Re: Snake Creek Gap (again)
- --- In email@example.com, "josepharose"
> ... He *would* have been strong enough to stay there and itI disagree. No matter how many men were at the starting point, the
> would have been fast enough to block Johnston's army *if* he knew
> that there was an unending stream of men 60,000 strong for him to
capacity of the road through Snake Creek Gap and then to Resaca
could only accomodate a limited number of men during a single day.
Thus, even with a huge force behind him, I don't see how McPherson
would have had much more than he actually did at Resaca when the sun
was going down. So the undending stream would not have made a
difference until the second day. With a cavalry division McPherson
could have had beeter scouting and could make a small break in the
railroad. In addition, if the AotC is lining up to move through the
gap, Johnston's reaction would have been different. The basic
result would have been Johnston evacuating Dalton a few days earlier.
> Sherman botched a golden opportunity.In my opinion there was no golden opportunity, simply a mistaken
assessment by Sherman and lots of Monday morning quarterbacking.
> ... this was later provedthan
> by Hooker's actually doing so--move a greater force through SCG
> the CSA could fight through.I don't follow what you claim Hooker's move proved.
- You've outlined a scenario that would have guaranteed Union defeat at Pittsburg Landing. Two divisions could not have withstood the assault launched. By the time the divisions at Crump's Landing could be moved into support position, it would have been all over. A division at Hamburg Landing could not have helped much.As it was, the divisions present were almost defeated. Too many Confederates for Union resistance. Had PGTB not called a halt near sundown, there might have been a different conclusion.