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Confederate Options in 1864 [was Hood]

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  • William H Keene
    Hood s report on the Atlanta campaign begins with a positive assessment of the condition of the Army of the Tennessee and states that The desires of the
    Message 1 of 6 , Feb 27, 2004
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      Hood's report on the Atlanta campaign begins with a positive
      assessment of the condition of the Army of the Tennessee and states
      that "The desires of the Government expressed to the Confederate
      commander in the West were to assume the offensive…The troops
      felt
      strong in their increased numbers, saw the means and arrangements to
      move forward and recover (not abandon) our own territory, and
      believed that victory might be achieved."

      Was there an opportunity for assuming the offensive?
      If so what form could it take?
    • tasimmo
      ... to ... In my opinion, this is all part of the attack and die syndrome, as embodied by Davis s offensive-defensive attitude and as practised almost
      Message 2 of 6 , Feb 27, 2004
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        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
        <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
        > Hood's report on the Atlanta campaign begins with a positive
        > assessment of the condition of the Army of the Tennessee and states
        > that "The desires of the Government expressed to the Confederate
        > commander in the West were to assume the offensive…The troops
        > felt
        > strong in their increased numbers, saw the means and arrangements
        to
        > move forward and recover (not abandon) our own territory, and
        > believed that victory might be achieved."
        >
        > Was there an opportunity for assuming the offensive?
        > If so what form could it take?

        In my opinion, this is all part of the "attack and die" syndrome, as
        embodied by Davis's "offensive-defensive" attitude and as practised
        almost without exception by Southern commanders (perhaps excepting
        Pat Cleburne, Joe Johnston, and Lee, post-Gettysburg) in the field.
        The South's only hope, ultimately, was to dig rifle pits and let the
        enemy come at them. Too many (with Hood foremost in this group) did
        not understand the concept.

        Tom S.
      • Bill Merritt
        After November 1864, the South had no hope. Once Lincoln was re-elected, all they could do was attack and die. That was Sherman s point with his March to the
        Message 3 of 6 , Feb 27, 2004
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          After November 1864, the South had no hope. Once Lincoln was re-elected, all they could do was attack and die.
           
          That was Sherman's point with his "March to the Sea;" the South wasn't going to surrender, even when there was no chance of winning, becauase the people didn't realize that they were beaten.

          tasimmo <cedarrun@...> wrote:
          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
          <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
          > Hood's report on the Atlanta campaign begins with a positive
          > assessment of the condition of the Army of the Tennessee and states
          > that "The desires of the Government expressed to the Confederate
          > commander in the West were to assume the offensive�The troops
          > felt
          > strong in their increased numbers, saw the means and arrangements
          to
          > move forward and recover (not abandon) our own territory, and
          > believed that victory might be achieved."
          >
          > Was there an opportunity for assuming the offensive?
          > If so what form could it take?

          In my opinion, this is all part of the "attack and die" syndrome, as
          embodied by Davis's "offensive-defensive" attitude and as practised
          almost without exception by Southern commanders (perhaps excepting
          Pat Cleburne, Joe Johnston, and Lee, post-Gettysburg) in the field.
          The South's only hope, ultimately, was to dig rifle pits and let the
          enemy come at them. Too many (with Hood foremost in this group) did
          not understand the concept.

          Tom S.

        • tasimmo
          ... elected, all they could do was attack and die. ... wasn t going to surrender, even when there was no chance of winning, becauase the people didn t realize
          Message 4 of 6 , Feb 27, 2004
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            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, Bill Merritt <bilmerritt@y...>
            wrote:
            > After November 1864, the South had no hope. Once Lincoln was re-
            elected, all they could do was attack and die.
            >
            > That was Sherman's point with his "March to the Sea;" the South
            wasn't going to surrender, even when there was no chance of winning,
            becauase the people didn't realize that they were beaten.
            >
            > tasimmo <cedarrun@e...> wrote:
            > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "William H Keene"
            > <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
            > > Hood's report on the Atlanta campaign begins with a positive
            > > assessment of the condition of the Army of the Tennessee and
            states
            > > that "The desires of the Government expressed to the Confederate
            > > commander in the West were to assume the offensive…The troops
            > > felt
            > > strong in their increased numbers, saw the means and arrangements
            > to
            > > move forward and recover (not abandon) our own territory, and
            > > believed that victory might be achieved."
            > >
            > > Was there an opportunity for assuming the offensive?
            > > If so what form could it take?
            >
            > In my opinion, this is all part of the "attack and die" syndrome,
            as
            > embodied by Davis's "offensive-defensive" attitude and as practised
            > almost without exception by Southern commanders (perhaps excepting
            > Pat Cleburne, Joe Johnston, and Lee, post-Gettysburg) in the field.
            > The South's only hope, ultimately, was to dig rifle pits and let
            the
            > enemy come at them. Too many (with Hood foremost in this group) did
            > not understand the concept.
            >
            > Tom S.
            >
            >
            >
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            Bill,

            I concur with what you say. The "pivot point" was the 1864 election,
            and with Lee still "holding the line" in the East, everything came
            down to the campaign in the West - the campaign for Atlanta. If the
            South could somehow have held that city until AFTER the 1864
            presidential election, who knows what may have happened? The war-
            weary North may well have decided the "game wasn't worth the candle"
            and elected an "anti-war" president, leaving the South "free". This
            is why it is so critical to consider those momentous days immediately
            preceding the removal of Joe Johnston, and what followed. For me,
            the "hinge period" was between 18-20 July, 1864. Johnston had planned
            to catch the Federals and defeat them "in detail" in front of
            Peachtree Creek, everything was in place for this to happen and all
            arrangements had been made - and what transpired next? Johnston was
            replaced by Hood, three precious days were lost, and when Hood
            attacked following the same plan, he found too many Federals in front
            of him. It came off almost like it was "fated" to be...after that,
            the Southern cause was truly a "lost" one....

            I would really like to change subjects (in a manner of speaking) and
            deal with the intriguing comparison between the AOT brigadiers (plus
            a few colonels, like John Murray of Arkansas) and their ANV
            counterparts...lots of room for "controversy" here....

            Regards,

            Tom S.
          • carlw4514
            I m unfamiliar with this colonel. What interests you about him? Carl
            Message 5 of 6 , Mar 1, 2004
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              I'm unfamiliar with this colonel. What interests you about him?
              Carl

              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tasimmo" <cedarrun@e...> wrote:

              > I would really like to change subjects (in a manner of speaking) and
              > deal with the intriguing comparison between the AOT brigadiers (plus
              > a few colonels, like John Murray of Arkansas) and their ANV
              > counterparts...lots of room for "controversy" here....
              >
              > Regards,
              >
              > Tom S.
            • tasimmo
              ... and ... (plus ... Hi Carl, Murray s youth (as I recall, he was a colonel at 19 but it was certainly while in his very early 20s), his charisma and his
              Message 6 of 6 , Mar 1, 2004
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                --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...>
                wrote:
                > I'm unfamiliar with this colonel. What interests you about him?
                > Carl
                >
                > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tasimmo" <cedarrun@e...>
                wrote:
                >
                > > I would really like to change subjects (in a manner of speaking)
                and
                > > deal with the intriguing comparison between the AOT brigadiers
                (plus
                > > a few colonels, like John Murray of Arkansas) and their ANV
                > > counterparts...lots of room for "controversy" here....
                > >
                > > Regards,
                > >
                > > Tom S.

                Hi Carl,

                Murray's youth (as I recall, he was a colonel at 19 but it was
                certainly while in his very early 20s), his charisma and his
                competency all come to mind. He is mentioned in reports in the
                Official Records on a number of occasions, and his existing written
                reports show him to be both educated and succinct. I would very much
                like to locate an image of him, if such exist. He was killed at
                Atlanta in August 1864 (again, as I recall but I'll look it up and
                give everyone a short "capsule bio" of John Murray).

                Regards,

                Tom S.
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