Re: "Well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge"
- --- In email@example.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
> > I think it was more than this, but regardless even if it was just
> > some skirmishers, so? You are now agreeing with me that
> > advance reached Tunnel Hill, contradicting your earlierassertions.
>Your earlier remakrs were that Sherman's advance "was about a mile
> I am not agreeing with you. Sherman's force (skirmishing at the
> foot of the hill and then departing quickly is not the same thing)
> did not take or occupy Tunnel Hill.
short and, with the steep valley between the two positions, I think
that we can state with some assurance that Sherman did not even
advance "to about the railroad tunnel"." So when you acknowledge
that Sherman did advance to Tunnel Hill, this seemd to me like a
change of tune.
> Many writers give great importance to the 'valley' also when theyimpregnable
> use phrases to the effect that, "Cleburne's position was
> from where Sherman was."Good for them.
> > > I think that he entrenched some 8000 men at the bridgehead, andSince we are discussing the plan for the battle of Chattanooga and
> > then
> > > he moved forward some 500 yards further from the shore, IIRC,
> > > entrenched again. That was the jumping-off point.
> > You seem incredibly desparate to win your point. Once again I
> > point out that the day began much earlier, and much further back,
> > Sherman's men.
> Why don't you start back in Vicksburg, then?
Sherman's actions with regard to the orders he was given for the
battle, I think it is appropriate to start where those orders start,
which is the crossing of the Tennessee.
> ...I thought it was understood from the preceding paragraphs. Ont he
> Why do you keep omitting the fact that Sherman was to carry the
24th, Sherman carried the end of the ridge and secured it.
> What in mercy's sake do you think that Sherman was supposed to be
> doing while Granger was doing this and when the Confederate guns
> positions were along the crest?Sherman was suppossed to do what he did -- attack southwards from the
position he secured. What I don't get was how Granger was suppossed
to do what you and he claim.
> > I am unaware of Grant ever indicating this specifically.Though, further movements depended on what the enemy did, Sherman
> > Please show me where Grant states this.
> If you don't think that this was so, please tell me what you think
> Sherman's duties were and how he was to carry the ridge from Tunnel
would likely be expected to attack southward as was done. Thomas
could then attack eastward taking the ridge in two directions.
> To confirm that you and Shanks are wrong about whether GrangerThis does not prove either of us wrong. Citico has two branches --
> followed Grant's plan in his frontal attack of the 25th, please see
> what Dana wrote: "At the same time that this wing [Sherman's]
> advances, Granger, with about 18,000 men, will first move up on the
> left of the Chattanooga lines, throwing two bridges across Citico
> Creek, and engaging the rebel right with all possible vigor."
> Crossing Citico leads toward Tunnel Hill. Taking Orchard Knob was
> not necessary to do this, although I would still maintain that this
> was a positive accomplishment.
one curves around between Orchard Knob and the ridge. If Granger
was suppossed to move so as to engage "the rebel right" than the plan
would not direct him to Tunnel Hill, since at the time Dana wrote
this the rebel right was further down the ridge.
> It is not an "opinion" that "in the battle itself, Sherman onlyused
> a third of his force." Please check the records. I think casualtyCheck the records yourself. Sherman used more than a third of his
> figures by brigade tell an extraordinary picture which may be
> covered up by the ORs of Sherman and his subordinates.
force in the attack. Since, if we count Howard's force too, Sherman
had 16 brigades, for it to be a third less than 6 would have to be
used. Yet the records show more than 6 brigades used [G Smith,
Corse, Loomis, Bushbeck, Mathies, Raum, + part of Lightburn and IIRC
part of Alexander]
> As to starting late, read Cleburne: "Up to 10.30 a.m. the enemyin
> contended himself with severe skirmishing . . ." Grant wrote: "I
> have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light
> the morning." That's late; well, really, that's very late. Iguess
> that Sherman was "slow."Yes, read Cleburne: "Up to 10.30 a.m. the enemy contended himself
with severe skirmishing" Thus Cleburne has indicated that prior to
10:30 Sherman has advanced.
> As to ending early, reports indicate that Sherman was pulling backI recall reports indicating otherwise, but will have to get back to
> around 2:30-3:30 PM, just as Thomas' atack was supposed to get
> started. Or do you think that it is wise to end an attack before
> one for its relief is even started or--as you believe Grant's tale,
> to end an attack in time to allow the enemy to reinforce his center
> just as Thomas was about to attack.
you on that.
> What is your evidence that Grant knew? We only have his orders toI have pointed out that Howard reported it was Grant who directed
> Thomas to ascertain the enemy's position.
that the Knob be held.
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
> ...Sure it is. Advances were typically led by skirmishers. This was
> "Skirmishing" is not the same as "advancing."
> ...Since Sherman secured the heights down to but not including Tunnel
> Think of it this way: "about" a certain point might mean within 1/4
> mile or so, depending on the circumstances. If a river or other
> major obstacle is between you and the destination, it effectively
> means that you are not nearly as "about."
Hill, seems like "about" to me. The valley turned out to not be such
a major obstacle.
> Fine. From wherever Sherman started, he came up short.It has been apparent that this is your opinion. And it appears that
no matter what Sherman did he would come up short for you.
> Sherman was supposed "to secure the heights from the northernAnd I contend that he did since he secured an important part of the
> extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can
> concentrate against him." He didn't.
heights before the enemy concentrated against him.
> No, after Sherman "secure[d] the heights from the northernextremity
> to about the railroad tunnel," the ridge was to be "carried," andFrom my understanding of the orders "secure the heights from the
> only afterwards was he ordered that "[f]arther movements will then
> depend on those of the enemy. Sherman did not do what he was
> supposed to do.
northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel" and "the ridge
carried" are the same concept.
> Granger was to do what Geary did on the southern end.Since Sherman already had men to do this, I once again point out that
this seems like an odd plan.
> ...So you claim, though Grant claimed otherwise.
> No. Sherman was *supposed* to attack southward alomg the ridge.
> Granger was to be parallel with him but lower on the near slope.
> Thomas was not supposed to attack eastward.
> Thomas' juncture was to be made with Sherman, "making your advanceSure, in a general sense. But the plan did not direct him TO Tunnel
> well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge." The plan
> directed him towards Tunnel Hill.
> Roughly a third. It would take a finer analysis--and more definedSo now it takes a finer analysis. Hadn't you done that before in
> terms--to determine this. You also discounted Baird.
order to arrive at your "facts" or are you now admitting it is "an
And I don't think Baird should be counted. I don;t veen think the
rest of Howard's force should be counter, but I was trying to be
accomadating. So maybe we should count Dodge and Osterhaus too. How
about Hulrbut and McPherson too cause I know you want to get this
fraction as low as possible.
> The skirmishers started earlier, but Sherman was ordered insteadHow does one determine what is "the point most advantageous"?
> to, "attack the enemy at the point most advantageous from your
> position at early dawn to-morrow morning." That's "attack," and
> not "skirmish."
How does one determine the position of the enemy? During the civil
war this was done by sending forward a skirmish line in front of your
assualt force. Even when the enemy position was known, skimish lines
often preceded the assualt force.
> Before the attack, there is no indication whatsoever that GrantNor that Thomas considered it either. But I would expect that both
> expected Orchard Knob would be carried or held.
would have thought about it since it was a key spot to moving in that