- Re your point below, OK, perhaps. Certainly there seems to be no
emphasis from historians that control of the Louisiana side was a
priority, as far as I know. I only ask you to consider that:
-Both in the case of Port Hudson and Vicksburg, such a step was taken.
-In the case of Vicksburg, Halleck [I think we are learning here
recently] seems to have directed it as a militiary necessity. I can't
quite imagine what that necessity was if not to gain Federal control;
Grant set to work trying a multitude of ways to to accomplish creating
proper supply south of Vicksburg, canals and such, but the notorious
string of failed attempts to accomplish this strongly suggests that
this was not the main purpose. In other words, how could the case be
made that "you must go down river to the L. side" in order to "figure
out what you are going to do once you get there." Am I missing
-In the case of Vicksburg, Federal forces, under Sherman IIRC, stayed
on the Louisiana side while Grant made his famous move back in to
Mississippi. Why leave any?
By "communications" largely this is used to emphasize the ability to
send in reinforcements and the like, not so much having courier
service. I think it can be imagined that the supply/communications
situation would have really been less than ideal, a picture you paint
below pretty well; certainly it would not haven been as good as the
RR supply would provide on the land side, but should it be discounted?
The failed Arkansas and Red River expeditions in '64 certainly found
out that if it was true that the Trans-Miss Rebs had supply problems,
they managed such well enough to basically turn the tables on two
substantial Federal forces and a Yankee fleet to boot.
-I can imagine that if Vicksburg had successfully been cut off and
sieged purely from the land side with no US control of the L. side,
that we would not have had the fairly quick collapse that occured.
Obviously if I'm right, then this would not be a militarily sound
operation, considering that it would be possible to do it right. I
think now this is where Halleck was coming from. Just IMHO.
--- In email@example.com, "slippymississippi"
> --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "carlw4514" <carlw4514@y...>side
> > It should not be missed that to attack a fortress on a river, you
> > can't allow the opposite bank to be in enemy hands complete with
> > supply and communications, otherwise you have not completed phase
> > one of encirclement.
> I think you're attributing more strategic value to the Louisiana
> of the river than it deserves. Domination of the river by federal
> gunboats would have prevented all but a minimum of resupply because
> it would have prevented large supply boats from docking. Resupply
> would have to come via night-time forays in small boats. Regular
> raids by marines would have reduced this even further.
> Communications? Pemberton was in constant communication with Kirby
> Smith, Joe Johnston, etc... only problem was nobody was listening.
- Will and Ole,
Thanks for your replies!
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerryFrom: keeno2@...Sender: email@example.comDate: Thu, 24 Jun 2010 08:29:48 EDTTo: <firstname.lastname@example.org>ReplyTo: email@example.comSubject: Re: [civilwarwest] Re: Vicksburg - GrabauIn a message dated 6/23/2010 10:17:42 P.M. Central Daylight Time, wh_keene@yahoo. com writes:
Enjoyed it very much. The style is quite different than other campaign studies. He split each chapter into a US section and a CSA section, discussing the knowledge and decision making for each side. Compared to other books, he devotes more attention to geography and logistics and less to personalities and anecdotes.What he said. Grabau added depth and another dimension to the campaign for Vicksburg. Scads of maps and geological and topographical detail.Highly recommended.Ole