Re: A different perspective
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "josepharose" <josepharose@y...>
> Mr. Keene:it
> As a barebones chronology, your outline is basically correct, but
> doesn't mention what was going on behind the scenes or summarizethe
> outcomes related to the generals' actions.My chronology was focused on Grant, so it left out other actors
except as they interected with Grant.
> Halleck knew, as the message from the naval ORs shows, thatTrue, but Halleck's agenda was outside the focus of my chronology.
> McClernand had been chosen for command, and Halleck did what he
> could to prevent this from happening, even though he was
> circumventing Lincoln's wishes. This does not appear in your
> Your one statement should read, "As of the beginning of December,I disagree that Grant assuredly knew. And I disagree that the troops
> Grant has received no *official* word that the President has
> assigned *McClernand.* Grant almost assuredly knew, but Halleck's
> failure to "officially" determine the facts and to notify Grant
> allowed them to use the troops obviously apportioned for
> McClernand's river expedition for their (and Sherman's) own.
were obviously (from Grant's persepctive) apportioned for
McClernand. He asked Halleck and was told that all troops were his
> A different perspective of this period would be:I don't think the reasons give are the cause of the failures.
> In their attempt to forestall McClernand's taking command of the
> expedition, Halleck, Grant and Sherman hastily sent the troops
> downriver where they suffered a lopsided defeat due, in part, to
> Sherman's inabilities and to Grant's failure to adequately protect
> his supply lines.
> When McClernand belatedly took command, he led the troops to aMost of the leadership was exercised by Sherman and Porter.
> significant victory at an objective which Sherman suggested.
McClernand also suceeded in immediately sowing discontent among his
subordinates and superiors, loosing focus on the assigned mission and
having no further plan of action.
> When Grant took command again, he had the troops wallowing in muddyand
> ventures up and down the river for some three months during which
> time they suffered an inordinate number of deaths due to disease
> illness, before finally beginning the siege of Vicksburg.The alternative being what? Withdraw back to Memphis?
I did not think the rate of disease was exceptional, but I will look
> Grant was the beneficiary of this large influx of fresh troops andSo? Every general could use an additional 10-20,000 men.
> had an overwhelming disparity over the Confederates, at a time when
> Rosecrans fought a desparate battle in which he could have used an
> additional 10- or 20,000 men.
Rosecrans, not Grant, was the creator of Rosecrans failures.
What unusual perspectives you have.
-Will (going on vacation for four days) Keene
- Thanks Dave.
Good points to ponder.
--- In email@example.com, Dave Gorski <bigg@m...> wrote:
> >Good points. I was thinking that long-term encampments would have
> >better sanitary and shelter arrangements and the men would be
> >rested than encampents of men campaigning.
> Secretary Olmsted of the Sanitary Commission issued a
> "Circular to the Colonels of the Army," in which he stated
> that "It is well known that when a considerable body of men
> have been living together in camp a few weeks a peculiar
> subtle poison is generated..."
> Another factor was that many soldiers were from rural areas
> where they had not had exposure to common illnesses, and had
> not built up any immunities. Groups in garrison were exposed to
> and often died of childhood diseases.
> Often soldiers who were hospitalized for wounds, died of some
> disease that they had been exposed to while in the hospital,
> especially typhoid.
> Yet, another point is that a soldier on the move was likely to
> have had occasion to have fresh fruits and vegetables than the
> soldier stuck in camp for weeks on end. A better diet made
> for a healthier soldier.
> Regards, Dave Gorski