--- In firstname.lastname@example.org
, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
> "Skirmishing" is not the same as "advancing."
Sure it is. Advances were typically led by skirmishers. This was
> Think of it this way: "about" a certain point might mean within 1/4
> mile or so, depending on the circumstances. If a river or other
> major obstacle is between you and the destination, it effectively
> means that you are not nearly as "about."
Since Sherman secured the heights down to but not including Tunnel
Hill, seems like "about" to me. The valley turned out to not be such
a major obstacle.
> Fine. From wherever Sherman started, he came up short.
It has been apparent that this is your opinion. And it appears that
no matter what Sherman did he would come up short for you.
> Sherman was supposed "to secure the heights from the northern
> extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can
> concentrate against him." He didn't.
And I contend that he did since he secured an important part of the
heights before the enemy concentrated against him.
> No, after Sherman "secure[d] the heights from the northern
> to about the railroad tunnel," the ridge was to be "carried," and
> only afterwards was he ordered that "[f]arther movements will then
> depend on those of the enemy. Sherman did not do what he was
> supposed to do.
From my understanding of the orders "secure the heights from the
northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel" and "the ridge
carried" are the same concept.
> Granger was to do what Geary did on the southern end.
Since Sherman already had men to do this, I once again point out that
this seems like an odd plan.
> No. Sherman was *supposed* to attack southward alomg the ridge.
> Granger was to be parallel with him but lower on the near slope.
> Thomas was not supposed to attack eastward.
So you claim, though Grant claimed otherwise.
> Thomas' juncture was to be made with Sherman, "making your advance
> well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge." The plan
> directed him towards Tunnel Hill.
Sure, in a general sense. But the plan did not direct him TO Tunnel
> Roughly a third. It would take a finer analysis--and more defined
> terms--to determine this. You also discounted Baird.
So now it takes a finer analysis. Hadn't you done that before in
order to arrive at your "facts" or are you now admitting it is "an
And I don't think Baird should be counted. I don;t veen think the
rest of Howard's force should be counter, but I was trying to be
accomadating. So maybe we should count Dodge and Osterhaus too. How
about Hulrbut and McPherson too cause I know you want to get this
fraction as low as possible.
> The skirmishers started earlier, but Sherman was ordered instead
> to, "attack the enemy at the point most advantageous from your
> position at early dawn to-morrow morning." That's "attack," and
> not "skirmish."
How does one determine what is "the point most advantageous"?
How does one determine the position of the enemy? During the civil
war this was done by sending forward a skirmish line in front of your
assualt force. Even when the enemy position was known, skimish lines
often preceded the assualt force.
> Before the attack, there is no indication whatsoever that Grant
> expected Orchard Knob would be carried or held.
Nor that Thomas considered it either. But I would expect that both
would have thought about it since it was a key spot to moving in that