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Re: Seeing the Elephant

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  • josepharose <josepharose@yahoo.com>
    Mr. Giallombardo: You wrote that: Nothing, absolutely nothing, I ve ever seen developed almost immediately. Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated
    Message 1 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
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      Mr. Giallombardo:

      You wrote that: 'Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen
      developed "almost immediately."'

      Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated that, at Shiloh, 'A
      complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."'

      You apparently disagree with Mr. JEJ, however, as he suggested
      that "defense lines developed almost immediately."

      Joseph


      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Daniel F. Giallombardo"
      <ParrotheadDan@l...> wrote:
      > "The
      surprise may
      > have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
      > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
      immediately."
      > Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam
      showed me - in
      > emphatic terms - that combat is a very fluid situation. Nothing,
      absolutely
      > nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of
      no reason
      > to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given,
      passed to the
      > appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize
      what we
      > think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to
      comprehend your
      > complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted
      above.....
      >
      > "josepharose " wrote:
      >
      > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
      > > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
      following
      > > facts:
      > > >
      > > > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
      not
      > > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
      strength.
      > >
      > > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
      > > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
      > > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
      planning,
      > > command, and coordination, among others.
      > >
      > > > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
      > > immenent.
      > >
      > > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
      > >
      > > > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
      lasted
      > > only
      > > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
      > >
      > > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted
      all
      > > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
      immediately."
      > >
      > > > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
      > > doing their
      > > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
      they
      > > later
      > > > regrouped and fought bravely.
      > >
      > > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
      > >
      > > > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
      > > the first
      > > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
      elephant
      > > for the
      > > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
      > >
      > > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
      overpowered
      > > throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.
      > >
      > > > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
      at
      > > the
      > > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest
      of
      > > that day
      > > > and the following day. Not at all.
      > >
      > > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
      > > actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
      such
      > > a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
      > > wasn't made of marble.
      > >
      > > > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle
      was
      > > lost. He
      > > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
      > > tide of
      > > > battle.
      > >
      > > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
      > >
      > > > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
      > > Commander that
      > > > did not do his duty properly. No
      > >
      > > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
      to
      > > get himself captured.
      > >
      > > > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
      the
      > > battle,
      > > > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
      > > prevailing.
      > >
      > > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
      > > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
      > >
      > > > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
      > > frustrated enough
      > > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
      at
      > > Shiloh and
      > > > go on to other topics. YES
      > >
      > > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
      > > still being made concerning the battle, no.
      > >
      > > Joseph
      > >
      > > > JEJ
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > >
      > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
      http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
    • Daniel F. Giallombardo
      Actually, I am saying that nothing, absolutely nothing develops almost immediately. And most especially that is true with infantry troops. I am not agreeing
      Message 2 of 9 , Mar 3, 2003
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                                                Actually, I am saying that nothing, absolutely nothing develops "almost immediately." And most especially that is true with infantry troops. I am not agreeing with your general premise, nor am I saying that they should have developed  more quickly; I was merely citing my experience that nothing in combat ever goes exactly as it should, and nothing ever remains the same for very long - unless siege operations are in progress I suppose. I've never been involved in a siege, so I cannot speak from personal experience there, though intuitively that would make sense. To argue that a defense should have developed more quickly, or did develop quickly, in my estimation takes away from the value of the post. We cannot change the times taken, we can, it seems to me, only argue how, or if, the time taken could have, or should have been better used and how. Additionally, I would be remiss to not mention that "almost immediately" can, and does mean a number of things: it can mean faster than the glaciers, or it can mean within minutes, hours, days, etc. depending on the timetable, and/or circumstance.
            I intend no one individual here, but  to argue that this or that general was not ready, less clever, more clever,smarter, better looking, failed to shave that day, etc. is an exercise in the annoying; this type of pedantics diminishes further the entire argument. And again, I'm not agreeing with, or disagreeing with, anyone. Merely my opinion, for whatever that may be worth.
                        Dan

        "josepharose " wrote:

        Mr. Giallombardo:

        You wrote that: 'Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen
        developed "almost immediately."'

        Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated that, at Shiloh, 'A
        complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."'

        You apparently disagree with Mr. JEJ, however, as he suggested
        that "defense lines developed almost immediately."

        Joseph

        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Daniel F. Giallombardo"
        <ParrotheadDan@l...> wrote:
        >                                                         "The
        surprise may
        > have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
        > day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
        immediately."
        > Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam
        showed me - in
        > emphatic terms - that combat is a very   fluid situation. Nothing,
        absolutely
        > nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of
        no reason
        > to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given,
        passed to the
        > appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize
        what we
        > think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to
        comprehend your
        > complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted
        above.....
        >
        > "josepharose " wrote:
        >
        > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
        > > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
        following
        > > facts:
        > > >
        > > > 1.  Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
        not
        > > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
        strength.
        > >
        > > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
        > > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
        > > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
        planning,
        > > command, and coordination, among others.
        > >
        > > > 2.  Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
        > > immenent.
        > >
        > > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
        > >
        > > > 3.  Yes,  the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
        lasted
        > > only
        > > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
        > >
        > > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted
        all
        > > day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
        immediately."
        > >
        > > > 4.  Yes, there were some  regiments and/or brigades derelict in
        > > doing their
        > > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy.  However,
        they
        > > later
        > > > regrouped and fought bravely.
        > >
        > > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
        > >
        > > > 5.  Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
        > > the first
        > > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
        elephant
        > > for the
        > > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
        > >
        > > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
        overpowered
        > > throughout the day.  It was their commander's fault.
        > >
        > > > 6.  Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
        at
        > > the
        > > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest
        of
        > > that day
        > > > and the following day.  Not at all.
        > >
        > > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
        > > actions that day.  I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
        such
        > > a battle without making at least one significant mistake.  Grant
        > > wasn't made of marble.
        > >
        > > > 7.  Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle
        was
        > > lost.  He
        > > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
        > > tide of
        > > > battle.
        > >
        > > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
        > >
        > > > 8.  Once the battle had been started,  was there any Division
        > > Commander that
        > > > did not do his duty properly.   No
        > >
        > > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
        to
        > > get himself captured.
        > >
        > > > 9.  Were there things that should have been different prior to
        the
        > > battle,
        > > > during the battle, and after the battle.  Yes with hindsight
        > > prevailing.
        > >
        > > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
        > > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
        > >
        > > > 10.  Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
        > > frustrated enough
        > > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
        at
        > > Shiloh and
        > > > go on to other topics.    YES
        > >
        > > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
        > > still being made concerning the battle, no.
        > >
        > > Joseph
        > >
        > > > JEJ
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > >
        > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
        http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
         
         

        Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

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