Re: Getting back to the west...
- --- In email@example.com, "slippymississippi
<slippymississippi@y...>" <slippymississippi@y...> wrote:
>I'm not sure whether you are referring to me, But I'll suggest one
> I notice that nobody has accepted the challenge to define a battle
> plan that would have rolled up the entire Union line at Shiloh.
plan. As was learned over and over again later in the war, a broad
frontal attack was quite dangerous and often ineffective.
If the Confederates concentrated their forces on either side of and
on the road leading to Shiloh church--thus avoiding the ravine in
front of Sherman's two westernmost brigades, the Rebels might have
had the strength to penetrate far into the Union rear flanking
Sherman and Prentiss along the way. The Union troops would have
found it harder to form defensive positions and their inability to
organize could have meant a rather quick defeat.
In case Grant had thought to entrench, this might also have been a
better plan to break through and flank any fortifications, rather
than butting directly up against them over a wide front.
> I also notice that certain stuck buttons have failed to addressthat
> Sherman was not sweeping the roads with infantry because he wasunder
> very strict orders not to bring on a general engagement.Grant's moving out far enough to sweep away two infantry regiments
and a battery--all Sherman thought was there besides some cavalry--
which were annoying his front should not have brought on a general
engagement, as Grant thought that the Rebel army was back at
Corinth. Marching to Corinth would have been, however, verboten
under Halleck's orders.
> I also notice that these posters have not addressed the fact that aA "completely contiguous defensive line" was eminently possible and--
> completely contiguous defensive line was impossible and unnecessary
> due to the dense tangle between the camps at Shiloh.
as was distinctly demonstrated--quite necessary to a proper defense,
in spite of the dense tangle between the camps at Shiloh.
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
> In a message dated 3/18/2003 10:05:44 AM Eastern Standard Time,That's how I read his behaviour. His behaviour during the battle was
> bjewell@i... writes:
> > Appler made
> > the decision to move his regiment forward, in contradiction of
> > Sherman's orders. Read Sword. It was his own mistake, not Sherman's.
> > And the collapse of his regiment resulted from his actions not
> > Sherman's. The man simply wasn't competent to command a regiment in
> > battle, as he clearly showed.
> Appler was not only incompetant, he was a coward only to be paralleled by
> Gideon Pillow hiding behind a tree while his troops were going forward.
abysmal. But even beforehand his constant "chicken little" routine
appears to have gotten on Sherman's nerves; hence the sarcastic
replies. Of course Appler did turn out to be right, thereby proving
the old adage about a broken clock being right twice a day. ;)
> exhibited bravado before battle only to have to clean out their pantsBut some of them actually stuck with the fight. To be afraid in combat
seems normal, but Appler's behaviour defined cowardice.
> JEJGood to hear from you General.