Re: Snake Creek Gap - Garrard
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "josepharose"
> ...I don't see where ypu stated that. In fact you stated the opposite,
> As I stated, McPherson *had* Garrard's cavalry.
as I tried ot point out. Garrard, as youy stated, was not available
at the time of themovement -- McPherson did not have him at the time
of the movement.
It is true that the movement couldhave been delayed to wait for
Garrard, but such a delay was not within McPherson's orders. So why
would it be McPherson's fault that Garrard wasn't present? Those at
fault are Sherman and Garrard.
> ... As I stated, thistime to
> cavalry *was not* available because it did not reach the gap in
> lead the way.Not only had it not reached the gap, it had not reached McPherson at
all. Prior to his mvoing through the gap., Garrard had not even
reported to him.
> ... It had been under Sherman's/McPherson's direction forIt had not been under McPherson's direction at all. Until Garrard
> long enough ...
arrived on the scene (which did not happene until afte McPherson
moved through the gap), he had been udner Sherman and Thomas.
> ... that if they had not changed the strategic plans ....McPherson did not change the plan, Sherman did.
> last minute, had started the cavalry earlier, and/or had delayedthe
> move until Garrard was ready, then Garrard *would* have beenavailable.
> There's a distinct difference between having a unit and making itYes there is a contradiction -- as pointed out above att he time he
> available for use. There is no contradiction.
moved through the gap McPherson did not have Garrard at his disposal
or under his orders.
> Sherman could also have realized the problem before the crunchtime
> came and could have switched Kilpatrick for Garrard, giving McP aCertainly true.
> cavalry division in good condition and ready for the move.
> These are mistakes of Sherman and McPherson.Why McPherson? Until after the fact Garrard was not his to command.
McPhersons was proceeding as Sherman directed.
- You've outlined a scenario that would have guaranteed Union defeat at Pittsburg Landing. Two divisions could not have withstood the assault launched. By the time the divisions at Crump's Landing could be moved into support position, it would have been all over. A division at Hamburg Landing could not have helped much.As it was, the divisions present were almost defeated. Too many Confederates for Union resistance. Had PGTB not called a halt near sundown, there might have been a different conclusion.