I, unfortunately, don't remember the source which contained the
table of deaths due to illness and disease for the first three
months of 1863. What I do remember is that the AotP's rate was
quite low, the AotC's somewhat higher than average, and the AotT's
I would like to see the breakdown by corps, as I think it likely
that the XVI Corps had a lower rate than the rest of the AotT.
Have a good vacation!
--- In email@example.com, "Will" <wh_keene@y...> wrote:
> --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "josepharose"
> > Mr. Keene:
> > As a barebones chronology, your outline is basically correct,
> > doesn't mention what was going on behind the scenes or summarize
> > outcomes related to the generals' actions.
> My chronology was focused on Grant, so it left out other actors
> except as they interected with Grant.
> > Halleck knew, as the message from the naval ORs shows, that
> > McClernand had been chosen for command, and Halleck did what he
> > could to prevent this from happening, even though he was
> > circumventing Lincoln's wishes. This does not appear in your
> > chronicle.
> True, but Halleck's agenda was outside the focus of my chronology.
> > Your one statement should read, "As of the beginning of
> > Grant has received no *official* word that the President has
> > assigned *McClernand.* Grant almost assuredly knew, but
> > failure to "officially" determine the facts and to notify Grant
> > allowed them to use the troops obviously apportioned for
> > McClernand's river expedition for their (and Sherman's) own.
> I disagree that Grant assuredly knew. And I disagree that the
> were obviously (from Grant's persepctive) apportioned for
> McClernand. He asked Halleck and was told that all troops were
> too command.
> > A different perspective of this period would be:
> > In their attempt to forestall McClernand's taking command of the
> > expedition, Halleck, Grant and Sherman hastily sent the troops
> > downriver where they suffered a lopsided defeat due, in part, to
> > Sherman's inabilities and to Grant's failure to adequately
> > his supply lines.
> I don't think the reasons give are the cause of the failures.
> > When McClernand belatedly took command, he led the troops to a
> > significant victory at an objective which Sherman suggested.
> Most of the leadership was exercised by Sherman and Porter.
> McClernand also suceeded in immediately sowing discontent among
> subordinates and superiors, loosing focus on the assigned mission
> having no further plan of action.
> > When Grant took command again, he had the troops wallowing in
> > ventures up and down the river for some three months during
> > time they suffered an inordinate number of deaths due to disease
> > illness, before finally beginning the siege of Vicksburg.
> The alternative being what? Withdraw back to Memphis?
> I did not think the rate of disease was exceptional, but I will
> into it.
> > Grant was the beneficiary of this large influx of fresh troops
> > had an overwhelming disparity over the Confederates, at a time
> > Rosecrans fought a desparate battle in which he could have used
> > additional 10- or 20,000 men.
> So? Every general could use an additional 10-20,000 men.
> Rosecrans, not Grant, was the creator of Rosecrans failures.
> What unusual perspectives you have.
> -Will (going on vacation for four days) Keene