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Wow... just wow...

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  • Tony Gunter
    Reading through the O.R. s, one has the feeling that Grant was reading every communication that the Confederates sent. Pemberton split north Mississippi into
    Message 1 of 27 , Oct 4, 2005
      Reading through the O.R.'s, one has the feeling that Grant was reading
      every communication that the Confederates sent. Pemberton split north
      Mississippi into two districts on April 3rd, the western district
      commanded by Chalmers, the eastern district commanded by Ruggles. Two
      weeks later, Grierson's raid commenced. The path taken by Grierson?
      Ripley, New Albany, Pontotoc, Houston, Starkville, Louisville,
      Philadelphia, Decatur... the EXACT seam between Chalmers' and Ruggles'
      departments.
    • GnrlJEJohnston@aol.com
      In a message dated 10/4/2005 2:42:33 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, tony_gunter@yahoo.com writes: Reading through the O.R. s, one has the feeling that Grant was
      Message 2 of 27 , Oct 4, 2005
        In a message dated 10/4/2005 2:42:33 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, tony_gunter@... writes:
        Reading through the O.R.'s, one has the feeling that Grant was reading
        every communication that the Confederates sent.
        You have to remember, Grant had spies within the Confederate armies.  He knew what JEJ wrote to Pemberton before Pemberton got the messages in Vicksburg.
         
        JEJ
      • josepharose
        ... reading ... north ... Two ... Ruggles ... From what I recall reading, Grant didn t give much or any input into the route Grierson took. As to the timing
        Message 3 of 27 , Oct 4, 2005
          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@y...>
          wrote:
          >
          > Reading through the O.R.'s, one has the feeling that Grant was
          reading
          > every communication that the Confederates sent. Pemberton split
          north
          > Mississippi into two districts on April 3rd, the western district
          > commanded by Chalmers, the eastern district commanded by Ruggles.
          Two
          > weeks later, Grierson's raid commenced. The path taken by Grierson?
          > Ripley, New Albany, Pontotoc, Houston, Starkville, Louisville,
          > Philadelphia, Decatur... the EXACT seam between Chalmers' and
          Ruggles'
          > departments.


          From what I recall reading, Grant didn't give much or any input into
          the route Grierson took.

          As to the timing of the raid, which also worked out very fortutitously,
          Grant had wanted it to begin much sooner, but it was unexpectedly
          delayed.

          Many people credit Grant for things he never did.

          Joe
        • William H Keene
          ... ... Ruggles. ... Grierson? ... into ... fortutitously, ... Good points. The credit here should go to Hurlbut, who organized the raid.
          Message 4 of 27 , Oct 4, 2005
            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
            wrote:
            > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter"
            <tony_gunter@y...>
            > wrote:
            > >
            > > Reading through the O.R.'s, one has the feeling that Grant was
            > reading
            > > every communication that the Confederates sent. Pemberton split
            > north
            > > Mississippi into two districts on April 3rd, the western district
            > > commanded by Chalmers, the eastern district commanded by
            Ruggles.
            > Two
            > > weeks later, Grierson's raid commenced. The path taken by
            Grierson?
            > > Ripley, New Albany, Pontotoc, Houston, Starkville, Louisville,
            > > Philadelphia, Decatur... the EXACT seam between Chalmers' and
            > Ruggles'
            > > departments.
            >
            >
            > From what I recall reading, Grant didn't give much or any input
            into
            > the route Grierson took.
            >
            > As to the timing of the raid, which also worked out very
            fortutitously,
            > Grant had wanted it to begin much sooner, but it was unexpectedly
            > delayed.
            >
            > Many people credit Grant for things he never did.
            >
            > Joe

            Good points. The credit here should go to Hurlbut, who organized the
            raid. Grant had given approal of the concept, but was not involved
            in the details. It was Hurlbut and not Grant who assessed intel of
            enemy strength and positions when devising this raid.

            The April 3rd order simply clarified the boundary between Ruggles and
            Chalmers. The division of the region between then had been in palce
            for some time. Confederate forces had generally clustered either
            along the M&O [Tupelo/Okolana/Columbus] or along the V formed by the
            rail lines going north from Grenada.

            The route was a natural choice regardless of the Confederate command
            structure. The raid was intended to move deep into Mississippi
            without being stopped. Thus it would want to initially avoid the
            main rail north-south corridors. It would need to be west of the M&O
            but east of the MS Central. This also made natural obstacles easier
            in that routes further west would entail more substantial crossings
            of the Yazoo tributaries.
          • josepharose
            ... wrote: [snip] ... the ... involved ... of ... and ... palce ... the ... command ... M&O ... easier ... crossings ... Thanks. I m away from
            Message 5 of 27 , Oct 5, 2005
              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
              <wh_keene@y...> wrote:

              [snip]

              >
              > Good points. The credit here should go to Hurlbut, who organized
              the
              > raid. Grant had given approal of the concept, but was not
              involved
              > in the details. It was Hurlbut and not Grant who assessed intel
              of
              > enemy strength and positions when devising this raid.
              >
              > The April 3rd order simply clarified the boundary between Ruggles
              and
              > Chalmers. The division of the region between then had been in
              palce
              > for some time. Confederate forces had generally clustered either
              > along the M&O [Tupelo/Okolana/Columbus] or along the V formed by
              the
              > rail lines going north from Grenada.
              >
              > The route was a natural choice regardless of the Confederate
              command
              > structure. The raid was intended to move deep into Mississippi
              > without being stopped. Thus it would want to initially avoid the
              > main rail north-south corridors. It would need to be west of the
              M&O
              > but east of the MS Central. This also made natural obstacles
              easier
              > in that routes further west would entail more substantial
              crossings
              > of the Yazoo tributaries.


              Thanks.

              I'm away from my notes but, IIRC, the dates on their messages
              indicated that both Hurlbut and Grant had the idea for a raid at the
              same time. As they were separated by a few days--for purposes of
              communications--that would make it quite a coincidence.

              Have you seen anything which gives better evidence than I've seen
              that one or the other of them came up with the idea first?

              At the time that the raid was first ordered, Grant was still
              depending on the various routes which later failed. Is there any
              indication that he wanted the raid to further any particular plan
              for getting his troops up on the high ground, or was the raid merely
              to help his operations in a more general way?

              Joseph
            • Tony Gunter
              ... If you pay careful attention to the Confederate O.R. during the period, you can see that Grant appears to be purposefully spreading out the Confederate
              Message 6 of 27 , Oct 5, 2005
                --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
                wrote:
                > At the time that the raid was first ordered, Grant was still
                > depending on the various routes which later failed.

                If you pay careful attention to the Confederate O.R. during the
                period, you can see that Grant appears to be purposefully spreading
                out the Confederate concentration of artillery. The expedition to
                Fort Pemberton diverted guns to both Greenwood and Yazoo City. The
                canal diverted guns to Warrenton. Deer Creek diverted guns to
                Haynes' Bluff. I haven't actually counted the number of guns that
                were diverted by Grant's probing efforts, but I would guess that by
                the time Porter ran the gauntlet, the artillery concentration at
                Vicksburg was half what it could have been.

                > Is there any indication that he wanted the raid to further any
                > particular plan for getting his troops up on the high ground, or
                > was the raid merely to help his operations in a more general way?

                The value of the raid is obvious: it cuts both the eastern and
                southern routes by which reinforcements would arrive. Even if the
                raid had not drawn Adams cavalry away, Grant would have landed at
                Rodney and enjoyed numeric superiority at Port Gibson. But Raymond
                is where the raid made the real difference: Pemberton had ordered all
                reinforcements arriving in Jackson to march to Raymond. Ideally,
                this would have meant a force of 10,000 - 12,000 men, but only
                Gregg's brigade made it to the battle, and they barely made it in
                time as it was. Having been forced to detrain and march half the
                distance from Port Hudson to Jackson, Gregg's men made it to Raymond
                just 14 hours before McPherson.
              • Tony Gunter
                ... ... Another key aspect of the expedition to Fort Pemberton, unintended or not, is that the floodwaters of the Mississippi swelled the
                Message 7 of 27 , Oct 5, 2005
                  --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@y...>
                  wrote:
                  > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
                  <josepharose@y...>
                  > wrote:
                  > > At the time that the raid was first ordered, Grant was still
                  > > depending on the various routes which later failed.
                  >
                  > If you pay careful attention to the Confederate O.R. during the
                  > period, you can see that Grant appears to be purposefully spreading
                  > out the Confederate concentration of artillery. The expedition to
                  > Fort Pemberton diverted guns to both Greenwood and Yazoo City. The
                  > canal diverted guns to Warrenton. Deer Creek diverted guns to
                  > Haynes' Bluff. I haven't actually counted the number of guns that
                  > were diverted by Grant's probing efforts, but I would guess that by
                  > the time Porter ran the gauntlet, the artillery concentration at
                  > Vicksburg was half what it could have been.

                  Another key aspect of the expedition to Fort Pemberton, unintended or
                  not, is that the floodwaters of the Mississippi swelled the Yazoo
                  River so badly that the chain preventing passage by union gunboats at
                  Snyder's Bluff broke... so the Fort Pemberton expedition diverted
                  guns and troops not only to Greenwood and Yazoo City, but Snyder's
                  Bluff and Hayne's Bluff as well.
                • William H Keene
                  In mid-February, Grant and Hurlbut worte to each other a few days apart about the idea of a raid to cut the railway east of Jackson. Hurlbut s letter says it
                  Message 8 of 27 , Oct 6, 2005
                    In mid-February, Grant and Hurlbut worte to each other a few days apart
                    about the idea of a raid to cut the railway east of Jackson. Hurlbut's
                    letter says it was Hamilton's suggestion.

                    In mid-March Grant directed Hurlbut to prepare for a raid to occur in
                    conjunction with a raid Grant planned once the Yazoo Pass route
                    worked. But the route did not work.

                    In early April Hurlbut made arrangements for a series of raids
                    includign Grierson's. In reporting to Halleck about it Grant gave
                    credit to Hurlbut for the plan.

                    - will

                    --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
                    wrote:
                    > I'm away from my notes but, IIRC, the dates on their messages
                    > indicated that both Hurlbut and Grant had the idea for a raid at the
                    > same time. As they were separated by a few days--for purposes of
                    > communications--that would make it quite a coincidence.
                    >
                    > Have you seen anything which gives better evidence than I've seen
                    > that one or the other of them came up with the idea first?
                    >
                    > At the time that the raid was first ordered, Grant was still
                    > depending on the various routes which later failed. Is there any
                    > indication that he wanted the raid to further any particular plan
                    > for getting his troops up on the high ground, or was the raid merely
                    > to help his operations in a more general way?
                    >
                    > Joseph
                  • Tony Gunter
                    ... apart ... Hurlbut s ... Interestingly enough, Joseph Johnston contributed to the success of the raid. Van Dorn and (the name of the other conspirator
                    Message 9 of 27 , Oct 6, 2005
                      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@y...>
                      wrote:
                      > In mid-February, Grant and Hurlbut worte to each other a few days
                      apart
                      > about the idea of a raid to cut the railway east of Jackson.
                      Hurlbut's
                      > letter says it was Hamilton's suggestion.
                      >
                      > In mid-March Grant directed Hurlbut to prepare for a raid to occur in
                      > conjunction with a raid Grant planned once the Yazoo Pass route
                      > worked. But the route did not work.
                      >
                      > In early April Hurlbut made arrangements for a series of raids
                      > includign Grierson's. In reporting to Halleck about it Grant gave
                      > credit to Hurlbut for the plan.


                      Interestingly enough, Joseph Johnston contributed to the success of the
                      raid. Van Dorn and (the name of the other conspirator escapes me now)
                      reported to Johnston that Pemberton had told them in confidence that he
                      could have held Vicksburg in December 1862 against 100,000 men... but
                      he didn't want to tell Johnston that because Johnston might ask for
                      reinforcements for Tullahoma from his department. So when Pemberton
                      informed Johnston that he had heard rumors that portions of Grant's
                      forces may have been pulled away to reinforce Roseacrans, and Johnston
                      also heard rumors that a large force was assembling near Corinth to
                      march on Tuscumbia, Johnston, in addition to ordering reinforcements
                      from Pemberton's department to Tullahoma, asked Pemberton to feign a
                      movement on Corinth. Pemberton ordered Ruggles to move on Corinth just
                      as Grierson's raid was about to launch, which meant that Ruggle's
                      cavalry was completely out of position to pursue the raiders.
                    • josepharose
                      ... ... days ... occur in ... gave ... of the ... now) ... that he ... but ... for ... Pemberton ... Grant s ... Johnston ... to ...
                      Message 10 of 27 , Oct 6, 2005
                        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter"
                        <tony_gunter@y...> wrote:
                        >
                        > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
                        <wh_keene@y...>
                        > wrote:
                        > > In mid-February, Grant and Hurlbut worte to each other a few
                        days
                        > apart
                        > > about the idea of a raid to cut the railway east of Jackson.
                        > Hurlbut's
                        > > letter says it was Hamilton's suggestion.
                        > >
                        > > In mid-March Grant directed Hurlbut to prepare for a raid to
                        occur in
                        > > conjunction with a raid Grant planned once the Yazoo Pass route
                        > > worked. But the route did not work.
                        > >
                        > > In early April Hurlbut made arrangements for a series of raids
                        > > includign Grierson's. In reporting to Halleck about it Grant
                        gave
                        > > credit to Hurlbut for the plan.
                        >
                        >
                        > Interestingly enough, Joseph Johnston contributed to the success
                        of the
                        > raid. Van Dorn and (the name of the other conspirator escapes me
                        now)
                        > reported to Johnston that Pemberton had told them in confidence
                        that he
                        > could have held Vicksburg in December 1862 against 100,000 men...
                        but
                        > he didn't want to tell Johnston that because Johnston might ask
                        for
                        > reinforcements for Tullahoma from his department. So when
                        Pemberton
                        > informed Johnston that he had heard rumors that portions of
                        Grant's
                        > forces may have been pulled away to reinforce Roseacrans, and
                        Johnston
                        > also heard rumors that a large force was assembling near Corinth
                        to
                        > march on Tuscumbia, Johnston, in addition to ordering
                        reinforcements
                        > from Pemberton's department to Tullahoma, asked Pemberton to feign
                        a
                        > movement on Corinth. Pemberton ordered Ruggles to move on Corinth
                        just
                        > as Grierson's raid was about to launch, which meant that Ruggle's
                        > cavalry was completely out of position to pursue the raiders.
                        >


                        What may also have helped Grierson is the delay which then allowed
                        Streight's raid to draw off Forrest. Without Streight, Forrest
                        might have gone after Grierson.

                        Joseph
                      • josepharose
                        ... ... spreading ... The ... by ... Raymond ... all ... Raymond ... You still seem to be trying to give Grant undue credit. I don t think
                        Message 11 of 27 , Oct 6, 2005
                          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter"
                          <tony_gunter@y...> wrote:
                          >
                          > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
                          <josepharose@y...>
                          > wrote:
                          > > At the time that the raid was first ordered, Grant was still
                          > > depending on the various routes which later failed.
                          >
                          > If you pay careful attention to the Confederate O.R. during the
                          > period, you can see that Grant appears to be purposefully
                          spreading
                          > out the Confederate concentration of artillery. The expedition to
                          > Fort Pemberton diverted guns to both Greenwood and Yazoo City.
                          The
                          > canal diverted guns to Warrenton. Deer Creek diverted guns to
                          > Haynes' Bluff. I haven't actually counted the number of guns that
                          > were diverted by Grant's probing efforts, but I would guess that
                          by
                          > the time Porter ran the gauntlet, the artillery concentration at
                          > Vicksburg was half what it could have been.
                          >
                          > > Is there any indication that he wanted the raid to further any
                          > > particular plan for getting his troops up on the high ground, or
                          > > was the raid merely to help his operations in a more general way?
                          >
                          > The value of the raid is obvious: it cuts both the eastern and
                          > southern routes by which reinforcements would arrive. Even if the
                          > raid had not drawn Adams cavalry away, Grant would have landed at
                          > Rodney and enjoyed numeric superiority at Port Gibson. But
                          Raymond
                          > is where the raid made the real difference: Pemberton had ordered
                          all
                          > reinforcements arriving in Jackson to march to Raymond. Ideally,
                          > this would have meant a force of 10,000 - 12,000 men, but only
                          > Gregg's brigade made it to the battle, and they barely made it in
                          > time as it was. Having been forced to detrain and march half the
                          > distance from Port Hudson to Jackson, Gregg's men made it to
                          Raymond
                          > just 14 hours before McPherson.
                          >

                          You still seem to be trying to give Grant undue credit.

                          I don't think that there is any hard evidence that Grant's delta
                          schemes were for the purpose of dispersing CSA artillery. The canal
                          plan, if anything, would have drawn guns *to* Vicksburg.

                          As Grant wanted Grierson's raid to start earlier, it wouldn't have
                          been connected to the landing at Bruinsburg--which was a very last-
                          minute affair, in any case--or elsewhere.

                          Joseph
                        • Tony Gunter
                          ... canal ... Whether they were explicitly for the purpose of dispersing CSA artillery or not is irrelevant. They were clearly designed to keep the CSA
                          Message 12 of 27 , Oct 7, 2005
                            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
                            wrote:
                            >
                            > I don't think that there is any hard evidence that Grant's delta
                            > schemes were for the purpose of dispersing CSA artillery. The
                            canal
                            > plan, if anything, would have drawn guns *to* Vicksburg.

                            Whether they were explicitly for the purpose of dispersing CSA
                            artillery or not is irrelevant. They were clearly designed to keep
                            the CSA command guessing as to Grant's intent. Shifting federal
                            forces along the waterways meant that Confederate guns and men had to
                            be marched long distances in order to meet the threats. Even the
                            Lake Providence expedition aggravated the fog of war; because
                            Pemberton's scouts were not operating in that area, when McClernand
                            began marching south it appeared as if the federal force fronting
                            Vicksburg had actually picked up and left. Coupled with the rumor
                            that empty boats had recently left Memphis, Pemberton could not help
                            but report the rumor to Johnston that Grant was moving to reinforce
                            Rosecrans.

                            Concerning the canal plan, it diverted guns off the Vicksburg
                            waterfront that were then used to harass the canal effort and
                            interdict the waterway should it be completed.

                            >
                            > As Grant wanted Grierson's raid to start earlier, it wouldn't have
                            > been connected to the landing at Bruinsburg--which was a very last-
                            > minute affair, in any case--or elsewhere.

                            There was reason to believe that the Moon Lake expedition might be
                            successful, they had travelled half the distance to Vicksburg without
                            a Confederate in sight. Without the amazing last-minuted erection of
                            Fort Pemberton, the Moon Lake expedition would have flanked Hayne's
                            Bluff and made Grant's move inland unnecessary.
                          • josepharose
                            ... ... keep ... to ... McClernand ... help ... reinforce ... have ... last- ... without ... of ... Hayne s ... Grant wanted all of the
                            Message 13 of 27 , Oct 7, 2005
                              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter"
                              <tony_gunter@y...> wrote:
                              >
                              > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
                              <josepharose@y...>
                              > wrote:
                              > >
                              > > I don't think that there is any hard evidence that Grant's delta
                              > > schemes were for the purpose of dispersing CSA artillery. The
                              > canal
                              > > plan, if anything, would have drawn guns *to* Vicksburg.
                              >
                              > Whether they were explicitly for the purpose of dispersing CSA
                              > artillery or not is irrelevant. They were clearly designed to
                              keep
                              > the CSA command guessing as to Grant's intent. Shifting federal
                              > forces along the waterways meant that Confederate guns and men had
                              to
                              > be marched long distances in order to meet the threats. Even the
                              > Lake Providence expedition aggravated the fog of war; because
                              > Pemberton's scouts were not operating in that area, when
                              McClernand
                              > began marching south it appeared as if the federal force fronting
                              > Vicksburg had actually picked up and left. Coupled with the rumor
                              > that empty boats had recently left Memphis, Pemberton could not
                              help
                              > but report the rumor to Johnston that Grant was moving to
                              reinforce
                              > Rosecrans.
                              >
                              > Concerning the canal plan, it diverted guns off the Vicksburg
                              > waterfront that were then used to harass the canal effort and
                              > interdict the waterway should it be completed.
                              >
                              > >
                              > > As Grant wanted Grierson's raid to start earlier, it wouldn't
                              have
                              > > been connected to the landing at Bruinsburg--which was a very
                              last-
                              > > minute affair, in any case--or elsewhere.
                              >
                              > There was reason to believe that the Moon Lake expedition might be
                              > successful, they had travelled half the distance to Vicksburg
                              without
                              > a Confederate in sight. Without the amazing last-minuted erection
                              of
                              > Fort Pemberton, the Moon Lake expedition would have flanked
                              Hayne's
                              > Bluff and made Grant's move inland unnecessary.


                              Grant wanted all of the schemes to succeed. Their impact on enemy
                              dispositions was not their main intent and, from my reading, I don't
                              see much mention by Grant that it was ever high up on his list.
                              Demonstatrate it, if you have the evidence, that this was so.

                              As to the canal, I don't know how much difference there is between a
                              gun on the waterfront and one interdicting the canal. The latter,
                              also, would be on the waterfront.

                              Sure, Yazoo Pass could have worked--except that it was managed
                              exceptionally poorly. This doesn't, however, further your
                              supposition that Grant did it in order to confuse, wear out, or
                              disperse the enemy.

                              Grant was lucky that Grierson was delayed, didn't have Forrest after
                              him, and decided to keep heading south.

                              Joseph
                            • William H Keene
                              ... Hulrbut had alreayd been planning to use Dodge s command at Corinth in a supporting move intended to draw the attention of Ruggles and Forrest.
                              Message 14 of 27 , Oct 7, 2005
                                --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...> wrote:
                                >...
                                > What may also have helped Grierson is the delay which then allowed
                                > Streight's raid to draw off Forrest. Without Streight, Forrest
                                > might have gone after Grierson.
                                >
                                > Joseph

                                Hulrbut had alreayd been planning to use Dodge's command at Corinth in a supporting
                                move intended to draw the attention of Ruggles and Forrest. Streight's raid just
                                dovetailed into this.
                              • GnrlJEJohnston@aol.com
                                In a message dated 10/7/2005 6:22:04 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, wh_keene@yahoo.com writes: Hulrbut had alreayd been planning to use Dodge s command at
                                Message 15 of 27 , Oct 7, 2005
                                  In a message dated 10/7/2005 6:22:04 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, wh_keene@... writes:
                                  Hulrbut had alreayd been planning to use Dodge's command at Corinth in a supporting
                                  move  intended to draw the attention of Ruggles and Forrest.  Streight's raid just
                                  dovetailed into this.  

                                  As a political general, Hurlbut did a pretty good job in strategic and tactical planning for this mission.
                                   
                                  JEJ
                                • William H Keene
                                  ... Since the canal was for the purpose of avoiding the Vickburg batteries, it would encourage the enemy to move guns from Vicksburg to a point lower down,
                                  Message 16 of 27 , Oct 17, 2005
                                    --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
                                    wrote:
                                    > ...
                                    > You still seem to be trying to give Grant undue credit.
                                    >
                                    > I don't think that there is any hard evidence that Grant's delta
                                    > schemes were for the purpose of dispersing CSA artillery. The canal
                                    > plan, if anything, would have drawn guns *to* Vicksburg.

                                    Since the canal was for the purpose of avoiding the Vickburg batteries,
                                    it would encourage the enemy to move guns from Vicksburg to a point
                                    lower down, such as Warrenton. From Grant to Col. Kelton, February 4,
                                    1863: "On examining the route of the present canal, I lost all faith
                                    in its ever leading to any practical results. ... Our labors, however,
                                    have had the effect of making the enemy divide his forces and spread
                                    their big guns over a great deal of territory. They are now fortified
                                    from Haynes' Bluff to Warrenton."
                                  • josepharose
                                    ... The canal would have drawn Confederate guns to the river opposite the lower end of the canal, which was very near Vicksburg. Although Grant noticed the
                                    Message 17 of 27 , Oct 18, 2005
                                      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@y...>
                                      wrote:
                                      >
                                      > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
                                      > wrote:
                                      > > ...
                                      > > You still seem to be trying to give Grant undue credit.
                                      > >
                                      > > I don't think that there is any hard evidence that Grant's delta
                                      > > schemes were for the purpose of dispersing CSA artillery. The canal
                                      > > plan, if anything, would have drawn guns *to* Vicksburg.
                                      >
                                      > Since the canal was for the purpose of avoiding the Vickburg batteries,
                                      > it would encourage the enemy to move guns from Vicksburg to a point
                                      > lower down, such as Warrenton. From Grant to Col. Kelton, February 4,
                                      > 1863: "On examining the route of the present canal, I lost all faith
                                      > in its ever leading to any practical results. ... Our labors, however,
                                      > have had the effect of making the enemy divide his forces and spread
                                      > their big guns over a great deal of territory. They are now fortified
                                      > from Haynes' Bluff to Warrenton."
                                      >

                                      The canal would have drawn Confederate guns to the river opposite the
                                      lower end of the canal, which was very near Vicksburg.

                                      Although Grant noticed the dispersive effect in his message, you must
                                      remember that he was thinking of taking another stab at the bluffs
                                      above Vicksburg (just before running the fleet past the city) and then
                                      decided that they were too strong. It doesn't help to disperse guns
                                      to the very places that you might want to attack later.

                                      Grant's excuse in the memoirs that these various schemes were just to
                                      keep the men occupied (or whatever his exact wording was) was untruthful.

                                      Joseph
                                    • Tony Gunter
                                      ... ... ... delta ... canal ... batteries, ... point ... February 4, ... faith ... however, ... spread ... fortified ... But
                                      Message 18 of 27 , Oct 18, 2005
                                        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
                                        wrote:
                                        >
                                        > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
                                        <wh_keene@y...>
                                        > wrote:
                                        > >
                                        > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
                                        <josepharose@y...>
                                        > > wrote:
                                        > > > ...
                                        > > > You still seem to be trying to give Grant undue credit.
                                        > > >
                                        > > > I don't think that there is any hard evidence that Grant's
                                        delta
                                        > > > schemes were for the purpose of dispersing CSA artillery. The
                                        canal
                                        > > > plan, if anything, would have drawn guns *to* Vicksburg.
                                        > >
                                        > > Since the canal was for the purpose of avoiding the Vickburg
                                        batteries,
                                        > > it would encourage the enemy to move guns from Vicksburg to a
                                        point
                                        > > lower down, such as Warrenton. From Grant to Col. Kelton,
                                        February 4,
                                        > > 1863: "On examining the route of the present canal, I lost all
                                        faith
                                        > > in its ever leading to any practical results. ... Our labors,
                                        however,
                                        > > have had the effect of making the enemy divide his forces and
                                        spread
                                        > > their big guns over a great deal of territory. They are now
                                        fortified
                                        > > from Haynes' Bluff to Warrenton."
                                        > >
                                        >
                                        > The canal would have drawn Confederate guns to the river
                                        > opposite the lower end of the canal, which was very near
                                        > Vicksburg.

                                        But the guns were placed on top of the hills, which meant they had a
                                        much lower percentage chance of actually hitting the targets.

                                        > Although Grant noticed the dispersive effect in his message,
                                        > you must remember that he was thinking of taking another stab
                                        > at the bluffs above Vicksburg (just before running the fleet
                                        > past the city) and then decided that they were too strong.

                                        I think the discussion with Porter that you're referencing was merely
                                        an attempt to warm Porter to the idea of running his boats through
                                        the gauntlet. No way in hell Grant attacks Snyder's Bluff. It was
                                        bristling with heavy artillery and fronted by an unfordable bayou.
                                      • Tony Gunter
                                        ... And, darnit, that s another key position I wish I could have gotten around to showing you guys during the muster. Snyder s Bluff, Hayne s Bluff,
                                        Message 19 of 27 , Oct 18, 2005
                                          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tony Gunter" <tony_gunter@y...>
                                          wrote:
                                          >
                                          > I think the discussion with Porter that you're referencing was merely
                                          > an attempt to warm Porter to the idea of running his boats through
                                          > the gauntlet. No way in hell Grant attacks Snyder's Bluff. It was
                                          > bristling with heavy artillery and fronted by an unfordable bayou.
                                          >

                                          And, darnit, that's another key position I wish I could have gotten
                                          around to showing you guys during the muster. Snyder's Bluff, Hayne's
                                          Bluff, Raymond... as well as the spot where the pontoon was placed at
                                          Chickasaw Bayou.
                                        • William H Keene
                                          ... Sure, but not in Vicksburg. So it spread them out, as Grant noted in the message that I quoted. ... untruthful. On what basis do you make this allegation?
                                          Message 20 of 27 , Oct 18, 2005
                                            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
                                            wrote:
                                            > ...
                                            > The canal would have drawn Confederate guns to the river opposite the
                                            > lower end of the canal, which was very near Vicksburg.

                                            Sure, but not in Vicksburg. So it spread them out, as Grant noted in
                                            the message that I quoted.


                                            > ...
                                            > Grant's excuse in the memoirs that these various schemes were just to
                                            > keep the men occupied (or whatever his exact wording was) was
                                            untruthful.


                                            On what basis do you make this allegation?
                                          • Bob Taubman
                                            ... Sure, but not in Vicksburg. So it spread them out, as Grant noted in the message that I quoted. ... untruthful. On what basis do you make this allegation?
                                            Message 21 of 27 , Oct 18, 2005
                                              William H Keene <wh_keene@...> wrote:

                                              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
                                              wrote:
                                              > ...
                                              > The canal would have drawn Confederate guns to the river opposite the
                                              > lower end of the canal, which was very near Vicksburg.

                                              Sure, but not in Vicksburg. So it spread them out, as Grant noted in
                                              the message that I quoted.


                                              > ...
                                              > Grant's excuse in the memoirs that these various schemes were just to
                                              > keep the men occupied (or whatever his exact wording was) was
                                              untruthful.


                                              On what basis do you make this allegation?

                                               

                                              In Kiper's, "McClernand, Policitician in Uniform", Kiper writes;

                                              "As mentioned in his memoirs, Grant thought of the canal attempt as an experiment in which he had little confidence, but the army commander was reluctant to lie idle until spring, when maneuver in the swampy region would become easier."

                                               

                                              Kiper's reference is Grant's memoirs, page 264.

                                               








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                                            • Bob Taubman
                                              I have to correct the citation. I checked Grant s Memoirs and I don t know what Kiper is referring to with the 264 reference following the Grant s Memoirs
                                              Message 22 of 27 , Oct 18, 2005
                                                I have to correct the citation.  I checked Grant's Memoirs and I don't know what Kiper is referring to with the "264" reference following the Grant's Memoirs indication.  Kiper doesn't give the number as a page, that was my assumption.  And we know what they say about assuming anything.  Perhaps someone could explain?
                                                 
                                                Thanx

                                                Bob Taubman <rtaubman@...> wrote:
                                                William H Keene <wh_keene@...> wrote:

                                                --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
                                                wrote:
                                                > ...
                                                > The canal would have drawn Confederate guns to the river opposite the
                                                > lower end of the canal, which was very near Vicksburg.

                                                Sure, but not in Vicksburg. So it spread them out, as Grant noted in
                                                the message that I quoted.


                                                > ...
                                                > Grant's excuse in the memoirs that these various schemes were just to
                                                > keep the men occupied (or whatever his exact wording was) was
                                                untruthful.


                                                On what basis do you make this allegation?

                                                 

                                                In Kiper's, "McClernand, Policitician in Uniform", Kiper writes;

                                                "As mentioned in his memoirs, Grant thought of the canal attempt as an experiment in which he had little confidence, but the army commander was reluctant to lie idle until spring, when maneuver in the swampy region would become easier."

                                                 

                                                Kiper's reference is Grant's memoirs, page 264.

                                                 








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                                              • Harry Smeltzer
                                                Keep in mind that the page numbers of Grant s memoirs depend upon what edition you have. For example, the pagination of the fine Library of America edition,
                                                Message 23 of 27 , Oct 18, 2005

                                                  Keep in mind that the page numbers of Grant’s memoirs depend upon what edition you have. For example, the pagination of the fine Library of America edition, which has a corrected index among other things, does not correspond to the original volumes or any facsimiles.

                                                   

                                                  Harry

                                                   

                                                  -----Original Message-----
                                                  From: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com [mailto:civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Bob Taubman
                                                  Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2005 12:01 PM
                                                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                                  Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] Re: The canal and other schemes

                                                   

                                                  I have to correct the citation.  I checked Grant's Memoirs and I don't know what Kiper is referring to with the "264" reference following the Grant's Memoirs indication.  Kiper doesn't give the number as a page, that was my assumption.  And we know what they say about assuming anything.  Perhaps someone could explain?

                                                   

                                                  Thanx

                                                  Bob Taubman <rtaubman@...> wrote:

                                                  William H Keene <wh_keene@...> wrote:

                                                  --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
                                                  wrote:
                                                  > ...
                                                  > The canal would have drawn Confederate guns to the river opposite the
                                                  > lower end of the canal, which was very near Vicksburg.

                                                  Sure, but not in Vicksburg. So it spread them out, as Grant noted in
                                                  the message that I quoted.


                                                  > ...
                                                  > Grant's excuse in the memoirs that these various schemes were just to
                                                  > keep the men occupied (or whatever his exact wording was) was
                                                  untruthful.


                                                  On what basis do you make this allegation?

                                                   

                                                  In Kiper's, "McClernand, Policitician in Uniform", Kiper writes;

                                                  "As mentioned in his memoirs, Grant thought of the canal attempt as an experiment in which he had little confidence, but the army commander was reluctant to lie idle until spring, when maneuver in the swampy region would become easier."

                                                   

                                                  Kiper's reference is Grant's memoirs, page 264.

                                                   








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                                                • William H Keene
                                                  Thanks Bob. But I was hoping for information about why Joseph claims this is untrue. Kiper seems to accept Grant s writing on this point as true. ... which he
                                                  Message 24 of 27 , Oct 18, 2005
                                                    Thanks Bob. But I was hoping for information about why Joseph claims this is untrue.
                                                    Kiper seems to accept Grant's writing on this point as true.

                                                    --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Bob Taubman <rtaubman@r...> wrote:
                                                    > ...
                                                    > > Grant's excuse in the memoirs that these various schemes were just to
                                                    > > keep the men occupied (or whatever his exact wording was) was
                                                    > untruthful.
                                                    >
                                                    >
                                                    > On what basis do you make this allegation?
                                                    >
                                                    >
                                                    >
                                                    > In Kiper's, "McClernand, Policitician in Uniform", Kiper writes;
                                                    >
                                                    > "As mentioned in his memoirs, Grant thought of the canal attempt as an experiment in
                                                    which he had little confidence, but the army commander was reluctant to lie idle until
                                                    spring, when maneuver in the swampy region would become easier."
                                                    >
                                                    >
                                                    >
                                                    > Kiper's reference is Grant's memoirs, page 264.
                                                  • josepharose
                                                    ... That depends on where they came from, how long they stayed, and how useful they were against Porter s boats, if you want to determine the effect on what
                                                    Message 25 of 27 , Oct 18, 2005
                                                      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@y...>
                                                      wrote:
                                                      >
                                                      > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
                                                      > wrote:
                                                      > > ...
                                                      > > The canal would have drawn Confederate guns to the river opposite the
                                                      > > lower end of the canal, which was very near Vicksburg.
                                                      >
                                                      > Sure, but not in Vicksburg. So it spread them out, as Grant noted in
                                                      > the message that I quoted.

                                                      That depends on where they came from, how long they stayed, and how
                                                      useful they were against Porter's boats, if you want to determine the
                                                      effect on what turned out to be Grant's last plan.

                                                      > > ...
                                                      > > Grant's excuse in the memoirs that these various schemes were just to
                                                      > > keep the men occupied (or whatever his exact wording was) was
                                                      > untruthful.
                                                      >
                                                      > On what basis do you make this allegation?

                                                      That Grant's statements in his memoirs (e.g., concerning the Lake
                                                      Providence route, "I let the work go on, believing employment was
                                                      better than idleness for the men. Then, too, it served as a cover for
                                                      other efforts which gave a better prospect of success. This work was
                                                      abandoned after the canal proved a failure"; and about the delta
                                                      schemes in toto, "All these failures would have been very discouraging
                                                      if I had expected much from the efforts; but I had not.") are not
                                                      credible.

                                                      If you read through the ORs, it is easy to see how Grant gave up on
                                                      each of the schemes, one after another, only after putting his hope in
                                                      them. One does not see evidence on how Grant was merely whiling away
                                                      the time. The Yazoo Pass episode is the most telling of these.

                                                      Besides, if this was truly Grant's intent, he appears an even worse
                                                      general. The men working in the swamps cutting trees and digging
                                                      ditches were getting sick and dying at an alarming rate (Grant was
                                                      untruthful about the troops' health, as well). Porter almost torched
                                                      his boats in Steele's Bayou. These should hardly be the outcomes of
                                                      whiling away the time.

                                                      I also don't understand why you question the basis for my assertion,
                                                      yet the recent allegation (viz. "I think the discussion with Porter
                                                      that you're referencing was merely an attempt to warm Porter to the
                                                      idea of running his boats through the gauntlet. No way in hell Grant
                                                      attacks Snyder's Bluff.") goes unquestioned, although it has no basis
                                                      that I've ever seen. Doesn't your argument suffer from a double standard?

                                                      Joseph
                                                    • William H Keene
                                                      ... I find it easy to see Grant expressing right at the beginning that his preferred route is the one that eventually is acted on and the others are attempted
                                                      Message 26 of 27 , Oct 18, 2005
                                                        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...> wrote:
                                                        > ...
                                                        > If you read through the ORs, it is easy to see how Grant gave up on
                                                        > each of the schemes, one after another, only after putting his hope in
                                                        > them. One does not see evidence on how Grant was merely whiling away
                                                        > the time. The Yazoo Pass episode is the most telling of these.

                                                        I find it easy to see Grant expressing right at the beginning that his preferred route is the
                                                        one that eventually is acted on and the others are attempted becuase the preferred route
                                                        is not possible at the time due to high water. He does get enthusiastic about the Yazoo
                                                        route when it seems to be working, but I dont see that he puts much hope in it when he
                                                        first has it investigated.

                                                        > Besides, if this was truly Grant's intent, he appears an even worse
                                                        > general. The men working in the swamps cutting trees and digging
                                                        > ditches were getting sick and dying at an alarming rate (Grant was
                                                        > untruthful about the troops' health, as well). Porter almost torched
                                                        > his boats in Steele's Bayou. These should hardly be the outcomes of
                                                        > whiling away the time.

                                                        The evidence I have seen indicates that Grant was truthful about the health of his troops.
                                                        Porter's fiasco was his own doing, not Grant's.

                                                        > I also don't understand why you question the basis for my assertion,

                                                        Whats so difficult to understand?

                                                        > yet the recent allegation (viz. "I think the discussion with Porter
                                                        > that you're referencing was merely an attempt to warm Porter to the
                                                        > idea of running his boats through the gauntlet. No way in hell Grant
                                                        > attacks Snyder's Bluff.") goes unquestioned, although it has no basis
                                                        > that I've ever seen.

                                                        The basis for Tony's remark is easier for me to see than the basis for most of your
                                                        allegations.

                                                        > ... Doesn't your argument suffer from a double standard?


                                                        I chose to challenge and debate some things but not others. You do the same.
                                                        My argument does not suffer as a result.
                                                      • josepharose
                                                        ... his preferred route is the ... the preferred route ... No, it s seemingly impossible to see Grant expressing right at the beginning any such thing as he
                                                        Message 27 of 27 , Oct 19, 2005
                                                          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene" <wh_keene@y...>
                                                          wrote:
                                                          >
                                                          > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
                                                          <josepharose@y...> wrote:
                                                          > > ...
                                                          > > If you read through the ORs, it is easy to see how Grant gave up on
                                                          > > each of the schemes, one after another, only after putting his hope in
                                                          > > them. One does not see evidence on how Grant was merely whiling away
                                                          > > the time. The Yazoo Pass episode is the most telling of these.
                                                          >
                                                          > I find it easy to see Grant expressing right at the beginning that
                                                          his preferred route is the
                                                          > one that eventually is acted on and the others are attempted becuase
                                                          the preferred route
                                                          > is not possible at the time due to high water.

                                                          No, it's seemingly impossible "to see Grant expressing right at the
                                                          beginning" any such thing as he himself wrote that he didn't tell
                                                          anyone of this plan until near the end. [From Grant's Memoirs: "I had
                                                          had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point
                                                          below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the possible
                                                          but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted to for
                                                          the purpose of giving us a different base. This could not be
                                                          undertaken until the waters receded. I did not therefore communicate
                                                          this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to
                                                          make preparations for the start."]

                                                          Besides, his actions beforehand got in the way of what was supposed to
                                                          be his final plan. The canal brought attention to the riverfront near
                                                          Vicksburg, when Grant should have desired the opposite. Much more
                                                          telling seems to be the breaking of the levees for the Carthage route;
                                                          these interrupted the movement of troops south (e.g., "SMITH'S
                                                          PLANTATION, La. , April 18,1863. Major General John A. McClernand, .
                                                          . . I see that great caution will have to be observed in getting
                                                          barges past the crevasse near New Carthage, and I apprehend a loss of
                                                          some artillery may be encountered.I will send over at once the pontoon
                                                          train, with men to lay it. . . . U. S. GRANT.)

                                                          > He does get enthusiastic about the Yazoo
                                                          > route when it seems to be working, but I dont see that he puts much
                                                          hope in it when he
                                                          > first has it investigated.

                                                          He only lost faith in Yazoo Pass well after the first "investigation."
                                                          He was still hopeful a month and a half after he ordered the levee cut.

                                                          Grant's protestations that he really only had hopes for his final plan
                                                          (e.g., from his Memoirs: "All these failures would have been very
                                                          discouraging if I had expected much from the efforts; but I had not.)
                                                          are belied repeatedly in the official record. Try this:

                                                          BEFORE Vicksburg, March 22, 1863. Major General WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,
                                                          Comdg. Fifteenth Army Corps: . . . I had made so much calculation upon
                                                          the expedition down Yazoo Pass, and now again by the route proposed by
                                                          Admiral Porter, that I have made really but little calculation upon
                                                          reaching Vicksburg by any other than Haynes' Bluff. . . U. S. GRANT.

                                                          Or do you suggest that he was lying to Sherman?

                                                          Even as late as July 6, 1863, Grant had written: "At this time our
                                                          forces were at a dead lock at Greenwood, and I looked upon the success
                                                          of this enterprise as of vast importance."

                                                          Grant's memoirs, on this point, are untruthful.

                                                          > > Besides, if this was truly Grant's intent, he appears an even worse
                                                          > > general. The men working in the swamps cutting trees and digging
                                                          > > ditches were getting sick and dying at an alarming rate (Grant was
                                                          > > untruthful about the troops' health, as well). Porter almost torched
                                                          > > his boats in Steele's Bayou. These should hardly be the outcomes of
                                                          > > whiling away the time.
                                                          >
                                                          > The evidence I have seen indicates that Grant was truthful about the
                                                          health of his troops.

                                                          I can disprove your contention easily in another set of posts. The
                                                          first volume of the medical-surgical history of the war, IIRC,
                                                          contains statistics on disease and mortality. These numbers increased
                                                          hugely after Grant's army went downstream.

                                                          > Porter's fiasco was his own doing, not Grant's.

                                                          But Grant wrote: "Admiral Porter and myself went up Steele's Bayou to
                                                          Little Black Bayou on the 15th." and "So I determined to get into the
                                                          Yazoo below Fort Pemberton."

                                                          If you're going to hold to this line of reasoning, then you should
                                                          give Porter all the credit for running the fleet past Vicksburg.

                                                          [snip]

                                                          Joseph
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