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RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

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  • William Gower
    So are you saying that in 1864 the AOT ceased to be capable of being an offensive army and for the rest of the war could only be on the defense? _____ From:
    Message 1 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
    • 0 Attachment

      So are you saying that in 1864 the AOT ceased to be capable of being an offensive army and for the rest of the war could only be on the defense?

       


      From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
      Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:25 PM
      To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
      Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

       

      In conjunction with what Lee wrote, the AOT was an experienced army as well and I would not go so far as to compare Joe with Mac. Mac refused to fight even with superior odds while Joe understood his situation more realistically and took the needed actions to slow Sherman while maintaining his army. An offensive, a’la Hood, may have destroyed the AOT sooner than at Franklin.

      Tom

       

      -----Original Message-----
      From: LWhite64@... [mailto:LWhite64@...]
      Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:07 PM
      To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
      Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

       

      In a message dated 10/4/2004 2:03:46 PM Eastern Standard Time, billgower@... writes:

      Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not wanting to take the offensive after he took over command of the Army of Tennessee?  At the time he took over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army which he rectified by the end of March

      At that point and time, yes.  The AOT was demoralized and in need of reequipping, I would not say badly trained, for all the good or bad of Braxton Bragg, one thing can be said he was a great trainer of troops. 

       

      Lee

       



    • tlind1@yahoo.com
      While I have the utmost respect for Joe Johnston and think he was one of the more capable commanders, he always had a bad habit of claiming not too have enough
      Message 2 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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        While I have the utmost respect for Joe Johnston and think he was
        one of the more capable commanders, he always had a bad habit of
        claiming not too have enough men and falling back. In the penisular
        campaign in the East, he constantly was falling back retreating and
        I believe he was at the point with Jefferson Davis of being replaced
        before his wounding and Robert E. Lee taking over.

        Lee on the other hand was able to stand his ground and make due with
        what he had, pulling off risky moves like bringing Jackson from the
        valley in defense of Richmond.

        When I read of Johnston retreating in face of Sherman in the Atlanta
        campaign, it is almost identical to his retreat in the penisular
        campaign outside of Richmond.

        I don't think he was a coward,it just seemed the make up of his
        style of commanding.

        I am one who believes that if left in command in either situation,
        Johnston would never had made an offensive effort no matter what he
        said he intended to do.

        Just my opinion though.

        Kindest Regards,
        Tracey
        http://aotn.homestead.com

        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William Gower"
        <billgower@c...> wrote:
        > So are you saying that in 1864 the AOT ceased to be capable of
        being an
        > offensive army and for the rest of the war could only be on the
        defense?
        >
        >
        >
        > _____
        >
        > From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@i...]
        > Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:25 PM
        > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
        > Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign
        >
        >
        >
        > In conjunction with what Lee wrote, the AOT was an experienced
        army as well
        > and I would not go so far as to compare Joe with Mac. Mac refused
        to fight
        > even with superior odds while Joe understood his situation more
        > realistically and took the needed actions to slow Sherman while
        maintaining
        > his army. An offensive, a'la Hood, may have destroyed the AOT
        sooner than at
        > Franklin.
        >
        > Tom
        >
        >
        >
        > -----Original Message-----
        > From: LWhite64@a... [mailto:LWhite64@a...]
        > Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:07 PM
        > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
        > Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign
        >
        >
        >
        > In a message dated 10/4/2004 2:03:46 PM Eastern Standard Time,
        > billgower@c... writes:
        >
        > Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not wanting to take the
        offensive
        > after he took over command of the Army of Tennessee? At the time
        he took
        > over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army which he
        rectified by the
        > end of March
        >
        > At that point and time, yes. The AOT was demoralized and in need
        of
        > reequipping, I would not say badly trained, for all the good or
        bad of
        > Braxton Bragg, one thing can be said he was a great trainer of
        troops.
        >
        >
        >
        > Lee
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
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        >
        >
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        :/compa
        > nion.yahoo.com> click here
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        M=295196.4901138.6071305.3001176/D=groups/S=
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        > _____
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      • William Gower
        And that is what I am getting at. Is there any place where JEJ took the offensive or was he only a defensive General? _____ From: tlind1@yahoo.com
        Message 3 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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          And that is what I am getting at.  Is there any place where JEJ took the offensive or was he only a defensive General?

           


          From: tlind1@... [mailto:tlind1@...]
          Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 3:13 PM
          To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
          Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

           


          While I have the utmost respect for Joe Johnston and think he was
          one of the more capable commanders, he always had a bad habit of
          claiming not too have enough men and falling back. In the penisular
          campaign in the East, he constantly was falling back retreating and
          I believe he was at the point with Jefferson Davis of being replaced
          before his wounding and Robert E. Lee taking over.

          Lee on the other hand was able to stand his ground and make due with
          what he had, pulling off risky moves like bringing Jackson from the
          valley in defense of Richmond.

          When I read of Johnston retreating in face of Sherman in the Atlanta
          campaign, it is almost identical to his retreat in the penisular
          campaign outside of Richmond.

          I don't think he was a coward,it just seemed the make up of his
          style of commanding.

          I am one who believes that if left in command in either situation,
          Johnston would never had made an offensive effort no matter what he
          said he intended to do.

          Just my opinion though.

          Kindest Regards,
          Tracey
          http://aotn.homestead.com

          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William Gower"
          <billgower@c...> wrote:
          > So are you saying that in 1864 the AOT ceased to be capable of
          being an
          > offensive army and for the rest of the war could only be on the
          defense?
          >

          >
          >   _____ 
          >
          > From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@i...]
          > Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:25 PM
          > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
          > Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign
          >

          >
          > In conjunction with what Lee wrote, the AOT was an experienced
          army as well
          > and I would not go so far as to compare Joe with Mac. Mac refused
          to fight
          > even with superior odds while Joe understood his situation more
          > realistically and took the needed actions to slow Sherman while
          maintaining
          > his army. An offensive, a'la Hood, may have destroyed the AOT
          sooner than at
          > Franklin.
          >
          > Tom
          >

          >
          > -----Original Message-----
          > From: LWhite64@a... [mailto:LWhite64@a...]
          > Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:07 PM
          > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
          > Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign
          >

          >
          > In a message dated 10/4/2004 2:03:46 PM Eastern Standard Time,
          > billgower@c... writes:
          >
          > Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not wanting to take the
          offensive
          > after he took over command of the Army of Tennessee?  At the time
          he took
          > over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army which he
          rectified by the
          > end of March
          >
          > At that point and time, yes.  The AOT was demoralized and in need
          of
          > reequipping, I would not say badly trained, for all the good or
          bad of
          > Braxton Bragg, one thing can be said he was a great trainer of
          troops. 
          >

          >
          > Lee
          >

          >
          >
          >
          >
          >
          >
          > Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
          >
          >
          >
          > ADVERTISEMENT

          >
          <http://us.ard.yahoo.com/SIG=129a0c34k/M=295196.4901138.6071305.30011
          76/D=gr
          >
          oups/S=1705126278:HM/EXP=1097000709/A=2128215/R=0/SIG=10se96mf6/*http
          :/compa
          > nion.yahoo.com> click here
          >
          >

          > <http://us.adserver.yahoo.com/l?
          M=295196.4901138.6071305.3001176/D=groups/S=
          > :HM/A=2128215/rand=787166719>
          >

          >
          >   _____ 
          >
          > Yahoo! Groups Links
          >
          > *      To visit your group on the web, go to:
          > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/civilwarwest/
          >  
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          > civilwarwest-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
          > <mailto:civilwarwest-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com?
          subject=Unsubscribe>
          >  
          > *      Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
          Service
          > <http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/> .





        • Tom Mix
          No, I m just saying that Joe new of his weaknesses and also knew how to best work around them to gain the most practical and positive results. A full blown
          Message 4 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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            No, I’m just saying that Joe new of his weaknesses and also knew how to best work around them to gain the most practical and positive results. A full blown offensive against Sherman was probably out of the question but a limited one may have been in order and I believe he did make a few offensive thrusts. But Joe needed to use his army in more of a defensive mode, much as Lee would in 1864-65. Thus preserving his army, rebuilding moral and attempting to “bleed” Sherman.

            Tom

             

            -----Original Message-----
            From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
            Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:28 PM
            To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
            Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

             

            So are you saying that in 1864 the AOT ceased to be capable of being an offensive army and for the rest of the war could only be on the defense?

             


            From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
            Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:25 PM
            To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
            Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

             

            In conjunction with what Lee wrote, the AOT was an experienced army as well and I would not go so far as to compare Joe with Mac. Mac refused to fight even with superior odds while Joe understood his situation more realistically and took the needed actions to slow Sherman while maintaining his army. An offensive, a’la Hood, may have destroyed the AOT sooner than at Franklin.

            Tom

             

            -----Original Message-----
            From: LWhite64@... [mailto:LWhite64@...]
            Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:07 PM
            To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
            Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

             

            In a message dated 10/4/2004 2:03:46 PM Eastern Standard Time, billgower@... writes:

            Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not wanting to take the offensive after he took over command of the Army of Tennessee?  At the time he took over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army which he rectified by the end of March

            At that point and time, yes.  The AOT was demoralized and in need of reequipping, I would not say badly trained, for all the good or bad of Braxton Bragg, one thing can be said he was a great trainer of troops. 

             

            Lee

             

             



          • William Gower
            I personally feel that the South should have been fighting a defensive war especially in the West from the very beginning. The longer they bled the North and
            Message 5 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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              I personally feel that the South should have been fighting a defensive war especially in the West from the very beginning.  The longer they bled the North and the less troops they lost they could hold out longer. 

               


              From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
              Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 3:38 PM
              To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
              Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

               

              No, I’m just saying that Joe new of his weaknesses and also knew how to best work around them to gain the most practical and positive results. A full blown offensive against Sherman was probably out of the question but a limited one may have been in order and I believe he did make a few offensive thrusts. But Joe needed to use his army in more of a defensive mode, much as Lee would in 1864-65. Thus preserving his army, rebuilding moral and attempting to “bleed” Sherman.

              Tom

               

              -----Original Message-----
              From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
              Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:28 PM
              To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
              Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

               

              So are you saying that in 1864 the AOT ceased to be capable of being an offensive army and for the rest of the war could only be on the defense?

               


              From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
              Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:25 PM
              To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
              Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

               

              In conjunction with what Lee wrote, the AOT was an experienced army as well and I would not go so far as to compare Joe with Mac. Mac refused to fight even with superior odds while Joe understood his situation more realistically and took the needed actions to slow Sherman while maintaining his army. An offensive, a’la Hood, may have destroyed the AOT sooner than at Franklin.

              Tom

               

              -----Original Message-----
              From: LWhite64@... [mailto:LWhite64@...]
              Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:07 PM
              To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
              Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

               

              In a message dated 10/4/2004 2:03:46 PM Eastern Standard Time, billgower@... writes:

              Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not wanting to take the offensive after he took over command of the Army of Tennessee?  At the time he took over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army which he rectified by the end of March

              At that point and time, yes.  The AOT was demoralized and in need of reequipping, I would not say badly trained, for all the good or bad of Braxton Bragg, one thing can be said he was a great trainer of troops. 

               

              Lee

               

               

               



            • Tom Mix
              Yes, I tend to agree with this assessment. Outside of Chattanooga and Bull Run (s), their offensive efforts seemed to hurt more than help. Antietam,
              Message 6 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
              • 0 Attachment

                Yes, I tend to agree with this assessment. Outside of Chattanooga and Bull Run (s), their offensive efforts seemed to hurt more than help. Antietam, Gettysburg, Shiloh and even Chancellorsville where percentage loss was higher for the CSA, were not effective efforts for the CSA.

                I guess Joe understood his limitations and the grand strategic needs.

                 

                -----Original Message-----
                From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
                Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:55 PM
                To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                 

                I personally feel that the South should have been fighting a defensive war especially in the West from the very beginning.  The longer they bled the North and the less troops they lost they could hold out longer. 

                 


                From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
                Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 3:38 PM
                To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                 

                No, I’m just saying that Joe new of his weaknesses and also knew how to best work around them to gain the most practical and positive results. A full blown offensive against Sherman was probably out of the question but a limited one may have been in order and I believe he did make a few offensive thrusts. But Joe needed to use his army in more of a defensive mode, much as Lee would in 1864-65. Thus preserving his army, rebuilding moral and attempting to “bleed” Sherman.

                Tom

                 

                -----Original Message-----
                From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
                Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:28 PM
                To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                 

                So are you saying that in 1864 the AOT ceased to be capable of being an offensive army and for the rest of the war could only be on the defense?

                 


                From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
                Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:25 PM
                To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                 

                In conjunction with what Lee wrote, the AOT was an experienced army as well and I would not go so far as to compare Joe with Mac. Mac refused to fight even with superior odds while Joe understood his situation more realistically and took the needed actions to slow Sherman while maintaining his army. An offensive, a’la Hood, may have destroyed the AOT sooner than at Franklin.

                Tom

                 

                -----Original Message-----
                From: LWhite64@... [mailto:LWhite64@...]
                Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:07 PM
                To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                 

                In a message dated 10/4/2004 2:03:46 PM Eastern Standard Time, billgower@... writes:

                Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not wanting to take the offensive after he took over command of the Army of Tennessee?  At the time he took over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army which he rectified by the end of March

                At that point and time, yes.  The AOT was demoralized and in need of reequipping, I would not say badly trained, for all the good or bad of Braxton Bragg, one thing can be said he was a great trainer of troops. 

                 

                Lee

                 

                 

                 

                 



              • William Gower
                Have you read the book Attack and Die . I don t necessarily agree with everything in the book but that is the author s premise that the South tended to
                Message 7 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                  Have you read the book “Attack and Die”.  I don’t necessarily agree with everything in the book but that is the author’s premise that the South tended to attack more and as a result they lost more men than the north and definitely more than they could replace especially in 1864 where by that time, the well was dry and the Southern armies would have to make due with the troops they had as there were no more replacements.  All this could have been avoided by going on the defensive more than they did. 

                   


                  From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
                  Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 4:06 PM
                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                  Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                   

                  Yes, I tend to agree with this assessment. Outside of Chattanooga and Bull Run (s), their offensive efforts seemed to hurt more than help. Antietam, Gettysburg, Shiloh and even Chancellorsville where percentage loss was higher for the CSA, were not effective efforts for the CSA.

                  I guess Joe understood his limitations and the grand strategic needs.

                   

                  -----Original Message-----
                  From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
                  Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:55 PM
                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                  Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                   

                  I personally feel that the South should have been fighting a defensive war especially in the West from the very beginning.  The longer they bled the North and the less troops they lost they could hold out longer. 

                   


                  From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
                  Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 3:38 PM
                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                  Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                   

                  No, I’m just saying that Joe new of his weaknesses and also knew how to best work around them to gain the most practical and positive results. A full blown offensive against Sherman was probably out of the question but a limited one may have been in order and I believe he did make a few offensive thrusts. But Joe needed to use his army in more of a defensive mode, much as Lee would in 1864-65. Thus preserving his army, rebuilding moral and attempting to “bleed” Sherman.

                  Tom

                   

                  -----Original Message-----
                  From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
                  Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:28 PM
                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                  Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                   

                  So are you saying that in 1864 the AOT ceased to be capable of being an offensive army and for the rest of the war could only be on the defense?

                   


                  From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
                  Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:25 PM
                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                  Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                   

                  In conjunction with what Lee wrote, the AOT was an experienced army as well and I would not go so far as to compare Joe with Mac. Mac refused to fight even with superior odds while Joe understood his situation more realistically and took the needed actions to slow Sherman while maintaining his army. An offensive, a’la Hood, may have destroyed the AOT sooner than at Franklin.

                  Tom

                   

                  -----Original Message-----
                  From: LWhite64@... [mailto:LWhite64@...]
                  Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:07 PM
                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                  Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                   

                  In a message dated 10/4/2004 2:03:46 PM Eastern Standard Time, billgower@... writes:

                  Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not wanting to take the offensive after he took over command of the Army of Tennessee?  At the time he took over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army which he rectified by the end of March

                  At that point and time, yes.  The AOT was demoralized and in need of reequipping, I would not say badly trained, for all the good or bad of Braxton Bragg, one thing can be said he was a great trainer of troops. 

                   

                  Lee

                   

                   

                   

                   

                   



                • Tom Mix
                  Interesting title but no I have not read it. However, the premise makes sense. Chancellorsville was a victory but the CSA pct. loss was not tolerable. Much
                  Message 8 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
                  • 0 Attachment

                    Interesting title but no I have not read it. However, the premise makes sense. Chancellorsville was a victory but the CSA pct. loss was not tolerable. Much like Bunker/Breeds Hill in the Revolution was a “victory” for the British. Dan Morgan, I believe, said that if we suffer many more of these “defeats” the British will lose the war for sure.

                     

                    -----Original Message-----
                    From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
                    Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 3:15 PM
                    To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                    Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                     

                    Have you read the book “Attack and Die”.  I don’t necessarily agree with everything in the book but that is the author’s premise that the South tended to attack more and as a result they lost more men than the north and definitely more than they could replace especially in 1864 where by that time, the well was dry and the Southern armies would have to make due with the troops they had as there were no more replacements.  All this could have been avoided by going on the defensive more than they did. 

                     


                    From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
                    Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 4:06 PM
                    To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                    Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                     

                    Yes, I tend to agree with this assessment. Outside of Chattanooga and Bull Run (s), their offensive efforts seemed to hurt more than help. Antietam, Gettysburg, Shiloh and even Chancellorsville where percentage loss was higher for the CSA, were not effective efforts for the CSA.

                    I guess Joe understood his limitations and the grand strategic needs.

                     

                    -----Original Message-----
                    From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
                    Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:55 PM
                    To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                    Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                     

                    I personally feel that the South should have been fighting a defensive war especially in the West from the very beginning.  The longer they bled the North and the less troops they lost they could hold out longer. 

                     


                    From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
                    Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 3:38 PM
                    To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                    Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                     

                    No, I’m just saying that Joe new of his weaknesses and also knew how to best work around them to gain the most practical and positive results. A full blown offensive against Sherman was probably out of the question but a limited one may have been in order and I believe he did make a few offensive thrusts. But Joe needed to use his army in more of a defensive mode, much as Lee would in 1864-65. Thus preserving his army, rebuilding moral and attempting to “bleed” Sherman.

                    Tom

                     

                    -----Original Message-----
                    From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
                    Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:28 PM
                    To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                    Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                     

                    So are you saying that in 1864 the AOT ceased to be capable of being an offensive army and for the rest of the war could only be on the defense?

                     


                    From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
                    Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 2:25 PM
                    To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                    Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                     

                    In conjunction with what Lee wrote, the AOT was an experienced army as well and I would not go so far as to compare Joe with Mac. Mac refused to fight even with superior odds while Joe understood his situation more realistically and took the needed actions to slow Sherman while maintaining his army. An offensive, a’la Hood, may have destroyed the AOT sooner than at Franklin.

                    Tom

                     

                    -----Original Message-----
                    From: LWhite64@... [mailto:LWhite64@...]
                    Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 1:07 PM
                    To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                    Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                     

                    In a message dated 10/4/2004 2:03:46 PM Eastern Standard Time, billgower@... writes:

                    Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not wanting to take the offensive after he took over command of the Army of Tennessee?  At the time he took over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army which he rectified by the end of March

                    At that point and time, yes.  The AOT was demoralized and in need of reequipping, I would not say badly trained, for all the good or bad of Braxton Bragg, one thing can be said he was a great trainer of troops. 

                     

                    Lee

                     

                     

                     

                     

                     

                     



                  • carlw4514
                    Two instances of taking the offensive I can think of are 7 Pines and Bentonville, and he planned to attack at Peachtree Creek but was relieved of command
                    Message 9 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                      Two instances of taking the offensive I can think of are 7 Pines and
                      Bentonville, and he planned to attack at Peachtree Creek but was
                      relieved of command before the battle. I may be missing an instance or
                      two as well.

                      Carl

                      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William Gower" <billgower@c...>
                      wrote:
                      > And that is what I am getting at. Is there any place where JEJ took the
                      > offensive or was he only a defensive General?
                    • Rick Moody
                      General Sherman estimated, with the use of spy s, that Joe Johnston had forty to sixty thousand men entrenched at Dalton. Sherman had one hundred thousand.
                      Message 10 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                        General Sherman estimated, with the use of spy's, that
                        Joe Johnston had forty to sixty thousand men
                        entrenched at Dalton. Sherman had one hundred
                        thousand. These numbers do not allow Johnston any
                        other choice. He must fight a defensive campaign or
                        risk loosing his supply lines.

                        In a letter to General Grant, Sherman makes his
                        opinions quite clear.
                        "My own opinion is that Johnston will be compelled to
                        hang to his railroad, the only possible avenue of
                        supply to his army, estimated at from forty-five to
                        sixty thousand men."

                        Later in the campaign at New Hope he wrote.
                        "Satisfied that Johnston in person was at New Hope
                        with all his army, and that it was so much nearer my
                        "objective;" the railroad."

                        With an Army half the size of his foe and a single
                        supply source what alternative did he have? There is
                        plenty of evidence to support the idea that Sherman
                        wished that Johnston would, stay in one place and
                        fight it out, allowing him to surround him and cut off
                        his supplies.

                        I believe that Lee would have done the same thing, In
                        fact when Lee was handed the control of all the
                        confederate forces the first thing he did was restore
                        Johnston to command to slow the advance of Sherman
                        through the Carolinas.

                        Rick Moody

                        --- William Gower <billgower@...> wrote:

                        > Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not wanting
                        > to take the offensive
                        > after he took over command of the Army of Tennessee?
                        > At the time he took
                        > over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army
                        > which he rectified by the
                        > end of March.
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        > Did he do the only thing possible for his army to do
                        > by his continually
                        > falling back to Atlanta?
                        >
                        >
                        >
                        > Or was Johnston, the McClellan of the South always
                        > waiting for the perfect
                        > situation and never thinking that he had enough
                        > troops? I realize the
                        > situation was a little bit different in that he was
                        > outnumbered by Sherman
                        > whereas McClellan outnumbered Lee/Johnston.
                        >
                        >

                        =====
                        Rick Moody
                        r_moody@...

                        General Grant upon meeting Robert E. Lee for the first time at Appomattox Court House.
                        "I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse."

                        "Whatever enables us to go to war, secures our peace." --Thomas Jefferson

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                      • William Gower
                        Actually Lee s first preference for Davis to reinstate Beauregard to be the commander of the AOT. Davis refused to reinstate Beauregard because his pride
                        Message 11 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                          Actually Lee’s first preference for Davis to reinstate Beauregard to be the commander of the AOT.  Davis refused to reinstate Beauregard because his pride would not let him admit that he was wrong in the first place for removing him so the command went to Johnston who was the only other Lt. Gen. available to take the command.  Incidentally Lee was Davis’ first choice but he didn’t want to go.

                           

                           


                          From: Rick Moody [mailto:r_moody@...]
                          Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 6:35 PM
                          To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                          Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                           

                          General Sherman estimated, with the use of spy's, that
                          Joe Johnston had forty to sixty thousand men
                          entrenched at Dalton.  Sherman had one hundred
                          thousand.  These numbers do not allow Johnston any
                          other choice.  He must fight a defensive campaign or
                          risk loosing his supply lines.

                          In a letter to General Grant, Sherman makes his
                          opinions quite clear.
                          "My own opinion is that Johnston will be compelled to
                          hang to his railroad, the only possible avenue of
                          supply to his army, estimated at from forty-five to
                          sixty thousand men."

                          Later in the campaign at New Hope he wrote.
                          "Satisfied that Johnston in person was at New Hope
                          with all his army, and that it was so much nearer my
                          "objective;" the railroad."

                          With an Army half the size of his foe and a single
                          supply source what alternative did he have?  There is
                          plenty of evidence to support the idea that Sherman
                          wished that Johnston would, stay in one place and
                          fight it out, allowing him to surround him and cut off
                          his supplies.

                          I believe that Lee would have done the same thing, In
                          fact when Lee was handed the control of all the
                          confederate forces the first thing he did was restore
                          Johnston to command to slow the advance of Sherman
                          through the Carolinas.

                          Rick Moody

                          --- William Gower <billgower@...> wrote:

                          > Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not wanting
                          > to take the offensive
                          > after he took over command of the Army of Tennessee?
                          >  At the time he took
                          > over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army
                          > which he rectified by the
                          > end of March.
                          >

                          >
                          > Did he do the only thing possible for his army to do
                          > by his continually
                          > falling back to Atlanta?
                          >

                          >
                          > Or was Johnston, the McClellan of the South always
                          > waiting for the perfect
                          > situation and never thinking that he had enough
                          > troops?  I realize the
                          > situation was a little bit different in that he was
                          > outnumbered by Sherman
                          > whereas McClellan outnumbered Lee/Johnston.
                          >
                          >

                          =====
                          Rick Moody
                          r_moody@...

                          General Grant upon meeting Robert E. Lee for the first time at Appomattox Court House. 
                          "I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse."

                          "Whatever enables us to go to war, secures our peace." --Thomas Jefferson

                          __________________________________________________
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                        • GnrlJEJohnston@aol.com
                          In a message dated 10/4/2004 6:37:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, r_moody@yahoo.com writes: General Sherman estimated, with the use of spy s, that Joe Johnston
                          Message 12 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                            In a message dated 10/4/2004 6:37:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, r_moody@... writes:
                            General Sherman estimated, with the use of spy's, that
                            Joe Johnston had forty to sixty thousand men
                            entrenched at Dalton.  Sherman had one hundred
                            thousand.  These numbers do not allow Johnston any
                            other choice.  He must fight a defensive campaign or
                            risk loosing his supply lines.
                             
                            I agree whole heartily with this assessment Rick.
                             

                            No, I’m just saying that Joe new of his weaknesses and also knew how to best work around them to gain the most practical and positive results. A full blown offensive against Sherman was probably out of the question but a limited one may have been in order and I believe he did make a few offensive thrusts. But Joe needed to use his army in more of a defensive mode, much as Lee would in 1864-65. Thus preserving his army, rebuilding moral and attempting to “bleed” Sherman.

                            Tom

                            I also agree with Tom.  Take a look at the amount of casualties the Union had between May 5th and when Hood assumed command.  Sherman made advancements, but he did so at a great price.  As I have said many times, JEJ knew that territory could be regained, but when one of his troops was killed or wounded, the possibility of replacement was very difficult.  New Hope Church, Cassville, and Kennesaw did bleed Sherman.  If JEJ lost his supply line as a result of Sherman's flanking movements, the AOT would have been lost.  JEJ knew that he could not defeat Sherman, but he knew that he could slow him down and have Sherman pay a big price for the territory that he did gain.  But once again, my screen name tells of my bias. 

                             

                            Best Regards
                            JEJ

                            "I have realized in our country that one class of
                            men makes war and leaves another to fight it out."
                                   - William T. Sherman




                          • DPowell334@AOL.COM
                            In a message dated 10/4/2004 5:38:00 PM Central Daylight Time, ... The classic one of the best generals of history. In order to outflank Johnston, Sherman had
                            Message 13 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                              In a message dated 10/4/2004 5:38:00 PM Central Daylight Time, r_moody@... writes:

                              With an Army half the size of his foe and a single
                              supply source what alternative did he have?  There is
                              plenty of evidence to support the idea that Sherman
                              wished that Johnston would, stay in one place and
                              fight it out, allowing him to surround him and cut off
                              his supplies.



                              The classic one of the best generals of history. In order to outflank Johnston, Sherman had to divide his army. Each time he does, he takes a grave risk of being defeated in detail or cut off himself. JEJ has the advantage of interior lines.

                              Add to that the increase in Strength when Polk arrives, and suddenly, JEJ has 75,000 men, more like 3/4 of Sherman's army, without the need to divide forces or take nearly as grave risks as Sherman.

                              Finally, effective use of cav might well have forced sherman to divert even more men to guarding his rear, further lessening the odds.

                              There are many historical examples of how to properly conduct such a campaign. JEJ's answer, however, is not one of them.

                              Dave Powell
                            • Rick Moody
                              As Abraham Lincoln said you were right and I was wrong Beauregard was his first choice. Rick Moody ...
                              Message 14 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                                As Abraham Lincoln said "you were right and I was
                                wrong"
                                Beauregard was his first choice.

                                Rick Moody

                                --- William Gower <billgower@...> wrote:

                                > Actually Lee's first preference for Davis to
                                > reinstate Beauregard to be the
                                > commander of the AOT. Davis refused to reinstate
                                > Beauregard because his
                                > pride would not let him admit that he was wrong in
                                > the first place for
                                > removing him so the command went to Johnston who was
                                > the only other Lt. Gen.
                                > available to take the command. Incidentally Lee was
                                > Davis' first choice but
                                > he didn't want to go.
                                >
                                >
                                >
                                >
                                >
                                > _____
                                >
                                > From: Rick Moody [mailto:r_moody@...]
                                > Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 6:35 PM
                                > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                > Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta
                                > Campaign
                                >
                                >
                                >
                                > General Sherman estimated, with the use of spy's,
                                > that
                                > Joe Johnston had forty to sixty thousand men
                                > entrenched at Dalton. Sherman had one hundred
                                > thousand. These numbers do not allow Johnston any
                                > other choice. He must fight a defensive campaign or
                                > risk loosing his supply lines.
                                >
                                > In a letter to General Grant, Sherman makes his
                                > opinions quite clear.
                                > "My own opinion is that Johnston will be compelled
                                > to
                                > hang to his railroad, the only possible avenue of
                                > supply to his army, estimated at from forty-five to
                                > sixty thousand men."
                                >
                                > Later in the campaign at New Hope he wrote.
                                > "Satisfied that Johnston in person was at New Hope
                                > with all his army, and that it was so much nearer my
                                > "objective;" the railroad."
                                >
                                > With an Army half the size of his foe and a single
                                > supply source what alternative did he have? There
                                > is
                                > plenty of evidence to support the idea that Sherman
                                > wished that Johnston would, stay in one place and
                                > fight it out, allowing him to surround him and cut
                                > off
                                > his supplies.
                                >
                                > I believe that Lee would have done the same thing,
                                > In
                                > fact when Lee was handed the control of all the
                                > confederate forces the first thing he did was
                                > restore
                                > Johnston to command to slow the advance of Sherman
                                > through the Carolinas.
                                >
                                > Rick Moody
                                >
                                > --- William Gower <billgower@...> wrote:
                                >
                                > > Was Joseph E. Johnston justified in his not
                                > wanting
                                > > to take the offensive
                                > > after he took over command of the Army of
                                > Tennessee?
                                > > At the time he took
                                > > over he did have a demoralized, badly trained army
                                > > which he rectified by the
                                > > end of March.
                                > >
                                > >
                                > >
                                > > Did he do the only thing possible for his army to
                                > do
                                > > by his continually
                                > > falling back to Atlanta?
                                > >
                                > >
                                > >
                                > > Or was Johnston, the McClellan of the South always
                                > > waiting for the perfect
                                > > situation and never thinking that he had enough
                                > > troops? I realize the
                                > > situation was a little bit different in that he
                                > was
                                > > outnumbered by Sherman
                                > > whereas McClellan outnumbered Lee/Johnston.
                                > >
                                > >
                                >
                                > =====
                                > Rick Moody
                                > r_moody@...
                                >
                                > General Grant upon meeting Robert E. Lee for the
                                > first time at Appomattox
                                > Court House.
                                > "I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the
                                > downfall of a foe who had
                                > fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so
                                > much for a cause, though
                                > that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for
                                > which a people ever fought,
                                > and one for which there was the least excuse."
                                >
                                > "Whatever enables us to go to war, secures our
                                > peace." --Thomas Jefferson
                                >
                                > __________________________________________________
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                                =====
                                Rick Moody
                                r_moody@...

                                General Grant upon meeting Robert E. Lee for the first time at Appomattox Court House.
                                "I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse."

                                "Whatever enables us to go to war, secures our peace." --Thomas Jefferson



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                              • Tom Mix
                                Napoleon said that ground can be retaken but time cannot. JEJ was trying to hold on to time as that is what the Confederacy was made of. It needed time to
                                Message 15 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                                  Napoleon said that ground can be retaken but time cannot. JEJ was trying to hold on to time as that is what the Confederacy was made of. It needed time to survive, to hope for aid. JEJ seemed to comprehend this pretty well.

                                   

                                  -----Original Message-----
                                  From: GnrlJEJohnston@... [mailto:GnrlJEJohnston@...]
                                  Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 7:15 PM
                                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                  Subject: Re: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                                   

                                  In a message dated 10/4/2004 6:37:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, r_moody@... writes:

                                  General Sherman estimated, with the use of spy's, that
                                  Joe Johnston had forty to sixty thousand men
                                  entrenched at Dalton.  Sherman had one hundred
                                  thousand.  These numbers do not allow Johnston any
                                  other choice.  He must fight a defensive campaign or
                                  risk loosing his supply lines.

                                   

                                  I agree whole heartily with this assessment Rick.

                                   

                                  No, I’m just saying that Joe new of his weaknesses and also knew how to best work around them to gain the most practical and positive results. A full blown offensive against Sherman was probably out of the question but a limited one may have been in order and I believe he did make a few offensive thrusts. But Joe needed to use his army in more of a defensive mode, much as Lee would in 1864-65. Thus preserving his army, rebuilding moral and attempting to “bleed” Sherman.

                                  Tom

                                  I also agree with Tom.  Take a look at the amount of casualties the Union had between May 5th and when Hood assumed command.  Sherman made advancements, but he did so at a great price.  As I have said many times, JEJ knew that territory could be regained, but when one of his troops was killed or wounded, the possibility of replacement was very difficult.  New Hope Church, Cassville, and Kennesaw did bleed Sherman.  If JEJ lost his supply line as a result of Sherman's flanking movements, the AOT would have been lost.  JEJ knew that he could not defeat Sherman, but he knew that he could slow him down and have Sherman pay a big price for the territory that he did gain.  But once again, my screen name tells of my bias. 

                                   

                                  Best Regards
                                  JEJ

                                  "I have realized in our country that one class of
                                  men makes war and leaves another to fight it out."
                                         - William T. Sherman





                                • James2044
                                  ... being an ... defense? ... That can not be stated as history proves it to be untrue. However, the AoT was badly out numbered and out gunned, attacking is
                                  Message 16 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                                    --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William Gower"
                                    <billgower@c...> wrote:
                                    > So are you saying that in 1864 the AOT ceased to be capable of
                                    being an
                                    > offensive army and for the rest of the war could only be on the
                                    defense?
                                    >

                                    That can not be stated as history proves it to be untrue. However,
                                    the AoT was badly out numbered and out gunned, attacking is not the
                                    best idea. Just ask J.B. Hood.

                                    James2044
                                  • Rick Moody
                                    There is no bias in the truth. ...Of the siege of Petersburg, I have only time to say that in it for nine months the Confederate commander displayed every art
                                    Message 17 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                                      There is no bias in the truth.

                                      "...Of the siege of Petersburg, I have only time to
                                      say that in it
                                      for nine months the Confederate commander displayed
                                      every art by which genius and courage can make good
                                      the lack of numbers and resources.
                                      But the increasing misfortunes of the Confederate arms
                                      on other theatres of the war gradually cut off the
                                      supply of men and means. The Army of Northern
                                      Virginia ceased to be recruited, it ceased to be
                                      adequately fed. It lived for months on less than
                                      one-third rations. It was demoralised, not by the
                                      enemy in its front, but by the enemy in Georgia and
                                      the Carolinas. - Colonel Archer Anderson

                                      Rick Moody

                                      --- GnrlJEJohnston@... wrote:

                                      > In a message dated 10/4/2004 6:37:56 PM Eastern
                                      > Daylight Time,
                                      > r_moody@... writes:
                                      > General Sherman estimated, with the use of spy's,
                                      > that
                                      > Joe Johnston had forty to sixty thousand men
                                      > entrenched at Dalton. Sherman had one hundred
                                      > thousand. These numbers do not allow Johnston any
                                      > other choice. He must fight a defensive campaign or
                                      > risk loosing his supply lines.
                                      >
                                      > I agree whole heartily with this assessment Rick.
                                      >
                                      > No, I���m just saying that Joe new of his weaknesses
                                      > and also knew how to best
                                      > work around them to gain the most practical and
                                      > positive results. A full blown
                                      > offensive against Sherman was probably out of the
                                      > question but a limited one
                                      > may have been in order and I believe he did make a
                                      > few offensive thrusts. But
                                      > Joe needed to use his army in more of a defensive
                                      > mode, much as Lee would in
                                      > 1864-65. Thus preserving his army, rebuilding moral
                                      > and attempting to ���bleed��?
                                      > Sherman.
                                      > Tom
                                      > I also agree with Tom. Take a look at the amount of
                                      > casualties the Union had
                                      > between May 5th and when Hood assumed command.
                                      > Sherman made advancements,
                                      > but he did so at a great price. As I have said many
                                      > times, JEJ knew that
                                      > territory could be regained, but when one of his
                                      > troops was killed or wounded, the
                                      > possibility of replacement was very difficult. New
                                      > Hope Church, Cassville, and
                                      > Kennesaw did bleed Sherman. If JEJ lost his supply
                                      > line as a result of
                                      > Sherman's flanking movements, the AOT would have
                                      > been lost. JEJ knew that he could
                                      > not defeat Sherman, but he knew that he could slow
                                      > him down and have Sherman
                                      > pay a big price for the territory that he did gain.
                                      > But once again, my screen
                                      > name tells of my bias.
                                      >
                                      > Best Regards
                                      > JEJ
                                      >
                                      > "I have realized in our country that one class of
                                      > men makes war and leaves another to fight it out."
                                      > - William T. Sherman
                                      >

                                      =====
                                      Rick Moody
                                      r_moody@...

                                      General Grant upon meeting Robert E. Lee for the first time at Appomattox Court House.
                                      "I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse."

                                      "Whatever enables us to go to war, secures our peace." --Thomas Jefferson




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                                    • James2044
                                      ... Can Polk be trusted to do what you want him to? His past history suggests the answer will be no. ... Isn t that Joe Wheeler? He was not one of the
                                      Message 18 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
                                      • 0 Attachment
                                        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, DPowell334@A... wrote:
                                        > In a message dated 10/4/2004 5:38:00 PM Central Daylight Time,
                                        > r_moody@y... writes:
                                        > Add to that the increase in Strength when Polk arrives,

                                        Can Polk be trusted to do what you want him to? His past history
                                        suggests the answer will be no.

                                        > Finally, effective use of cav

                                        Isn't that Joe Wheeler? He was not one of the brightest lights in
                                        the sign, was he?

                                        James2044
                                      • Harry Smeltzer
                                        I agree that time is what the Confederacy needed, but not hope for aid. Outside aid was never much of a possibility. Time and the corresponding effect on
                                        Message 19 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
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                                          I agree that time is what the Confederacy needed, but not hope for aid.  Outside aid was never much of a possibility.  Time and the corresponding effect on Northern morale was the Confederacy’s most crucial ally.

                                           

                                          Harry

                                           

                                          -----Original Message-----
                                          From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
                                          Sent:
                                          Monday, October 04, 2004 8:05 PM
                                          To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                          Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                                           

                                          Napoleon said that ground can be retaken but time cannot. JEJ was trying to hold on to time as that is what the Confederacy was made of. It needed time to survive, to hope for aid. JEJ seemed to comprehend this pretty well.

                                           

                                           

                                        • Tom Mix
                                          Correct, Harry, not that you need my agreement. But they hoped for help. It wasn t coming but they sure hoped for it. ... From: Harry Smeltzer
                                          Message 20 of 26 , Oct 4, 2004
                                          • 0 Attachment

                                            Correct, Harry, not that you need my agreement. But they “hoped” for help. It wasn’t coming but they sure hoped for it.

                                             

                                            -----Original Message-----
                                            From: Harry Smeltzer [mailto:hjs21@...]
                                            Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 8:20 PM
                                            To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                            Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                                             

                                            I agree that time is what the Confederacy needed, but not hope for aid.  Outside aid was never much of a possibility.  Time and the corresponding effect on Northern morale was the Confederacy’s most crucial ally.

                                             

                                            Harry

                                             

                                            -----Original Message-----
                                            From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@...]
                                            Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 8:05 PM
                                            To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                            Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                                             

                                            Napoleon said that ground can be retaken but time cannot. JEJ was trying to hold on to time as that is what the Confederacy was made of. It needed time to survive, to hope for aid. JEJ seemed to comprehend this pretty well.

                                             

                                             



                                          • GnrlJEJohnston@aol.com
                                            In a message dated 10/5/2004 5:06:33 AM Eastern Daylight Time, DPowell334@AOL.COM writes: The classic one of the best generals of history. In order to outflank
                                            Message 21 of 26 , Oct 5, 2004
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                                              In a message dated 10/5/2004 5:06:33 AM Eastern Daylight Time, DPowell334@... writes:
                                              The classic one of the best generals of history. In order to outflank Johnston, Sherman had to divide his army. Each time he does, he takes a grave risk of being defeated in detail or cut off himself. JEJ has the advantage of interior lines.

                                              Add to that the increase in Strength when Polk arrives, and suddenly, JEJ has 75,000 men, more like 3/4 of Sherman's army, without the need to divide forces or take nearly as grave risks as Sherman.
                                              Dividing his army would not have nor did it harm Sherman in any way.  The Army of the Cumberland alone equalled Johnston's strength so in no way did he risk anything.  Even when Polk arrived, he still would have been able and did use McPherson and Schofield for the flanking movements, leaving a force in front of Johnston equal to his own..  Each time that a flanking movement was used, it put Johnston's supply line in danger.  Without that supply line, the AoT was doomed.  Johnston was wise enough not to try to use the same tactics that Hood did.  Yes, Johnston did wait until Sherman made an error, but Sherman did not make many errors.  One golden opportunity was at Cassville, but then again, Hood screwed that up.  Sherman's biggest mistake was at Kennesaw, for he too, found out the fruitility of frontal assaults.
                                               
                                              Johnston faced two enemies.  One being Sherman., and the other, his subordinates Hood, Polk, and Wheeler, who were continually conniving with Jeff Davis behind his back.
                                               
                                              At Cassville, Johnston did divide his forces along two diverging roads below Adairsville anticipating that Sherman would divide his forces as well.  He planned to attack and destroy one column before the other column could arrive to assist as a reserve.  The plan was a sound one however it never came off on May 19th after Hood declined to attack.  That night at Polk's Headquarters, it was Hood and Polk that convinced JEJ not to hold his position for they felt it was too weak and that they should fall back across the Etowah River.  It was then that Johnston ordered a strategic withdrawl into the Allatoona Mountains.  By JEJ crossing the Etowah, Sherman himself called the Etowah the "Rubicon of Georgia."
                                               
                                              At New Hope Church, Sherman hastily ordered an attack of that intersection.  Hooker in tangled underbrush, advanced his three divisions abreast in column of brigades - one behind another.  In doing so, their front was narrow and A.P. Stewarts division (go get them Sam) supported by a 16 gun artillery battalion, poured devestating fire into the concentrated Union forces, even after a violent lightning and thunder storm erupted during the fighting with torrents of rain.  Hooker was defeated and Johnston's forces retained possession of the intersection.
                                               
                                              Once again at Pickett's Mill two days later, Howard used the same formation that Hooker had used at New Hope Church and the results were the same.  With Hazen's lead brigade advanced up the ravine, Confederates under Cleburn supported by a pair of howitzer's, tore the Union formation into pieces as it did two other Union brigades committed by Howard at 40 minute intervals.  With a horrendious defeat at Pickett's Mill, it is no wonder that Sherman any mention of that battle in his official report or later on as well. 
                                               
                                              Sherman then moved back to the railroad and an attack by JEJ's Bate's division and Confederate cavalry  was unsuccessful upon McPherson's troops at Dallas,  Despite several attacks to try to keep Sherman away from the railroad, they were to no avail and Sherman was able to occupy Acworth.
                                               
                                              Up to this point of time, JEJ had suffered relatively few casualties yet inflicted quite a bit of damage to Sherman's army.  He began to receive a few reinforcements and since May 5th, had continually blocked all Sherman's thrusts against his supply line, and more importantly, had turned back all of Sherman's assaults.
                                               
                                              One may fault JEJ that the withdrawls, and they were strategic withdrawls, not retreats in the face of the enemy,  resulted in consequent loss of territory.  However, to fault JEJ's generalship in doing so is flagrantly wrong.  The Confederacy had no other leader, except perhaps Lee, that could have delayed Sherman as long as Johnston did, with a minimal loss of troops.  Each time he made a withdrawl, JEJ made sure that defensive positions were begun before the withdrawl began by his pioneers.  JEJ continually held the high ground and could see every move that the Union army made.  As Sherman wrote to his wife Ellen, "These fellows fight like Devils and Indians combined and calls for all my cunning and strength."    It is no wonder that Sherman called Johnston his greatest adversary.  IMHO, during the Atlanta campaign, one can find generalship at its best both by Johnston and Sherman.
                                               
                                               
                                               

                                              Best Regards
                                              JEJ

                                              "I have realized in our country that one class of
                                              men makes war and leaves another to fight it out."
                                                     - William T. Sherman




                                            • Bill Bruner
                                              ... outflank ... takes a grave risk of ... of ... suddenly, JEJ has ... divide ... way. The ... way did he ... able and did use ... force in front ... was
                                              Message 22 of 26 , Dec 3, 2006
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                                                --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@... wrote:
                                                >
                                                > In a message dated 10/5/2004 5:06:33 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
                                                > DPowell334@... writes:
                                                > The classic one of the best generals of history. In order to
                                                outflank
                                                > Johnston, Sherman had to divide his army. Each time he does, he
                                                takes a grave risk of
                                                > being defeated in detail or cut off himself. JEJ has the advantage
                                                of
                                                > interior lines.
                                                >
                                                > Add to that the increase in Strength when Polk arrives, and
                                                suddenly, JEJ has
                                                > 75,000 men, more like 3/4 of Sherman's army, without the need to
                                                divide
                                                > forces or take nearly as grave risks as Sherman.
                                                > Dividing his army would not have nor did it harm Sherman in any
                                                way. The
                                                > Army of the Cumberland alone equalled Johnston's strength so in no
                                                way did he
                                                > risk anything. Even when Polk arrived, he still would have been
                                                able and did use
                                                > McPherson and Schofield for the flanking movements, leaving a
                                                force in front
                                                > of Johnston equal to his own.. Each time that a flanking movement
                                                was used,
                                                > it put Johnston's supply line in danger. Without that supply
                                                line, the AoT was
                                                > doomed. Johnston was wise enough not to try to use the same
                                                tactics that
                                                > Hood did. Yes, Johnston did wait until Sherman made an error, but
                                                Sherman did
                                                > not make many errors. One golden opportunity was at Cassville,
                                                but then again,
                                                > Hood screwed that up. Sherman's biggest mistake was at Kennesaw,
                                                for he too,
                                                > found out the fruitility of frontal assaults.
                                                >
                                                > Johnston faced two enemies. One being Sherman., and the other,
                                                his
                                                > subordinates Hood, Polk, and Wheeler, who were continually
                                                conniving with Jeff Davis
                                                > behind his back.
                                                >
                                                > At Cassville, Johnston did divide his forces along two diverging
                                                roads below
                                                > Adairsville anticipating that Sherman would divide his forces as
                                                well. He
                                                > planned to attack and destroy one column before the other column
                                                could arrive to
                                                > assist as a reserve. The plan was a sound one however it never
                                                came off on
                                                > May 19th after Hood declined to attack. That night at Polk's
                                                Headquarters, it
                                                > was Hood and Polk that convinced JEJ not to hold his position for
                                                they felt it
                                                > was too weak and that they should fall back across the Etowah
                                                River. It was
                                                > then that Johnston ordered a strategic withdrawl into the
                                                Allatoona Mountains.
                                                > By JEJ crossing the Etowah, Sherman himself called the Etowah
                                                the "Rubicon of
                                                > Georgia."
                                                >
                                                > At New Hope Church, Sherman hastily ordered an attack of that
                                                intersection.
                                                > Hooker in tangled underbrush, advanced his three divisions abreast
                                                in column
                                                > of brigades - one behind another. In doing so, their front was
                                                narrow and A.P.
                                                > Stewarts division (go get them Sam) supported by a 16 gun
                                                artillery
                                                > battalion, poured devestating fire into the concentrated Union
                                                forces, even after a
                                                > violent lightning and thunder storm erupted during the fighting
                                                with torrents of
                                                > rain. Hooker was defeated and Johnston's forces retained
                                                possession of the
                                                > intersection.
                                                >
                                                > Once again at Pickett's Mill two days later, Howard used the same
                                                formation
                                                > that Hooker had used at New Hope Church and the results were the
                                                same. With
                                                > Hazen's lead brigade advanced up the ravine, Confederates under
                                                Cleburn
                                                > supported by a pair of howitzer's, tore the Union formation into
                                                pieces as it did two
                                                > other Union brigades committed by Howard at 40 minute intervals.
                                                With a
                                                > horrendious defeat at Pickett's Mill, it is no wonder that Sherman
                                                any mention of
                                                > that battle in his official report or later on as well.
                                                >
                                                > Sherman then moved back to the railroad and an attack by JEJ's
                                                Bate's
                                                > division and Confederate cavalry was unsuccessful upon
                                                McPherson's troops at Dallas,
                                                > Despite several attacks to try to keep Sherman away from the
                                                railroad, they
                                                > were to no avail and Sherman was able to occupy Acworth.
                                                >
                                                > Up to this point of time, JEJ had suffered relatively few
                                                casualties yet
                                                > inflicted quite a bit of damage to Sherman's army. He began to
                                                receive a few
                                                > reinforcements and since May 5th, had continually blocked all
                                                Sherman's thrusts
                                                > against his supply line, and more importantly, had turned back all
                                                of Sherman's
                                                > assaults.
                                                >
                                                > One may fault JEJ that the withdrawls, and they were strategic
                                                withdrawls,
                                                > not retreats in the face of the enemy, resulted in consequent
                                                loss of
                                                > territory. However, to fault JEJ's generalship in doing so is
                                                flagrantly wrong. The
                                                > Confederacy had no other leader, except perhaps Lee, that could
                                                have delayed
                                                > Sherman as long as Johnston did, with a minimal loss of troops.
                                                Each time he
                                                > made a withdrawl, JEJ made sure that defensive positions were
                                                begun before the
                                                > withdrawl began by his pioneers. JEJ continually held the high
                                                ground and
                                                > could see every move that the Union army made. As Sherman wrote
                                                to his wife
                                                > Ellen, "These fellows fight like Devils and Indians combined and
                                                calls for all my
                                                > cunning and strength." It is no wonder that Sherman called
                                                Johnston his
                                                > greatest adversary. IMHO, during the Atlanta campaign, one can
                                                find generalship
                                                > at its best both by Johnston and Sherman.
                                                >
                                                >
                                                >
                                                > Best Regards
                                                > JEJ


                                                Excellent post, General
                                              • Tom Mix
                                                Excellent piece, General, and I agree. Tom ... From: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com [mailto:civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Bill Bruner Sent: Sunday,
                                                Message 23 of 26 , Dec 3, 2006
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                                                  Excellent piece, General, and I agree.

                                                  Tom

                                                  -----Original Message-----
                                                  From: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com [mailto:civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Bill Bruner
                                                  Sent:
                                                  Sunday, December 03, 2006 5:09 PM
                                                  To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                                                  Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: JEJ and the Atlanta Campaign

                                                   

                                                  --- In civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com, GnrlJEJohnston@ ... wrote:

                                                  >
                                                  > In a message dated 10/5/2004 5:06:33 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
                                                  > DPowell334@. .. writes:
                                                  > The classic one of the best generals of history. In order to
                                                  outflank
                                                  > Johnston, Sherman had to divide his army. Each time he does, he
                                                  takes a grave risk of
                                                  > being defeated in detail or cut off himself. JEJ has the advantage
                                                  of
                                                  > interior lines.
                                                  >
                                                  > Add to that the increase in Strength when Polk arrives, and
                                                  suddenly, JEJ has
                                                  > 75,000 men, more like 3/4 of Sherman's army, without the need to
                                                  divide
                                                  > forces or take nearly as grave risks as Sherman.
                                                  > Dividing his army would not have nor did it harm Sherman in any
                                                  way. The
                                                  > Army of the Cumberland alone equalled Johnston's strength so in no
                                                  way did he
                                                  > risk anything. Even when Polk arrived, he still would have been
                                                  able and did use
                                                  > McPherson and Schofield for the flanking movements, leaving a
                                                  force in front
                                                  > of Johnston equal to his own.. Each time that a flanking movement
                                                  was used,
                                                  > it put Johnston's supply line in danger. Without that supply
                                                  line, the AoT was
                                                  > doomed. Johnston was wise enough not to try to use the same
                                                  tactics that
                                                  > Hood did. Yes, Johnston did wait until Sherman made an error, but
                                                  Sherman did
                                                  > not make many errors. One golden opportunity was at Cassville,
                                                  but then again,
                                                  > Hood screwed that up. Sherman's biggest mistake was at Kennesaw,
                                                  for he too,
                                                  > found out the fruitility of frontal assaults.
                                                  >
                                                  > Johnston faced two enemies. One being Sherman., and the other,
                                                  his
                                                  > subordinates Hood, Polk, and Wheeler, who were continually
                                                  conniving with Jeff Davis
                                                  > behind his back.
                                                  >
                                                  > At Cassville, Johnston did divide his forces along two diverging
                                                  roads below
                                                  > Adairsville anticipating that Sherman would divide his forces as
                                                  well. He
                                                  > planned to attack and destroy one column before the other column
                                                  could arrive to
                                                  > assist as a reserve. The plan was a sound one however it never
                                                  came off on
                                                  > May 19th after Hood declined to attack. That night at Polk's
                                                  Headquarters, it
                                                  > was Hood and Polk that convinced JEJ not to hold his position for
                                                  they felt it
                                                  > was too weak and that they should fall back across the Etowah
                                                  River. It was
                                                  > then that Johnston ordered a strategic withdrawl into the
                                                  Allatoona Mountains.
                                                  > By JEJ crossing the Etowah, Sherman himself called the Etowah
                                                  the "Rubicon of
                                                  > Georgia."
                                                  >
                                                  > At New Hope Church, Sherman hastily ordered an attack of that
                                                  intersection.
                                                  > Hooker in tangled underbrush, advanced his three divisions abreast
                                                  in column
                                                  > of brigades - one behind another. In doing so, their front was
                                                  narrow and A.P.
                                                  > Stewarts division (go get them Sam) supported by a 16 gun
                                                  artillery
                                                  > battalion, poured devestating fire into the concentrated Union
                                                  forces, even after a
                                                  > violent lightning and thunder storm erupted during the fighting
                                                  with torrents of
                                                  > rain. Hooker was defeated and Johnston's forces retained
                                                  possession of the
                                                  > intersection.
                                                  >
                                                  > Once again at Pickett's Mill two days later, Howard used the same
                                                  formation
                                                  > that Hooker had used at New Hope Church and the results were the
                                                  same. With
                                                  > Hazen's lead brigade advanced up the ravine, Confederates under
                                                  Cleburn
                                                  > supported by a pair of howitzer's, tore the Union formation into
                                                  pieces as it did two
                                                  > other Union brigades committed by Howard at 40 minute intervals.
                                                  With a
                                                  > horrendious defeat at Pickett's Mill, it is no wonder that Sherman
                                                  any mention of
                                                  > that battle in his official report or later on as well.
                                                  >
                                                  > Sherman then moved back to the railroad and an attack by JEJ's
                                                  Bate's
                                                  > division and Confederate cavalry was unsuccessful upon
                                                  McPherson's troops at Dallas,
                                                  > Despite several attacks to try to keep Sherman away from the
                                                  railroad, they
                                                  > were to no avail and Sherman was able to occupy Acworth.
                                                  >
                                                  > Up to this point of time, JEJ had suffered relatively few
                                                  casualties yet
                                                  > inflicted quite a bit of damage to Sherman's army. He began to
                                                  receive a few
                                                  > reinforcements and since May 5th, had continually blocked all
                                                  Sherman's thrusts
                                                  > against his supply line, and more importantly, had turned back all
                                                  of Sherman's
                                                  > assaults.
                                                  >
                                                  > One may fault JEJ that the withdrawls, and they were strategic
                                                  withdrawls,
                                                  > not retreats in the face of the enemy, resulted in consequent
                                                  loss of
                                                  > territory. However, to fault JEJ's generalship in doing so is
                                                  flagrantly wrong. The
                                                  > Confederacy had no other leader, except perhaps Lee, that could
                                                  have delayed
                                                  > Sherman as long as Johnston did, with a minimal loss of troops.
                                                  Each time he
                                                  > made a withdrawl, JEJ made sure that defensive positions were
                                                  begun before the
                                                  > withdrawl began by his pioneers. JEJ continually held the high
                                                  ground and
                                                  > could see every move that the Union army made. As Sherman wrote
                                                  to his wife
                                                  > Ellen, "These fellows fight like Devils and Indians combined and
                                                  calls for all my
                                                  > cunning and strength." It is no wonder that Sherman called
                                                  Johnston his
                                                  > greatest adversary. IMHO, during the Atlanta campaign, one can
                                                  find generalship
                                                  > at its best both by Johnston and Sherman.
                                                  >
                                                  >
                                                  >
                                                  > Best Regards
                                                  > JEJ

                                                  Excellent post, General

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