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Re: Seeing the Elephant

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  • josepharose <josepharose@yahoo.com>
    Mr. Mix, With all due respect, the post to which I replied started with: Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following facts: The facts
    Message 1 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
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      Mr. Mix,

      With all due respect, the post to which I replied started
      with: "Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
      following facts:" The facts listed, however, had not been
      ascertained by "us"; several "facts" were myths and several merely
      misleading. Then the last fact was an apparent attempt to shut down
      further discussion after claiming victory. You criticize me here for
      not allowing this recent discussion to be inaccurately summarized.

      If someone would like to state, thinking that they are correct, that
      Grant did nothing wrong in his two days on the battlefield, they may
      do so. I will, if I think appropriate, claim that such an assertion
      is wrong as I think that I am correct, and I will provide evidence as
      I see fit.

      You, and others, are at liberty to fully criticize my evidence and/or
      my argument.

      Joseph




      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tmix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
      > Mr. Rose, your comments are why this cannot ever die. You push and
      push
      > and push and you are see yourself as being ALWAYS right, something
      you
      > sometimes overlook. Grant is not a marble man but he surpasses your
      hero
      > Gen. Buell. Grant did a masterful job on the 1st day with no help.
      That
      > is a fact and it cannot be disputed. The Confederates did not "water
      > their horses in the Tennessee". Grant's army held and that is the
      bottom
      > line. Line Vince Lombardi said, every one gets knocked down, it's
      you do
      > after you get knocked down that matters. Grant got knocked down
      then he
      > picked himself up and stopped the Confederates cold. That evidence
      > cannot be disputed. I wish you the best, Tom Mix
      >
      > -----Original Message-----
      > From: josepharose <josepharose@y...> [mailto:josepharose@y...]
      >
      > Sent: Saturday, March 01, 2003 9:48 PM
      > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
      > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Seeing the Elephant
      >
      > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
      > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
      following
      > facts:
      > >
      > > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
      not
      > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.
      >
      > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
      > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
      > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
      planning,
      > command, and coordination, among others.
      >
      > > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
      > immenent.
      >
      > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
      >
      > > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
      > only
      > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
      >
      > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
      > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
      immediately."
      >
      > > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
      > doing their
      > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
      they
      > later
      > > regrouped and fought bravely.
      >
      > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
      >
      > > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
      > the first
      > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant
      > for the
      > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
      >
      > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
      overpowered
      > throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.
      >
      > > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
      at
      > the
      > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
      > that day
      > > and the following day. Not at all.
      >
      > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
      > actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
      such
      > a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
      > wasn't made of marble.
      >
      > > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
      > lost. He
      > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
      > tide of
      > > battle.
      >
      > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
      >
      > > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
      > Commander that
      > > did not do his duty properly. No
      >
      > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
      to
      > get himself captured.
      >
      > > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
      the
      > battle,
      > > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
      > prevailing.
      >
      > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
      > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
      >
      > > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
      > frustrated enough
      > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
      at
      > Shiloh and
      > > go on to other topics. YES
      >
      > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
      > still being made concerning the battle, no.
      >
      > Joseph
      >
      > > JEJ
      >
      >
      >
      >
      >
      > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
      > http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
    • bjer50010 <bjewell@iastate.edu>
      ... push and push ... something you ... surpasses your hero ... help. That ... water ... the bottom ... it s you do ... down then he ... evidence ... Nice
      Message 2 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
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        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tmix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
        > Mr. Rose, your comments are why this cannot ever die. You
        push and push
        > and push and you are see yourself as being ALWAYS right,
        something you
        > sometimes overlook. Grant is not a marble man but he
        surpasses your hero
        > Gen. Buell. Grant did a masterful job on the 1st day with no
        help. That
        > is a fact and it cannot be disputed. The Confederates did not
        "water
        > their horses in the Tennessee". Grant's army held and that is
        the bottom
        > line. Line Vince Lombardi said, every one gets knocked down,
        it's you do
        > after you get knocked down that matters. Grant got knocked
        down then he
        > picked himself up and stopped the Confederates cold. That
        evidence
        > cannot be disputed. I wish you the best, Tom Mix
        >

        Nice post Tom. While Grant's pre-battle assumptions can be
        criticized it is completely unfair to criticze his behaviour once the
        battle began. Other Union commanders would have fled the
        field under the same circumstances. Grant not only stayed and
        fought, he actually won the battle. And yes, Buell deserves credit
        for the second day's fighting. But he did nothing the first day,
        despite his later assertions that he saved Grant's army.

        > -----Original Message-----
        > From: josepharose <josepharose@y...>
        [mailto:josepharose@y...]
        >
        > Sent: Saturday, March 01, 2003 9:48 PM
        > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
        > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Seeing the Elephant
        >
        > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a...
        wrote:
        > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
        following
        > facts:
        > >
        > > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at
        fault in not
        > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
        strength.
        >
        > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
        > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
        > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
        planning,
        > command, and coordination, among others.
        >

        This is a gross overstatement. Everyone of these issues has
        been discussed ad nauseum and you seem to hld a minority
        point of view. Patrols and reconnaissance were very definitely a
        part of what Sherman did prior to the battle. As for
        entrenchments, so what? That decision was made by Smith
        and Grant concurred. Their reasoning was that raw troops
        needed drill, which instills discipline, more than entrenchments.
        A perfectly sound idea. As for planning, since the entire point of
        encamping on the west side of the river was to attack
        Corinth,Grant was awaiting Buell's arrival before devising his
        plans. So what?

        > > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack
        was
        > immenent.
        >
        > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
        >

        So what? Sherman made a mistake. But if we accept that
        Sherman mislead Grant what does that do to your oft repeated
        assertions about Grant? If the superior officer was mislead how
        can he be faulted for making the mistake?

        > > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
        lasted
        > only
        > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost
        immediately.
        >
        > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects
        lasted all
        > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
        immediately."
        >

        This is simply wrong. The effects did not last all day, the
        element of surprise was over with very quickly. The fact that a
        complete line of defense took all day to set up indicates how raw
        the troops were. Your argument here is in contradiction to your
        assertions that Hurlbut and WHL Wallace were moving to the
        front as Prentiss fell back. Are you seriously trying to make the
        case that Hurlbut and Wallace, who were moving to the front,
        were surprised? Does it not occur to you that although the
        original defensive lines were not the strongest they held out long
        enough to allow better lines to form? This was a pattern
        repeated throughout the day. BTW, the same thing as you claim
        above can also be held true for Rosecrans at Stone's River, the
        effect of the surprise lasted all day. Ditto about Chickamauga.

        > > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict
        in
        > doing their
        > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
        they
        > later
        > > regrouped and fought bravely.
        >
        > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first
        day.
        >

        According to whom? Buell? His account of thousands of
        stragglers at the Ldg. was at best an exaggeration. Many of the
        panicked troops did regroup, thanks in large part to Grant and
        Sherman's actions in placing them. If your account is to be
        believed Grant's effective strength was ridiculously low. No
        wonder the Confederates overran them, much of Grant's army
        was hiding at Pittsburg Ldg.

        > > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
        > the first
        > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
        elephant
        > for the
        > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
        >
        > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
        overpowered
        > throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.
        >

        Many of those troops panicked without being flanked from the
        sheer ferocity of the fighting, perfectly normal behaviour for
        completely raw troops. And no entrenchments are proof against
        that kind of panic. In fact that was one of the stated reasons
        Grant and Smith decided against entrenching in the first place.
        However, since you must lay blame, blame the brigade and
        regimental commanders, not Grant; they are the ones who were
        supposed to keep their men together. Unless your argument is
        that an army commander has to spend his entire time moving
        from company to company maintaining order. If this is true why
        have lower grade officers? Why not just have a commanding
        general and a bunch of privates? Doesn't sound like an efficient
        way to run an army, does it/

        > > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and
        arrived at
        > the
        > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
        > that day
        > > and the following day. Not at all.
        >
        > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about
        his
        > actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
        such
        > a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
        > wasn't made of marble.
        >

        Give me a break. This argument makes no sense at all. Now it
        comes down to, well Grant was only human so he must have
        made a mistake? Grant's behaviour was exemplary on the 6th,
        as was Sherman's. Ditto for WHL Wallace, Hurlbut and even
        Prentiss; though the latter can definitely be criticized for allowing
        his command to be surrounded.

        > > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
        > lost. He
        > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn
        the
        > tide of
        > > battle.
        >
        > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
        >

        So what? Note what you say above "Grant suggested that the
        day might still be lost" indicates that losing was an option, that
        doesn't mean Grant felt the battle WAS lost., only that it "might"
        be lost.

        > > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
        > Commander that
        > > did not do his duty properly. No
        >
        > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for
        allowing to
        > get himself captured.
        >

        And are you saying he wasn't? Who didn't fall back when his
        support on either side did fall back? The fact that Grant believed
        Prentiss should not have gotten his command captured belies
        Prentiss's subsequent assertions, assertions which are even
        more self-serving than anything Grant ever wrote. But the
        Prentiss situation comes down to a simple point. Either he was
        ordered to hold at all hazards, in which case he followed orders,
        or he was not. Grant's account indicates the latter. Badeau
        concurred in this and his account is rather more scathing than
        anything Grant wrote. But the fact that units on both of his flanks
        fell back and Prentiss did not suggests to me his account was
        not quite true.

        > > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
        the
        > battle,
        > > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
        > prevailing.
        >
        > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
        > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
        >

        So what? It does take hindsight to realize that the Confederates
        intended to attack. As others have pointed out, including ASJs
        own son, the decision to attack the full Union army on the kind of
        naturally defensible ground offered at Shiloh, could be viewed as
        militarily unsound.

        > > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
        > frustrated enough
        > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
        at
        > Shiloh and
        > > go on to other topics. YES
        >
        > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable
        assumptions
        > still being made concerning the battle, no.
        >

        Which incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions are
        those? You have ripped Grant apart for not being on the field
        when the attack started. How would his presence have
        prevented the attack or allowed a quicker more coordinated
        response? To assert that his presence on the field would have
        altered the early course of the battle is an assumption, not a fact.
        Incorrect facts, like there were no pickets? This is belied by the
        unit history of the 6th IA which was on the extreme right flank of
        Sherman's division. They were ordered to put out pickets.
        Incorrect facts like Buell saved Grant's army? Ridiculous. By the
        time Buell arrived Grant's army had already thrown up a near
        impregnable final line of defense. Facts and assumptions like
        Prentiss saying he was ordered to hold at all hazards? This is
        contradicted by other accounts, and most especially is
        contradicted by the actions of other division commanders around
        him. Facts like Buell was held up from reinforcing Grant
        because Grant didn't send orders for him? Which is of course
        contradicted by the record.

        I guess there are rather a lot of incorrect facts and unreasonable
        assumptions flying around.
        > Joseph
        >
        > > JEJ
        >
        >
        >
        >
        >
        > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
        > http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
      • Daniel F. Giallombardo
        The surprise may have been momentary, but it s effects lasted all day. A complete line of defense did not develop almost immediately. Joe, I m unaware of
        Message 3 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
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                                                                  "The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
          day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."    Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam showed me - in emphatic terms - that combat is a very   fluid situation. Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of no reason to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given, passed to the appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize what we think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to comprehend your complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted above.....

          "josepharose " wrote:

          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
          > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following
          facts:
          >
          > 1.  Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in not
          > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.

          True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
          concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
          reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions, planning,
          command, and coordination, among others.

          > 2.  Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
          immenent.

          IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.

          > 3.  Yes,  the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
          only
          > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.

          The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
          day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."

          > 4.  Yes, there were some  regiments and/or brigades derelict in
          doing their
          > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy.  However, they
          later
          > regrouped and fought bravely.

          Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.

          > 5.  Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
          the first
          > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant
          for the
          > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.

          But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and overpowered
          throughout the day.  It was their commander's fault.

          > 6.  Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived at
          the
          > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
          that day
          > and the following day.  Not at all.

          There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
          actions that day.  I'd be very surprised if any commander fought such
          a battle without making at least one significant mistake.  Grant
          wasn't made of marble.

          > 7.  Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
          lost.  He
          > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
          tide of
          > battle.

          Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.

          > 8.  Once the battle had been started,  was there any Division
          Commander that
          > did not do his duty properly.   No

          Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing to
          get himself captured.

          > 9.  Were there things that should have been different prior to the
          battle,
          > during the battle, and after the battle.  Yes with hindsight
          prevailing.

          It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
          almost completely unprepared for the attack.

          > 10.  Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
          frustrated enough
          > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves at
          Shiloh and
          > go on to other topics.    YES

          Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
          still being made concerning the battle, no.

          Joseph

          > JEJ

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        • josepharose <josepharose@yahoo.com>
          Mr. Giallombardo: You wrote that: Nothing, absolutely nothing, I ve ever seen developed almost immediately. Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated
          Message 4 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
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            Mr. Giallombardo:

            You wrote that: 'Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen
            developed "almost immediately."'

            Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated that, at Shiloh, 'A
            complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."'

            You apparently disagree with Mr. JEJ, however, as he suggested
            that "defense lines developed almost immediately."

            Joseph


            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Daniel F. Giallombardo"
            <ParrotheadDan@l...> wrote:
            > "The
            surprise may
            > have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
            > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
            immediately."
            > Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam
            showed me - in
            > emphatic terms - that combat is a very fluid situation. Nothing,
            absolutely
            > nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of
            no reason
            > to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given,
            passed to the
            > appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize
            what we
            > think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to
            comprehend your
            > complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted
            above.....
            >
            > "josepharose " wrote:
            >
            > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
            > > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
            following
            > > facts:
            > > >
            > > > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
            not
            > > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
            strength.
            > >
            > > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
            > > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
            > > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
            planning,
            > > command, and coordination, among others.
            > >
            > > > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
            > > immenent.
            > >
            > > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
            > >
            > > > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
            lasted
            > > only
            > > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
            > >
            > > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted
            all
            > > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
            immediately."
            > >
            > > > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
            > > doing their
            > > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
            they
            > > later
            > > > regrouped and fought bravely.
            > >
            > > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
            > >
            > > > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
            > > the first
            > > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
            elephant
            > > for the
            > > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
            > >
            > > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
            overpowered
            > > throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.
            > >
            > > > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
            at
            > > the
            > > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest
            of
            > > that day
            > > > and the following day. Not at all.
            > >
            > > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
            > > actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
            such
            > > a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
            > > wasn't made of marble.
            > >
            > > > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle
            was
            > > lost. He
            > > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
            > > tide of
            > > > battle.
            > >
            > > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
            > >
            > > > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
            > > Commander that
            > > > did not do his duty properly. No
            > >
            > > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
            to
            > > get himself captured.
            > >
            > > > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
            the
            > > battle,
            > > > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
            > > prevailing.
            > >
            > > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
            > > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
            > >
            > > > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
            > > frustrated enough
            > > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
            at
            > > Shiloh and
            > > > go on to other topics. YES
            > >
            > > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
            > > still being made concerning the battle, no.
            > >
            > > Joseph
            > >
            > > > JEJ
            > >
            > >
            > >
            > >
            > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
            http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
          • Daniel F. Giallombardo
            Actually, I am saying that nothing, absolutely nothing develops almost immediately. And most especially that is true with infantry troops. I am not agreeing
            Message 5 of 9 , Mar 3, 2003
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                                                      Actually, I am saying that nothing, absolutely nothing develops "almost immediately." And most especially that is true with infantry troops. I am not agreeing with your general premise, nor am I saying that they should have developed  more quickly; I was merely citing my experience that nothing in combat ever goes exactly as it should, and nothing ever remains the same for very long - unless siege operations are in progress I suppose. I've never been involved in a siege, so I cannot speak from personal experience there, though intuitively that would make sense. To argue that a defense should have developed more quickly, or did develop quickly, in my estimation takes away from the value of the post. We cannot change the times taken, we can, it seems to me, only argue how, or if, the time taken could have, or should have been better used and how. Additionally, I would be remiss to not mention that "almost immediately" can, and does mean a number of things: it can mean faster than the glaciers, or it can mean within minutes, hours, days, etc. depending on the timetable, and/or circumstance.
                  I intend no one individual here, but  to argue that this or that general was not ready, less clever, more clever,smarter, better looking, failed to shave that day, etc. is an exercise in the annoying; this type of pedantics diminishes further the entire argument. And again, I'm not agreeing with, or disagreeing with, anyone. Merely my opinion, for whatever that may be worth.
                              Dan

              "josepharose " wrote:

              Mr. Giallombardo:

              You wrote that: 'Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen
              developed "almost immediately."'

              Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated that, at Shiloh, 'A
              complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."'

              You apparently disagree with Mr. JEJ, however, as he suggested
              that "defense lines developed almost immediately."

              Joseph

              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Daniel F. Giallombardo"
              <ParrotheadDan@l...> wrote:
              >                                                         "The
              surprise may
              > have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
              > day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
              immediately."
              > Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam
              showed me - in
              > emphatic terms - that combat is a very   fluid situation. Nothing,
              absolutely
              > nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of
              no reason
              > to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given,
              passed to the
              > appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize
              what we
              > think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to
              comprehend your
              > complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted
              above.....
              >
              > "josepharose " wrote:
              >
              > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
              > > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
              following
              > > facts:
              > > >
              > > > 1.  Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
              not
              > > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
              strength.
              > >
              > > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
              > > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
              > > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
              planning,
              > > command, and coordination, among others.
              > >
              > > > 2.  Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
              > > immenent.
              > >
              > > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
              > >
              > > > 3.  Yes,  the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
              lasted
              > > only
              > > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
              > >
              > > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted
              all
              > > day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
              immediately."
              > >
              > > > 4.  Yes, there were some  regiments and/or brigades derelict in
              > > doing their
              > > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy.  However,
              they
              > > later
              > > > regrouped and fought bravely.
              > >
              > > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
              > >
              > > > 5.  Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
              > > the first
              > > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
              elephant
              > > for the
              > > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
              > >
              > > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
              overpowered
              > > throughout the day.  It was their commander's fault.
              > >
              > > > 6.  Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
              at
              > > the
              > > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest
              of
              > > that day
              > > > and the following day.  Not at all.
              > >
              > > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
              > > actions that day.  I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
              such
              > > a battle without making at least one significant mistake.  Grant
              > > wasn't made of marble.
              > >
              > > > 7.  Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle
              was
              > > lost.  He
              > > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
              > > tide of
              > > > battle.
              > >
              > > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
              > >
              > > > 8.  Once the battle had been started,  was there any Division
              > > Commander that
              > > > did not do his duty properly.   No
              > >
              > > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
              to
              > > get himself captured.
              > >
              > > > 9.  Were there things that should have been different prior to
              the
              > > battle,
              > > > during the battle, and after the battle.  Yes with hindsight
              > > prevailing.
              > >
              > > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
              > > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
              > >
              > > > 10.  Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
              > > frustrated enough
              > > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
              at
              > > Shiloh and
              > > > go on to other topics.    YES
              > >
              > > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
              > > still being made concerning the battle, no.
              > >
              > > Joseph
              > >
              > > > JEJ
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > >
              > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
              http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
               
               

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