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Re: Snake Creek Gap - Garrard

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  • josepharose
    ... opposite, ... I did so state that. I had written, Sherman took the AotC s division of cavalry under Garrard and gave it to McPherson. Therefore, McP
    Message 1 of 101 , Jun 3, 2005
      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
      <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
      > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose"
      > <josepharose@y...> wrote:
      > > ...
      > > As I stated, McPherson *had* Garrard's cavalry.
      > I don't see where ypu stated that. In fact you stated the
      > as I tried ot point out.

      I did so state that. I had written, "Sherman took the AotC's
      division of cavalry under Garrard and gave it to McPherson."
      Therefore, McP *had* Garrard's division. I never stated the opposite.

      > Garrard, as youy stated, was not available
      > at the time of themovement -- McPherson did not have him at the
      > of the movement.

      Please review the ORs. Garrard was in the vicinity, but he wasn't at
      the head of McP's troops when McP went through the gap. Instead,
      Garrard was left in front of the gap--around Villanow, IIRC, and told
      to patrol toward the south. Garrard was part of McPherson's command,
      but McP did not avail himself of the cavalry in the move thru SCG
      because of the delays in moving and McP's/Sherman's decision not to
      wait for him.

      > It is true that the movement couldhave been delayed to wait for
      > Garrard, but such a delay was not within McPherson's orders. So
      > would it be McPherson's fault that Garrard wasn't present? Those
      > fault are Sherman and Garrard.

      Unless Garrard can be shown to have been moving too slowly, the fault
      lies with Sherman and McP.

      > > ... As I stated, this
      > > cavalry *was not* available because it did not reach the gap in
      > time to
      > > lead the way.
      > Not only had it not reached the gap, it had not reached McPherson
      > all. Prior to his mvoing through the gap., Garrard had not even
      > reported to him.

      Do you have evidence for this assertion? I think that I can show you
      ORs to prove your wrong.

      > > ... It had been under Sherman's/McPherson's direction for
      > > long enough ...
      > It had not been under McPherson's direction at all. Until Garrard
      > arrived on the scene (which did not happene until afte McPherson
      > moved through the gap), he had been udner Sherman and Thomas.

      I do think that you are wrong, and I would like to see evidence that
      states what you assert.

      > > ... that if they had not changed the strategic plans ....
      > McPherson did not change the plan, Sherman did.

      I do not know whether McP had input into the initial decision or
      not. I'd be surprised if he was not part of the decision-making

      > at the
      > > last minute, had started the cavalry earlier, and/or had delayed
      > the
      > > move until Garrard was ready, then Garrard *would* have been
      > available.
      > True.
      > > There's a distinct difference between having a unit and making it
      > > available for use. There is no contradiction.
      > Yes there is a contradiction -- as pointed out above att he time he
      > moved through the gap McPherson did not have Garrard at his
      > or under his orders.

      As above, I think that you are wrong.

      > > Sherman could also have realized the problem before the crunch
      > time
      > > came and could have switched Kilpatrick for Garrard, giving McP a
      > > cavalry division in good condition and ready for the move.
      > Certainly true.
      > > These are mistakes of Sherman and McPherson.
      > Why McPherson? Until after the fact Garrard was not his to
      > McPhersons was proceeding as Sherman directed.

      Even if McP didn't have Garrard under his command, McP would still be
      at fault for not requesting the necessary numbers and types of troops
      needed to fulfill his mission.

    • keeno2@aol.com
      You ve outlined a scenario that would have guaranteed Union defeat at Pittsburg Landing. Two divisions could not have withstood the assault launched. By the
      Message 101 of 101 , Jun 10, 2005
        You've outlined a scenario that would have guaranteed Union defeat at Pittsburg Landing. Two divisions could not have withstood the assault launched. By the time the divisions at Crump's Landing could be moved into support position, it would have been all over. A division at Hamburg Landing could not have helped much.
        As it was, the divisions present were almost defeated. Too many Confederates for Union resistance. Had PGTB not called a halt near sundown, there might have been a different conclusion.
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