame.

                          Take care,

                          Bob

                          Judy and Bob Huddleston
                          10643 Sperry Street
                          Northglenn, CO  80234-3612
                          303.451.6276   Adco@...

                           
                          In a message dated 5/1/2001 12:23:41 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
                          josepharose@... writes:


                           SNIP I'll be honest....I find HUG
                          fascinating...but even I am tired of the lack of new scholarship on Thomas.  
                          It seems that everytime I walk into the bookstore....a new book appears on
                          Grant.   Is a big discussion in the us-civilwar chat room.....Many feel that
                          Rosy and GHT are ignored...and I agree.... SNIP 
                        • josepharose@yahoo.com
                          To all: In Simpson s book, he stated that Baldy Smith urged Grant to make an all-out attack on the ridge at Chattanooga on 11/8/63 to be led by Thomas.
                          Message 12 of 12 , May 2 11:20 AM
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                            To all:

                            In Simpson's book, he stated that "Baldy" Smith "urged" Grant to make
                            an all-out attack on the ridge at Chattanooga on 11/8/63 to be led by
                            Thomas. The professor quoted Smith as saying he "instigated" the
                            all-out attack. I said, according to all I had read (e.g., Cozzens
                            and a Smith quote), that he did not. I suggested that any instigation
                            may have referred to the advance on Citico Creek and demonstration
                            toward the ridge which Smith did undoubtedly propose.

                            Not having Smith's autobiography at hand, can anyone provide me with
                            excerpts from it of from other sources which would enlighten us on
                            this matter?

                            Thanks in advance,
                            Joseph

                            P.S. If you want to read much more on the subject, my last post stated:
                            Professor,
                            You requested documentation for my assertion that, "Baldy Smith
                            did no such thing" in response to your book's statement, "Smith,
                            who had urged Grant to order the attack...." regarding Grant's
                            peremptory order for Thomas to attack the northern end of
                            Missionary Ridge on 11/7/63. As I stated before, "I don't have
                            his autobiography present to look it up first-hand." My reading,
                            though, had given me adequate confirmation that "Baldy" Smith did
                            not share the feelings you ascribed to him.

                            As evidence for this conclusion, and in deference to your opinion
                            of Smith's reliability as a correspondent, I submit Charles Dana's
                            three reports, which are copied below. They seem especially
                            acceptable as documentation of the situation, having been written
                            before and during the incident and not years after when other
                            events may have colored his perspective. The change seen between
                            11/5/63, when only an advance to the creek and a demonstration was
                            considered, and 11/7/63, when Grant's all-out attack had been
                            ordered, is obvious.

                            Furthermore, I had quoted the following extract from Baldy Smith
                            before: "When it is remembered that eighteen days after this
                            Sherman with six perfectly appointed divisions failed to carry
                            this same point of Missionary Ridge, at a time when Thomas with
                            four divisions stood threatening Bragg's center, and Hooker with
                            nearly three divisions was driving in Bragg's left flank (Bragg
                            having no more strength than on the 7th), it will not be a matter
                            of surprise that the order staggered Thomas." If Smith did urge
                            such an attack as you say, he should definitely have been
                            surprised if it staggered the very general who he knew was to
                            carry it out.

                            I would agree with your book's statement that Thomas "paled at the
                            notion of a full-scale attack"--psychologically at least, if not
                            physiologically. In reality, Grant's plan would have to be
                            carried out by a still-hungry Army of the Cumberland--without
                            cavalry or horses to draw artillery or a supply train, without
                            holding Lookout Mountain or Orchard Knob, with Chattanooga left
                            mainly undefended, with Hooker still in Lookout Valley, without
                            Sherman's troops, with Johnson's Confederate division still on the
                            field, with no advantage of surprise, and with only one day's
                            notice. Once accomplished, the troops would take four days
                            rations in their haversacks and cut the rail lines some twenty
                            miles away. Even if they got that far, Longstreet would have been
                            close enough to turn on them. Grant, furthermore, didn't even
                            delineate how all of this was to be accomplished; he left that up
                            to Thomas.

                            Dana to Stanton, 11/5/63 11 AM
                            Grant and Thomas considering plan proposed by W. F. Smith to
                            advance our pickets on the left to Citico Creek, about a mile in
                            front of the position they have occupied from the first, and to
                            threaten the seizure of the northwest extremity of Missionary
                            Ridge. This, taken in connection with our present demonstration
                            in Lookout Valley, will compel them to concentrate and come back
                            from Burnside to fight here.

                            Dana to Stanton, 11/7/63 10 AM
                            Before receiving this information, Grant had ordered Thomas to
                            execute the movement on Citico Creek, which I reported on the 5th,
                            as proposed by Smith. Thomas, who rather preferred an attempt
                            on Lookout Mountain, desired to postpone the operation until Sher-
                            man should come up, but Grant has decided that for the sake of
                            Burnside the attack must be made at once; and I presume the
                            advance on Citico will take place to-morrow morning, and that on
                            Missionary Ridge immediately afterward. If successful, this
                            operation will divide Bragg's forces in Chattanooga Valley from
                            those in the Valley of the Chickamauga, and will compel him either
                            to retreat, leaving the railroad communications of Cheatham and
                            Longstreet exposed, or else to fight a battle with his diminished
                            forces.

                            Dana to Stanton, 11/8/63 11 AM
                            Reconnaissance of Citico Creek and head of Missionary Ridge
                            made yesterday by Thomas, Smith, and Brannan, from the heights
                            opposite on the north of the Tennessee, proved Smith's plan of
                            attack impracticable. The creek and country are wrongly laid
                            down on our maps, and no operation for the seizure of Missionary
                            Ridge can be undertaken with the force which Thomas can now
                            command for the purpose. That force cannot by any efforts be
                            made to exceed 18,000 men. The deficiency of animals, forage, and
                            subsistence rendering any attacks by us on Bragg's line of
                            communications at Cleveland or Charleston out of the question, it
                            follows that no important effort for the relief of Burnside can be
                            made.

                            P.P.S. To be fair, herewith is the professor's response, starting
                            with a quote from my post [so you won't be confused]:
                            "You requested documentation for my assertion that, 'Baldy Smith
                            did no such thing' in response to your book's statement, 'Smith,
                            who had urged Grant to order the attack....' regarding Grant's
                            peremptory order for Thomas to attack the northern end of
                            Missionary Ridge on 11/7/63. As I stated before, 'I don't have
                            his autobiography present to look it up first-hand.'"

                            Joseph, have you ever seen the book in question? Have you read
                            the part under discussion? And how can you assert that I've
                            taken something out of context when you do not have the context
                            at hand?

                            "My reading, though, had given me adequate confirmation
                            that 'Baldy' Smith did not share the feelings you ascribed to
                            him."

                            Well, I think Smith knew better than you what his feelings were,
                            and he set them down in his autobiography.

                            "As evidence for this conclusion, and in deference to your opinion
                            of Smith's reliability as a correspondent, I submit Charles Dana's
                            three reports, which are copied below. They seem especially
                            acceptable as documentation of the situation, having been written
                            before and during the incident and not years after when other
                            events may have colored his perspective."

                            Exactly. Each dispatch credits Smith with the concept of the
                            operation.

                            "The change seen between
                            11/5/63, when only an advance to the creek and a demonstration was
                            considered, and 11/7/63, when Grant's all-out attack had been
                            ordered, is obvious."

                            Not to Dana; not to Smith.

                            "If Smith did urge
                            such an attack as you say, he should definitely have been
                            surprised if it staggered the very general who he knew was to
                            carry it out."

                            That's what Smith said in his autobiography.

                            "Grant, furthermore, didn't even delineate how all of this was to be
                            accomplished; he left that up to Thomas."

                            True. I've already quoted Grant on this. Don't you think it was
                            wise of him to allow Thomas to devise the best way to execute the
                            order? And, when Thomas and Smith returned with news that
                            Smith's plan wouldn't work, didn't Grant heed Thomas's advice?

                            So what's the problem?

                            As for authorship of the plan, let's focus on the Dana dispatches:

                            Dana to Stanton, 11/5/63 11 AM
                            "Grant and Thomas considering plan proposed by W. F. Smith to
                            advance our pickets on the left to Citico Creek, about a mile in
                            front of the position they have occupied from the first, and to
                            threaten the seizure of the northwest extremity of Missionary
                            Ridge."

                            Note Dana says "plan proposed by W. F. Smith."

                            Dana to Stanton, 11/7/63 10 AM
                            "Before receiving this information, Grant had ordered Thomas to
                            execute the movement on Citico Creek, which I reported on the 5th,
                            as proposed by Smith."

                            Note Dana says "as proposed by Smith."

                            Dana to Stanton, 11/8/63 11 AM
                            "Reconnaissance of Citico Creek and head of Missionary Ridge
                            made yesterday by Thomas, Smith, and Brannan, from the heights
                            opposite on the north of the Tennessee, proved Smith?s plan of
                            attack impracticable."

                            Note Dana called it "Smith's plan."

                            Smith's autobiography and Dana's dispatches settle the matter: it
                            was Smith's plan. Thanks for providing us with the additional
                            information.

                            P.P.P.S. Simpson also had asked whether I was as critical of other
                            authors; I replied:
                            As a very critical reader, I find problems with most
                            articles and books that cross my path. On the CivilWarWest
                            e-group, someone mentioned errors in Cozzens' "Shipwreck..." and I
                            asked what they were. The individual only mentioned a mistake in
                            an officer's rank and one other smallish problem. I have yet to
                            finish the book, but I have found two more--what I feel
                            are--substantial issues. On page 259, enumerating Thomas' assault
                            force, Cozzens writes: "On Granger's right, Palmer's Fourteenth
                            Corps was represented solely by Richard Johnson's division." Yet,
                            in his appendix (no, not that appendix), it correctly states that
                            Palmer's third division is Baird's which was on the opposite end
                            of the line. Worse, in my mind, the timing of Hooker's delay at
                            the bridge appear to be self-contradictory. On page 244, it
                            notes, "It was 1:25 P.M. when the ... advance guard ... bumped up
                            against the bank of the creek." On the next page, "[Hooker]
                            scribbled a note apprising Thomas that his march had stalled ...."
                            On page 247, "[Thomas] had heard nothing from Hooker since 1:30
                            P.M., when Hooker had reported his delay at the creek ...." Not
                            only would these times give Hooker only five minutes to determine
                            his situation, scribble a note, and send it over the creek three
                            miles to Orchard Knob, but the time of first encountering the
                            creek must have happened much sooner.
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