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Re: Who would have been the best choice for commander in the West?

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  • carlw4514
    my comments below yours ... for some reason I never considered this exact combination, but not elevating Longstreet to army command was a huge mistake for the
    Message 1 of 23 , Nov 10, 2004
      my comments below yours

      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
      <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
      >
      > Hi everyone, I'm fairly new here. Been lurking for a while, and have
      > read most of the posts on who would have been the best choice with
      > respect to the Confederacy for commander in the West. Best option,
      > IMHO, Lee.
      >
      > I know this has been suggested before, and Davis himself even
      > considered it, but rejected it partially because of Lee's
      > reluctance. Nevertheless, sending Lee west and placing Longstreet in
      > command in the East,


      for some reason I never considered this exact combination, but not
      elevating Longstreet to army command was a huge mistake for the CSA,
      IMHO. Your arrangement appeals to me.


      > after Chattanooga,


      I favor the time period prior to the fall of Vicksburg; but replacing
      Bragg may have cost too much in political capital at this earlier
      time, granted.


      > probably would have been the
      > Confederacy's best course of action. There are several major
      > positives and negatives in this plan and, if everyone will bear with
      > me real quick, I'm gonna try to lay 'em out.
      >
      > First the weakness:
      >
      > 1. LONGSTREET'S LACKLUSTER RECORD AS AN INDEPENDANT COMMANDER: For
      > whatever reason "Pete" had a fairly lackluster record as an
      > independant commander. While he admittedly faced several handicaps
      > at Knoxville and during his tenure in command of a department in
      > southeastern Virginia, such as having to deal with a number of
      > generals Lee had banished there so Marse Robert himself would no
      > longer have to worry about them, the record remains disturbing at
      > best. Just how would Longstreet have fared if given complete control
      > of the ANV? There is enough evidence out there to cast some serious
      > doubt on his abilities as an independant commander.



      Good point, but I really think he would have risen to the occassion.


      > 2. LEE'S OWN RELUCTANCE TO LEAVE THE ANV: Lee was a Virginian by
      > birth, by early 1864 he wanted to keep command of the ANV, which he
      > had more than earned and proved himself a master at commanding.
      > Furthermore Lee's reluctance to leave a theater he knew so well, for
      > one he knew very little about is a legitimate objection. I would
      > also add to this Davis' heavy reliance on having Lee nearby, not
      > only as commander of the ANV, but as a valued friend and general to
      > consult with. Nevertheless, given Lee's notion of honor and devotion
      > to duty, there is no doubt in my mind that had Davis actually
      > ordered him out west, he would have went.




      In the balance of things, it usually comes up to Davis's shortcomings,
      failure of vision, cronyism, whatever... a failure in almost
      everything, I am no fan of Jeff Davis as some here will undoubtably
      remember. Apologies to those who think I am a bit shrill on this.



      > 3. THE REACTION OF THE ANV: While there is no doubt that the ANV
      > dearly loved Longstreet, and held him in high esteem, the regard
      > they had for him could never compare to that they had for Lee.
      > Understandably no general would ever hold in their hearts the place
      > that Lee did. Again, nevertheless, if Lee were sent West after
      > Chattanooga, given the circumstances, and the fact that by 1864 the
      > ANV was an actual army in discipline as well as name, I think the
      > change just might have worked.



      The men usually decided they liked someone who kept the casualties
      down, and L. would have done this and also succeeded in winning
      battles, IMO.



      > Now the strenghts:
      >
      > 1. LEE'S AGRESSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AS A COMMANDER, AND ABILITY TO
      > SEE OPPORTUNITY WHERE OTHERS SAW DISASTER: Lee is exactly the type
      > of commander that was needed in the West. One who always remained
      > inherently aggressive, and looked for ways to attack the enemy
      > rather than lamenting the shortcomings he faced. If anyone could
      > have viewed the Confederate situation out West, after Chattanooga,
      > and found a way to counterattack the Union advance it would have
      > been Lee. Moreover he would have brought a sense of the offensive
      > that was often missing in the AoT's commanders (Johnston), although
      > not the AoT itself.


      I have to believe the results would have been good and tremendously
      helped the Confederacy.


      > 2. LEE'S PERSONALITY: His unique ability to balance delicate and
      > often intemperate subordinates. This was a key in the AoT and one
      > that all of its previous commanders, including chiefly Bragg and
      > Johnston, simply missed. Men like Forrest and even Hood would not
      > have bucked Lee as easily as they did Johnston. A situation like
      > Cassville, where Hood's attitude toward Johnston, his motivations,
      > and his actions were questionable, simply would not have happened
      > under Lee. Hood, along with pretty much every other commander in the
      > Confederacy revered Lee. It's safe to say even a man like Forrest
      > probably would not have reacted to Lee the same way he did to Bragg
      > for several reasons. (The first of which is that Lee always highly
      > valued the reports of his cavalry and paid close attention to them.
      > The second that he was a far more competent operational commander
      > than Bragg could ever hope to be, and the third that he was simply
      > Robert E. Lee.) Finally men like Cleburne would have been given the
      > opportunity to either prove themselves as leaders at higher command
      > positions, failed and been moved back to their original command, or
      > simply shuffled to another theater as Lee was so adroit at doing.
      > (When I look at Cleburne out West I can't help but think of John B.
      > Gordon out East. It's hard for me to believe that Clebure would not
      > have been, at least temporarily, allowed to try his hand at a corps
      > command under Lee.)


      Absolutely on the money here.


      > 3. THE INHERENT PERSONALITY FLAWS IN THE OTHER COMMANDERS OF THE
      > AoT: Say what you like about Johnston, Beauregard and Bragg but they
      > were simply not as easy to get along with as Lee. Moreover, with
      > respect to Davis, it has always seemed rather beside the point to me
      > whether or not Johnston and Beauregard were right about his
      > treatment of them. The point is HE, Davis, not them was the
      > President of the Confederacy. The president MUST always have
      > complete faith in his subordinates and trust their judgement. If he
      > can't, even because of his own personal shortcomings, these men must
      > be relieved or else the command will suffer. With Lee, Davis would
      > have been able to have complete confidence, for the first time since
      > Albert Sidney Johnston, in the commander of the AoT. This doubtless
      > would have been a better military arrangement for all involved, and
      > elevated the morale of the army. Not only would they like their
      > commander (as they did Joe Johnston) or the president support him
      > (as he did Bragg), but rather both the army and the president would
      > both support the commanding general at the same time. A rather novel
      > notion out west.


      also a good point


      > 4. LONGSTREET'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE GRAND STRATEGIC PLAN OUT EAST:
      > Longstreet's idea of remaining on the defensive, and simply beating
      > off Federal attacks would have worked much better in Virginia than
      > it would have in Tenesse or Georgia. Think Fredericksburg. (Yes I
      > know Lee was the commanding general, but Longstreet's reading of the
      > field and handling of his own troops was masterful here. I think he
      > could have done it on a larger scale.) Although Longstreet was
      > undoubtedly better under Lee and this strategy may have had its
      > difficulties against a federal army under Grant, I don't think it
      > would have worn out the ability of the ANV to take the offensive as
      > quickly as Lee did.



      In some ways, I think Longstreet would have been more suited to the
      new situation in the East at this time than Lee proved to be.


      > In closing, and given the subsequent history, I don't believe Davis
      > really had any other viable options. Lee out West, and Longstreet in
      > the East, at least until the elections of 1864, and the hope that
      > Lee could have kept Sherman out of Atlanta, would have been a
      > pretty good hand to play.
      >
      > Sorry if this post was too long, but you know what they say. Figured
      > I'd try to make somewhat of a good first impression.


      I think you have succeeded in that good impression, sir.

      Carl
    • illiniillinois
      Sorry but I had to reply to this. What would the central deparment in the West have looked like to you, Tom? Tenesse, Georgia, South Carolina and North
      Message 2 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
        Sorry but I had to reply to this. What would the central deparment
        in the West have looked like to you, Tom? Tenesse, Georgia, South
        Carolina and North Carolina? This seems like one of the most
        intersting ideas to me yet and the more I think on it a darn good
        idea. Curious on what you were thinking.

        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
        > I think the South had three capable leaders after the death of A.S.
        > Johnston. R.E. Lee, Joe Johnston and Beauregard. What they had was
        a
        > horrible road network (to call it a "network" is a compliment) that
        > covered a territory that was simply too large for an East, a West
        and a
        > Southern Mississippi. They needed a third area between Lee and the
        West.
        > Beauregard could have been left in command of the West and Northern
        > Mississippi region and Joe Johnston put in charge of a middle area
        > around Knoxville, Chattanooga and Georgia.
        > Just a thought and probably a lousy one. But something to consider.
        > Don't think about Davis and his prejudices. We know of them. This
        is an
        > alternative thought of could be done if Davis really wanted to do
        > something that would utilized the best available talent.
        >
        >
        > -----Original Message-----
        > From: Mark Peters [mailto:mark.peters14@b...]
        > Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 2004 9:18 PM
        > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
        > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
        > commander in the West?
        >
        >
        >
        > Davis wanted a commission at the beginning of the war, but ended
        up
        > with the Presidency. He was the one that never got over this, and
        > hence his continuous dabblings. That's my opinion, anyway.
        >
        > However, I don't agree that Beauregard and Johnston were in the
        > wrong, because they didn't accept his war record and military
        > ambitions. Rather, they were the ones in the field, and should
        have
        > been given the responsibility to act upon their commissions.
        >
        > Best wishes,
        >
        > Mark
        >
        > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
        > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
        > >
        > > Thanks for the response mark. Yeah you bring up a good point. I
        > > hadn't even thought of Davis' fixation on the East.
        > >
        > > Also I don't have that big a problem with Beauregard either.
        > Granted
        > > the man thought he was another Napoleon and he had a fixation
        with
        > > overly ambitious, grand strategic plans, but once he was brought
        > > back down to earth he was able to tailor his plans based
        somewhat
        > > more on reality. I think First Manassas was a good example of
        > this,
        > > even though a lot of the credit goes to Joe Johnston for that.
        His
        > > defense of Petersburg was also much better than he traditionally
        > > gets credit for, IMHO.
        > >
        > > Anyway I know this is a western discussion board, and,
        especially
        > > being the new guy, I don't mean to stray too much. As for Davis
        I
        > > couldn't agree more. I think the Confederacy's biggest problem
        was
        > > his firm belief that because of his previous experience in
        Mexico
        > > and as Secretary in War he was, in his opinion, almost a de
        facto
        > > general. I just happen to think that he was the president of the
        > > CSA, for better or worse, and Beauregard and Johnston would have
        > > been a lot better off, both from a personal and military
        > > perspective, if they had swallowed their pride and dealt with
        this
        > > fact.
        > >
        > >
        > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Mark Peters"
        > > <mark.peters14@b...> wrote:
        > > >
        > > > You highlight several problems.
        > > >
        > > > Firstly, my belief is that Lee refused command in the West.
        So,
        > > he
        > > > wasn't a viable option. Davis, as did Lee, thought the war
        > would
        > > be
        > > > won in the east. There is no way that he would have wanted
        his
        > > best
        > > > commander in the west, on a permanent basis.
        > > >
        > > > Of those willing to serve, as I've stated before, my belief is
        > > that
        > > > Beauregard was the best option. The fact that Davis
        > continuously
        > > > meddled in military affairs surely shows that politicians
        should
        > > > allow their military commanders to get on with it. Because
        > Davis
        > > > did not get on, at a personal level, with Beauregard or J.
        > > Johnston
        > > > should not have precluded them from continuous command out
        west.
        > > >
        > > > I do agree with you on Cleburne!
        > > >
        > > > Best wishes,
        > > >
        > > > Mark
        > > >
        > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
        > > > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
        > > > >
        > > > > Hi everyone, I'm fairly new here. Been lurking for a while,
        > and
        > > > have
        > > > > read most of the posts on who would have been the best
        choice
        > > with
        > > > > respect to the Confederacy for commander in the West. Best
        > > option,
        > > > > IMHO, Lee.
        > > > >
        > > > > I know this has been suggested before, and Davis himself
        even
        > > > > considered it, but rejected it partially because of Lee's
        > > > > reluctance. Nevertheless, sending Lee west and placing
        > > Longstreet
        > > > in
        > > > > command in the East, after Chattanooga, probably would have
        > been
        > > > the
        > > > > Confederacy's best course of action. There are several major
        > > > > positives and negatives in this plan and, if everyone will
        > bear
        > > > with
        > > > > me real quick, I'm gonna try to lay 'em out.
        > > > >
        > > > > First the weakness:
        > > > >
        > > > > 1. LONGSTREET'S LACKLUSTER RECORD AS AN INDEPENDANT
        COMMANDER:
        > > For
        > > > > whatever reason "Pete" had a fairly lackluster record as an
        > > > > independant commander. While he admittedly faced several
        > > handicaps
        > > > > at Knoxville and during his tenure in command of a
        department
        > in
        > > > > southeastern Virginia, such as having to deal with a number
        of
        > > > > generals Lee had banished there so Marse Robert himself
        would
        > no
        > > > > longer have to worry about them, the record remains
        disturbing
        > > at
        > > > > best. Just how would Longstreet have fared if given complete
        > > > control
        > > > > of the ANV? There is enough evidence out there to cast some
        > > > serious
        > > > > doubt on his abilities as an independant commander.
        > > > >
        > > > > 2. LEE'S OWN RELUCTANCE TO LEAVE THE ANV: Lee was a
        Virginian
        > by
        > > > > birth, by early 1864 he wanted to keep command of the ANV,
        > which
        > > > he
        > > > > had more than earned and proved himself a master at
        > commanding.
        > > > > Furthermore Lee's reluctance to leave a theater he knew so
        > well,
        > > > for
        > > > > one he knew very little about is a legitimate objection. I
        > would
        > > > > also add to this Davis' heavy reliance on having Lee nearby,
        > not
        > > > > only as commander of the ANV, but as a valued friend and
        > general
        > > > to
        > > > > consult with. Nevertheless, given Lee's notion of honor and
        > > > devotion
        > > > > to duty, there is no doubt in my mind that had Davis
        actually
        > > > > ordered him out west, he would have went.
        > > > >
        > > > > 3. THE REACTION OF THE ANV: While there is no doubt that the
        > ANV
        > > > > dearly loved Longstreet, and held him in high esteem, the
        > regard
        > > > > they had for him could never compare to that they had for
        Lee.
        > > > > Understandably no general would ever hold in their hearts
        the
        > > > place
        > > > > that Lee did. Again, nevertheless, if Lee were sent West
        after
        > > > > Chattanooga, given the circumstances, and the fact that by
        > 1864
        > > > the
        > > > > ANV was an actual army in discipline as well as name, I
        think
        > > the
        > > > > change just might have worked.
        > > > >
        > > > > Now the strenghts:
        > > > >
        > > > > 1. LEE'S AGRESSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AS A COMMANDER, AND
        ABILITY
        > > TO
        > > > > SEE OPPORTUNITY WHERE OTHERS SAW DISASTER: Lee is exactly
        the
        > > type
        > > > > of commander that was needed in the West. One who always
        > > remained
        > > > > inherently aggressive, and looked for ways to attack the
        enemy
        > > > > rather than lamenting the shortcomings he faced. If anyone
        > could
        > > > > have viewed the Confederate situation out West, after
        > > Chattanooga,
        > > > > and found a way to counterattack the Union advance it would
        > have
        > > > > been Lee. Moreover he would have brought a sense of the
        > > offensive
        > > > > that was often missing in the AoT's commanders (Johnston),
        > > > although
        > > > > not the AoT itself.
        > > > >
        > > > > 2. LEE'S PERSONALITY: His unique ability to balance delicate
        > and
        > > > > often intemperate subordinates. This was a key in the AoT
        and
        > > one
        > > > > that all of its previous commanders, including chiefly Bragg
        > and
        > > > > Johnston, simply missed. Men like Forrest and even Hood
        would
        > > not
        > > > > have bucked Lee as easily as they did Johnston. A situation
        > like
        > > > > Cassville, where Hood's attitude toward Johnston, his
        > > motivations,
        > > > > and his actions were questionable, simply would not have
        > > happened
        > > > > under Lee. Hood, along with pretty much every other
        commander
        > in
        > > > the
        > > > > Confederacy revered Lee. It's safe to say even a man like
        > > Forrest
        > > > > probably would not have reacted to Lee the same way he did
        to
        > > > Bragg
        > > > > for several reasons. (The first of which is that Lee always
        > > highly
        > > > > valued the reports of his cavalry and paid close attention
        to
        > > > them.
        > > > > The second that he was a far more competent operational
        > > commander
        > > > > than Bragg could ever hope to be, and the third that he was
        > > simply
        > > > > Robert E. Lee.) Finally men like Cleburne would have been
        > given
        > > > the
        > > > > opportunity to either prove themselves as leaders at higher
        > > > command
        > > > > positions, failed and been moved back to their original
        > command,
        > > > or
        > > > > simply shuffled to another theater as Lee was so adroit at
        > > doing.
        > > > > (When I look at Cleburne out West I can't help but think of
        > John
        > > > B.
        > > > > Gordon out East. It's hard for me to believe that Clebure
        > would
        > > > not
        > > > > have been, at least temporarily, allowed to try his hand at
        a
        > > > corps
        > > > > command under Lee.)
        > > > >
        > > > > 3. THE INHERENT PERSONALITY FLAWS IN THE OTHER COMMANDERS OF
        > THE
        > > > > AoT: Say what you like about Johnston, Beauregard and Bragg
        > but
        > > > they
        > > > > were simply not as easy to get along with as Lee. Moreover,
        > with
        > > > > respect to Davis, it has always seemed rather beside the
        point
        > > to
        > > > me
        > > > > whether or not Johnston and Beauregard were right about his
        > > > > treatment of them. The point is HE, Davis, not them was the
        > > > > President of the Confederacy. The president MUST always have
        > > > > complete faith in his subordinates and trust their
        judgement.
        > If
        > > > he
        > > > > can't, even because of his own personal shortcomings, these
        > men
        > > > must
        > > > > be relieved or else the command will suffer. With Lee, Davis
        > > would
        > > > > have been able to have complete confidence, for the first
        time
        > > > since
        > > > > Albert Sidney Johnston, in the commander of the AoT. This
        > > > doubtless
        > > > > would have been a better military arrangement for all
        > involved,
        > > > and
        > > > > elevated the morale of the army. Not only would they like
        > their
        > > > > commander (as they did Joe Johnston) or the president
        support
        > > him
        > > > > (as he did Bragg), but rather both the army and the
        president
        > > > would
        > > > > both support the commanding general at the same time. A
        rather
        > > > novel
        > > > > notion out west.
        > > > >
        > > > > 4. LONGSTREET'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE GRAND STRATEGIC PLAN
        OUT
        > > > EAST:
        > > > > Longstreet's idea of remaining on the defensive, and simply
        > > > beating
        > > > > off Federal attacks would have worked much better in
        Virginia
        > > than
        > > > > it would have in Tenesse or Georgia. Think Fredericksburg.
        > (Yes
        > > I
        > > > > know Lee was the commanding general, but Longstreet's
        reading
        > of
        > > > the
        > > > > field and handling of his own troops was masterful here. I
        > think
        > > > he
        > > > > could have done it on a larger scale.) Although Longstreet
        was
        > > > > undoubtedly better under Lee and this strategy may have had
        > its
        > > > > difficulties against a federal army under Grant, I don't
        think
        > > it
        > > > > would have worn out the ability of the ANV to take the
        > offensive
        > > > as
        > > > > quickly as Lee did.
        > > > >
        > > > > In closing, and given the subsequent history, I don't
        believe
        > > > Davis
        > > > > really had any other viable options. Lee out West, and
        > > Longstreet
        > > > in
        > > > > the East, at least until the elections of 1864, and the hope
        > > that
        > > > > Lee could have kept Sherman out of Atlanta, would have been
        a
        > > > > pretty good hand to play.
        > > > >
        > > > > Sorry if this post was too long, but you know what they say.
        > > > Figured
        > > > > I'd try to make somewhat of a good first impression.
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > Yahoo! Groups Links
      • Tom Mix
        I would include central and east Tennessee, Georgia, possibly inland S.C. but not coastal Georgia. I would have a Coastal Defense as a separate entity. Having
        Message 3 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
          I would include central and east Tennessee, Georgia, possibly inland
          S.C. but not coastal Georgia. I would have a Coastal Defense as a
          separate entity. Having to defend Nashville and the Savannah coast is
          just nonsensical. To the West the area could be from Nashville to the
          Mississippi River and South to below Vicksburg. Taylor could command the
          Tran-Miss area and Texas. The AOT was grossly over extended as A.S.
          Johnston rapidly discovered. Drawing a middle or central department
          would add more focus to their efforts. Trying to communicate and
          coordinate from Knoxville to Vicksburg was not feasible and it just
          simply did not work.

          This is just a rough outline of a concept or theory that needs further
          discussion. But I think it would have been a viable alternative to what
          actually occurred and failed. They had several capable leaders who kept
          replacing each other. This program would have put the available talent
          into the game together, enhanced communication, provided more structure
          and allowed the Department commander to focus on a more centralized set
          of problems, tasks and circumstances.
          Just a thought...

          -----Original Message-----
          From: illiniillinois [mailto:illiniillinois@...]
          Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 2:18 AM
          To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
          Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
          commander in the West?



          Sorry but I had to reply to this. What would the central deparment
          in the West have looked like to you, Tom? Tenesse, Georgia, South
          Carolina and North Carolina? This seems like one of the most
          intersting ideas to me yet and the more I think on it a darn good
          idea. Curious on what you were thinking.

          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
          > I think the South had three capable leaders after the death of A.S.
          > Johnston. R.E. Lee, Joe Johnston and Beauregard. What they had was
          a
          > horrible road network (to call it a "network" is a compliment) that
          > covered a territory that was simply too large for an East, a West
          and a
          > Southern Mississippi. They needed a third area between Lee and the
          West.
          > Beauregard could have been left in command of the West and Northern
          > Mississippi region and Joe Johnston put in charge of a middle area
          > around Knoxville, Chattanooga and Georgia.
          > Just a thought and probably a lousy one. But something to consider.
          > Don't think about Davis and his prejudices. We know of them. This
          is an
          > alternative thought of could be done if Davis really wanted to do
          > something that would utilized the best available talent.
          >
          >
          > -----Original Message-----
          > From: Mark Peters [mailto:mark.peters14@b...]
          > Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 2004 9:18 PM
          > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
          > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
          > commander in the West?
          >
          >
          >
          > Davis wanted a commission at the beginning of the war, but ended
          up
          > with the Presidency. He was the one that never got over this, and
          > hence his continuous dabblings. That's my opinion, anyway.
          >
          > However, I don't agree that Beauregard and Johnston were in the
          > wrong, because they didn't accept his war record and military
          > ambitions. Rather, they were the ones in the field, and should
          have
          > been given the responsibility to act upon their commissions.
          >
          > Best wishes,
          >
          > Mark
          >
          > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
          > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
          > >
          > > Thanks for the response mark. Yeah you bring up a good point. I
          > > hadn't even thought of Davis' fixation on the East.
          > >
          > > Also I don't have that big a problem with Beauregard either.
          > Granted
          > > the man thought he was another Napoleon and he had a fixation
          with
          > > overly ambitious, grand strategic plans, but once he was brought
          > > back down to earth he was able to tailor his plans based
          somewhat
          > > more on reality. I think First Manassas was a good example of
          > this,
          > > even though a lot of the credit goes to Joe Johnston for that.
          His
          > > defense of Petersburg was also much better than he traditionally
          > > gets credit for, IMHO.
          > >
          > > Anyway I know this is a western discussion board, and,
          especially
          > > being the new guy, I don't mean to stray too much. As for Davis
          I
          > > couldn't agree more. I think the Confederacy's biggest problem
          was
          > > his firm belief that because of his previous experience in
          Mexico
          > > and as Secretary in War he was, in his opinion, almost a de
          facto
          > > general. I just happen to think that he was the president of the
          > > CSA, for better or worse, and Beauregard and Johnston would have
          > > been a lot better off, both from a personal and military
          > > perspective, if they had swallowed their pride and dealt with
          this
          > > fact.
          > >
          > >
          > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Mark Peters"
          > > <mark.peters14@b...> wrote:
          > > >
          > > > You highlight several problems.
          > > >
          > > > Firstly, my belief is that Lee refused command in the West.
          So,
          > > he
          > > > wasn't a viable option. Davis, as did Lee, thought the war
          > would
          > > be
          > > > won in the east. There is no way that he would have wanted
          his
          > > best
          > > > commander in the west, on a permanent basis.
          > > >
          > > > Of those willing to serve, as I've stated before, my belief is
          > > that
          > > > Beauregard was the best option. The fact that Davis
          > continuously
          > > > meddled in military affairs surely shows that politicians
          should
          > > > allow their military commanders to get on with it. Because
          > Davis
          > > > did not get on, at a personal level, with Beauregard or J.
          > > Johnston
          > > > should not have precluded them from continuous command out
          west.
          > > >
          > > > I do agree with you on Cleburne!
          > > >
          > > > Best wishes,
          > > >
          > > > Mark
          > > >
          > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
          > > > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
          > > > >
          > > > > Hi everyone, I'm fairly new here. Been lurking for a while,
          > and
          > > > have
          > > > > read most of the posts on who would have been the best
          choice
          > > with
          > > > > respect to the Confederacy for commander in the West. Best
          > > option,
          > > > > IMHO, Lee.
          > > > >
          > > > > I know this has been suggested before, and Davis himself
          even
          > > > > considered it, but rejected it partially because of Lee's
          > > > > reluctance. Nevertheless, sending Lee west and placing
          > > Longstreet
          > > > in
          > > > > command in the East, after Chattanooga, probably would have
          > been
          > > > the
          > > > > Confederacy's best course of action. There are several major
          > > > > positives and negatives in this plan and, if everyone will
          > bear
          > > > with
          > > > > me real quick, I'm gonna try to lay 'em out.
          > > > >
          > > > > First the weakness:
          > > > >
          > > > > 1. LONGSTREET'S LACKLUSTER RECORD AS AN INDEPENDANT
          COMMANDER:
          > > For
          > > > > whatever reason "Pete" had a fairly lackluster record as an
          > > > > independant commander. While he admittedly faced several
          > > handicaps
          > > > > at Knoxville and during his tenure in command of a
          department
          > in
          > > > > southeastern Virginia, such as having to deal with a number
          of
          > > > > generals Lee had banished there so Marse Robert himself
          would
          > no
          > > > > longer have to worry about them, the record remains
          disturbing
          > > at
          > > > > best. Just how would Longstreet have fared if given complete
          > > > control
          > > > > of the ANV? There is enough evidence out there to cast some
          > > > serious
          > > > > doubt on his abilities as an independant commander.
          > > > >
          > > > > 2. LEE'S OWN RELUCTANCE TO LEAVE THE ANV: Lee was a
          Virginian
          > by
          > > > > birth, by early 1864 he wanted to keep command of the ANV,
          > which
          > > > he
          > > > > had more than earned and proved himself a master at
          > commanding.
          > > > > Furthermore Lee's reluctance to leave a theater he knew so
          > well,
          > > > for
          > > > > one he knew very little about is a legitimate objection. I
          > would
          > > > > also add to this Davis' heavy reliance on having Lee nearby,
          > not
          > > > > only as commander of the ANV, but as a valued friend and
          > general
          > > > to
          > > > > consult with. Nevertheless, given Lee's notion of honor and
          > > > devotion
          > > > > to duty, there is no doubt in my mind that had Davis
          actually
          > > > > ordered him out west, he would have went.
          > > > >
          > > > > 3. THE REACTION OF THE ANV: While there is no doubt that the
          > ANV
          > > > > dearly loved Longstreet, and held him in high esteem, the
          > regard
          > > > > they had for him could never compare to that they had for
          Lee.
          > > > > Understandably no general would ever hold in their hearts
          the
          > > > place
          > > > > that Lee did. Again, nevertheless, if Lee were sent West
          after
          > > > > Chattanooga, given the circumstances, and the fact that by
          > 1864
          > > > the
          > > > > ANV was an actual army in discipline as well as name, I
          think
          > > the
          > > > > change just might have worked.
          > > > >
          > > > > Now the strenghts:
          > > > >
          > > > > 1. LEE'S AGRESSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AS A COMMANDER, AND
          ABILITY
          > > TO
          > > > > SEE OPPORTUNITY WHERE OTHERS SAW DISASTER: Lee is exactly
          the
          > > type
          > > > > of commander that was needed in the West. One who always
          > > remained
          > > > > inherently aggressive, and looked for ways to attack the
          enemy
          > > > > rather than lamenting the shortcomings he faced. If anyone
          > could
          > > > > have viewed the Confederate situation out West, after
          > > Chattanooga,
          > > > > and found a way to counterattack the Union advance it would
          > have
          > > > > been Lee. Moreover he would have brought a sense of the
          > > offensive
          > > > > that was often missing in the AoT's commanders (Johnston),
          > > > although
          > > > > not the AoT itself.
          > > > >
          > > > > 2. LEE'S PERSONALITY: His unique ability to balance delicate
          > and
          > > > > often intemperate subordinates. This was a key in the AoT
          and
          > > one
          > > > > that all of its previous commanders, including chiefly Bragg
          > and
          > > > > Johnston, simply missed. Men like Forrest and even Hood
          would
          > > not
          > > > > have bucked Lee as easily as they did Johnston. A situation
          > like
          > > > > Cassville, where Hood's attitude toward Johnston, his
          > > motivations,
          > > > > and his actions were questionable, simply would not have
          > > happened
          > > > > under Lee. Hood, along with pretty much every other
          commander
          > in
          > > > the
          > > > > Confederacy revered Lee. It's safe to say even a man like
          > > Forrest
          > > > > probably would not have reacted to Lee the same way he did
          to
          > > > Bragg
          > > > > for several reasons. (The first of which is that Lee always
          > > highly
          > > > > valued the reports of his cavalry and paid close attention
          to
          > > > them.
          > > > > The second that he was a far more competent operational
          > > commander
          > > > > than Bragg could ever hope to be, and the third that he was
          > > simply
          > > > > Robert E. Lee.) Finally men like Cleburne would have been
          > given
          > > > the
          > > > > opportunity to either prove themselves as leaders at higher
          > > > command
          > > > > positions, failed and been moved back to their original
          > command,
          > > > or
          > > > > simply shuffled to another theater as Lee was so adroit at
          > > doing.
          > > > > (When I look at Cleburne out West I can't help but think of
          > John
          > > > B.
          > > > > Gordon out East. It's hard for me to believe that Clebure
          > would
          > > > not
          > > > > have been, at least temporarily, allowed to try his hand at
          a
          > > > corps
          > > > > command under Lee.)
          > > > >
          > > > > 3. THE INHERENT PERSONALITY FLAWS IN THE OTHER COMMANDERS OF
          > THE
          > > > > AoT: Say what you like about Johnston, Beauregard and Bragg
          > but
          > > > they
          > > > > were simply not as easy to get along with as Lee. Moreover,
          > with
          > > > > respect to Davis, it has always seemed rather beside the
          point
          > > to
          > > > me
          > > > > whether or not Johnston and Beauregard were right about his
          > > > > treatment of them. The point is HE, Davis, not them was the
          > > > > President of the Confederacy. The president MUST always have
          > > > > complete faith in his subordinates and trust their
          judgement.
          > If
          > > > he
          > > > > can't, even because of his own personal shortcomings, these
          > men
          > > > must
          > > > > be relieved or else the command will suffer. With Lee, Davis
          > > would
          > > > > have been able to have complete confidence, for the first
          time
          > > > since
          > > > > Albert Sidney Johnston, in the commander of the AoT. This
          > > > doubtless
          > > > > would have been a better military arrangement for all
          > involved,
          > > > and
          > > > > elevated the morale of the army. Not only would they like
          > their
          > > > > commander (as they did Joe Johnston) or the president
          support
          > > him
          > > > > (as he did Bragg), but rather both the army and the
          president
          > > > would
          > > > > both support the commanding general at the same time. A
          rather
          > > > novel
          > > > > notion out west.
          > > > >
          > > > > 4. LONGSTREET'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE GRAND STRATEGIC PLAN
          OUT
          > > > EAST:
          > > > > Longstreet's idea of remaining on the defensive, and simply
          > > > beating
          > > > > off Federal attacks would have worked much better in
          Virginia
          > > than
          > > > > it would have in Tenesse or Georgia. Think Fredericksburg.
          > (Yes
          > > I
          > > > > know Lee was the commanding general, but Longstreet's
          reading
          > of
          > > > the
          > > > > field and handling of his own troops was masterful here. I
          > think
          > > > he
          > > > > could have done it on a larger scale.) Although Longstreet
          was
          > > > > undoubtedly better under Lee and this strategy may have had
          > its
          > > > > difficulties against a federal army under Grant, I don't
          think
          > > it
          > > > > would have worn out the ability of the ANV to take the
          > offensive
          > > > as
          > > > > quickly as Lee did.
          > > > >
          > > > > In closing, and given the subsequent history, I don't
          believe
          > > > Davis
          > > > > really had any other viable options. Lee out West, and
          > > Longstreet
          > > > in
          > > > > the East, at least until the elections of 1864, and the hope
          > > that
          > > > > Lee could have kept Sherman out of Atlanta, would have been
          a
          > > > > pretty good hand to play.
          > > > >
          > > > > Sorry if this post was too long, but you know what they say.
          > > > Figured
          > > > > I'd try to make somewhat of a good first impression.
          >
          >
          >
          >
          >
          >
          >
          > Yahoo! Groups Links







          Yahoo! Groups Links
        • William H Keene
          Isn t your idea what was done in the fall of 1862: - Bragg commanded an area consisting of central and eastern Tennesee plus the northern portions of Georgia
          Message 4 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
            Isn't your idea what was done in the fall of 1862:
            - Bragg commanded an area consisting of central and eastern Tennesee plus the northern
            portions of Georgia and Alabama;
            - Pemberton commanded Mississippi. eastern Louisiana and ambitions of retaking western
            Tennessee;
            JEJ was given authority over both Departments in hopes of providing some level of
            coordination. Coastal Georgia and South Carolina was a separate Department under
            Beauregard. This structure lasted until early 1864.




            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
            > I would include central and east Tennessee, Georgia, possibly inland
            > S.C. but not coastal Georgia. I would have a Coastal Defense as a
            > separate entity. Having to defend Nashville and the Savannah coast is
            > just nonsensical. To the West the area could be from Nashville to the
            > Mississippi River and South to below Vicksburg. Taylor could command the
            > Tran-Miss area and Texas. The AOT was grossly over extended as A.S.
            > Johnston rapidly discovered. Drawing a middle or central department
            > would add more focus to their efforts. Trying to communicate and
            > coordinate from Knoxville to Vicksburg was not feasible and it just
            > simply did not work.
            >
            > This is just a rough outline of a concept or theory that needs further
            > discussion. But I think it would have been a viable alternative to what
            > actually occurred and failed. They had several capable leaders who kept
            > replacing each other. This program would have put the available talent
            > into the game together, enhanced communication, provided more structure
            > and allowed the Department commander to focus on a more centralized set
            > of problems, tasks and circumstances.
            > Just a thought...
            >
            > -----Original Message-----
            > From: illiniillinois [mailto:illiniillinois@y...]
            > Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 2:18 AM
            > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
            > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
            > commander in the West?
            >
            >
            >
            > Sorry but I had to reply to this. What would the central deparment
            > in the West have looked like to you, Tom? Tenesse, Georgia, South
            > Carolina and North Carolina? This seems like one of the most
            > intersting ideas to me yet and the more I think on it a darn good
            > idea. Curious on what you were thinking.
            >
            > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
            > > I think the South had three capable leaders after the death of A.S.
            > > Johnston. R.E. Lee, Joe Johnston and Beauregard. What they had was
            > a
            > > horrible road network (to call it a "network" is a compliment) that
            > > covered a territory that was simply too large for an East, a West
            > and a
            > > Southern Mississippi. They needed a third area between Lee and the
            > West.
            > > Beauregard could have been left in command of the West and Northern
            > > Mississippi region and Joe Johnston put in charge of a middle area
            > > around Knoxville, Chattanooga and Georgia.
            > > Just a thought and probably a lousy one. But something to consider.
            > > Don't think about Davis and his prejudices. We know of them. This
            > is an
            > > alternative thought of could be done if Davis really wanted to do
            > > something that would utilized the best available talent.
            > >
            > >
            > > -----Original Message-----
            > > From: Mark Peters [mailto:mark.peters14@b...]
            > > Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 2004 9:18 PM
            > > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
            > > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
            > > commander in the West?
            > >
            > >
            > >
            > > Davis wanted a commission at the beginning of the war, but ended
            > up
            > > with the Presidency. He was the one that never got over this, and
            > > hence his continuous dabblings. That's my opinion, anyway.
            > >
            > > However, I don't agree that Beauregard and Johnston were in the
            > > wrong, because they didn't accept his war record and military
            > > ambitions. Rather, they were the ones in the field, and should
            > have
            > > been given the responsibility to act upon their commissions.
            > >
            > > Best wishes,
            > >
            > > Mark
            > >
            > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
            > > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
            > > >
            > > > Thanks for the response mark. Yeah you bring up a good point. I
            > > > hadn't even thought of Davis' fixation on the East.
            > > >
            > > > Also I don't have that big a problem with Beauregard either.
            > > Granted
            > > > the man thought he was another Napoleon and he had a fixation
            > with
            > > > overly ambitious, grand strategic plans, but once he was brought
            > > > back down to earth he was able to tailor his plans based
            > somewhat
            > > > more on reality. I think First Manassas was a good example of
            > > this,
            > > > even though a lot of the credit goes to Joe Johnston for that.
            > His
            > > > defense of Petersburg was also much better than he traditionally
            > > > gets credit for, IMHO.
            > > >
            > > > Anyway I know this is a western discussion board, and,
            > especially
            > > > being the new guy, I don't mean to stray too much. As for Davis
            > I
            > > > couldn't agree more. I think the Confederacy's biggest problem
            > was
            > > > his firm belief that because of his previous experience in
            > Mexico
            > > > and as Secretary in War he was, in his opinion, almost a de
            > facto
            > > > general. I just happen to think that he was the president of the
            > > > CSA, for better or worse, and Beauregard and Johnston would have
            > > > been a lot better off, both from a personal and military
            > > > perspective, if they had swallowed their pride and dealt with
            > this
            > > > fact.
            > > >
            > > >
            > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Mark Peters"
            > > > <mark.peters14@b...> wrote:
            > > > >
            > > > > You highlight several problems.
            > > > >
            > > > > Firstly, my belief is that Lee refused command in the West.
            > So,
            > > > he
            > > > > wasn't a viable option. Davis, as did Lee, thought the war
            > > would
            > > > be
            > > > > won in the east. There is no way that he would have wanted
            > his
            > > > best
            > > > > commander in the west, on a permanent basis.
            > > > >
            > > > > Of those willing to serve, as I've stated before, my belief is
            > > > that
            > > > > Beauregard was the best option. The fact that Davis
            > > continuously
            > > > > meddled in military affairs surely shows that politicians
            > should
            > > > > allow their military commanders to get on with it. Because
            > > Davis
            > > > > did not get on, at a personal level, with Beauregard or J.
            > > > Johnston
            > > > > should not have precluded them from continuous command out
            > west.
            > > > >
            > > > > I do agree with you on Cleburne!
            > > > >
            > > > > Best wishes,
            > > > >
            > > > > Mark
            > > > >
            > > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
            > > > > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
            > > > > >
            > > > > > Hi everyone, I'm fairly new here. Been lurking for a while,
            > > and
            > > > > have
            > > > > > read most of the posts on who would have been the best
            > choice
            > > > with
            > > > > > respect to the Confederacy for commander in the West. Best
            > > > option,
            > > > > > IMHO, Lee.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > I know this has been suggested before, and Davis himself
            > even
            > > > > > considered it, but rejected it partially because of Lee's
            > > > > > reluctance. Nevertheless, sending Lee west and placing
            > > > Longstreet
            > > > > in
            > > > > > command in the East, after Chattanooga, probably would have
            > > been
            > > > > the
            > > > > > Confederacy's best course of action. There are several major
            > > > > > positives and negatives in this plan and, if everyone will
            > > bear
            > > > > with
            > > > > > me real quick, I'm gonna try to lay 'em out.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > First the weakness:
            > > > > >
            > > > > > 1. LONGSTREET'S LACKLUSTER RECORD AS AN INDEPENDANT
            > COMMANDER:
            > > > For
            > > > > > whatever reason "Pete" had a fairly lackluster record as an
            > > > > > independant commander. While he admittedly faced several
            > > > handicaps
            > > > > > at Knoxville and during his tenure in command of a
            > department
            > > in
            > > > > > southeastern Virginia, such as having to deal with a number
            > of
            > > > > > generals Lee had banished there so Marse Robert himself
            > would
            > > no
            > > > > > longer have to worry about them, the record remains
            > disturbing
            > > > at
            > > > > > best. Just how would Longstreet have fared if given complete
            > > > > control
            > > > > > of the ANV? There is enough evidence out there to cast some
            > > > > serious
            > > > > > doubt on his abilities as an independant commander.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > 2. LEE'S OWN RELUCTANCE TO LEAVE THE ANV: Lee was a
            > Virginian
            > > by
            > > > > > birth, by early 1864 he wanted to keep command of the ANV,
            > > which
            > > > > he
            > > > > > had more than earned and proved himself a master at
            > > commanding.
            > > > > > Furthermore Lee's reluctance to leave a theater he knew so
            > > well,
            > > > > for
            > > > > > one he knew very little about is a legitimate objection. I
            > > would
            > > > > > also add to this Davis' heavy reliance on having Lee nearby,
            > > not
            > > > > > only as commander of the ANV, but as a valued friend and
            > > general
            > > > > to
            > > > > > consult with. Nevertheless, given Lee's notion of honor and
            > > > > devotion
            > > > > > to duty, there is no doubt in my mind that had Davis
            > actually
            > > > > > ordered him out west, he would have went.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > 3. THE REACTION OF THE ANV: While there is no doubt that the
            > > ANV
            > > > > > dearly loved Longstreet, and held him in high esteem, the
            > > regard
            > > > > > they had for him could never compare to that they had for
            > Lee.
            > > > > > Understandably no general would ever hold in their hearts
            > the
            > > > > place
            > > > > > that Lee did. Again, nevertheless, if Lee were sent West
            > after
            > > > > > Chattanooga, given the circumstances, and the fact that by
            > > 1864
            > > > > the
            > > > > > ANV was an actual army in discipline as well as name, I
            > think
            > > > the
            > > > > > change just might have worked.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > Now the strenghts:
            > > > > >
            > > > > > 1. LEE'S AGRESSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AS A COMMANDER, AND
            > ABILITY
            > > > TO
            > > > > > SEE OPPORTUNITY WHERE OTHERS SAW DISASTER: Lee is exactly
            > the
            > > > type
            > > > > > of commander that was needed in the West. One who always
            > > > remained
            > > > > > inherently aggressive, and looked for ways to attack the
            > enemy
            > > > > > rather than lamenting the shortcomings he faced. If anyone
            > > could
            > > > > > have viewed the Confederate situation out West, after
            > > > Chattanooga,
            > > > > > and found a way to counterattack the Union advance it would
            > > have
            > > > > > been Lee. Moreover he would have brought a sense of the
            > > > offensive
            > > > > > that was often missing in the AoT's commanders (Johnston),
            > > > > although
            > > > > > not the AoT itself.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > 2. LEE'S PERSONALITY: His unique ability to balance delicate
            > > and
            > > > > > often intemperate subordinates. This was a key in the AoT
            > and
            > > > one
            > > > > > that all of its previous commanders, including chiefly Bragg
            > > and
            > > > > > Johnston, simply missed. Men like Forrest and even Hood
            > would
            > > > not
            > > > > > have bucked Lee as easily as they did Johnston. A situation
            > > like
            > > > > > Cassville, where Hood's attitude toward Johnston, his
            > > > motivations,
            > > > > > and his actions were questionable, simply would not have
            > > > happened
            > > > > > under Lee. Hood, along with pretty much every other
            > commander
            > > in
            > > > > the
            > > > > > Confederacy revered Lee. It's safe to say even a man like
            > > > Forrest
            > > > > > probably would not have reacted to Lee the same way he did
            > to
            > > > > Bragg
            > > > > > for several reasons. (The first of which is that Lee always
            > > > highly
            > > > > > valued the reports of his cavalry and paid close attention
            > to
            > > > > them.
            > > > > > The second that he was a far more competent operational
            > > > commander
            > > > > > than Bragg could ever hope to be, and the third that he was
            > > > simply
            > > > > > Robert E. Lee.) Finally men like Cleburne would have been
            > > given
            > > > > the
            > > > > > opportunity to either prove themselves as leaders at higher
            > > > > command
            > > > > > positions, failed and been moved back to their original
            > > command,
            > > > > or
            > > > > > simply shuffled to another theater as Lee was so adroit at
            > > > doing.
            > > > > > (When I look at Cleburne out West I can't help but think of
            > > John
            > > > > B.
            > > > > > Gordon out East. It's hard for me to believe that Clebure
            > > would
            > > > > not
            > > > > > have been, at least temporarily, allowed to try his hand at
            > a
            > > > > corps
            > > > > > command under Lee.)
            > > > > >
            > > > > > 3. THE INHERENT PERSONALITY FLAWS IN THE OTHER COMMANDERS OF
            > > THE
            > > > > > AoT: Say what you like about Johnston, Beauregard and Bragg
            > > but
            > > > > they
            > > > > > were simply not as easy to get along with as Lee. Moreover,
            > > with
            > > > > > respect to Davis, it has always seemed rather beside the
            > point
            > > > to
            > > > > me
            > > > > > whether or not Johnston and Beauregard were right about his
            > > > > > treatment of them. The point is HE, Davis, not them was the
            > > > > > President of the Confederacy. The president MUST always have
            > > > > > complete faith in his subordinates and trust their
            > judgement.
            > > If
            > > > > he
            > > > > > can't, even because of his own personal shortcomings, these
            > > men
            > > > > must
            > > > > > be relieved or else the command will suffer. With Lee, Davis
            > > > would
            > > > > > have been able to have complete confidence, for the first
            > time
            > > > > since
            > > > > > Albert Sidney Johnston, in the commander of the AoT. This
            > > > > doubtless
            > > > > > would have been a better military arrangement for all
            > > involved,
            > > > > and
            > > > > > elevated the morale of the army. Not only would they like
            > > their
            > > > > > commander (as they did Joe Johnston) or the president
            > support
            > > > him
            > > > > > (as he did Bragg), but rather both the army and the
            > president
            > > > > would
            > > > > > both support the commanding general at the same time. A
            > rather
            > > > > novel
            > > > > > notion out west.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > 4. LONGSTREET'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE GRAND STRATEGIC PLAN
            > OUT
            > > > > EAST:
            > > > > > Longstreet's idea of remaining on the defensive, and simply
            > > > > beating
            > > > > > off Federal attacks would have worked much better in
            > Virginia
            > > > than
            > > > > > it would have in Tenesse or Georgia. Think Fredericksburg.
            > > (Yes
            > > > I
            > > > > > know Lee was the commanding general, but Longstreet's
            > reading
            > > of
            > > > > the
            > > > > > field and handling of his own troops was masterful here. I
            > > think
            > > > > he
            > > > > > could have done it on a larger scale.) Although Longstreet
            > was
            > > > > > undoubtedly better under Lee and this strategy may have had
            > > its
            > > > > > difficulties against a federal army under Grant, I don't
            > think
            > > > it
            > > > > > would have worn out the ability of the ANV to take the
            > > offensive
            > > > > as
            > > > > > quickly as Lee did.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > In closing, and given the subsequent history, I don't
            > believe
            > > > > Davis
            > > > > > really had any other viable options. Lee out West, and
            > > > Longstreet
            > > > > in
            > > > > > the East, at least until the elections of 1864, and the hope
            > > > that
            > > > > > Lee could have kept Sherman out of Atlanta, would have been
            > a
            > > > > > pretty good hand to play.
            > > > > >
            > > > > > Sorry if this post was too long, but you know what they say.
            > > > > Figured
            > > > > > I'd try to make somewhat of a good first impression.
            > >
            > >
            > >
            > >
            > >
            > >
            > >
            > > Yahoo! Groups Links
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > Yahoo! Groups Links
          • Tom Mix
            To a degree. But you have AOT fighting from Perryville to Shiloh from Chattanooga to Mississippi. It was simply stretched too thin and the territorial command
            Message 5 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
              To a degree. But you have AOT fighting from Perryville to Shiloh from
              Chattanooga to Mississippi. It was simply stretched too thin and the
              territorial command responsibilities were clearly lacking of focus. A.S.
              Johnston had a huge territory to attempt to control and he found he
              could not do attempting to consolidate his efforts at Shiloh. It was too
              diverse, too unwieldy. So, what you describe did exist but was not
              applied as it should have been. Just follow the combat history of Bragg.
              From Shiloh to Perryville. Hood from Atlanta to Nashville. No focus.

              -----Original Message-----
              From: William H Keene [mailto:wh_keene@...]
              Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 3:18 PM
              To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
              Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
              commander in the West?



              Isn't your idea what was done in the fall of 1862:
              - Bragg commanded an area consisting of central and eastern Tennesee
              plus the northern
              portions of Georgia and Alabama;
              - Pemberton commanded Mississippi. eastern Louisiana and ambitions of
              retaking western
              Tennessee;
              JEJ was given authority over both Departments in hopes of providing some
              level of
              coordination. Coastal Georgia and South Carolina was a separate
              Department under
              Beauregard. This structure lasted until early 1864.




              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
              > I would include central and east Tennessee, Georgia, possibly inland
              > S.C. but not coastal Georgia. I would have a Coastal Defense as a
              > separate entity. Having to defend Nashville and the Savannah coast is
              > just nonsensical. To the West the area could be from Nashville to the
              > Mississippi River and South to below Vicksburg. Taylor could command
              the
              > Tran-Miss area and Texas. The AOT was grossly over extended as A.S.
              > Johnston rapidly discovered. Drawing a middle or central department
              > would add more focus to their efforts. Trying to communicate and
              > coordinate from Knoxville to Vicksburg was not feasible and it just
              > simply did not work.
              >
              > This is just a rough outline of a concept or theory that needs further
              > discussion. But I think it would have been a viable alternative to
              what
              > actually occurred and failed. They had several capable leaders who
              kept
              > replacing each other. This program would have put the available talent
              > into the game together, enhanced communication, provided more
              structure
              > and allowed the Department commander to focus on a more centralized
              set
              > of problems, tasks and circumstances.
              > Just a thought...
              >
              > -----Original Message-----
              > From: illiniillinois [mailto:illiniillinois@y...]
              > Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 2:18 AM
              > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
              > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
              > commander in the West?
              >
              >
              >
              > Sorry but I had to reply to this. What would the central deparment
              > in the West have looked like to you, Tom? Tenesse, Georgia, South
              > Carolina and North Carolina? This seems like one of the most
              > intersting ideas to me yet and the more I think on it a darn good
              > idea. Curious on what you were thinking.
              >
              > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
              > > I think the South had three capable leaders after the death of A.S.
              > > Johnston. R.E. Lee, Joe Johnston and Beauregard. What they had was
              > a
              > > horrible road network (to call it a "network" is a compliment) that
              > > covered a territory that was simply too large for an East, a West
              > and a
              > > Southern Mississippi. They needed a third area between Lee and the
              > West.
              > > Beauregard could have been left in command of the West and Northern
              > > Mississippi region and Joe Johnston put in charge of a middle area
              > > around Knoxville, Chattanooga and Georgia.
              > > Just a thought and probably a lousy one. But something to consider.
              > > Don't think about Davis and his prejudices. We know of them. This
              > is an
              > > alternative thought of could be done if Davis really wanted to do
              > > something that would utilized the best available talent.
              > >
              > >
              > > -----Original Message-----
              > > From: Mark Peters [mailto:mark.peters14@b...]
              > > Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 2004 9:18 PM
              > > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
              > > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
              > > commander in the West?
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > > Davis wanted a commission at the beginning of the war, but ended
              > up
              > > with the Presidency. He was the one that never got over this, and
              > > hence his continuous dabblings. That's my opinion, anyway.
              > >
              > > However, I don't agree that Beauregard and Johnston were in the
              > > wrong, because they didn't accept his war record and military
              > > ambitions. Rather, they were the ones in the field, and should
              > have
              > > been given the responsibility to act upon their commissions.
              > >
              > > Best wishes,
              > >
              > > Mark
              > >
              > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
              > > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
              > > >
              > > > Thanks for the response mark. Yeah you bring up a good point. I
              > > > hadn't even thought of Davis' fixation on the East.
              > > >
              > > > Also I don't have that big a problem with Beauregard either.
              > > Granted
              > > > the man thought he was another Napoleon and he had a fixation
              > with
              > > > overly ambitious, grand strategic plans, but once he was brought
              > > > back down to earth he was able to tailor his plans based
              > somewhat
              > > > more on reality. I think First Manassas was a good example of
              > > this,
              > > > even though a lot of the credit goes to Joe Johnston for that.
              > His
              > > > defense of Petersburg was also much better than he traditionally
              > > > gets credit for, IMHO.
              > > >
              > > > Anyway I know this is a western discussion board, and,
              > especially
              > > > being the new guy, I don't mean to stray too much. As for Davis
              > I
              > > > couldn't agree more. I think the Confederacy's biggest problem
              > was
              > > > his firm belief that because of his previous experience in
              > Mexico
              > > > and as Secretary in War he was, in his opinion, almost a de
              > facto
              > > > general. I just happen to think that he was the president of the
              > > > CSA, for better or worse, and Beauregard and Johnston would have
              > > > been a lot better off, both from a personal and military
              > > > perspective, if they had swallowed their pride and dealt with
              > this
              > > > fact.
              > > >
              > > >
              > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Mark Peters"
              > > > <mark.peters14@b...> wrote:
              > > > >
              > > > > You highlight several problems.
              > > > >
              > > > > Firstly, my belief is that Lee refused command in the West.
              > So,
              > > > he
              > > > > wasn't a viable option. Davis, as did Lee, thought the war
              > > would
              > > > be
              > > > > won in the east. There is no way that he would have wanted
              > his
              > > > best
              > > > > commander in the west, on a permanent basis.
              > > > >
              > > > > Of those willing to serve, as I've stated before, my belief is
              > > > that
              > > > > Beauregard was the best option. The fact that Davis
              > > continuously
              > > > > meddled in military affairs surely shows that politicians
              > should
              > > > > allow their military commanders to get on with it. Because
              > > Davis
              > > > > did not get on, at a personal level, with Beauregard or J.
              > > > Johnston
              > > > > should not have precluded them from continuous command out
              > west.
              > > > >
              > > > > I do agree with you on Cleburne!
              > > > >
              > > > > Best wishes,
              > > > >
              > > > > Mark
              > > > >
              > > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
              > > > > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
              > > > > >
              > > > > > Hi everyone, I'm fairly new here. Been lurking for a while,
              > > and
              > > > > have
              > > > > > read most of the posts on who would have been the best
              > choice
              > > > with
              > > > > > respect to the Confederacy for commander in the West. Best
              > > > option,
              > > > > > IMHO, Lee.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > I know this has been suggested before, and Davis himself
              > even
              > > > > > considered it, but rejected it partially because of Lee's
              > > > > > reluctance. Nevertheless, sending Lee west and placing
              > > > Longstreet
              > > > > in
              > > > > > command in the East, after Chattanooga, probably would have
              > > been
              > > > > the
              > > > > > Confederacy's best course of action. There are several major
              > > > > > positives and negatives in this plan and, if everyone will
              > > bear
              > > > > with
              > > > > > me real quick, I'm gonna try to lay 'em out.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > First the weakness:
              > > > > >
              > > > > > 1. LONGSTREET'S LACKLUSTER RECORD AS AN INDEPENDANT
              > COMMANDER:
              > > > For
              > > > > > whatever reason "Pete" had a fairly lackluster record as an
              > > > > > independant commander. While he admittedly faced several
              > > > handicaps
              > > > > > at Knoxville and during his tenure in command of a
              > department
              > > in
              > > > > > southeastern Virginia, such as having to deal with a number
              > of
              > > > > > generals Lee had banished there so Marse Robert himself
              > would
              > > no
              > > > > > longer have to worry about them, the record remains
              > disturbing
              > > > at
              > > > > > best. Just how would Longstreet have fared if given complete
              > > > > control
              > > > > > of the ANV? There is enough evidence out there to cast some
              > > > > serious
              > > > > > doubt on his abilities as an independant commander.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > 2. LEE'S OWN RELUCTANCE TO LEAVE THE ANV: Lee was a
              > Virginian
              > > by
              > > > > > birth, by early 1864 he wanted to keep command of the ANV,
              > > which
              > > > > he
              > > > > > had more than earned and proved himself a master at
              > > commanding.
              > > > > > Furthermore Lee's reluctance to leave a theater he knew so
              > > well,
              > > > > for
              > > > > > one he knew very little about is a legitimate objection. I
              > > would
              > > > > > also add to this Davis' heavy reliance on having Lee nearby,
              > > not
              > > > > > only as commander of the ANV, but as a valued friend and
              > > general
              > > > > to
              > > > > > consult with. Nevertheless, given Lee's notion of honor and
              > > > > devotion
              > > > > > to duty, there is no doubt in my mind that had Davis
              > actually
              > > > > > ordered him out west, he would have went.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > 3. THE REACTION OF THE ANV: While there is no doubt that the
              > > ANV
              > > > > > dearly loved Longstreet, and held him in high esteem, the
              > > regard
              > > > > > they had for him could never compare to that they had for
              > Lee.
              > > > > > Understandably no general would ever hold in their hearts
              > the
              > > > > place
              > > > > > that Lee did. Again, nevertheless, if Lee were sent West
              > after
              > > > > > Chattanooga, given the circumstances, and the fact that by
              > > 1864
              > > > > the
              > > > > > ANV was an actual army in discipline as well as name, I
              > think
              > > > the
              > > > > > change just might have worked.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > Now the strenghts:
              > > > > >
              > > > > > 1. LEE'S AGRESSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AS A COMMANDER, AND
              > ABILITY
              > > > TO
              > > > > > SEE OPPORTUNITY WHERE OTHERS SAW DISASTER: Lee is exactly
              > the
              > > > type
              > > > > > of commander that was needed in the West. One who always
              > > > remained
              > > > > > inherently aggressive, and looked for ways to attack the
              > enemy
              > > > > > rather than lamenting the shortcomings he faced. If anyone
              > > could
              > > > > > have viewed the Confederate situation out West, after
              > > > Chattanooga,
              > > > > > and found a way to counterattack the Union advance it would
              > > have
              > > > > > been Lee. Moreover he would have brought a sense of the
              > > > offensive
              > > > > > that was often missing in the AoT's commanders (Johnston),
              > > > > although
              > > > > > not the AoT itself.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > 2. LEE'S PERSONALITY: His unique ability to balance delicate
              > > and
              > > > > > often intemperate subordinates. This was a key in the AoT
              > and
              > > > one
              > > > > > that all of its previous commanders, including chiefly Bragg
              > > and
              > > > > > Johnston, simply missed. Men like Forrest and even Hood
              > would
              > > > not
              > > > > > have bucked Lee as easily as they did Johnston. A situation
              > > like
              > > > > > Cassville, where Hood's attitude toward Johnston, his
              > > > motivations,
              > > > > > and his actions were questionable, simply would not have
              > > > happened
              > > > > > under Lee. Hood, along with pretty much every other
              > commander
              > > in
              > > > > the
              > > > > > Confederacy revered Lee. It's safe to say even a man like
              > > > Forrest
              > > > > > probably would not have reacted to Lee the same way he did
              > to
              > > > > Bragg
              > > > > > for several reasons. (The first of which is that Lee always
              > > > highly
              > > > > > valued the reports of his cavalry and paid close attention
              > to
              > > > > them.
              > > > > > The second that he was a far more competent operational
              > > > commander
              > > > > > than Bragg could ever hope to be, and the third that he was
              > > > simply
              > > > > > Robert E. Lee.) Finally men like Cleburne would have been
              > > given
              > > > > the
              > > > > > opportunity to either prove themselves as leaders at higher
              > > > > command
              > > > > > positions, failed and been moved back to their original
              > > command,
              > > > > or
              > > > > > simply shuffled to another theater as Lee was so adroit at
              > > > doing.
              > > > > > (When I look at Cleburne out West I can't help but think of
              > > John
              > > > > B.
              > > > > > Gordon out East. It's hard for me to believe that Clebure
              > > would
              > > > > not
              > > > > > have been, at least temporarily, allowed to try his hand at
              > a
              > > > > corps
              > > > > > command under Lee.)
              > > > > >
              > > > > > 3. THE INHERENT PERSONALITY FLAWS IN THE OTHER COMMANDERS OF
              > > THE
              > > > > > AoT: Say what you like about Johnston, Beauregard and Bragg
              > > but
              > > > > they
              > > > > > were simply not as easy to get along with as Lee. Moreover,
              > > with
              > > > > > respect to Davis, it has always seemed rather beside the
              > point
              > > > to
              > > > > me
              > > > > > whether or not Johnston and Beauregard were right about his
              > > > > > treatment of them. The point is HE, Davis, not them was the
              > > > > > President of the Confederacy. The president MUST always have
              > > > > > complete faith in his subordinates and trust their
              > judgement.
              > > If
              > > > > he
              > > > > > can't, even because of his own personal shortcomings, these
              > > men
              > > > > must
              > > > > > be relieved or else the command will suffer. With Lee, Davis
              > > > would
              > > > > > have been able to have complete confidence, for the first
              > time
              > > > > since
              > > > > > Albert Sidney Johnston, in the commander of the AoT. This
              > > > > doubtless
              > > > > > would have been a better military arrangement for all
              > > involved,
              > > > > and
              > > > > > elevated the morale of the army. Not only would they like
              > > their
              > > > > > commander (as they did Joe Johnston) or the president
              > support
              > > > him
              > > > > > (as he did Bragg), but rather both the army and the
              > president
              > > > > would
              > > > > > both support the commanding general at the same time. A
              > rather
              > > > > novel
              > > > > > notion out west.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > 4. LONGSTREET'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE GRAND STRATEGIC PLAN
              > OUT
              > > > > EAST:
              > > > > > Longstreet's idea of remaining on the defensive, and simply
              > > > > beating
              > > > > > off Federal attacks would have worked much better in
              > Virginia
              > > > than
              > > > > > it would have in Tenesse or Georgia. Think Fredericksburg.
              > > (Yes
              > > > I
              > > > > > know Lee was the commanding general, but Longstreet's
              > reading
              > > of
              > > > > the
              > > > > > field and handling of his own troops was masterful here. I
              > > think
              > > > > he
              > > > > > could have done it on a larger scale.) Although Longstreet
              > was
              > > > > > undoubtedly better under Lee and this strategy may have had
              > > its
              > > > > > difficulties against a federal army under Grant, I don't
              > think
              > > > it
              > > > > > would have worn out the ability of the ANV to take the
              > > offensive
              > > > > as
              > > > > > quickly as Lee did.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > In closing, and given the subsequent history, I don't
              > believe
              > > > > Davis
              > > > > > really had any other viable options. Lee out West, and
              > > > Longstreet
              > > > > in
              > > > > > the East, at least until the elections of 1864, and the hope
              > > > that
              > > > > > Lee could have kept Sherman out of Atlanta, would have been
              > a
              > > > > > pretty good hand to play.
              > > > > >
              > > > > > Sorry if this post was too long, but you know what they say.
              > > > > Figured
              > > > > > I'd try to make somewhat of a good first impression.
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > > Yahoo! Groups Links
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              > Yahoo! Groups Links







              Yahoo! Groups Links
            • Ricky Washburn
              My idea is a far fetched belief, but i do believe that giving a appropriate command staff, and a small area of command Van Dorn had potential. I am not sure
              Message 6 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                My idea is a far fetched belief, but i do believe
                that giving a appropriate command staff, and a small
                area of command Van Dorn had potential. I am not sure
                what it is, though maybe if he was placed as a corps
                commander he might have done a decent job, or made use
                of cavalry as scouts for a regular army...

                =====

                .....Eternally.....





                __________________________________
                Do you Yahoo!?
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                www.yahoo.com
              • Mark Peters
                Tom, I think with an increased number of Departments, Davis would have been a fly in the ointment , and made the option unworkable. Forgetting the
                Message 7 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                  Tom,

                  I think with an increased number of Departments, Davis would have
                  been a 'fly in the ointment', and made the option unworkable.

                  Forgetting the Trans-Missippi, he struggled to find two commanders,
                  at any one time, that he could work with effectively. Would it have
                  been feasable that he could have found three?

                  We also know that Union Generals often bickered over who had control
                  of troops, when they crossed into another sphere of influence. I
                  wonder how the egos of the CSA high-command would have reacted when
                  this happened!

                  Best wishes,

                  Mark

                  --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                  > I would include central and east Tennessee, Georgia, possibly
                  inland
                  > S.C. but not coastal Georgia. I would have a Coastal Defense as a
                  > separate entity. Having to defend Nashville and the Savannah coast
                  is
                  > just nonsensical. To the West the area could be from Nashville to
                  the
                  > Mississippi River and South to below Vicksburg. Taylor could
                  command the
                  > Tran-Miss area and Texas. The AOT was grossly over extended as A.S.
                  > Johnston rapidly discovered. Drawing a middle or central department
                  > would add more focus to their efforts. Trying to communicate and
                  > coordinate from Knoxville to Vicksburg was not feasible and it just
                  > simply did not work.
                  >
                  > This is just a rough outline of a concept or theory that needs
                  further
                  > discussion. But I think it would have been a viable alternative to
                  what
                  > actually occurred and failed. They had several capable leaders who
                  kept
                  > replacing each other. This program would have put the available
                  talent
                  > into the game together, enhanced communication, provided more
                  structure
                  > and allowed the Department commander to focus on a more
                  centralized set
                  > of problems, tasks and circumstances.
                  > Just a thought...
                  >
                  > -----Original Message-----
                  > From: illiniillinois [mailto:illiniillinois@y...]
                  > Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 2:18 AM
                  > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                  > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
                  > commander in the West?
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > Sorry but I had to reply to this. What would the central deparment
                  > in the West have looked like to you, Tom? Tenesse, Georgia, South
                  > Carolina and North Carolina? This seems like one of the most
                  > intersting ideas to me yet and the more I think on it a darn good
                  > idea. Curious on what you were thinking.
                  >
                  > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                  > > I think the South had three capable leaders after the death of
                  A.S.
                  > > Johnston. R.E. Lee, Joe Johnston and Beauregard. What they had
                  was
                  > a
                  > > horrible road network (to call it a "network" is a compliment)
                  that
                  > > covered a territory that was simply too large for an East, a
                  West
                  > and a
                  > > Southern Mississippi. They needed a third area between Lee and
                  the
                  > West.
                  > > Beauregard could have been left in command of the West and
                  Northern
                  > > Mississippi region and Joe Johnston put in charge of a middle
                  area
                  > > around Knoxville, Chattanooga and Georgia.
                  > > Just a thought and probably a lousy one. But something to
                  consider.
                  > > Don't think about Davis and his prejudices. We know of them.
                  This
                  > is an
                  > > alternative thought of could be done if Davis really wanted to do
                  > > something that would utilized the best available talent.
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > -----Original Message-----
                  > > From: Mark Peters [mailto:mark.peters14@b...]
                  > > Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 2004 9:18 PM
                  > > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                  > > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice
                  for
                  > > commander in the West?
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > Davis wanted a commission at the beginning of the war, but ended
                  > up
                  > > with the Presidency. He was the one that never got over this,
                  and
                  > > hence his continuous dabblings. That's my opinion, anyway.
                  > >
                  > > However, I don't agree that Beauregard and Johnston were in the
                  > > wrong, because they didn't accept his war record and military
                  > > ambitions. Rather, they were the ones in the field, and should
                  > have
                  > > been given the responsibility to act upon their commissions.
                  > >
                  > > Best wishes,
                  > >
                  > > Mark
                  > >
                  > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
                  > > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
                  > > >
                  > > > Thanks for the response mark. Yeah you bring up a good point.
                  I
                  > > > hadn't even thought of Davis' fixation on the East.
                  > > >
                  > > > Also I don't have that big a problem with Beauregard either.
                  > > Granted
                  > > > the man thought he was another Napoleon and he had a fixation
                  > with
                  > > > overly ambitious, grand strategic plans, but once he was
                  brought
                  > > > back down to earth he was able to tailor his plans based
                  > somewhat
                  > > > more on reality. I think First Manassas was a good example of
                  > > this,
                  > > > even though a lot of the credit goes to Joe Johnston for that.
                  > His
                  > > > defense of Petersburg was also much better than he
                  traditionally
                  > > > gets credit for, IMHO.
                  > > >
                  > > > Anyway I know this is a western discussion board, and,
                  > especially
                  > > > being the new guy, I don't mean to stray too much. As for
                  Davis
                  > I
                  > > > couldn't agree more. I think the Confederacy's biggest problem
                  > was
                  > > > his firm belief that because of his previous experience in
                  > Mexico
                  > > > and as Secretary in War he was, in his opinion, almost a de
                  > facto
                  > > > general. I just happen to think that he was the president of
                  the
                  > > > CSA, for better or worse, and Beauregard and Johnston would
                  have
                  > > > been a lot better off, both from a personal and military
                  > > > perspective, if they had swallowed their pride and dealt with
                  > this
                  > > > fact.
                  > > >
                  > > >
                  > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Mark Peters"
                  > > > <mark.peters14@b...> wrote:
                  > > > >
                  > > > > You highlight several problems.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Firstly, my belief is that Lee refused command in the West.
                  > So,
                  > > > he
                  > > > > wasn't a viable option. Davis, as did Lee, thought the war
                  > > would
                  > > > be
                  > > > > won in the east. There is no way that he would have wanted
                  > his
                  > > > best
                  > > > > commander in the west, on a permanent basis.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Of those willing to serve, as I've stated before, my belief
                  is
                  > > > that
                  > > > > Beauregard was the best option. The fact that Davis
                  > > continuously
                  > > > > meddled in military affairs surely shows that politicians
                  > should
                  > > > > allow their military commanders to get on with it. Because
                  > > Davis
                  > > > > did not get on, at a personal level, with Beauregard or J.
                  > > > Johnston
                  > > > > should not have precluded them from continuous command out
                  > west.
                  > > > >
                  > > > > I do agree with you on Cleburne!
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Best wishes,
                  > > > >
                  > > > > Mark
                  > > > >
                  > > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
                  > > > > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > Hi everyone, I'm fairly new here. Been lurking for a
                  while,
                  > > and
                  > > > > have
                  > > > > > read most of the posts on who would have been the best
                  > choice
                  > > > with
                  > > > > > respect to the Confederacy for commander in the West. Best
                  > > > option,
                  > > > > > IMHO, Lee.
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > I know this has been suggested before, and Davis himself
                  > even
                  > > > > > considered it, but rejected it partially because of Lee's
                  > > > > > reluctance. Nevertheless, sending Lee west and placing
                  > > > Longstreet
                  > > > > in
                  > > > > > command in the East, after Chattanooga, probably would
                  have
                  > > been
                  > > > > the
                  > > > > > Confederacy's best course of action. There are several
                  major
                  > > > > > positives and negatives in this plan and, if everyone will
                  > > bear
                  > > > > with
                  > > > > > me real quick, I'm gonna try to lay 'em out.
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > First the weakness:
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > 1. LONGSTREET'S LACKLUSTER RECORD AS AN INDEPENDANT
                  > COMMANDER:
                  > > > For
                  > > > > > whatever reason "Pete" had a fairly lackluster record as
                  an
                  > > > > > independant commander. While he admittedly faced several
                  > > > handicaps
                  > > > > > at Knoxville and during his tenure in command of a
                  > department
                  > > in
                  > > > > > southeastern Virginia, such as having to deal with a
                  number
                  > of
                  > > > > > generals Lee had banished there so Marse Robert himself
                  > would
                  > > no
                  > > > > > longer have to worry about them, the record remains
                  > disturbing
                  > > > at
                  > > > > > best. Just how would Longstreet have fared if given
                  complete
                  > > > > control
                  > > > > > of the ANV? There is enough evidence out there to cast
                  some
                  > > > > serious
                  > > > > > doubt on his abilities as an independant commander.
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > 2. LEE'S OWN RELUCTANCE TO LEAVE THE ANV: Lee was a
                  > Virginian
                  > > by
                  > > > > > birth, by early 1864 he wanted to keep command of the ANV,
                  > > which
                  > > > > he
                  > > > > > had more than earned and proved himself a master at
                  > > commanding.
                  > > > > > Furthermore Lee's reluctance to leave a theater he knew so
                  > > well,
                  > > > > for
                  > > > > > one he knew very little about is a legitimate objection. I
                  > > would
                  > > > > > also add to this Davis' heavy reliance on having Lee
                  nearby,
                  > > not
                  > > > > > only as commander of the ANV, but as a valued friend and
                  > > general
                  > > > > to
                  > > > > > consult with. Nevertheless, given Lee's notion of honor
                  and
                  > > > > devotion
                  > > > > > to duty, there is no doubt in my mind that had Davis
                  > actually
                  > > > > > ordered him out west, he would have went.
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > 3. THE REACTION OF THE ANV: While there is no doubt that
                  the
                  > > ANV
                  > > > > > dearly loved Longstreet, and held him in high esteem, the
                  > > regard
                  > > > > > they had for him could never compare to that they had for
                  > Lee.
                  > > > > > Understandably no general would ever hold in their hearts
                  > the
                  > > > > place
                  > > > > > that Lee did. Again, nevertheless, if Lee were sent West
                  > after
                  > > > > > Chattanooga, given the circumstances, and the fact that by
                  > > 1864
                  > > > > the
                  > > > > > ANV was an actual army in discipline as well as name, I
                  > think
                  > > > the
                  > > > > > change just might have worked.
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > Now the strenghts:
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > 1. LEE'S AGRESSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AS A COMMANDER, AND
                  > ABILITY
                  > > > TO
                  > > > > > SEE OPPORTUNITY WHERE OTHERS SAW DISASTER: Lee is exactly
                  > the
                  > > > type
                  > > > > > of commander that was needed in the West. One who always
                  > > > remained
                  > > > > > inherently aggressive, and looked for ways to attack the
                  > enemy
                  > > > > > rather than lamenting the shortcomings he faced. If anyone
                  > > could
                  > > > > > have viewed the Confederate situation out West, after
                  > > > Chattanooga,
                  > > > > > and found a way to counterattack the Union advance it
                  would
                  > > have
                  > > > > > been Lee. Moreover he would have brought a sense of the
                  > > > offensive
                  > > > > > that was often missing in the AoT's commanders (Johnston),
                  > > > > although
                  > > > > > not the AoT itself.
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > 2. LEE'S PERSONALITY: His unique ability to balance
                  delicate
                  > > and
                  > > > > > often intemperate subordinates. This was a key in the AoT
                  > and
                  > > > one
                  > > > > > that all of its previous commanders, including chiefly
                  Bragg
                  > > and
                  > > > > > Johnston, simply missed. Men like Forrest and even Hood
                  > would
                  > > > not
                  > > > > > have bucked Lee as easily as they did Johnston. A
                  situation
                  > > like
                  > > > > > Cassville, where Hood's attitude toward Johnston, his
                  > > > motivations,
                  > > > > > and his actions were questionable, simply would not have
                  > > > happened
                  > > > > > under Lee. Hood, along with pretty much every other
                  > commander
                  > > in
                  > > > > the
                  > > > > > Confederacy revered Lee. It's safe to say even a man like
                  > > > Forrest
                  > > > > > probably would not have reacted to Lee the same way he did
                  > to
                  > > > > Bragg
                  > > > > > for several reasons. (The first of which is that Lee
                  always
                  > > > highly
                  > > > > > valued the reports of his cavalry and paid close attention
                  > to
                  > > > > them.
                  > > > > > The second that he was a far more competent operational
                  > > > commander
                  > > > > > than Bragg could ever hope to be, and the third that he
                  was
                  > > > simply
                  > > > > > Robert E. Lee.) Finally men like Cleburne would have been
                  > > given
                  > > > > the
                  > > > > > opportunity to either prove themselves as leaders at
                  higher
                  > > > > command
                  > > > > > positions, failed and been moved back to their original
                  > > command,
                  > > > > or
                  > > > > > simply shuffled to another theater as Lee was so adroit at
                  > > > doing.
                  > > > > > (When I look at Cleburne out West I can't help but think
                  of
                  > > John
                  > > > > B.
                  > > > > > Gordon out East. It's hard for me to believe that Clebure
                  > > would
                  > > > > not
                  > > > > > have been, at least temporarily, allowed to try his hand
                  at
                  > a
                  > > > > corps
                  > > > > > command under Lee.)
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > 3. THE INHERENT PERSONALITY FLAWS IN THE OTHER COMMANDERS
                  OF
                  > > THE
                  > > > > > AoT: Say what you like about Johnston, Beauregard and
                  Bragg
                  > > but
                  > > > > they
                  > > > > > were simply not as easy to get along with as Lee.
                  Moreover,
                  > > with
                  > > > > > respect to Davis, it has always seemed rather beside the
                  > point
                  > > > to
                  > > > > me
                  > > > > > whether or not Johnston and Beauregard were right about
                  his
                  > > > > > treatment of them. The point is HE, Davis, not them was
                  the
                  > > > > > President of the Confederacy. The president MUST always
                  have
                  > > > > > complete faith in his subordinates and trust their
                  > judgement.
                  > > If
                  > > > > he
                  > > > > > can't, even because of his own personal shortcomings,
                  these
                  > > men
                  > > > > must
                  > > > > > be relieved or else the command will suffer. With Lee,
                  Davis
                  > > > would
                  > > > > > have been able to have complete confidence, for the first
                  > time
                  > > > > since
                  > > > > > Albert Sidney Johnston, in the commander of the AoT. This
                  > > > > doubtless
                  > > > > > would have been a better military arrangement for all
                  > > involved,
                  > > > > and
                  > > > > > elevated the morale of the army. Not only would they like
                  > > their
                  > > > > > commander (as they did Joe Johnston) or the president
                  > support
                  > > > him
                  > > > > > (as he did Bragg), but rather both the army and the
                  > president
                  > > > > would
                  > > > > > both support the commanding general at the same time. A
                  > rather
                  > > > > novel
                  > > > > > notion out west.
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > 4. LONGSTREET'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE GRAND STRATEGIC PLAN
                  > OUT
                  > > > > EAST:
                  > > > > > Longstreet's idea of remaining on the defensive, and
                  simply
                  > > > > beating
                  > > > > > off Federal attacks would have worked much better in
                  > Virginia
                  > > > than
                  > > > > > it would have in Tenesse or Georgia. Think Fredericksburg.
                  > > (Yes
                  > > > I
                  > > > > > know Lee was the commanding general, but Longstreet's
                  > reading
                  > > of
                  > > > > the
                  > > > > > field and handling of his own troops was masterful here. I
                  > > think
                  > > > > he
                  > > > > > could have done it on a larger scale.) Although Longstreet
                  > was
                  > > > > > undoubtedly better under Lee and this strategy may have
                  had
                  > > its
                  > > > > > difficulties against a federal army under Grant, I don't
                  > think
                  > > > it
                  > > > > > would have worn out the ability of the ANV to take the
                  > > offensive
                  > > > > as
                  > > > > > quickly as Lee did.
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > In closing, and given the subsequent history, I don't
                  > believe
                  > > > > Davis
                  > > > > > really had any other viable options. Lee out West, and
                  > > > Longstreet
                  > > > > in
                  > > > > > the East, at least until the elections of 1864, and the
                  hope
                  > > > that
                  > > > > > Lee could have kept Sherman out of Atlanta, would have
                  been
                  > a
                  > > > > > pretty good hand to play.
                  > > > > >
                  > > > > > Sorry if this post was too long, but you know what they
                  say.
                  > > > > Figured
                  > > > > > I'd try to make somewhat of a good first impression.
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > Yahoo! Groups Links
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  >
                  > Yahoo! Groups Links
                • William H Keene
                  ... I am a little confused about what you mean. The Confederate force at Shiloh was not called the Army of Tennessee. ... I agree that A.S.J. had too large a
                  Message 8 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                    --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                    > To a degree. But you have AOT fighting from Perryville to Shiloh from
                    > Chattanooga to Mississippi.

                    I am a little confused about what you mean.
                    The Confederate force at Shiloh was not called the Army of Tennessee.


                    > ... It was simply stretched too thin and the
                    > territorial command responsibilities were clearly lacking of focus. A.S.
                    > Johnston had a huge territory to attempt to control and he found he
                    > could not do attempting to consolidate his efforts at Shiloh. It was too
                    > diverse, too unwieldy.

                    I agree that A.S.J. had too large a geography for too small a force. But it seems to me that
                    this was rectified by late 1862 along the lines of what you suggested. I don't think that
                    ASJ's problem was that his force was unwieldy.


                    > .. So, what you describe did exist but was not
                    > applied as it should have been. Just follow the combat history of Bragg.
                    > From Shiloh to Perryville. Hood from Atlanta to Nashville. No focus.

                    I don't understand the examples. Why is there no focus? Hood was also at Antietam and
                    the Seven Days.

                    -Will
                  • Tom Mix
                    The key it to remember that we are working on theory here. You are correct in that Davis would have messed it up. He has a solid track record of that. what I
                    Message 9 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                      The key it to remember that we are working on theory here. You are
                      correct in that Davis would have messed it up. He has a solid track
                      record of that. what I am doing is just trying to form an alternative
                      that MAY have worked if given a valid opportunity.
                      I think the talent was available. Joe Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg,
                      Hardee, and Stewart come readily to mind. Cleburne and Cheatham.
                      The Richmond command didn't just think inside the box they reinforced
                      it, put a lid on it and lived there. But if they allowed a little
                      creativity to enter perhaps they could have got beyond the West Point
                      only leadership and seen talent where education was not. A West Point
                      education alone did not make a good general. Forrest did ok. So,
                      venturing outside the practical whelm of history, letting some
                      imagination to enter, I think it might have worked, at least better if
                      not successfully.

                      -----Original Message-----
                      From: Mark Peters [mailto:mark.peters14@...]
                      Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 3:43 PM
                      To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                      Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
                      commander in the West?



                      Tom,

                      I think with an increased number of Departments, Davis would have
                      been a 'fly in the ointment', and made the option unworkable.

                      Forgetting the Trans-Missippi, he struggled to find two commanders,
                      at any one time, that he could work with effectively. Would it have
                      been feasable that he could have found three?

                      We also know that Union Generals often bickered over who had control
                      of troops, when they crossed into another sphere of influence. I
                      wonder how the egos of the CSA high-command would have reacted when
                      this happened!

                      Best wishes,

                      Mark

                      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                      > I would include central and east Tennessee, Georgia, possibly
                      inland
                      > S.C. but not coastal Georgia. I would have a Coastal Defense as a
                      > separate entity. Having to defend Nashville and the Savannah coast
                      is
                      > just nonsensical. To the West the area could be from Nashville to
                      the
                      > Mississippi River and South to below Vicksburg. Taylor could
                      command the
                      > Tran-Miss area and Texas. The AOT was grossly over extended as A.S.
                      > Johnston rapidly discovered. Drawing a middle or central department
                      > would add more focus to their efforts. Trying to communicate and
                      > coordinate from Knoxville to Vicksburg was not feasible and it just
                      > simply did not work.
                      >
                      > This is just a rough outline of a concept or theory that needs
                      further
                      > discussion. But I think it would have been a viable alternative to
                      what
                      > actually occurred and failed. They had several capable leaders who
                      kept
                      > replacing each other. This program would have put the available
                      talent
                      > into the game together, enhanced communication, provided more
                      structure
                      > and allowed the Department commander to focus on a more
                      centralized set
                      > of problems, tasks and circumstances.
                      > Just a thought...
                      >
                      > -----Original Message-----
                      > From: illiniillinois [mailto:illiniillinois@y...]
                      > Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 2:18 AM
                      > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                      > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
                      > commander in the West?
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > Sorry but I had to reply to this. What would the central deparment
                      > in the West have looked like to you, Tom? Tenesse, Georgia, South
                      > Carolina and North Carolina? This seems like one of the most
                      > intersting ideas to me yet and the more I think on it a darn good
                      > idea. Curious on what you were thinking.
                      >
                      > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                      > > I think the South had three capable leaders after the death of
                      A.S.
                      > > Johnston. R.E. Lee, Joe Johnston and Beauregard. What they had
                      was
                      > a
                      > > horrible road network (to call it a "network" is a compliment)
                      that
                      > > covered a territory that was simply too large for an East, a
                      West
                      > and a
                      > > Southern Mississippi. They needed a third area between Lee and
                      the
                      > West.
                      > > Beauregard could have been left in command of the West and
                      Northern
                      > > Mississippi region and Joe Johnston put in charge of a middle
                      area
                      > > around Knoxville, Chattanooga and Georgia.
                      > > Just a thought and probably a lousy one. But something to
                      consider.
                      > > Don't think about Davis and his prejudices. We know of them.
                      This
                      > is an
                      > > alternative thought of could be done if Davis really wanted to do
                      > > something that would utilized the best available talent.
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > -----Original Message-----
                      > > From: Mark Peters [mailto:mark.peters14@b...]
                      > > Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 2004 9:18 PM
                      > > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                      > > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice
                      for
                      > > commander in the West?
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > Davis wanted a commission at the beginning of the war, but ended
                      > up
                      > > with the Presidency. He was the one that never got over this,
                      and
                      > > hence his continuous dabblings. That's my opinion, anyway.
                      > >
                      > > However, I don't agree that Beauregard and Johnston were in the
                      > > wrong, because they didn't accept his war record and military
                      > > ambitions. Rather, they were the ones in the field, and should
                      > have
                      > > been given the responsibility to act upon their commissions.
                      > >
                      > > Best wishes,
                      > >
                      > > Mark
                      > >
                      > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
                      > > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
                      > > >
                      > > > Thanks for the response mark. Yeah you bring up a good point.
                      I
                      > > > hadn't even thought of Davis' fixation on the East.
                      > > >
                      > > > Also I don't have that big a problem with Beauregard either.
                      > > Granted
                      > > > the man thought he was another Napoleon and he had a fixation
                      > with
                      > > > overly ambitious, grand strategic plans, but once he was
                      brought
                      > > > back down to earth he was able to tailor his plans based
                      > somewhat
                      > > > more on reality. I think First Manassas was a good example of
                      > > this,
                      > > > even though a lot of the credit goes to Joe Johnston for that.
                      > His
                      > > > defense of Petersburg was also much better than he
                      traditionally
                      > > > gets credit for, IMHO.
                      > > >
                      > > > Anyway I know this is a western discussion board, and,
                      > especially
                      > > > being the new guy, I don't mean to stray too much. As for
                      Davis
                      > I
                      > > > couldn't agree more. I think the Confederacy's biggest problem
                      > was
                      > > > his firm belief that because of his previous experience in
                      > Mexico
                      > > > and as Secretary in War he was, in his opinion, almost a de
                      > facto
                      > > > general. I just happen to think that he was the president of
                      the
                      > > > CSA, for better or worse, and Beauregard and Johnston would
                      have
                      > > > been a lot better off, both from a personal and military
                      > > > perspective, if they had swallowed their pride and dealt with
                      > this
                      > > > fact.
                      > > >
                      > > >
                      > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Mark Peters"
                      > > > <mark.peters14@b...> wrote:
                      > > > >
                      > > > > You highlight several problems.
                      > > > >
                      > > > > Firstly, my belief is that Lee refused command in the West.
                      > So,
                      > > > he
                      > > > > wasn't a viable option. Davis, as did Lee, thought the war
                      > > would
                      > > > be
                      > > > > won in the east. There is no way that he would have wanted
                      > his
                      > > > best
                      > > > > commander in the west, on a permanent basis.
                      > > > >
                      > > > > Of those willing to serve, as I've stated before, my belief
                      is
                      > > > that
                      > > > > Beauregard was the best option. The fact that Davis
                      > > continuously
                      > > > > meddled in military affairs surely shows that politicians
                      > should
                      > > > > allow their military commanders to get on with it. Because
                      > > Davis
                      > > > > did not get on, at a personal level, with Beauregard or J.
                      > > > Johnston
                      > > > > should not have precluded them from continuous command out
                      > west.
                      > > > >
                      > > > > I do agree with you on Cleburne!
                      > > > >
                      > > > > Best wishes,
                      > > > >
                      > > > > Mark
                      > > > >
                      > > > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "illiniillinois"
                      > > > > <illiniillinois@y...> wrote:
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > Hi everyone, I'm fairly new here. Been lurking for a
                      while,
                      > > and
                      > > > > have
                      > > > > > read most of the posts on who would have been the best
                      > choice
                      > > > with
                      > > > > > respect to the Confederacy for commander in the West. Best
                      > > > option,
                      > > > > > IMHO, Lee.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > I know this has been suggested before, and Davis himself
                      > even
                      > > > > > considered it, but rejected it partially because of Lee's
                      > > > > > reluctance. Nevertheless, sending Lee west and placing
                      > > > Longstreet
                      > > > > in
                      > > > > > command in the East, after Chattanooga, probably would
                      have
                      > > been
                      > > > > the
                      > > > > > Confederacy's best course of action. There are several
                      major
                      > > > > > positives and negatives in this plan and, if everyone will
                      > > bear
                      > > > > with
                      > > > > > me real quick, I'm gonna try to lay 'em out.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > First the weakness:
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > 1. LONGSTREET'S LACKLUSTER RECORD AS AN INDEPENDANT
                      > COMMANDER:
                      > > > For
                      > > > > > whatever reason "Pete" had a fairly lackluster record as
                      an
                      > > > > > independant commander. While he admittedly faced several
                      > > > handicaps
                      > > > > > at Knoxville and during his tenure in command of a
                      > department
                      > > in
                      > > > > > southeastern Virginia, such as having to deal with a
                      number
                      > of
                      > > > > > generals Lee had banished there so Marse Robert himself
                      > would
                      > > no
                      > > > > > longer have to worry about them, the record remains
                      > disturbing
                      > > > at
                      > > > > > best. Just how would Longstreet have fared if given
                      complete
                      > > > > control
                      > > > > > of the ANV? There is enough evidence out there to cast
                      some
                      > > > > serious
                      > > > > > doubt on his abilities as an independant commander.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > 2. LEE'S OWN RELUCTANCE TO LEAVE THE ANV: Lee was a
                      > Virginian
                      > > by
                      > > > > > birth, by early 1864 he wanted to keep command of the ANV,
                      > > which
                      > > > > he
                      > > > > > had more than earned and proved himself a master at
                      > > commanding.
                      > > > > > Furthermore Lee's reluctance to leave a theater he knew so
                      > > well,
                      > > > > for
                      > > > > > one he knew very little about is a legitimate objection. I
                      > > would
                      > > > > > also add to this Davis' heavy reliance on having Lee
                      nearby,
                      > > not
                      > > > > > only as commander of the ANV, but as a valued friend and
                      > > general
                      > > > > to
                      > > > > > consult with. Nevertheless, given Lee's notion of honor
                      and
                      > > > > devotion
                      > > > > > to duty, there is no doubt in my mind that had Davis
                      > actually
                      > > > > > ordered him out west, he would have went.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > 3. THE REACTION OF THE ANV: While there is no doubt that
                      the
                      > > ANV
                      > > > > > dearly loved Longstreet, and held him in high esteem, the
                      > > regard
                      > > > > > they had for him could never compare to that they had for
                      > Lee.
                      > > > > > Understandably no general would ever hold in their hearts
                      > the
                      > > > > place
                      > > > > > that Lee did. Again, nevertheless, if Lee were sent West
                      > after
                      > > > > > Chattanooga, given the circumstances, and the fact that by
                      > > 1864
                      > > > > the
                      > > > > > ANV was an actual army in discipline as well as name, I
                      > think
                      > > > the
                      > > > > > change just might have worked.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > Now the strenghts:
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > 1. LEE'S AGRESSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AS A COMMANDER, AND
                      > ABILITY
                      > > > TO
                      > > > > > SEE OPPORTUNITY WHERE OTHERS SAW DISASTER: Lee is exactly
                      > the
                      > > > type
                      > > > > > of commander that was needed in the West. One who always
                      > > > remained
                      > > > > > inherently aggressive, and looked for ways to attack the
                      > enemy
                      > > > > > rather than lamenting the shortcomings he faced. If anyone
                      > > could
                      > > > > > have viewed the Confederate situation out West, after
                      > > > Chattanooga,
                      > > > > > and found a way to counterattack the Union advance it
                      would
                      > > have
                      > > > > > been Lee. Moreover he would have brought a sense of the
                      > > > offensive
                      > > > > > that was often missing in the AoT's commanders (Johnston),
                      > > > > although
                      > > > > > not the AoT itself.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > 2. LEE'S PERSONALITY: His unique ability to balance
                      delicate
                      > > and
                      > > > > > often intemperate subordinates. This was a key in the AoT
                      > and
                      > > > one
                      > > > > > that all of its previous commanders, including chiefly
                      Bragg
                      > > and
                      > > > > > Johnston, simply missed. Men like Forrest and even Hood
                      > would
                      > > > not
                      > > > > > have bucked Lee as easily as they did Johnston. A
                      situation
                      > > like
                      > > > > > Cassville, where Hood's attitude toward Johnston, his
                      > > > motivations,
                      > > > > > and his actions were questionable, simply would not have
                      > > > happened
                      > > > > > under Lee. Hood, along with pretty much every other
                      > commander
                      > > in
                      > > > > the
                      > > > > > Confederacy revered Lee. It's safe to say even a man like
                      > > > Forrest
                      > > > > > probably would not have reacted to Lee the same way he did
                      > to
                      > > > > Bragg
                      > > > > > for several reasons. (The first of which is that Lee
                      always
                      > > > highly
                      > > > > > valued the reports of his cavalry and paid close attention
                      > to
                      > > > > them.
                      > > > > > The second that he was a far more competent operational
                      > > > commander
                      > > > > > than Bragg could ever hope to be, and the third that he
                      was
                      > > > simply
                      > > > > > Robert E. Lee.) Finally men like Cleburne would have been
                      > > given
                      > > > > the
                      > > > > > opportunity to either prove themselves as leaders at
                      higher
                      > > > > command
                      > > > > > positions, failed and been moved back to their original
                      > > command,
                      > > > > or
                      > > > > > simply shuffled to another theater as Lee was so adroit at
                      > > > doing.
                      > > > > > (When I look at Cleburne out West I can't help but think
                      of
                      > > John
                      > > > > B.
                      > > > > > Gordon out East. It's hard for me to believe that Clebure
                      > > would
                      > > > > not
                      > > > > > have been, at least temporarily, allowed to try his hand
                      at
                      > a
                      > > > > corps
                      > > > > > command under Lee.)
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > 3. THE INHERENT PERSONALITY FLAWS IN THE OTHER COMMANDERS
                      OF
                      > > THE
                      > > > > > AoT: Say what you like about Johnston, Beauregard and
                      Bragg
                      > > but
                      > > > > they
                      > > > > > were simply not as easy to get along with as Lee.
                      Moreover,
                      > > with
                      > > > > > respect to Davis, it has always seemed rather beside the
                      > point
                      > > > to
                      > > > > me
                      > > > > > whether or not Johnston and Beauregard were right about
                      his
                      > > > > > treatment of them. The point is HE, Davis, not them was
                      the
                      > > > > > President of the Confederacy. The president MUST always
                      have
                      > > > > > complete faith in his subordinates and trust their
                      > judgement.
                      > > If
                      > > > > he
                      > > > > > can't, even because of his own personal shortcomings,
                      these
                      > > men
                      > > > > must
                      > > > > > be relieved or else the command will suffer. With Lee,
                      Davis
                      > > > would
                      > > > > > have been able to have complete confidence, for the first
                      > time
                      > > > > since
                      > > > > > Albert Sidney Johnston, in the commander of the AoT. This
                      > > > > doubtless
                      > > > > > would have been a better military arrangement for all
                      > > involved,
                      > > > > and
                      > > > > > elevated the morale of the army. Not only would they like
                      > > their
                      > > > > > commander (as they did Joe Johnston) or the president
                      > support
                      > > > him
                      > > > > > (as he did Bragg), but rather both the army and the
                      > president
                      > > > > would
                      > > > > > both support the commanding general at the same time. A
                      > rather
                      > > > > novel
                      > > > > > notion out west.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > 4. LONGSTREET'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE GRAND STRATEGIC PLAN
                      > OUT
                      > > > > EAST:
                      > > > > > Longstreet's idea of remaining on the defensive, and
                      simply
                      > > > > beating
                      > > > > > off Federal attacks would have worked much better in
                      > Virginia
                      > > > than
                      > > > > > it would have in Tenesse or Georgia. Think Fredericksburg.
                      > > (Yes
                      > > > I
                      > > > > > know Lee was the commanding general, but Longstreet's
                      > reading
                      > > of
                      > > > > the
                      > > > > > field and handling of his own troops was masterful here. I
                      > > think
                      > > > > he
                      > > > > > could have done it on a larger scale.) Although Longstreet
                      > was
                      > > > > > undoubtedly better under Lee and this strategy may have
                      had
                      > > its
                      > > > > > difficulties against a federal army under Grant, I don't
                      > think
                      > > > it
                      > > > > > would have worn out the ability of the ANV to take the
                      > > offensive
                      > > > > as
                      > > > > > quickly as Lee did.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > In closing, and given the subsequent history, I don't
                      > believe
                      > > > > Davis
                      > > > > > really had any other viable options. Lee out West, and
                      > > > Longstreet
                      > > > > in
                      > > > > > the East, at least until the elections of 1864, and the
                      hope
                      > > > that
                      > > > > > Lee could have kept Sherman out of Atlanta, would have
                      been
                      > a
                      > > > > > pretty good hand to play.
                      > > > > >
                      > > > > > Sorry if this post was too long, but you know what they
                      say.
                      > > > > Figured
                      > > > > > I'd try to make somewhat of a good first impression.
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > Yahoo! Groups Links
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      >
                      > Yahoo! Groups Links







                      Yahoo! Groups Links
                    • Tom Mix
                      And how miles away is Antietam from the VA peninsula? I would say much closer than from Perryville to Nashville. I am not so much interested in exact titles of
                      Message 10 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                        And how miles away is Antietam from the VA peninsula? I would say much
                        closer than from Perryville to Nashville.

                        I am not so much interested in exact titles of the armies as I am the
                        theory of territorial command. But just follow Bragg's combat experience
                        he was at Shiloh, Chattanooga and Perryville. That is a huge territory
                        to monitor and command. And I believe it was the same army if not title.

                        What I meant by unwieldy was the territory not the force. He had a good
                        army it just could not do job asked of it over such a vast and difficult
                        terrain. They tried something like in '62 but they didn't give clear
                        concise orders of control nor man power allocations. They seemed to be
                        whipping all over the South trying to put out fires. While accomplishing
                        nothing. A clear line of division, a clear command structure, an
                        organized set army in each department under clear command, working in
                        unison with the other departments as needed would clear up questions
                        like should we be in Chattanooga or Vicksburg. Those would be two
                        separate departments. Again, working on theory. That is all a what if is
                        anyways.

                        You make good valid points though.

                        -----Original Message-----
                        From: William H Keene [mailto:wh_keene@...]
                        Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 3:51 PM
                        To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                        Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
                        commander in the West?



                        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                        > To a degree. But you have AOT fighting from Perryville to Shiloh from
                        > Chattanooga to Mississippi.

                        I am a little confused about what you mean.
                        The Confederate force at Shiloh was not called the Army of Tennessee.


                        > ... It was simply stretched too thin and the
                        > territorial command responsibilities were clearly lacking of focus.
                        A.S.
                        > Johnston had a huge territory to attempt to control and he found he
                        > could not do attempting to consolidate his efforts at Shiloh. It was
                        too
                        > diverse, too unwieldy.

                        I agree that A.S.J. had too large a geography for too small a force.
                        But it seems to me that
                        this was rectified by late 1862 along the lines of what you suggested.
                        I don't think that
                        ASJ's problem was that his force was unwieldy.


                        > .. So, what you describe did exist but was not
                        > applied as it should have been. Just follow the combat history of
                        Bragg.
                        > From Shiloh to Perryville. Hood from Atlanta to Nashville. No focus.

                        I don't understand the examples. Why is there no focus? Hood was also
                        at Antietam and
                        the Seven Days.

                        -Will








                        Yahoo! Groups Links
                      • Mark Peters
                        Tom, ... I couldn t disagree that the talent was there. Notably Lee, Johnston and Beauregard. But looking at my earlier point about co- operation, between
                        Message 11 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                          Tom,

                          > I think the talent was available. Joe Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg,
                          > Hardee, and Stewart come readily to mind. Cleburne and Cheatham.
                          > The Richmond command didn't just think inside the box they
                          > reinforced

                          I couldn't disagree that the talent was there. Notably Lee,
                          Johnston and Beauregard. But looking at my earlier point about co-
                          operation, between commanders, it wasn't just an issue with Davis.

                          Lee ensured that his AoNV had the pick of supplies and
                          reinforcements, despite the political protestations from those out
                          west. I do wonder if these persons, let alone Bragg, could have put
                          aside their differences and worked as a team. Of course, an extra
                          Department would have caused additional strain on limited
                          resources. As a result, relationships would have been strained even
                          further than was the reality.

                          As always, best wishes

                          Mark
                        • William H Keene
                          ... So you have Hood going from the Peninsula to Antietam to Gettysburg to Chickamaugua to Knoxville to Atlanta to Nashville. While Bragg goes from Pensacola
                          Message 12 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                            > And how miles away is Antietam from the VA peninsula? I would say much
                            > closer than from Perryville to Nashville.

                            So you have Hood going from the Peninsula to Antietam to Gettysburg to Chickamaugua
                            to Knoxville to Atlanta to Nashville. While Bragg goes from Pensacola to Shiloh to
                            Perryville via Chattanooga to Stone's River to Chickamauaga to Chattanooga. So?
                            Sherman went from Bull Run to Shiloh to Vicksburg to Chattanooga to Atlanta to Savannah
                            to the Carolinas. I don't see what this shows about the focus of Departments.


                            > I am not so much interested in exact titles of the armies as I am the
                            > theory of territorial command. But just follow Bragg's combat experience
                            > he was at Shiloh, Chattanooga and Perryville. That is a huge territory
                            > to monitor and command. And I believe it was the same army if not title.

                            The titles changed and so did Bragg's command position. He was in command of the army
                            at Perryville and Chattanooga, he was in command of a Corps at Shiloh.


                            > What I meant by unwieldy was the territory not the force. He had a good
                            > army it just could not do job asked of it over such a vast and difficult
                            > terrain. They tried something like in '62 but they didn't give clear
                            > concise orders of control nor man power allocations. They seemed to be
                            > whipping all over the South trying to put out fires. While accomplishing
                            > nothing. A clear line of division, a clear command structure, an
                            > organized set army in each department under clear command, working in
                            > unison with the other departments as needed would clear up questions
                            > like should we be in Chattanooga or Vicksburg. Those would be two
                            > separate departments.

                            After October 1862, they were. One was Bragg's department, the other was Pemberton's
                            Department. There was a clear division between these two departments, I think the
                            allocations in late 1862 were quite concise. During the middle of 1862 there was much
                            confusion. I think a lot of that was becuas eof the death of ASJ and the loss of much of
                            Tennessee and uncertainty of what to do next. the reorganization in the fall of 1862
                            straightened things out.
                          • Tom Mix
                            You are missing my point all together. If it worked so well, show me the great accomplishments of Pemberton in Tennessee or Alabama or anywhere beyond the
                            Message 13 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                              You are missing my point all together.
                              If it worked so well, show me the great accomplishments of Pemberton in
                              Tennessee or Alabama or anywhere beyond the outlying areas of Vicksburg.


                              I tried illustrate that the ANV had a very small territory to cover.
                              While Bragg was all over the map trying to do his job. He had a vast
                              territory to cover and it possibly could have been better if done a
                              better way.

                              Lets hear your ideas or alternatives to a command structure that failed.

                              -----Original Message-----
                              From: William H Keene [mailto:wh_keene@...]
                              Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 4:27 PM
                              To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                              Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
                              commander in the West?



                              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                              > And how miles away is Antietam from the VA peninsula? I would say much
                              > closer than from Perryville to Nashville.

                              So you have Hood going from the Peninsula to Antietam to Gettysburg to
                              Chickamaugua
                              to Knoxville to Atlanta to Nashville. While Bragg goes from Pensacola
                              to Shiloh to
                              Perryville via Chattanooga to Stone's River to Chickamauaga to
                              Chattanooga. So?
                              Sherman went from Bull Run to Shiloh to Vicksburg to Chattanooga to
                              Atlanta to Savannah
                              to the Carolinas. I don't see what this shows about the focus of
                              Departments.


                              > I am not so much interested in exact titles of the armies as I am the
                              > theory of territorial command. But just follow Bragg's combat
                              experience
                              > he was at Shiloh, Chattanooga and Perryville. That is a huge territory
                              > to monitor and command. And I believe it was the same army if not
                              title.

                              The titles changed and so did Bragg's command position. He was in
                              command of the army
                              at Perryville and Chattanooga, he was in command of a Corps at Shiloh.



                              > What I meant by unwieldy was the territory not the force. He had a
                              good
                              > army it just could not do job asked of it over such a vast and
                              difficult
                              > terrain. They tried something like in '62 but they didn't give clear
                              > concise orders of control nor man power allocations. They seemed to be
                              > whipping all over the South trying to put out fires. While
                              accomplishing
                              > nothing. A clear line of division, a clear command structure, an
                              > organized set army in each department under clear command, working in
                              > unison with the other departments as needed would clear up questions
                              > like should we be in Chattanooga or Vicksburg. Those would be two
                              > separate departments.

                              After October 1862, they were. One was Bragg's department, the other
                              was Pemberton's
                              Department. There was a clear division between these two departments,
                              I think the
                              allocations in late 1862 were quite concise. During the middle of 1862
                              there was much
                              confusion. I think a lot of that was becuas eof the death of ASJ and
                              the loss of much of
                              Tennessee and uncertainty of what to do next. the reorganization in the
                              fall of 1862
                              straightened things out.











                              Yahoo! Groups Links
                            • Tom Mix
                              Mark, All good points. Lets face it, it was a not a great decision for the South to start a civil war. But they did. We both know they were doomed from the get
                              Message 14 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                                Mark,
                                All good points. Lets face it, it was a not a great decision for the
                                South to start a civil war. But they did. We both know they were doomed
                                from the get go. This is just a theory to bounce around with. I doubt if
                                it would work. But perhaps Georgia, for example, would have been more
                                willing to send supplies and personal to a more local department rather
                                than to Richmond or Memphis. Or Alabama to Memphis or Vicksburg instead
                                of Knoxville, Charlotte or Richmond.
                                I doubt it, but who knows?
                                Thanks,
                                Tom

                                -----Original Message-----
                                From: Mark Peters [mailto:mark.peters14@...]
                                Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 4:23 PM
                                To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
                                commander in the West?



                                Tom,

                                > I think the talent was available. Joe Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg,
                                > Hardee, and Stewart come readily to mind. Cleburne and Cheatham.
                                > The Richmond command didn't just think inside the box they
                                > reinforced

                                I couldn't disagree that the talent was there. Notably Lee,
                                Johnston and Beauregard. But looking at my earlier point about co-
                                operation, between commanders, it wasn't just an issue with Davis.

                                Lee ensured that his AoNV had the pick of supplies and
                                reinforcements, despite the political protestations from those out
                                west. I do wonder if these persons, let alone Bragg, could have put
                                aside their differences and worked as a team. Of course, an extra
                                Department would have caused additional strain on limited
                                resources. As a result, relationships would have been strained even
                                further than was the reality.

                                As always, best wishes

                                Mark









                                Yahoo! Groups Links
                              • Tom Mix
                                Will, I just have to say that I am aware that Bragg did not command the army at Shiloh. Again you missed the point. It was the same army that fought in all
                                Message 15 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                                  Will,
                                  I just have to say that I am aware that Bragg did not command the army
                                  at Shiloh. Again you missed the point. It was the same army that fought
                                  in all those places you mentioned and Bragg was either in partial or
                                  full command. I could have used Cheatham or Cleburne or a number or
                                  other names just as easy. The point is that it was one army covering way
                                  too much territory. While the Union had Grant toward the west and
                                  Rosecrans, among others, in the center.

                                  -----Original Message-----
                                  From: William H Keene [mailto:wh_keene@...]
                                  Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 4:27 PM
                                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                  Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
                                  commander in the West?



                                  --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                                  > And how miles away is Antietam from the VA peninsula? I would say much
                                  > closer than from Perryville to Nashville.

                                  So you have Hood going from the Peninsula to Antietam to Gettysburg to
                                  Chickamaugua
                                  to Knoxville to Atlanta to Nashville. While Bragg goes from Pensacola
                                  to Shiloh to
                                  Perryville via Chattanooga to Stone's River to Chickamauaga to
                                  Chattanooga. So?
                                  Sherman went from Bull Run to Shiloh to Vicksburg to Chattanooga to
                                  Atlanta to Savannah
                                  to the Carolinas. I don't see what this shows about the focus of
                                  Departments.


                                  > I am not so much interested in exact titles of the armies as I am the
                                  > theory of territorial command. But just follow Bragg's combat
                                  experience
                                  > he was at Shiloh, Chattanooga and Perryville. That is a huge territory
                                  > to monitor and command. And I believe it was the same army if not
                                  title.

                                  The titles changed and so did Bragg's command position. He was in
                                  command of the army
                                  at Perryville and Chattanooga, he was in command of a Corps at Shiloh.



                                  > What I meant by unwieldy was the territory not the force. He had a
                                  good
                                  > army it just could not do job asked of it over such a vast and
                                  difficult
                                  > terrain. They tried something like in '62 but they didn't give clear
                                  > concise orders of control nor man power allocations. They seemed to be
                                  > whipping all over the South trying to put out fires. While
                                  accomplishing
                                  > nothing. A clear line of division, a clear command structure, an
                                  > organized set army in each department under clear command, working in
                                  > unison with the other departments as needed would clear up questions
                                  > like should we be in Chattanooga or Vicksburg. Those would be two
                                  > separate departments.

                                  After October 1862, they were. One was Bragg's department, the other
                                  was Pemberton's
                                  Department. There was a clear division between these two departments,
                                  I think the
                                  allocations in late 1862 were quite concise. During the middle of 1862
                                  there was much
                                  confusion. I think a lot of that was becuas eof the death of ASJ and
                                  the loss of much of
                                  Tennessee and uncertainty of what to do next. the reorganization in the
                                  fall of 1862
                                  straightened things out.











                                  Yahoo! Groups Links
                                • William H Keene
                                  ... Who said it worked well. My point was just that there was a clear division of Departments as you have theorized about. ... By the time Pemberton took
                                  Message 16 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                                    --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                                    > You are missing my point all together.
                                    > If it worked so well...

                                    Who said it worked well. My point was just that there was a clear division of Departments
                                    as you have theorized about.

                                    > ... , show me the great accomplishments of Pemberton in
                                    > Tennessee or Alabama or anywhere beyond the outlying areas of Vicksburg.

                                    By the time Pemberton took over, western Tennesee was pretty much lost to the
                                    Confederates, so his command was constrained to Mississippi. Northern Alabama was in
                                    Bragg's Department; southern Alabama was in a different Department. Van Dorn's raid of
                                    December 1862 (which was ordered by Pemberton) was a nice accomplishement, but in
                                    gneeral Pemberton's activities were focused around Vicksburg. There was a focus.

                                    > I tried illustrate that the ANV had a very small territory to cover.
                                    > While Bragg was all over the map trying to do his job. He had a vast
                                    > territory to cover and it possibly could have been better if done a
                                    > better way.
                                    >
                                    > Lets hear your ideas or alternatives to a command structure that failed.

                                    I don't think the size of Bragg's Department was a problem. In fact I think Bragg's
                                    command area was well drawn -- northern Georgia, northern Alabama and middle
                                    Tennessee seems like a manageable area. Leadership and resources were a problem.

                                    I do think there was a problem with the extent of Pemberton's Department since he was
                                    tasked with blocking the Mississippi but he had no authority over forces to the west of the
                                    river. I think a department that to some extent straddled the river might have been
                                    better. In fact, I think that at times the problem was too many Departments, not too few.
                                    The Deprtmental divide of the river made cooperation more difficult and during much of
                                    the time, eastern Tennessee was a separate Department.
                                  • William H Keene
                                    ... At the time of Shiloh, the Union had Grant and Buell coming together in one place. Toss in Pope during the move on Corinth and the Union was as
                                    Message 17 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                                      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                                      > Will,
                                      > I just have to say that I am aware that Bragg did not command the army
                                      > at Shiloh. Again you missed the point. It was the same army that fought
                                      > in all those places you mentioned and Bragg was either in partial or
                                      > full command. I could have used Cheatham or Cleburne or a number or
                                      > other names just as easy. The point is that it was one army covering way
                                      > too much territory. While the Union had Grant toward the west and
                                      > Rosecrans, among others, in the center.

                                      At the time of Shiloh, the Union had Grant and Buell coming together in one place. Toss in
                                      Pope during the move on Corinth and the Union was as concetrated in a single army as
                                      the Confederates. The Confederates also had Kirby-Smith with a small force covering
                                      East Tennessee, includign Chattanooga, at the time of Shiloh.

                                      Later when the Union had Grant in the western part of Tennessee and Buell in the center,
                                      the Confederates had Bragg and Smith operating together against Buell while Van Dorn
                                      and Price were operating in Mississippi against Grant. Then it was Rosecrans against
                                      Bragg and Grant against Pemberton.

                                      So my point is that there wasn't just this one Confederate army shuttling back and forth.
                                      Multiple armies were formed, split, united, moved, etc.

                                      -Will

                                      > -----Original Message-----
                                      > From: William H Keene [mailto:wh_keene@y...]
                                      > Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 4:27 PM
                                      > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                      > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
                                      > commander in the West?
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                                      > > And how miles away is Antietam from the VA peninsula? I would say much
                                      > > closer than from Perryville to Nashville.
                                      >
                                      > So you have Hood going from the Peninsula to Antietam to Gettysburg to
                                      > Chickamaugua
                                      > to Knoxville to Atlanta to Nashville. While Bragg goes from Pensacola
                                      > to Shiloh to
                                      > Perryville via Chattanooga to Stone's River to Chickamauaga to
                                      > Chattanooga. So?
                                      > Sherman went from Bull Run to Shiloh to Vicksburg to Chattanooga to
                                      > Atlanta to Savannah
                                      > to the Carolinas. I don't see what this shows about the focus of
                                      > Departments.
                                      >
                                      >
                                      > > I am not so much interested in exact titles of the armies as I am the
                                      > > theory of territorial command. But just follow Bragg's combat
                                      > experience
                                      > > he was at Shiloh, Chattanooga and Perryville. That is a huge territory
                                      > > to monitor and command. And I believe it was the same army if not
                                      > title.
                                      >
                                      > The titles changed and so did Bragg's command position. He was in
                                      > command of the army
                                      > at Perryville and Chattanooga, he was in command of a Corps at Shiloh.
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      > > What I meant by unwieldy was the territory not the force. He had a
                                      > good
                                      > > army it just could not do job asked of it over such a vast and
                                      > difficult
                                      > > terrain. They tried something like in '62 but they didn't give clear
                                      > > concise orders of control nor man power allocations. They seemed to be
                                      > > whipping all over the South trying to put out fires. While
                                      > accomplishing
                                      > > nothing. A clear line of division, a clear command structure, an
                                      > > organized set army in each department under clear command, working in
                                      > > unison with the other departments as needed would clear up questions
                                      > > like should we be in Chattanooga or Vicksburg. Those would be two
                                      > > separate departments.
                                      >
                                      > After October 1862, they were. One was Bragg's department, the other
                                      > was Pemberton's
                                      > Department. There was a clear division between these two departments,
                                      > I think the
                                      > allocations in late 1862 were quite concise. During the middle of 1862
                                      > there was much
                                      > confusion. I think a lot of that was becuas eof the death of ASJ and
                                      > the loss of much of
                                      > Tennessee and uncertainty of what to do next. the reorganization in the
                                      > fall of 1862
                                      > straightened things out.
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      >
                                      > Yahoo! Groups Links
                                    • Tom Mix
                                      Ok. ... From: William H Keene [mailto:wh_keene@yahoo.com] Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 6:15 PM To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com Subject: [civilwarwest] Re:
                                      Message 18 of 23 , Nov 12, 2004
                                        Ok.

                                        -----Original Message-----
                                        From: William H Keene [mailto:wh_keene@...]
                                        Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 6:15 PM
                                        To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                        Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
                                        commander in the West?



                                        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                                        > Will,
                                        > I just have to say that I am aware that Bragg did not command the army
                                        > at Shiloh. Again you missed the point. It was the same army that
                                        fought
                                        > in all those places you mentioned and Bragg was either in partial or
                                        > full command. I could have used Cheatham or Cleburne or a number or
                                        > other names just as easy. The point is that it was one army covering
                                        way
                                        > too much territory. While the Union had Grant toward the west and
                                        > Rosecrans, among others, in the center.

                                        At the time of Shiloh, the Union had Grant and Buell coming together in
                                        one place. Toss in
                                        Pope during the move on Corinth and the Union was as concetrated in a
                                        single army as
                                        the Confederates. The Confederates also had Kirby-Smith with a small
                                        force covering
                                        East Tennessee, includign Chattanooga, at the time of Shiloh.

                                        Later when the Union had Grant in the western part of Tennessee and
                                        Buell in the center,
                                        the Confederates had Bragg and Smith operating together against Buell
                                        while Van Dorn
                                        and Price were operating in Mississippi against Grant. Then it was
                                        Rosecrans against
                                        Bragg and Grant against Pemberton.

                                        So my point is that there wasn't just this one Confederate army
                                        shuttling back and forth.
                                        Multiple armies were formed, split, united, moved, etc.

                                        -Will

                                        > -----Original Message-----
                                        > From: William H Keene [mailto:wh_keene@y...]
                                        > Sent: Friday, November 12, 2004 4:27 PM
                                        > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                        > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Who would have been the best choice for
                                        > commander in the West?
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Tom Mix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                                        > > And how miles away is Antietam from the VA peninsula? I would say
                                        much
                                        > > closer than from Perryville to Nashville.
                                        >
                                        > So you have Hood going from the Peninsula to Antietam to Gettysburg to
                                        > Chickamaugua
                                        > to Knoxville to Atlanta to Nashville. While Bragg goes from Pensacola
                                        > to Shiloh to
                                        > Perryville via Chattanooga to Stone's River to Chickamauaga to
                                        > Chattanooga. So?
                                        > Sherman went from Bull Run to Shiloh to Vicksburg to Chattanooga to
                                        > Atlanta to Savannah
                                        > to the Carolinas. I don't see what this shows about the focus of
                                        > Departments.
                                        >
                                        >
                                        > > I am not so much interested in exact titles of the armies as I am
                                        the
                                        > > theory of territorial command. But just follow Bragg's combat
                                        > experience
                                        > > he was at Shiloh, Chattanooga and Perryville. That is a huge
                                        territory
                                        > > to monitor and command. And I believe it was the same army if not
                                        > title.
                                        >
                                        > The titles changed and so did Bragg's command position. He was in
                                        > command of the army
                                        > at Perryville and Chattanooga, he was in command of a Corps at Shiloh.
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        > > What I meant by unwieldy was the territory not the force. He had a
                                        > good
                                        > > army it just could not do job asked of it over such a vast and
                                        > difficult
                                        > > terrain. They tried something like in '62 but they didn't give clear
                                        > > concise orders of control nor man power allocations. They seemed to
                                        be
                                        > > whipping all over the South trying to put out fires. While
                                        > accomplishing
                                        > > nothing. A clear line of division, a clear command structure, an
                                        > > organized set army in each department under clear command, working
                                        in
                                        > > unison with the other departments as needed would clear up questions
                                        > > like should we be in Chattanooga or Vicksburg. Those would be two
                                        > > separate departments.
                                        >
                                        > After October 1862, they were. One was Bragg's department, the other
                                        > was Pemberton's
                                        > Department. There was a clear division between these two departments,
                                        > I think the
                                        > allocations in late 1862 were quite concise. During the middle of
                                        1862
                                        > there was much
                                        > confusion. I think a lot of that was becuas eof the death of ASJ and
                                        > the loss of much of
                                        > Tennessee and uncertainty of what to do next. the reorganization in
                                        the
                                        > fall of 1862
                                        > straightened things out.
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        >
                                        > Yahoo! Groups Links







                                        Yahoo! Groups Links
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