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Re: Seeing the Elephant

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  • josepharose <josepharose@yahoo.com>
    ... True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes, reconnaisance, interrogation,
    Message 1 of 9 , Mar 1, 2003
      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
      > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following
      facts:
      >
      > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in not
      > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.

      True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
      concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
      reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions, planning,
      command, and coordination, among others.

      > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
      immenent.

      IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.

      > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
      only
      > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.

      The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
      day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."

      > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
      doing their
      > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However, they
      later
      > regrouped and fought bravely.

      Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.

      > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
      the first
      > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant
      for the
      > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.

      But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and overpowered
      throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.

      > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived at
      the
      > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
      that day
      > and the following day. Not at all.

      There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
      actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought such
      a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
      wasn't made of marble.

      > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
      lost. He
      > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
      tide of
      > battle.

      Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.

      > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
      Commander that
      > did not do his duty properly. No

      Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing to
      get himself captured.

      > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to the
      battle,
      > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
      prevailing.

      It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
      almost completely unprepared for the attack.

      > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
      frustrated enough
      > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves at
      Shiloh and
      > go on to other topics. YES

      Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
      still being made concerning the battle, no.

      Joseph

      > JEJ
    • tmix
      Mr. Rose, your comments are why this cannot ever die. You push and push and push and you are see yourself as being ALWAYS right, something you sometimes
      Message 2 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
        Mr. Rose, your comments are why this cannot ever die. You push and push
        and push and you are see yourself as being ALWAYS right, something you
        sometimes overlook. Grant is not a marble man but he surpasses your hero
        Gen. Buell. Grant did a masterful job on the 1st day with no help. That
        is a fact and it cannot be disputed. The Confederates did not "water
        their horses in the Tennessee". Grant's army held and that is the bottom
        line. Line Vince Lombardi said, every one gets knocked down, it's you do
        after you get knocked down that matters. Grant got knocked down then he
        picked himself up and stopped the Confederates cold. That evidence
        cannot be disputed. I wish you the best, Tom Mix

        -----Original Message-----
        From: josepharose <josepharose@...> [mailto:josepharose@...]

        Sent: Saturday, March 01, 2003 9:48 PM
        To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
        Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Seeing the Elephant

        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
        > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following
        facts:
        >
        > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in not
        > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.

        True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
        concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
        reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions, planning,
        command, and coordination, among others.

        > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
        immenent.

        IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.

        > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
        only
        > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.

        The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
        day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."

        > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
        doing their
        > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However, they
        later
        > regrouped and fought bravely.

        Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.

        > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
        the first
        > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant
        for the
        > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.

        But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and overpowered
        throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.

        > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived at
        the
        > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
        that day
        > and the following day. Not at all.

        There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
        actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought such
        a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
        wasn't made of marble.

        > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
        lost. He
        > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
        tide of
        > battle.

        Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.

        > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
        Commander that
        > did not do his duty properly. No

        Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing to
        get himself captured.

        > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to the
        battle,
        > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
        prevailing.

        It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
        almost completely unprepared for the attack.

        > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
        frustrated enough
        > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves at
        Shiloh and
        > go on to other topics. YES

        Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
        still being made concerning the battle, no.

        Joseph

        > JEJ





        Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
        http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
      • josepharose <josepharose@yahoo.com>
        Mr. Mix, With all due respect, the post to which I replied started with: Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following facts: The facts
        Message 3 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
          Mr. Mix,

          With all due respect, the post to which I replied started
          with: "Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
          following facts:" The facts listed, however, had not been
          ascertained by "us"; several "facts" were myths and several merely
          misleading. Then the last fact was an apparent attempt to shut down
          further discussion after claiming victory. You criticize me here for
          not allowing this recent discussion to be inaccurately summarized.

          If someone would like to state, thinking that they are correct, that
          Grant did nothing wrong in his two days on the battlefield, they may
          do so. I will, if I think appropriate, claim that such an assertion
          is wrong as I think that I am correct, and I will provide evidence as
          I see fit.

          You, and others, are at liberty to fully criticize my evidence and/or
          my argument.

          Joseph




          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tmix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
          > Mr. Rose, your comments are why this cannot ever die. You push and
          push
          > and push and you are see yourself as being ALWAYS right, something
          you
          > sometimes overlook. Grant is not a marble man but he surpasses your
          hero
          > Gen. Buell. Grant did a masterful job on the 1st day with no help.
          That
          > is a fact and it cannot be disputed. The Confederates did not "water
          > their horses in the Tennessee". Grant's army held and that is the
          bottom
          > line. Line Vince Lombardi said, every one gets knocked down, it's
          you do
          > after you get knocked down that matters. Grant got knocked down
          then he
          > picked himself up and stopped the Confederates cold. That evidence
          > cannot be disputed. I wish you the best, Tom Mix
          >
          > -----Original Message-----
          > From: josepharose <josepharose@y...> [mailto:josepharose@y...]
          >
          > Sent: Saturday, March 01, 2003 9:48 PM
          > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
          > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Seeing the Elephant
          >
          > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
          > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
          following
          > facts:
          > >
          > > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
          not
          > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.
          >
          > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
          > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
          > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
          planning,
          > command, and coordination, among others.
          >
          > > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
          > immenent.
          >
          > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
          >
          > > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
          > only
          > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
          >
          > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
          > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
          immediately."
          >
          > > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
          > doing their
          > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
          they
          > later
          > > regrouped and fought bravely.
          >
          > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
          >
          > > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
          > the first
          > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant
          > for the
          > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
          >
          > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
          overpowered
          > throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.
          >
          > > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
          at
          > the
          > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
          > that day
          > > and the following day. Not at all.
          >
          > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
          > actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
          such
          > a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
          > wasn't made of marble.
          >
          > > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
          > lost. He
          > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
          > tide of
          > > battle.
          >
          > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
          >
          > > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
          > Commander that
          > > did not do his duty properly. No
          >
          > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
          to
          > get himself captured.
          >
          > > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
          the
          > battle,
          > > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
          > prevailing.
          >
          > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
          > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
          >
          > > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
          > frustrated enough
          > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
          at
          > Shiloh and
          > > go on to other topics. YES
          >
          > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
          > still being made concerning the battle, no.
          >
          > Joseph
          >
          > > JEJ
          >
          >
          >
          >
          >
          > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
          > http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
        • bjer50010 <bjewell@iastate.edu>
          ... push and push ... something you ... surpasses your hero ... help. That ... water ... the bottom ... it s you do ... down then he ... evidence ... Nice
          Message 4 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tmix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
            > Mr. Rose, your comments are why this cannot ever die. You
            push and push
            > and push and you are see yourself as being ALWAYS right,
            something you
            > sometimes overlook. Grant is not a marble man but he
            surpasses your hero
            > Gen. Buell. Grant did a masterful job on the 1st day with no
            help. That
            > is a fact and it cannot be disputed. The Confederates did not
            "water
            > their horses in the Tennessee". Grant's army held and that is
            the bottom
            > line. Line Vince Lombardi said, every one gets knocked down,
            it's you do
            > after you get knocked down that matters. Grant got knocked
            down then he
            > picked himself up and stopped the Confederates cold. That
            evidence
            > cannot be disputed. I wish you the best, Tom Mix
            >

            Nice post Tom. While Grant's pre-battle assumptions can be
            criticized it is completely unfair to criticze his behaviour once the
            battle began. Other Union commanders would have fled the
            field under the same circumstances. Grant not only stayed and
            fought, he actually won the battle. And yes, Buell deserves credit
            for the second day's fighting. But he did nothing the first day,
            despite his later assertions that he saved Grant's army.

            > -----Original Message-----
            > From: josepharose <josepharose@y...>
            [mailto:josepharose@y...]
            >
            > Sent: Saturday, March 01, 2003 9:48 PM
            > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
            > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Seeing the Elephant
            >
            > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a...
            wrote:
            > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
            following
            > facts:
            > >
            > > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at
            fault in not
            > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
            strength.
            >
            > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
            > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
            > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
            planning,
            > command, and coordination, among others.
            >

            This is a gross overstatement. Everyone of these issues has
            been discussed ad nauseum and you seem to hld a minority
            point of view. Patrols and reconnaissance were very definitely a
            part of what Sherman did prior to the battle. As for
            entrenchments, so what? That decision was made by Smith
            and Grant concurred. Their reasoning was that raw troops
            needed drill, which instills discipline, more than entrenchments.
            A perfectly sound idea. As for planning, since the entire point of
            encamping on the west side of the river was to attack
            Corinth,Grant was awaiting Buell's arrival before devising his
            plans. So what?

            > > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack
            was
            > immenent.
            >
            > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
            >

            So what? Sherman made a mistake. But if we accept that
            Sherman mislead Grant what does that do to your oft repeated
            assertions about Grant? If the superior officer was mislead how
            can he be faulted for making the mistake?

            > > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
            lasted
            > only
            > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost
            immediately.
            >
            > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects
            lasted all
            > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
            immediately."
            >

            This is simply wrong. The effects did not last all day, the
            element of surprise was over with very quickly. The fact that a
            complete line of defense took all day to set up indicates how raw
            the troops were. Your argument here is in contradiction to your
            assertions that Hurlbut and WHL Wallace were moving to the
            front as Prentiss fell back. Are you seriously trying to make the
            case that Hurlbut and Wallace, who were moving to the front,
            were surprised? Does it not occur to you that although the
            original defensive lines were not the strongest they held out long
            enough to allow better lines to form? This was a pattern
            repeated throughout the day. BTW, the same thing as you claim
            above can also be held true for Rosecrans at Stone's River, the
            effect of the surprise lasted all day. Ditto about Chickamauga.

            > > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict
            in
            > doing their
            > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
            they
            > later
            > > regrouped and fought bravely.
            >
            > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first
            day.
            >

            According to whom? Buell? His account of thousands of
            stragglers at the Ldg. was at best an exaggeration. Many of the
            panicked troops did regroup, thanks in large part to Grant and
            Sherman's actions in placing them. If your account is to be
            believed Grant's effective strength was ridiculously low. No
            wonder the Confederates overran them, much of Grant's army
            was hiding at Pittsburg Ldg.

            > > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
            > the first
            > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
            elephant
            > for the
            > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
            >
            > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
            overpowered
            > throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.
            >

            Many of those troops panicked without being flanked from the
            sheer ferocity of the fighting, perfectly normal behaviour for
            completely raw troops. And no entrenchments are proof against
            that kind of panic. In fact that was one of the stated reasons
            Grant and Smith decided against entrenching in the first place.
            However, since you must lay blame, blame the brigade and
            regimental commanders, not Grant; they are the ones who were
            supposed to keep their men together. Unless your argument is
            that an army commander has to spend his entire time moving
            from company to company maintaining order. If this is true why
            have lower grade officers? Why not just have a commanding
            general and a bunch of privates? Doesn't sound like an efficient
            way to run an army, does it/

            > > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and
            arrived at
            > the
            > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
            > that day
            > > and the following day. Not at all.
            >
            > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about
            his
            > actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
            such
            > a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
            > wasn't made of marble.
            >

            Give me a break. This argument makes no sense at all. Now it
            comes down to, well Grant was only human so he must have
            made a mistake? Grant's behaviour was exemplary on the 6th,
            as was Sherman's. Ditto for WHL Wallace, Hurlbut and even
            Prentiss; though the latter can definitely be criticized for allowing
            his command to be surrounded.

            > > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
            > lost. He
            > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn
            the
            > tide of
            > > battle.
            >
            > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
            >

            So what? Note what you say above "Grant suggested that the
            day might still be lost" indicates that losing was an option, that
            doesn't mean Grant felt the battle WAS lost., only that it "might"
            be lost.

            > > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
            > Commander that
            > > did not do his duty properly. No
            >
            > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for
            allowing to
            > get himself captured.
            >

            And are you saying he wasn't? Who didn't fall back when his
            support on either side did fall back? The fact that Grant believed
            Prentiss should not have gotten his command captured belies
            Prentiss's subsequent assertions, assertions which are even
            more self-serving than anything Grant ever wrote. But the
            Prentiss situation comes down to a simple point. Either he was
            ordered to hold at all hazards, in which case he followed orders,
            or he was not. Grant's account indicates the latter. Badeau
            concurred in this and his account is rather more scathing than
            anything Grant wrote. But the fact that units on both of his flanks
            fell back and Prentiss did not suggests to me his account was
            not quite true.

            > > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
            the
            > battle,
            > > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
            > prevailing.
            >
            > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
            > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
            >

            So what? It does take hindsight to realize that the Confederates
            intended to attack. As others have pointed out, including ASJs
            own son, the decision to attack the full Union army on the kind of
            naturally defensible ground offered at Shiloh, could be viewed as
            militarily unsound.

            > > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
            > frustrated enough
            > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
            at
            > Shiloh and
            > > go on to other topics. YES
            >
            > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable
            assumptions
            > still being made concerning the battle, no.
            >

            Which incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions are
            those? You have ripped Grant apart for not being on the field
            when the attack started. How would his presence have
            prevented the attack or allowed a quicker more coordinated
            response? To assert that his presence on the field would have
            altered the early course of the battle is an assumption, not a fact.
            Incorrect facts, like there were no pickets? This is belied by the
            unit history of the 6th IA which was on the extreme right flank of
            Sherman's division. They were ordered to put out pickets.
            Incorrect facts like Buell saved Grant's army? Ridiculous. By the
            time Buell arrived Grant's army had already thrown up a near
            impregnable final line of defense. Facts and assumptions like
            Prentiss saying he was ordered to hold at all hazards? This is
            contradicted by other accounts, and most especially is
            contradicted by the actions of other division commanders around
            him. Facts like Buell was held up from reinforcing Grant
            because Grant didn't send orders for him? Which is of course
            contradicted by the record.

            I guess there are rather a lot of incorrect facts and unreasonable
            assumptions flying around.
            > Joseph
            >
            > > JEJ
            >
            >
            >
            >
            >
            > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
            > http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
          • Daniel F. Giallombardo
            The surprise may have been momentary, but it s effects lasted all day. A complete line of defense did not develop almost immediately. Joe, I m unaware of
            Message 5 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
                                                                      "The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
              day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."    Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam showed me - in emphatic terms - that combat is a very   fluid situation. Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of no reason to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given, passed to the appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize what we think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to comprehend your complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted above.....

              "josepharose " wrote:

              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
              > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following
              facts:
              >
              > 1.  Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in not
              > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.

              True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
              concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
              reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions, planning,
              command, and coordination, among others.

              > 2.  Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
              immenent.

              IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.

              > 3.  Yes,  the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
              only
              > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.

              The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
              day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."

              > 4.  Yes, there were some  regiments and/or brigades derelict in
              doing their
              > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy.  However, they
              later
              > regrouped and fought bravely.

              Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.

              > 5.  Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
              the first
              > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant
              for the
              > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.

              But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and overpowered
              throughout the day.  It was their commander's fault.

              > 6.  Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived at
              the
              > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
              that day
              > and the following day.  Not at all.

              There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
              actions that day.  I'd be very surprised if any commander fought such
              a battle without making at least one significant mistake.  Grant
              wasn't made of marble.

              > 7.  Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
              lost.  He
              > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
              tide of
              > battle.

              Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.

              > 8.  Once the battle had been started,  was there any Division
              Commander that
              > did not do his duty properly.   No

              Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing to
              get himself captured.

              > 9.  Were there things that should have been different prior to the
              battle,
              > during the battle, and after the battle.  Yes with hindsight
              prevailing.

              It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
              almost completely unprepared for the attack.

              > 10.  Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
              frustrated enough
              > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves at
              Shiloh and
              > go on to other topics.    YES

              Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
              still being made concerning the battle, no.

              Joseph

              > JEJ

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            • josepharose <josepharose@yahoo.com>
              Mr. Giallombardo: You wrote that: Nothing, absolutely nothing, I ve ever seen developed almost immediately. Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated
              Message 6 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
                Mr. Giallombardo:

                You wrote that: 'Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen
                developed "almost immediately."'

                Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated that, at Shiloh, 'A
                complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."'

                You apparently disagree with Mr. JEJ, however, as he suggested
                that "defense lines developed almost immediately."

                Joseph


                --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Daniel F. Giallombardo"
                <ParrotheadDan@l...> wrote:
                > "The
                surprise may
                > have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
                > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
                immediately."
                > Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam
                showed me - in
                > emphatic terms - that combat is a very fluid situation. Nothing,
                absolutely
                > nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of
                no reason
                > to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given,
                passed to the
                > appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize
                what we
                > think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to
                comprehend your
                > complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted
                above.....
                >
                > "josepharose " wrote:
                >
                > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
                > > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
                following
                > > facts:
                > > >
                > > > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
                not
                > > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
                strength.
                > >
                > > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
                > > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
                > > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
                planning,
                > > command, and coordination, among others.
                > >
                > > > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
                > > immenent.
                > >
                > > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
                > >
                > > > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
                lasted
                > > only
                > > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
                > >
                > > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted
                all
                > > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
                immediately."
                > >
                > > > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
                > > doing their
                > > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
                they
                > > later
                > > > regrouped and fought bravely.
                > >
                > > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
                > >
                > > > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
                > > the first
                > > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
                elephant
                > > for the
                > > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
                > >
                > > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
                overpowered
                > > throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.
                > >
                > > > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
                at
                > > the
                > > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest
                of
                > > that day
                > > > and the following day. Not at all.
                > >
                > > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
                > > actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
                such
                > > a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
                > > wasn't made of marble.
                > >
                > > > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle
                was
                > > lost. He
                > > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
                > > tide of
                > > > battle.
                > >
                > > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
                > >
                > > > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
                > > Commander that
                > > > did not do his duty properly. No
                > >
                > > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
                to
                > > get himself captured.
                > >
                > > > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
                the
                > > battle,
                > > > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
                > > prevailing.
                > >
                > > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
                > > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
                > >
                > > > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
                > > frustrated enough
                > > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
                at
                > > Shiloh and
                > > > go on to other topics. YES
                > >
                > > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
                > > still being made concerning the battle, no.
                > >
                > > Joseph
                > >
                > > > JEJ
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > >
                > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
              • Daniel F. Giallombardo
                Actually, I am saying that nothing, absolutely nothing develops almost immediately. And most especially that is true with infantry troops. I am not agreeing
                Message 7 of 9 , Mar 3, 2003
                                                          Actually, I am saying that nothing, absolutely nothing develops "almost immediately." And most especially that is true with infantry troops. I am not agreeing with your general premise, nor am I saying that they should have developed  more quickly; I was merely citing my experience that nothing in combat ever goes exactly as it should, and nothing ever remains the same for very long - unless siege operations are in progress I suppose. I've never been involved in a siege, so I cannot speak from personal experience there, though intuitively that would make sense. To argue that a defense should have developed more quickly, or did develop quickly, in my estimation takes away from the value of the post. We cannot change the times taken, we can, it seems to me, only argue how, or if, the time taken could have, or should have been better used and how. Additionally, I would be remiss to not mention that "almost immediately" can, and does mean a number of things: it can mean faster than the glaciers, or it can mean within minutes, hours, days, etc. depending on the timetable, and/or circumstance.
                      I intend no one individual here, but  to argue that this or that general was not ready, less clever, more clever,smarter, better looking, failed to shave that day, etc. is an exercise in the annoying; this type of pedantics diminishes further the entire argument. And again, I'm not agreeing with, or disagreeing with, anyone. Merely my opinion, for whatever that may be worth.
                                  Dan

                  "josepharose " wrote:

                  Mr. Giallombardo:

                  You wrote that: 'Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen
                  developed "almost immediately."'

                  Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated that, at Shiloh, 'A
                  complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."'

                  You apparently disagree with Mr. JEJ, however, as he suggested
                  that "defense lines developed almost immediately."

                  Joseph

                  --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Daniel F. Giallombardo"
                  <ParrotheadDan@l...> wrote:
                  >                                                         "The
                  surprise may
                  > have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
                  > day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
                  immediately."
                  > Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam
                  showed me - in
                  > emphatic terms - that combat is a very   fluid situation. Nothing,
                  absolutely
                  > nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of
                  no reason
                  > to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given,
                  passed to the
                  > appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize
                  what we
                  > think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to
                  comprehend your
                  > complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted
                  above.....
                  >
                  > "josepharose " wrote:
                  >
                  > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
                  > > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
                  following
                  > > facts:
                  > > >
                  > > > 1.  Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
                  not
                  > > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
                  strength.
                  > >
                  > > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
                  > > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
                  > > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
                  planning,
                  > > command, and coordination, among others.
                  > >
                  > > > 2.  Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
                  > > immenent.
                  > >
                  > > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
                  > >
                  > > > 3.  Yes,  the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
                  lasted
                  > > only
                  > > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
                  > >
                  > > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted
                  all
                  > > day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
                  immediately."
                  > >
                  > > > 4.  Yes, there were some  regiments and/or brigades derelict in
                  > > doing their
                  > > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy.  However,
                  they
                  > > later
                  > > > regrouped and fought bravely.
                  > >
                  > > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
                  > >
                  > > > 5.  Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
                  > > the first
                  > > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
                  elephant
                  > > for the
                  > > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
                  > >
                  > > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
                  overpowered
                  > > throughout the day.  It was their commander's fault.
                  > >
                  > > > 6.  Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
                  at
                  > > the
                  > > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest
                  of
                  > > that day
                  > > > and the following day.  Not at all.
                  > >
                  > > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
                  > > actions that day.  I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
                  such
                  > > a battle without making at least one significant mistake.  Grant
                  > > wasn't made of marble.
                  > >
                  > > > 7.  Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle
                  was
                  > > lost.  He
                  > > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
                  > > tide of
                  > > > battle.
                  > >
                  > > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
                  > >
                  > > > 8.  Once the battle had been started,  was there any Division
                  > > Commander that
                  > > > did not do his duty properly.   No
                  > >
                  > > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
                  to
                  > > get himself captured.
                  > >
                  > > > 9.  Were there things that should have been different prior to
                  the
                  > > battle,
                  > > > during the battle, and after the battle.  Yes with hindsight
                  > > prevailing.
                  > >
                  > > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
                  > > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
                  > >
                  > > > 10.  Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
                  > > frustrated enough
                  > > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
                  at
                  > > Shiloh and
                  > > > go on to other topics.    YES
                  > >
                  > > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
                  > > still being made concerning the battle, no.
                  > >
                  > > Joseph
                  > >
                  > > > JEJ
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > >
                  > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                  http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                   
                   

                  Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

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