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Re: Snake Creek Gap (again)

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  • Tony Gunter
    ... have ... I think Sherman was concerned about showing Johnston his cards. If Johnston had detected troops shifting towards the south, the natural
    Message 1 of 101 , Jun 3, 2005
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      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
      wrote:
      > 3) The AotC, being already in the vicinity, could have reached the
      > gap in better condition, with Kilpatrick's division of cavalry out
      > front, and in far greater strength.
      > 4) Although it would have taken longer for more men to go through
      > the gap, Sherman's main mistake was that he didn't keep pushing
      > troops through SCG once he had started. There was a long period
      > after the AotT was through and before Hooker started. IIRC, Thomas
      > offered twice to push through Hooker before Sherman took him up on
      > it. At any rate, by the time more men got through, it was too
      > late. If a steady stream of men made it through--regardless as to
      > whether McPherson was in the front, middle, rear, or absent--there
      > would have been sufficient troops to have placed a blocking force
      > across Johnston's lines of communication and retreat. He would
      have
      > had to either attack a force equivalent to his own or attempt to
      > pass through the rugged area to his east with a good chance of
      > getting hit from behind. You could probably say "Goodbye" to the
      > AoT as an organized army.


      I think Sherman was concerned about showing Johnston his cards. If
      Johnston had detected troops shifting towards the south, the natural
      assumption would be that the AotC was moving through Snake Creek Gap.
      Additionally, the logistics of pushing an entire army through Snake
      Creek gap was probably giving him pause. Obviously, an army cannot
      be fed and maintained over a single winding mountain gap road. Once
      federal units push through the gap, the clock is ticking on how long
      they can remain. The larger the force, the more narrow the window of
      time.

      >
      > 5) Lastly, even with the most modest orders of merely hiding in the
      > mouth of the gap and striking the retreating AoT in the flank,
      > McPherson failed to do that or any significant damage.

      You're suggesting McPherson should have assaulted the entrenched
      positions above Resaca, only to gain a position that was in the air,
      leaving him completely open to the full fury of the Confederate army
      sweeping down upon him from the north.
    • keeno2@aol.com
      You ve outlined a scenario that would have guaranteed Union defeat at Pittsburg Landing. Two divisions could not have withstood the assault launched. By the
      Message 101 of 101 , Jun 10, 2005
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        You've outlined a scenario that would have guaranteed Union defeat at Pittsburg Landing. Two divisions could not have withstood the assault launched. By the time the divisions at Crump's Landing could be moved into support position, it would have been all over. A division at Hamburg Landing could not have helped much.
         
        As it was, the divisions present were almost defeated. Too many Confederates for Union resistance. Had PGTB not called a halt near sundown, there might have been a different conclusion.
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