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Re: [civilwarwest] Shiloh

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  • carpmaster
    ... I think Halleck stopped the advance of the Union Army, not Shiloh or the Confederate Army. 1. Buell and the Army of Ohio were sent east, to follow and
    Message 1 of 141 , Nov 23 8:07 PM
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      crogers48@... wrote:

      It is my opinion that the Union's tactical victory at Shiloh turned into a
      strategic defeat in combination with Chickamauga.  Prior to Shiloh the South
      had lost two boarder states without putting up much of a fight.  This opened
      up the cotton growing region for invasion.  After Shiloh, the North advanced
      barely one mile a day before reaching Corinth. Shiloh stopped the Union's
      advance on the cotton growing region which was there after converted as
      quickly as possible into manufacturing.  Shiloh and Chickamauga bought the
      South 3 more years of survival and both sides that much more carnage.

      I think  Halleck stopped the advance of the Union Army, not Shiloh or the Confederate
       1. Buell and the Army of Ohio were sent east, to follow and repair the line of the Memphis
      and Charleston Railroad, which was destroyed again by small guerilla bands as he
      progressed down the line.
      (First possiblity) Instead, he could have gone to Chattanooga and taken it with little fighting.
      It is not likely that Bragg would  have been able to raise a army quickly enough to save
      middle and east Tenn.
        Maybe the battles of Chickamauga and Stones Rivers would not have been fought.
        And the advance to Atlanta would have/could have? been sooner.
       2. Grant was allowed to return to Memphis.
        (2nd possibility)If  the approx 80,000 men had been kept together, and with fresh
      re-inforcements that were already being raised, they could have tried for Vicksburg
      right away. Or to any other point south of Corinth in the interior of Mississippi.

    • Ronald black
      Tom; They say that timing is everything but you don t quite have it right. W.H.L. Wallace was wounded late in the day, about 5:00 pm during the withdrawal of
      Message 141 of 141 , Feb 28, 2007
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        They say that timing is everything but you don't quite have it right.  W.H.L. Wallace was wounded late in the day, about 5:00 pm during the withdrawal of his troops and while they were in the process of being trapped by the confederates.  There is a possibility that he may have been captured if he was not wounded.  Wallace's division took position at 10:00 am in the Duncan field and the western portion of the sunken road.  They held until about 4:00 pm, the retreat began first with the artillery, then the regiments started pulling back.  At this time, they started to come disorganized while in the withdrawal, those still in front line positions continued to hold for a short while longer.  The balance of units fighting at the front after 5:00 pm were commanded by Prentiss and he had troops from all three divisions and they were coming unglued.  The surrenders started shortly, about 5:30.  
        As to Grant and the sunken road, I believe that he had very little to do with the selection of this lane as a position.  At 10:00 am, Wallace and Hurlbut ordered and put their troops in position along this lane and placed Prentiss' survivors between them.  Grant only approved their choice of position.  Actuall the Official Reports are mostly silent about Grant and this position.  
        Original Message -----
        From: Tom Mix
        Sent: Wednesday, February 28, 2007 1:59 PM
        Subject: FW: [civilwarwest] Re: Shiloh



        -----Original Message-----
        From: Tom Mix [mailto:tmix@ insightbb. com]
        Wednesday, February 28, 2007 11:32 AM
        To: 'civilwarwest@ yahoogroups. com'
        Subject: RE: [civilwarwest] Re:


        I agree completely in what your saying about how they ended up in the lane. They sort of “fell” together there. But Grant did recognize something about the position that made a defense plausible then set it as the official design for defense.  I have found it highly creditable as to how Will Wallace’s unit maintained a degree of order after their commander’s mortal wound, the heavy attack confronting them, the confusion surrounding the soldiers, the terrain limits and such and yet they stay together, re-establish order, establish a defensive line and coordinate with Prentiss.  It speaks well for the more junior officers of the Division. And Grant’s personal involvement.


        If any one walks the road one of the first things that becomes very apparent is that it is not “sunken” any where.  The fencing, the tree line, the slight undulation kind of creating a natural rallying point, I would guess, for those who were not high tailing it to the rear. As I think about those men in blue at that specific moment, I am always impressed with their courage, clarity of purpose and ability to keep their heads while those all around them were losing their’s, literally and figuratively.  I would guess that seeing Grant at the front amidst all the smoke, noise, trees, chaos, disorder and death must have had a positive effect on the men too. I think it could be equated to the response to Hancock 1 July  1863, IMO.


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