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Re: The Most Important Battle in the West, 1861-1863

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  • hartshje
    I most heartily concur with Carl s assessment that New Orleans and Vicksburg are not connected in the sense that Col. Freemantle is implying. The Confederates
    Message 1 of 32 , Jul 25, 2003
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      I most heartily concur with Carl's assessment that New Orleans and
      Vicksburg are not connected in the sense that Col. Freemantle is
      implying. The Confederates proved on numerous occasions that
      properly placed, armed, and manned, forifications COULD stop the
      Union ships. Even at Donelson this occurred. Ft. Henry didn't meet
      ANY of the three qualifications. My point being that the
      Confederates basically controlled both ends of the segment of the
      Mississippi lying between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. All the Union
      gunboats could accomplish was "running" past these fortresses. It
      was the bumbling on land that led to their fall.

      I also take issue with the Colonel's analysis of Hampton Roads, in
      the forbidden zone. Alas, we may not speak of this. Suffice it to
      say that the CSS Virginia's success would not have meant an end to
      Union naval superiority, just a delay in re-establishing it.

      Regards,
      Joe H.

      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...>
      wrote:
      > Colonel, your many opinions come fast and furious and I find myself
      on
      > to the next one before responding to the last. But let me stop and
      > interject some points here: look for my comments below your remarks
      > [edited].
      >
      > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "col_freemantle"
      > <[...]
      > > However, I maintain for the following reasons that Vicksburg was
      > > already inevitable and thus loses it's claim to be the "Most
      > > Important Battle in the West, 1861-1863". I won't go over old
      > > aground, I promise. As you are now aware, I'm not from the
      States
      > > and have no real concept of the terrain faced by the combatants
      > > during the War. I admit that some of my assumptions might not be
      > > borne out by practicality. Apologies if that is the case.
      >
      >
      > Actually I question some of your facts, not your familiarity with
      > terrain.
      >
      >
      > [...]
      >
      > > Firstly, Union ironclads would not have been able to proceed
      > upriver,
      > > Grant would not have been able to get his forces around Vicksburg
      > and
      > > resultant wins at Jackson, Champion's Hill, etc.; thus not being
      > able
      > > to capture the city.
      >
      >
      >
      > The Union navy that the Graybacks were having to contend with were
      not
      > coming from New Orleans; the attempt to control the river from New
      > Orleans had been abandoned in 1862. It was the Federal "Brownwater
      > Navy" that the Rebels faced. Furthermore, the Union navy was not
      > calling all the shots in the critical area between Vicksburg and
      Port
      > Hudson, fortresses that prevented free movement of Union naval
      assets
      > especially upstream. Running the batteries going downstream, the
      Yanks
      > were able to obtain acceptable results; versus the current, it was
      a
      > different story. Grant had been warned by Admiral Porter that the
      > transports that had made it past the batteries at Vicksburg were
      never
      > going to make it back up, should that be a necessity, till
      Vicksburg
      > fell.
      >
      >
      >
      >
      > [...]
      >
      > > Secondly, control of New Orleans would have enabled the
      resupplying
      > > of Vicksburg My understanding is that Vicksburg fell as a result
      of
      > > starvation, rather than the assaults of Grant. I accept that the
      > > aforementioned victories pushed back Southern forces to the
      city.
      > > This improved the strength of Southern defences, but more
      > importantly
      > > increased the number of mouths to feed.
      >
      >
      >
      > Well, at this point in time, it was a siege of a trapped city; in
      > such cases starvation is often what tells. New Orleans is not
      relevant
      > to this, that city could have still been in Secesh hands and it
      would
      > not have helped [directly anyway].
      >
      >
      >
      >
      > > Thus, Vicksburg fell as a result of union control of the
      waterways.
      >
      >
      > This conclusion is not warranted. Vicksburg fell because Grant
      pulled
      > off the difficult and amazing feat of simultaneously cutting V. off
      > and re-establishing his own supply via the Yazoo, at the very place
      > where the Confederates surely knew he must never reach.
      >
      >
      > [...]
      > >
      > > Best wishes,
      > >
      > > Col. Freemantle
      >
      >
      > Thanks for your contributions, Sir!
      > Carl
    • hartshje
      I most heartily concur with Carl s assessment that New Orleans and Vicksburg are not connected in the sense that Col. Freemantle is implying. The Confederates
      Message 32 of 32 , Jul 25, 2003
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        I most heartily concur with Carl's assessment that New Orleans and
        Vicksburg are not connected in the sense that Col. Freemantle is
        implying. The Confederates proved on numerous occasions that
        properly placed, armed, and manned, forifications COULD stop the
        Union ships. Even at Donelson this occurred. Ft. Henry didn't meet
        ANY of the three qualifications. My point being that the
        Confederates basically controlled both ends of the segment of the
        Mississippi lying between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. All the Union
        gunboats could accomplish was "running" past these fortresses. It
        was the bumbling on land that led to their fall.

        I also take issue with the Colonel's analysis of Hampton Roads, in
        the forbidden zone. Alas, we may not speak of this. Suffice it to
        say that the CSS Virginia's success would not have meant an end to
        Union naval superiority, just a delay in re-establishing it.

        Regards,
        Joe H.

        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...>
        wrote:
        > Colonel, your many opinions come fast and furious and I find myself
        on
        > to the next one before responding to the last. But let me stop and
        > interject some points here: look for my comments below your remarks
        > [edited].
        >
        > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "col_freemantle"
        > <[...]
        > > However, I maintain for the following reasons that Vicksburg was
        > > already inevitable and thus loses it's claim to be the "Most
        > > Important Battle in the West, 1861-1863". I won't go over old
        > > aground, I promise. As you are now aware, I'm not from the
        States
        > > and have no real concept of the terrain faced by the combatants
        > > during the War. I admit that some of my assumptions might not be
        > > borne out by practicality. Apologies if that is the case.
        >
        >
        > Actually I question some of your facts, not your familiarity with
        > terrain.
        >
        >
        > [...]
        >
        > > Firstly, Union ironclads would not have been able to proceed
        > upriver,
        > > Grant would not have been able to get his forces around Vicksburg
        > and
        > > resultant wins at Jackson, Champion's Hill, etc.; thus not being
        > able
        > > to capture the city.
        >
        >
        >
        > The Union navy that the Graybacks were having to contend with were
        not
        > coming from New Orleans; the attempt to control the river from New
        > Orleans had been abandoned in 1862. It was the Federal "Brownwater
        > Navy" that the Rebels faced. Furthermore, the Union navy was not
        > calling all the shots in the critical area between Vicksburg and
        Port
        > Hudson, fortresses that prevented free movement of Union naval
        assets
        > especially upstream. Running the batteries going downstream, the
        Yanks
        > were able to obtain acceptable results; versus the current, it was
        a
        > different story. Grant had been warned by Admiral Porter that the
        > transports that had made it past the batteries at Vicksburg were
        never
        > going to make it back up, should that be a necessity, till
        Vicksburg
        > fell.
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > [...]
        >
        > > Secondly, control of New Orleans would have enabled the
        resupplying
        > > of Vicksburg My understanding is that Vicksburg fell as a result
        of
        > > starvation, rather than the assaults of Grant. I accept that the
        > > aforementioned victories pushed back Southern forces to the
        city.
        > > This improved the strength of Southern defences, but more
        > importantly
        > > increased the number of mouths to feed.
        >
        >
        >
        > Well, at this point in time, it was a siege of a trapped city; in
        > such cases starvation is often what tells. New Orleans is not
        relevant
        > to this, that city could have still been in Secesh hands and it
        would
        > not have helped [directly anyway].
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > > Thus, Vicksburg fell as a result of union control of the
        waterways.
        >
        >
        > This conclusion is not warranted. Vicksburg fell because Grant
        pulled
        > off the difficult and amazing feat of simultaneously cutting V. off
        > and re-establishing his own supply via the Yazoo, at the very place
        > where the Confederates surely knew he must never reach.
        >
        >
        > [...]
        > >
        > > Best wishes,
        > >
        > > Col. Freemantle
        >
        >
        > Thanks for your contributions, Sir!
        > Carl
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