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Confeds to the west

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  • Laurence D. Schiller
    ... Hi Bill: Well, the big question is, where do you sent them? Forgetting the Trans-Mississippi, you have several choices, the chief being Vicksburg or
    Message 1 of 12 , Aug 31, 2004
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      At 5:45 PM +0000 8/31/04, civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com wrote:
      >If Lee had sent troops to the West in 1863 instead of squandering them in
      >Gettysburg, would things have been different? I look at his losses at
      >Gettysburg and they didn't accomplish anything. It didn't help the South in
      >terms of having the war fought on Northern soil for a while as it was only
      >about a month and it didn't help strenghten the anti-war parties in the
      >north. So IMHO it didn't accomplish anything for the South. From the POV
      >of the South would the South have been better served to send the troops to
      >the West for a while?

      Hi Bill:

      Well, the big question is, where do you sent them? Forgetting
      the Trans-Mississippi, you have several choices, the chief being
      Vicksburg or Tullahoma. The chief danger point was Vicksburg - OK,
      how many can we send? 20,000? OK, how do we get them to Vicksburg.
      The rail line through Corinth is gone, New Orleans is occupied - That
      leaves the line through Jackson, IF you get there before Sherman
      does. However, what is your strategy. If you join Pemberton, you may
      just end up surrendering more troops to Grant. Do you try and guard
      all the MS crossings? Push troops up towards Memphis to draw out
      Grant? There are possibilities here but great difficulties,
      especially depending on what your timing is. If you send the troops
      before Sherman takes Jackson, well, so much for Chancellorsville. And
      if that is the case, Hooker may be marching on Richmond after Lee's
      defeat at C. and then what do you do?
      The other option is to send them to Bragg. If he used them
      aggressively against Rosey, they might have made a difference, but
      Nashville still would be out of reach. And what makes us think that
      Bragg would have done a better job than in the KY campaign of fall
      62? Again, there are possibilities, but it is still Bragg.
      Ultimately, if you weaken Lee before Chancellorsville, you
      risk disaster in VA, which would way overshadow any benefit in the
      west. If you do it after Chancellorsville, then you throw away the
      fruits of that victory. Then you have the problems of logistics and
      getting these troops out west. Not so hard to Bragg, but much more
      difficult to Pemberton.

      Just thinking out loud.

      Best,

      Laurie Schiller
      --
      Dr. Laurence Dana Schiller 19th Century Personalities
      Maitre d'Armes William Bradshaw, Co. F 2nd WI
      Head Fencing Coach George Hammitt, Co. H 104th Ill
      Department of History
      Northwestern University
      lds307@...
      847-491-4654 (Athletics)
      847-467-5344 (History)
      FAX 847-467-1406
      Official Sports site: http://nusports.ocsn.com/
      Student web site: http://groups.northwestern.edu/fencing/
    • William Gower
      Being new to this theater I need to do a lot more reading but why was it felt ok to send Longstreet to the West after Gettysburg up until the time of the
      Message 2 of 12 , Aug 31, 2004
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        Being new to this theater I need to do a lot more reading but why was it felt ok to send Longstreet to the West after Gettysburg up until the time of the Wilderness campaign?  If Meade knew that this had occurred why didn’t he take advantage of it?  Why did Longstreet wish to leave Lee?  Was it by choice or was he volunteered?

         

         


        From: Laurence D. Schiller [mailto:LDS307@...]
        Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2004 8:14 PM
        To: Civil War West
        Subject: [civilwarwest] Confeds to the west

         

        At 5:45 PM +0000 8/31/04, civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com wrote:
        >If Lee had sent troops to the West in 1863 instead of squandering them in
        >Gettysburg, would things have been different?  I look at his losses at
        >Gettysburg and they didn't accomplish anything.  It didn't help the South in
        >terms of having the war fought on Northern soil for a while as it was only
        >about a month and it didn't help strenghten the anti-war parties in the
        >north.  So IMHO it didn't accomplish anything for the South.  From the POV
        >of the South would the South have been better served to send the troops to
        >the West for a while?

        Hi Bill:

              Well, the big question is, where do you sent them? Forgetting
        the Trans-Mississippi, you have several choices, the chief being
        Vicksburg or Tullahoma. The chief danger point was Vicksburg - OK,
        how many can we send? 20,000? OK, how do we get them to Vicksburg.
        The rail line through Corinth is gone, New Orleans is occupied - That
        leaves the line through Jackson, IF you get there before Sherman
        does. However, what is your strategy. If you join Pemberton, you may
        just end up surrendering more troops to Grant. Do you try and guard
        all the MS crossings? Push troops up towards Memphis to draw out
        Grant? There are possibilities here but great difficulties,
        especially depending on what your timing is. If you send the troops
        before Sherman takes Jackson, well, so much for Chancellorsville. And
        if that is the case, Hooker may be marching on Richmond after Lee's
        defeat at C. and then what do you do?
              The other option is to send them to Bragg. If he used them
        aggressively against Rosey, they might have made a difference, but
        Nashville still would be out of reach. And what makes us think that
        Bragg would have done a better job than in the KY campaign of fall
        62? Again, there are possibilities, but it is still Bragg.
              Ultimately, if you weaken Lee before Chancellorsville, you
        risk disaster in VA, which would way overshadow any benefit in the
        west. If you do it after Chancellorsville, then you throw away the
        fruits of that victory. Then you have the problems of logistics and
        getting these troops out west. Not so hard to Bragg, but much more
        difficult to Pemberton.

              Just thinking out loud.

        Best,

        Laurie Schiller
        --
        Dr. Laurence Dana Schiller            19th Century Personalities
        Maitre d'Armes                        William Bradshaw, Co. F 2nd WI
        Head Fencing Coach                  George Hammitt, Co. H 104th Ill
        Department of History
        Northwestern University
        lds307@...
        847-491-4654 (Athletics)
        847-467-5344 (History)
        FAX 847-467-1406
        Official Sports site: http://nusports.ocsn.com/
        Student web site: http://groups.northwestern.edu/fencing/


      • Martin Williams
        How about down through Southwestern Virginia, into East Tennessee, and thence through Cumberland Gap into Kentucky, timed to take advantage of IX Corps
        Message 3 of 12 , Aug 31, 2004
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          How about down through Southwestern Virginia, into East Tennessee, and thence through Cumberland Gap into Kentucky, timed to take advantage of IX Corps' transfer from that area to Vicksburg? 
          ----- Original Message -----
          Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2004 8:13 PM
          Subject: [civilwarwest] Confeds to the west

          At 5:45 PM +0000 8/31/04, civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com wrote:
          >If Lee had sent troops to the West in 1863 instead of squandering them in
          >Gettysburg, would things have been different?  I look at his losses at
          >Gettysburg and they didn't accomplish anything.  It didn't help the South in
          >terms of having the war fought on Northern soil for a while as it was only
          >about a month and it didn't help strenghten the anti-war parties in the
          >north.  So IMHO it didn't accomplish anything for the South.  From the POV
          >of the South would the South have been better served to send the troops to
          >the West for a while?

          Hi Bill:

                Well, the big question is, where do you sent them? Forgetting
          the Trans-Mississippi, you have several choices, the chief being
          Vicksburg or Tullahoma. The chief danger point was Vicksburg - OK,
          how many can we send? 20,000? OK, how do we get them to Vicksburg.
          The rail line through Corinth is gone, New Orleans is occupied - That
          leaves the line through Jackson, IF you get there before Sherman
          does. However, what is your strategy. If you join Pemberton, you may
          just end up surrendering more troops to Grant. Do you try and guard
          all the MS crossings? Push troops up towards Memphis to draw out
          Grant? There are possibilities here but great difficulties,
          especially depending on what your timing is. If you send the troops
          before Sherman takes Jackson, well, so much for Chancellorsville. And
          if that is the case, Hooker may be marching on Richmond after Lee's
          defeat at C. and then what do you do?
                The other option is to send them to Bragg. If he used them
          aggressively against Rosey, they might have made a difference, but
          Nashville still would be out of reach. And what makes us think that
          Bragg would have done a better job than in the KY campaign of fall
          62? Again, there are possibilities, but it is still Bragg.
                Ultimately, if you weaken Lee before Chancellorsville, you
          risk disaster in VA, which would way overshadow any benefit in the
          west. If you do it after Chancellorsville, then you throw away the
          fruits of that victory. Then you have the problems of logistics and
          getting these troops out west. Not so hard to Bragg, but much more
          difficult to Pemberton.

                Just thinking out loud.

          Best,

          Laurie Schiller
          --
          Dr. Laurence Dana Schiller            19th Century Personalities
          Maitre d'Armes                        William Bradshaw, Co. F 2nd WI
          Head Fencing Coach                  George Hammitt, Co. H 104th Ill
          Department of History
          Northwestern University
          lds307@...
          847-491-4654 (Athletics)
          847-467-5344 (History)
          FAX 847-467-1406
          Official Sports site: http://nusports.ocsn.com/
          Student web site: http://groups.northwestern.edu/fencing/

        • GnrlJEJohnston@aol.com
          In a message dated 8/31/2004 8:15:12 PM Eastern Standard Time, LDS307@northwestern.edu writes: If you join Pemberton, you may just end up surrendering more
          Message 4 of 12 , Aug 31, 2004
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            In a message dated 8/31/2004 8:15:12 PM Eastern Standard Time, LDS307@... writes:
            If you join Pemberton, you may
            just end up surrendering more troops to Grant.
            This is my premise on JEJ's reasoning of not going to the aid of Pemberton, in addition to Grant knowing JEJ's plans due to having JEJ's couriers as his spies.  (Well at least two of them have been documented). 
             
            JEJ
          • Harry Smeltzer
            A good summary of the constraints placed on Meade during this time can be found in A. A. Humphreys Gettysburg to the Rapidan . Harry ... From: William Gower
            Message 5 of 12 , Aug 31, 2004
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              A good summary of the constraints placed on Meade during this time can be found in A. A. Humphreys ‘ “Gettysburg to the Rapidan”.

               

              Harry

               

              -----Original Message-----
              From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
              Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2004 7:28 PM
              To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
              Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Confeds to the west

               

              Being new to this theater I need to do a lot more reading but why was it felt ok to send Longstreet to the West after Gettysburg up until the time of the Wilderness campaign?  If Meade knew that this had occurred why didn’t he take advantage of it?  Why did Longstreet wish to leave Lee?  Was it by choice or was he volunteered?

               

               


              From: Laurence D. Schiller [mailto:LDS307@...]
              Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2004 8:14 PM
              To: Civil War West
              Subject: [civilwarwest] Confeds to the west

               

              At 5:45 PM +0000 8/31/04, civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com wrote:
              >If Lee had sent troops to the West in 1863 instead of squandering them in
              >Gettysburg, would things have been different?  I look at his losses at
              >Gettysburg and they didn't accomplish anything.  It didn't help the South in
              >terms of having the war fought on Northern soil for a while as it was only
              >about a month and it didn't help strenghten the anti-war parties in the
              >north.  So IMHO it didn't accomplish anything for the South.  From the POV
              >of the South would the South have been better served to send the troops to
              >the West for a while?

              Hi Bill:

                    Well, the big question is, where do you sent them? Forgetting
              the Trans-Mississippi, you have several choices, the chief being
              Vicksburg or Tullahoma. The chief danger point was Vicksburg - OK,
              how many can we send? 20,000? OK, how do we get them to Vicksburg.
              The rail line through Corinth is gone, New Orleans is occupied - That
              leaves the line through Jackson, IF you get there before Sherman
              does. However, what is your strategy. If you join Pemberton, you may
              just end up surrendering more troops to Grant. Do you try and guard
              all the MS crossings? Push troops up towards Memphis to draw out
              Grant? There are possibilities here but great difficulties,
              especially depending on what your timing is. If you send the troops
              before Sherman takes Jackson, well, so much for Chancellorsville. And
              if that is the case, Hooker may be marching on Richmond after Lee's
              defeat at C. and then what do you do?
                    The other option is to send them to Bragg. If he used them
              aggressively against Rosey, they might have made a difference, but
              Nashville still would be out of reach. And what makes us think that
              Bragg would have done a better job than in the KY campaign of fall
              62? Again, there are possibilities, but it is still Bragg.
                    Ultimately, if you weaken Lee before Chancellorsville, you
              risk disaster in VA, which would way overshadow any benefit in the
              west. If you do it after Chancellorsville, then you throw away the
              fruits of that victory. Then you have the problems of logistics and
              getting these troops out west. Not so hard to Bragg, but much more
              difficult to Pemberton.

                    Just thinking out loud.

              Best,

              Laurie Schiller
              --
              Dr. Laurence Dana Schiller            19th Century Personalities
              Maitre d'Armes                        William Bradshaw, Co. F 2nd WI
              Head Fencing Coach                  George Hammitt, Co. H 104th Ill
              Department of History
              Northwestern University
              lds307@...
              847-491-4654 (Athletics)
              847-467-5344 (History)
              FAX 847-467-1406
              Official Sports site: http://nusports.ocsn.com/
              Student web site: http://groups.northwestern.edu/fencing/



            • Tom Mix
              Bill, Regarding Longstreet it was a little of both. Longstreet wanted and deserved an independent command and, I think, would have been a fit replacement for
              Message 6 of 12 , Aug 31, 2004
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                Bill,

                Regarding Longstreet it was a little of both. Longstreet wanted and deserved an independent command and, I think, would have been a fit replacement for Bragg after Chattanooga. Bragg needed some reinforcements and it was deemed that Longstreet and his corps fit that need. The move fit Longstreet’s desires too. So, it was a mutual decision. It is my belief, just an opinion that Bragg felt quite threatened by Longstreet’s arrival helping to lead to a bitter relationship between the two and making Longstreet more eager to return east to Lee.

                Meade is in that other theater that we do not talk much about here. But, quickly, Meade should have taken more of an aggressive attitude toward Lee once Longstreet was gone. But remember the AoP had suffered heavy losses at G’burg too and psychiatrists have suggested a group battle fatigue had set in after the big fight. I’ll leave it at that but it wasn’t quite that simple.

                There was nothing wrong in the highly under rated Joe Johnston getting the choice over Longstreet but it would have been interesting to have found out. Of course, we would probably be talking about why Joe wasn’t picked instead of Old Pete.

                Tom m.

                 

                -----Original Message-----
                From: William Gower [mailto:billgower@...]
                Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2004 7:28 PM
                To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Confeds to the west

                 

                Being new to this theater I need to do a lot more reading but why was it felt ok to send Longstreet to the West after Gettysburg up until the time of the Wilderness campaign?  If Meade knew that this had occurred why didn’t he take advantage of it?  Why did Longstreet wish to leave Lee?  Was it by choice or was he volunteered?

                 

                 


                From: Laurence D. Schiller [mailto:LDS307@...]
                Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2004 8:14 PM
                To: Civil War West
                Subject: [civilwarwest] Confeds to the west

                 

                At 5:45 PM +0000 8/31/04, civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com wrote:
                >If Lee had sent troops to the West in 1863 instead of squandering them in
                >Gettysburg, would things have been different?  I look at his losses at
                >Gettysburg and they didn't accomplish anything.  It didn't help the South in
                >terms of having the war fought on Northern soil for a while as it was only
                >about a month and it didn't help strenghten the anti-war parties in the
                >north.  So IMHO it didn't accomplish anything for the South.  From the POV
                >of the South would the South have been better served to send the troops to
                >the West for a while?

                Hi Bill:

                      Well, the big question is, where do you sent them? Forgetting
                the Trans-Mississippi, you have several choices, the chief being
                Vicksburg or Tullahoma. The chief danger point was Vicksburg - OK,
                how many can we send? 20,000? OK, how do we get them to Vicksburg.
                The rail line through Corinth is gone, New Orleans is occupied - That
                leaves the line through Jackson, IF you get there before Sherman
                does. However, what is your strategy. If you join Pemberton, you may
                just end up surrendering more troops to Grant. Do you try and guard
                all the MS crossings? Push troops up towards Memphis to draw out
                Grant? There are possibilities here but great difficulties,
                especially depending on what your timing is. If you send the troops
                before Sherman takes Jackson, well, so much for Chancellorsville. And
                if that is the case, Hooker may be marching on Richmond after Lee's
                defeat at C. and then what do you do?
                      The other option is to send them to Bragg. If he used them
                aggressively against Rosey, they might have made a difference, but
                Nashville still would be out of reach. And what makes us think that
                Bragg would have done a better job than in the KY campaign of fall
                62? Again, there are possibilities, but it is still Bragg.
                      Ultimately, if you weaken Lee before Chancellorsville, you
                risk disaster in VA, which would way overshadow any benefit in the
                west. If you do it after Chancellorsville, then you throw away the
                fruits of that victory. Then you have the problems of logistics and
                getting these troops out west. Not so hard to Bragg, but much more
                difficult to Pemberton.

                      Just thinking out loud.

                Best,

                Laurie Schiller
                --
                Dr. Laurence Dana Schiller            19th Century Personalities
                Maitre d'Armes                        William Bradshaw, Co. F 2nd WI
                Head Fencing Coach                  George Hammitt, Co. H 104th Ill
                Department of History
                Northwestern University
                lds307@...
                847-491-4654 (Athletics)
                847-467-5344 (History)
                FAX 847-467-1406
                Official Sports site: http://nusports.ocsn.com/
                Student web site: http://groups.northwestern.edu/fencing/



              • LWhite64@aol.com
                Well also remember that by the time JEJ came into the picture Longstreet had a lot of mud on his face due to events during the siege of Chattanooga and then
                Message 7 of 12 , Aug 31, 2004
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                  Well also remember that by the time JEJ came into the picture Longstreet had a lot of mud on his face due to events during the siege of Chattanooga and then the debacle up at Knoxville.
                   
                  Lee
                • DPowell334@AOL.COM
                  When you examine the battles fought in the mid-war period in the west, you find that manpower was not the problem. The Confederates equalled their opponents at
                  Message 8 of 12 , Sep 1, 2004
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                    When you examine the battles fought in the mid-war period in the west, you find that manpower was not the problem. The Confederates equalled their opponents at Murfreesboro. During all but the last couple weeks of the Vicksburg Campaign, the Rebels had as many troops as Grant did. through most of May, they had a manpower advantage, and they had parity in numbers until at least late June, when Grant started to move sizable forces from Tennessee and Kentucky. While Bragg was certainly outnumbered at Tullahoma, at Chickamauga the Rebs had a slight numerical advantage.

                    All of this suggests that more men would not have helped. Sending troops West to reinforce failure violates one of the fundamental principles of war, and I personally don't think it would have mattered in the slightest.

                    The South had endemic command and leadership problems in the west, not manpower issues. Reinforcements correct the wrong problem.

                    Dave Powell
                  • William H Keene
                    Dave, I appreciated you point about command and leadership being problems. However, Bragg went from being outnumbered at Tullahoma to having the advantage at
                    Message 9 of 12 , Sep 1, 2004
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                      Dave,

                      I appreciated you point about command and leadership being problems.

                      However, Bragg went from being outnumbered at Tullahoma to having the advantage at
                      Chickamauga becuase troops had been sent west under Longstreet and becuase of the
                      shifting of troops back from Mississippi to Tennessee. Likewise the size of the force
                      facing Grant was achieved by borrowing from Bragg and Beauregard.

                      ~Will

                      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, DPowell334@A... wrote:
                      > When you examine the battles fought in the mid-war period in the west, you
                      > find that manpower was not the problem. The Confederates equalled their
                      > opponents at Murfreesboro. During all but the last couple weeks of the Vicksburg
                      > Campaign, the Rebels had as many troops as Grant did. through most of May, they had
                      > a manpower advantage, and they had parity in numbers until at least late
                      > June, when Grant started to move sizable forces from Tennessee and Kentucky. While
                      > Bragg was certainly outnumbered at Tullahoma, at Chickamauga the Rebs had a
                      > slight numerical advantage.
                      >
                      > All of this suggests that more men would not have helped. Sending troops West
                      > to reinforce failure violates one of the fundamental principles of war, and I
                      > personally don't think it would have mattered in the slightest.
                      >
                      > The South had endemic command and leadership problems in the west, not
                      > manpower issues. Reinforcements correct the wrong problem.
                      >
                      > Dave Powell
                    • DPowell334@AOL.COM
                      In a message dated 9/1/2004 12:29:49 PM Central Standard Time, ... Yes, I agree. The point I wanted to stress, however, was that in neither case did those
                      Message 10 of 12 , Sep 1, 2004
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                        In a message dated 9/1/2004 12:29:49 PM Central Standard Time, wh_keene@... writes:

                        However, Bragg went from being outnumbered at Tullahoma to having the advantage at
                        Chickamauga becuase troops had been sent west under Longstreet and becuase of the
                        shifting of troops back from Mississippi to Tennessee.  Likewise the size of the force
                        facing Grant was achieved by borrowing from Bragg and Beauregard. 




                        Yes, I agree. The point I wanted to stress, however, was that in neither case did those troop transfers produce victory. Nothing was done at Vicksburg, despite numeric parity, because of leadership failings.

                        Chickamauga, despite the numeric advantage and a signal tactical success, was completely wasted - two months later Bragg had completely frittered away that manpower advantage, sending commands off on useless side missions, and was soundly defeated on Nov 25th.

                        Let me be clear. I saw people commenting that Davis should have reinforced the west more strongly and more quickly. From Davis' perspective, however, each time he sent troops they failed to stem the problems. Force levels were not, in fact, the problem. When forces were equal or to the CSA advantage, they still were defeated. What advantages were gained were promptly thrown away.

                        At the same time, Lee was accomplishing significant acheivements against sometimes rediculous odds, and I do not think it unreasonable for Davis to choose to reinforce success instead of failure.

                        Dave Powell
                      • William H Keene
                        Dave, Understood and agreed with. Will
                        Message 11 of 12 , Sep 1, 2004
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                          Dave,

                          Understood and agreed with.

                          Will

                          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, DPowell334@A... wrote:
                          > In a message dated 9/1/2004 12:29:49 PM Central Standard Time,
                          > wh_keene@y... writes:
                          >
                          > > However, Bragg went from being outnumbered at Tullahoma to having the
                          > > advantage at
                          > > Chickamauga becuase troops had been sent west under Longstreet and becuase
                          > > of the
                          > > shifting of troops back from Mississippi to Tennessee. Likewise the size of
                          > > the force
                          > > facing Grant was achieved by borrowing from Bragg and Beauregard.
                          > >
                          > >
                          >
                          >
                          > Yes, I agree. The point I wanted to stress, however, was that in neither case
                          > did those troop transfers produce victory. Nothing was done at Vicksburg,
                          > despite numeric parity, because of leadership failings.
                          >
                          > Chickamauga, despite the numeric advantage and a signal tactical success, was
                          > completely wasted - two months later Bragg had completely frittered away that
                          > manpower advantage, sending commands off on useless side missions, and was
                          > soundly defeated on Nov 25th.
                          >
                          > Let me be clear. I saw people commenting that Davis should have reinforced
                          > the west more strongly and more quickly. From Davis' perspective, however, each
                          > time he sent troops they failed to stem the problems. Force levels were not,
                          > in fact, the problem. When forces were equal or to the CSA advantage, they
                          > still were defeated. What advantages were gained were promptly thrown away.
                          >
                          > At the same time, Lee was accomplishing significant acheivements against
                          > sometimes rediculous odds, and I do not think it unreasonable for Davis to choose
                          > to reinforce success instead of failure.
                          >
                          > Dave Powell
                        • carlw4514
                          Lee, I have heard this before but never understood what it was that L. did or did not do exactly [meaning I am just ignorant, not arguing] at Chattanooga.
                          Message 12 of 12 , Sep 1, 2004
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                            Lee, I have heard this before but never understood what it was that L.
                            did or did not do exactly [meaning I am just ignorant, not arguing] at
                            Chattanooga. Could you elaborate?



                            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, LWhite64@a... wrote:
                            > Well also remember that by the time JEJ came into the picture
                            Longstreet had
                            > a lot of mud on his face due to events during the siege of Chattanooga
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