Re: "Well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge"
- --- In email@example.com, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
> He was about a mile short and, with the steep valley between the
> positions, I think that we can state with some assurance thatSherman's force certainly advanced to Tunnel Hill on the 24th--
> Sherman did not even advance "to about the railroad tunnel".
Cleburne describes Sherman's men clashing with his there, Sherman
identifies Lightburn's brigade as the one that did this. Lightburn's
report gives more details of this; unfortunately I don't belive there
are any published reports from any of Lightburn's regiments or Smith
(Cleburne's brigade commander) or any of Smith's regiments.
Sherman's orders called for him to secure a portion of the ridge.
Since the enemy was already on Tunnel Hill, he secured what he
could. This position put him somewhat less than a mile short of the
Tunnel -- I estimate it at 1/2 mile as measured on a map and as
reported by some of the men involved. So with some assurance this
puts Sherman's force close to the railroad tunnel.
> He had only gone two-thirds of the way from his jumping off pointto
> the objective. That's not good.2/3 sounds good to me, though in my opinion the fraction was larger,
say around 3/4 using the south bank as his jumping off point (though
the camp he departed from was some distance away on the north bank)
and the tunnel itself as the objective (though his orders only stated
that he was to secure the ridge to "about" the tunnel).
> Mr. Keene, I was talking about Grant ordering the carrying of theActually Sherman accomplished the objective of securing important
> ridge and Sherman *not* carrying the ridge. You, instead, state
> that "Sherman did secure the end of the ridge." That's was pretty
> meaningless. Alerting the enemy to his presence was *about* all
> Sherman accomplished.
geographic features of the battlefield, which seems to me to have
been Grant's intent. Cleburne said that the heights which Sherman
secured "in a military point of view dominated over every point
within cannon range". Sounds like a good thing to me.
> ... However, the movements that actually took place also fitI seems to me that Grant did plan to carry the ridge in the area
> > Grant's original plan.
> You would only be correct if Grant was actually planning to carry
> the ridge on the south (where Hooker actually did so) or the center
> (where Granger actually did so). Grant was not planning to do
> either, so both you and Shanks are incorrect.
where Thomas actually assualted the ridge as this was where Bragg's
position on the ridge was at the time the plan was first developed.
> Look, when even a stalwart hero-worshipper asserts that Grant wasI disagree. If you consider someone faulty in their research and a
> being self-serving, then you can probably put some stock in it. He
> should just not be believed when he's engaged in hero-worshipping.
bad historian (or some such thing as you have labelled Simpson in the
past) then it seems ridiculous to say that he is trustworthy on some
parts just becuase you find the conclusion pleasing.
> Think of what Hooker did: one division on the crest and one on eachSince as events actually happened Sherman's forces occupied the crest
> side. Granger would have stayed on the near side of the ridge.
and each slope of the ridge AND he was originally suppossed to have
had one more division AND Granger was allegedly to bring along two
extra large divisions, then the idea that there would be space for
Granger to fit on the western slope of the ridge seems to me to be
> Sherman would have had five divisions and could have used them ononly
> the crest, along the back side, in reserve, to cross the creek to
> attack the supply line, and in pursuit. Unfortunately, Sherman
> used about a third of the force of six divisions he was given--andHe was only given four divisions with which to carry out the actions
> that's not even counting Baird.
of the 24th and started the 25th with still only four divisions.
Even though Howard's force was designated as two divisions in, its
actual size was comparable to a single division, in fact Howard's
Corps was smaller than either Sheridan's or Wood's divisions
individually. Howard spent the first half of the day moving to
Sherman and then was put into position on Sherman's left to fill a
gap, a useful purpose. When the opportunity presented itself,
Sherman went on to make effective use of Howard, and of Davis who had
been protecting the brigdes and line of communication (something
military commanders usually thing is a useful thing to do). I don't
think there is anything unfortunate about his dispositions. On the
contrary they seem to have been quite good.
> I would agree with you that taking Orchard Knob should have beenreceive
> done before moving Granger out, and that's why Thomas should
> kudos for taking it on the 23rd. I don't know why Grant's plansLazy? Ever heard of a concept called delegation. I did not think you
> didn't mention it; maybe he overlooked it or was too lazy to spell
> it out.
had such a low opinion of Thomas that you feel Grant needed to spell
out to him in detail each move he should make. Though interesting
that Thomas's first orders did not direct that the Knob be held, it
seemed to be an afterthought. According to Howard's Report it was
Grant who made the determination to hold Orchard Knob; Thomas's
report doesn't say it whether it was or wasn't Grant idea.
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
> ...Sure it is. Advances were typically led by skirmishers. This was
> "Skirmishing" is not the same as "advancing."
> ...Since Sherman secured the heights down to but not including Tunnel
> Think of it this way: "about" a certain point might mean within 1/4
> mile or so, depending on the circumstances. If a river or other
> major obstacle is between you and the destination, it effectively
> means that you are not nearly as "about."
Hill, seems like "about" to me. The valley turned out to not be such
a major obstacle.
> Fine. From wherever Sherman started, he came up short.It has been apparent that this is your opinion. And it appears that
no matter what Sherman did he would come up short for you.
> Sherman was supposed "to secure the heights from the northernAnd I contend that he did since he secured an important part of the
> extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can
> concentrate against him." He didn't.
heights before the enemy concentrated against him.
> No, after Sherman "secure[d] the heights from the northernextremity
> to about the railroad tunnel," the ridge was to be "carried," andFrom my understanding of the orders "secure the heights from the
> only afterwards was he ordered that "[f]arther movements will then
> depend on those of the enemy. Sherman did not do what he was
> supposed to do.
northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel" and "the ridge
carried" are the same concept.
> Granger was to do what Geary did on the southern end.Since Sherman already had men to do this, I once again point out that
this seems like an odd plan.
> ...So you claim, though Grant claimed otherwise.
> No. Sherman was *supposed* to attack southward alomg the ridge.
> Granger was to be parallel with him but lower on the near slope.
> Thomas was not supposed to attack eastward.
> Thomas' juncture was to be made with Sherman, "making your advanceSure, in a general sense. But the plan did not direct him TO Tunnel
> well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge." The plan
> directed him towards Tunnel Hill.
> Roughly a third. It would take a finer analysis--and more definedSo now it takes a finer analysis. Hadn't you done that before in
> terms--to determine this. You also discounted Baird.
order to arrive at your "facts" or are you now admitting it is "an
And I don't think Baird should be counted. I don;t veen think the
rest of Howard's force should be counter, but I was trying to be
accomadating. So maybe we should count Dodge and Osterhaus too. How
about Hulrbut and McPherson too cause I know you want to get this
fraction as low as possible.
> The skirmishers started earlier, but Sherman was ordered insteadHow does one determine what is "the point most advantageous"?
> to, "attack the enemy at the point most advantageous from your
> position at early dawn to-morrow morning." That's "attack," and
> not "skirmish."
How does one determine the position of the enemy? During the civil
war this was done by sending forward a skirmish line in front of your
assualt force. Even when the enemy position was known, skimish lines
often preceded the assualt force.
> Before the attack, there is no indication whatsoever that GrantNor that Thomas considered it either. But I would expect that both
> expected Orchard Knob would be carried or held.
would have thought about it since it was a key spot to moving in that