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Re: [civilwarwest] Seeing the Elephant

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  • GnrlJEJohnston@aol.com
    Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following facts: 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in not evaluating
    Message 1 of 9 , Mar 1, 2003
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      Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following facts:

      1.  Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in not evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.

      2.  Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was immenent.

      3.  Yes,  the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted only momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.

      4.  Yes, there were some  regiments and/or brigades derelict in doing their duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy.  However, they later regrouped and fought bravely.

      5.  Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was the first time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant for the first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.

      6.  Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived at the battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of that day and the following day.  Not at all.

      7.  Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was lost.  He knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the tide of battle.

      8.  Once the battle had been started,  was there any Division Commander that did not do his duty properly.   No

      9.  Were there things that should have been different prior to the battle, during the battle, and after the battle.  Yes with hindsight prevailing.

      10.  Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been frustrated enough to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves at Shiloh and go on to other topics.    YES

      JEJ
    • bjer50010 <bjewell@iastate.edu>
      ... in not ... was immenent. ... only ... immediately. ... in doing their ... they later ... the first ... elephant for the ... arrived at the ... that day ...
      Message 2 of 9 , Mar 1, 2003
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        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a...
        wrote:
        > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
        following facts:
        >
        > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault
        in not
        > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.
        >
        > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack
        was immenent.
        >
        > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
        only
        > momentarily and defense lines developed almost
        immediately.
        >
        > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict
        in doing their
        > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
        they later
        > regrouped and fought bravely.
        >
        > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
        the first
        > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
        elephant for the
        > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
        >
        > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and
        arrived at the
        > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
        that day
        > and the following day. Not at all.
        >
        > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
        lost. He
        > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
        tide of
        > battle.
        >
        > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
        Commander that
        > did not do his duty properly. No
        >
        > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
        the battle,
        > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
        prevailing.
        >
        > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
        frustrated enough
        > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves at
        Shiloh and
        > go on to other topics. YES
        >
        > JEJ

        A good synopsis General! Can't find much room to question any
        of your statements; especially #10.

        JB Jewell
      • josepharose <josepharose@yahoo.com>
        ... True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes, reconnaisance, interrogation,
        Message 3 of 9 , Mar 1, 2003
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          --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
          > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following
          facts:
          >
          > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in not
          > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.

          True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
          concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
          reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions, planning,
          command, and coordination, among others.

          > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
          immenent.

          IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.

          > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
          only
          > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.

          The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
          day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."

          > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
          doing their
          > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However, they
          later
          > regrouped and fought bravely.

          Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.

          > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
          the first
          > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant
          for the
          > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.

          But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and overpowered
          throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.

          > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived at
          the
          > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
          that day
          > and the following day. Not at all.

          There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
          actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought such
          a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
          wasn't made of marble.

          > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
          lost. He
          > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
          tide of
          > battle.

          Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.

          > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
          Commander that
          > did not do his duty properly. No

          Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing to
          get himself captured.

          > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to the
          battle,
          > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
          prevailing.

          It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
          almost completely unprepared for the attack.

          > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
          frustrated enough
          > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves at
          Shiloh and
          > go on to other topics. YES

          Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
          still being made concerning the battle, no.

          Joseph

          > JEJ
        • tmix
          Mr. Rose, your comments are why this cannot ever die. You push and push and push and you are see yourself as being ALWAYS right, something you sometimes
          Message 4 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
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            Mr. Rose, your comments are why this cannot ever die. You push and push
            and push and you are see yourself as being ALWAYS right, something you
            sometimes overlook. Grant is not a marble man but he surpasses your hero
            Gen. Buell. Grant did a masterful job on the 1st day with no help. That
            is a fact and it cannot be disputed. The Confederates did not "water
            their horses in the Tennessee". Grant's army held and that is the bottom
            line. Line Vince Lombardi said, every one gets knocked down, it's you do
            after you get knocked down that matters. Grant got knocked down then he
            picked himself up and stopped the Confederates cold. That evidence
            cannot be disputed. I wish you the best, Tom Mix

            -----Original Message-----
            From: josepharose <josepharose@...> [mailto:josepharose@...]

            Sent: Saturday, March 01, 2003 9:48 PM
            To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
            Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Seeing the Elephant

            --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
            > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following
            facts:
            >
            > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in not
            > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.

            True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
            concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
            reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions, planning,
            command, and coordination, among others.

            > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
            immenent.

            IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.

            > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
            only
            > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.

            The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
            day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."

            > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
            doing their
            > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However, they
            later
            > regrouped and fought bravely.

            Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.

            > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
            the first
            > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant
            for the
            > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.

            But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and overpowered
            throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.

            > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived at
            the
            > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
            that day
            > and the following day. Not at all.

            There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
            actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought such
            a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
            wasn't made of marble.

            > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
            lost. He
            > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
            tide of
            > battle.

            Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.

            > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
            Commander that
            > did not do his duty properly. No

            Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing to
            get himself captured.

            > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to the
            battle,
            > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
            prevailing.

            It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
            almost completely unprepared for the attack.

            > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
            frustrated enough
            > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves at
            Shiloh and
            > go on to other topics. YES

            Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
            still being made concerning the battle, no.

            Joseph

            > JEJ





            Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
            http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
          • josepharose <josepharose@yahoo.com>
            Mr. Mix, With all due respect, the post to which I replied started with: Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following facts: The facts
            Message 5 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
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              Mr. Mix,

              With all due respect, the post to which I replied started
              with: "Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
              following facts:" The facts listed, however, had not been
              ascertained by "us"; several "facts" were myths and several merely
              misleading. Then the last fact was an apparent attempt to shut down
              further discussion after claiming victory. You criticize me here for
              not allowing this recent discussion to be inaccurately summarized.

              If someone would like to state, thinking that they are correct, that
              Grant did nothing wrong in his two days on the battlefield, they may
              do so. I will, if I think appropriate, claim that such an assertion
              is wrong as I think that I am correct, and I will provide evidence as
              I see fit.

              You, and others, are at liberty to fully criticize my evidence and/or
              my argument.

              Joseph




              --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tmix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
              > Mr. Rose, your comments are why this cannot ever die. You push and
              push
              > and push and you are see yourself as being ALWAYS right, something
              you
              > sometimes overlook. Grant is not a marble man but he surpasses your
              hero
              > Gen. Buell. Grant did a masterful job on the 1st day with no help.
              That
              > is a fact and it cannot be disputed. The Confederates did not "water
              > their horses in the Tennessee". Grant's army held and that is the
              bottom
              > line. Line Vince Lombardi said, every one gets knocked down, it's
              you do
              > after you get knocked down that matters. Grant got knocked down
              then he
              > picked himself up and stopped the Confederates cold. That evidence
              > cannot be disputed. I wish you the best, Tom Mix
              >
              > -----Original Message-----
              > From: josepharose <josepharose@y...> [mailto:josepharose@y...]
              >
              > Sent: Saturday, March 01, 2003 9:48 PM
              > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
              > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Seeing the Elephant
              >
              > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
              > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
              following
              > facts:
              > >
              > > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
              not
              > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.
              >
              > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
              > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
              > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
              planning,
              > command, and coordination, among others.
              >
              > > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
              > immenent.
              >
              > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
              >
              > > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
              > only
              > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
              >
              > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
              > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
              immediately."
              >
              > > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
              > doing their
              > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
              they
              > later
              > > regrouped and fought bravely.
              >
              > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
              >
              > > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
              > the first
              > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant
              > for the
              > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
              >
              > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
              overpowered
              > throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.
              >
              > > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
              at
              > the
              > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
              > that day
              > > and the following day. Not at all.
              >
              > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
              > actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
              such
              > a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
              > wasn't made of marble.
              >
              > > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
              > lost. He
              > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
              > tide of
              > > battle.
              >
              > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
              >
              > > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
              > Commander that
              > > did not do his duty properly. No
              >
              > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
              to
              > get himself captured.
              >
              > > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
              the
              > battle,
              > > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
              > prevailing.
              >
              > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
              > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
              >
              > > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
              > frustrated enough
              > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
              at
              > Shiloh and
              > > go on to other topics. YES
              >
              > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
              > still being made concerning the battle, no.
              >
              > Joseph
              >
              > > JEJ
              >
              >
              >
              >
              >
              > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
              > http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
            • bjer50010 <bjewell@iastate.edu>
              ... push and push ... something you ... surpasses your hero ... help. That ... water ... the bottom ... it s you do ... down then he ... evidence ... Nice
              Message 6 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
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                --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "tmix" <tmix@i...> wrote:
                > Mr. Rose, your comments are why this cannot ever die. You
                push and push
                > and push and you are see yourself as being ALWAYS right,
                something you
                > sometimes overlook. Grant is not a marble man but he
                surpasses your hero
                > Gen. Buell. Grant did a masterful job on the 1st day with no
                help. That
                > is a fact and it cannot be disputed. The Confederates did not
                "water
                > their horses in the Tennessee". Grant's army held and that is
                the bottom
                > line. Line Vince Lombardi said, every one gets knocked down,
                it's you do
                > after you get knocked down that matters. Grant got knocked
                down then he
                > picked himself up and stopped the Confederates cold. That
                evidence
                > cannot be disputed. I wish you the best, Tom Mix
                >

                Nice post Tom. While Grant's pre-battle assumptions can be
                criticized it is completely unfair to criticze his behaviour once the
                battle began. Other Union commanders would have fled the
                field under the same circumstances. Grant not only stayed and
                fought, he actually won the battle. And yes, Buell deserves credit
                for the second day's fighting. But he did nothing the first day,
                despite his later assertions that he saved Grant's army.

                > -----Original Message-----
                > From: josepharose <josepharose@y...>
                [mailto:josepharose@y...]
                >
                > Sent: Saturday, March 01, 2003 9:48 PM
                > To: civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com
                > Subject: [civilwarwest] Re: Seeing the Elephant
                >
                > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a...
                wrote:
                > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
                following
                > facts:
                > >
                > > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at
                fault in not
                > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
                strength.
                >
                > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
                > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
                > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
                planning,
                > command, and coordination, among others.
                >

                This is a gross overstatement. Everyone of these issues has
                been discussed ad nauseum and you seem to hld a minority
                point of view. Patrols and reconnaissance were very definitely a
                part of what Sherman did prior to the battle. As for
                entrenchments, so what? That decision was made by Smith
                and Grant concurred. Their reasoning was that raw troops
                needed drill, which instills discipline, more than entrenchments.
                A perfectly sound idea. As for planning, since the entire point of
                encamping on the west side of the river was to attack
                Corinth,Grant was awaiting Buell's arrival before devising his
                plans. So what?

                > > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack
                was
                > immenent.
                >
                > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
                >

                So what? Sherman made a mistake. But if we accept that
                Sherman mislead Grant what does that do to your oft repeated
                assertions about Grant? If the superior officer was mislead how
                can he be faulted for making the mistake?

                > > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
                lasted
                > only
                > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost
                immediately.
                >
                > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects
                lasted all
                > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
                immediately."
                >

                This is simply wrong. The effects did not last all day, the
                element of surprise was over with very quickly. The fact that a
                complete line of defense took all day to set up indicates how raw
                the troops were. Your argument here is in contradiction to your
                assertions that Hurlbut and WHL Wallace were moving to the
                front as Prentiss fell back. Are you seriously trying to make the
                case that Hurlbut and Wallace, who were moving to the front,
                were surprised? Does it not occur to you that although the
                original defensive lines were not the strongest they held out long
                enough to allow better lines to form? This was a pattern
                repeated throughout the day. BTW, the same thing as you claim
                above can also be held true for Rosecrans at Stone's River, the
                effect of the surprise lasted all day. Ditto about Chickamauga.

                > > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict
                in
                > doing their
                > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
                they
                > later
                > > regrouped and fought bravely.
                >
                > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first
                day.
                >

                According to whom? Buell? His account of thousands of
                stragglers at the Ldg. was at best an exaggeration. Many of the
                panicked troops did regroup, thanks in large part to Grant and
                Sherman's actions in placing them. If your account is to be
                believed Grant's effective strength was ridiculously low. No
                wonder the Confederates overran them, much of Grant's army
                was hiding at Pittsburg Ldg.

                > > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
                > the first
                > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
                elephant
                > for the
                > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
                >
                > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
                overpowered
                > throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.
                >

                Many of those troops panicked without being flanked from the
                sheer ferocity of the fighting, perfectly normal behaviour for
                completely raw troops. And no entrenchments are proof against
                that kind of panic. In fact that was one of the stated reasons
                Grant and Smith decided against entrenching in the first place.
                However, since you must lay blame, blame the brigade and
                regimental commanders, not Grant; they are the ones who were
                supposed to keep their men together. Unless your argument is
                that an army commander has to spend his entire time moving
                from company to company maintaining order. If this is true why
                have lower grade officers? Why not just have a commanding
                general and a bunch of privates? Doesn't sound like an efficient
                way to run an army, does it/

                > > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and
                arrived at
                > the
                > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
                > that day
                > > and the following day. Not at all.
                >
                > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about
                his
                > actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
                such
                > a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
                > wasn't made of marble.
                >

                Give me a break. This argument makes no sense at all. Now it
                comes down to, well Grant was only human so he must have
                made a mistake? Grant's behaviour was exemplary on the 6th,
                as was Sherman's. Ditto for WHL Wallace, Hurlbut and even
                Prentiss; though the latter can definitely be criticized for allowing
                his command to be surrounded.

                > > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
                > lost. He
                > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn
                the
                > tide of
                > > battle.
                >
                > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
                >

                So what? Note what you say above "Grant suggested that the
                day might still be lost" indicates that losing was an option, that
                doesn't mean Grant felt the battle WAS lost., only that it "might"
                be lost.

                > > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
                > Commander that
                > > did not do his duty properly. No
                >
                > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for
                allowing to
                > get himself captured.
                >

                And are you saying he wasn't? Who didn't fall back when his
                support on either side did fall back? The fact that Grant believed
                Prentiss should not have gotten his command captured belies
                Prentiss's subsequent assertions, assertions which are even
                more self-serving than anything Grant ever wrote. But the
                Prentiss situation comes down to a simple point. Either he was
                ordered to hold at all hazards, in which case he followed orders,
                or he was not. Grant's account indicates the latter. Badeau
                concurred in this and his account is rather more scathing than
                anything Grant wrote. But the fact that units on both of his flanks
                fell back and Prentiss did not suggests to me his account was
                not quite true.

                > > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
                the
                > battle,
                > > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
                > prevailing.
                >
                > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
                > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
                >

                So what? It does take hindsight to realize that the Confederates
                intended to attack. As others have pointed out, including ASJs
                own son, the decision to attack the full Union army on the kind of
                naturally defensible ground offered at Shiloh, could be viewed as
                militarily unsound.

                > > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
                > frustrated enough
                > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
                at
                > Shiloh and
                > > go on to other topics. YES
                >
                > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable
                assumptions
                > still being made concerning the battle, no.
                >

                Which incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions are
                those? You have ripped Grant apart for not being on the field
                when the attack started. How would his presence have
                prevented the attack or allowed a quicker more coordinated
                response? To assert that his presence on the field would have
                altered the early course of the battle is an assumption, not a fact.
                Incorrect facts, like there were no pickets? This is belied by the
                unit history of the 6th IA which was on the extreme right flank of
                Sherman's division. They were ordered to put out pickets.
                Incorrect facts like Buell saved Grant's army? Ridiculous. By the
                time Buell arrived Grant's army had already thrown up a near
                impregnable final line of defense. Facts and assumptions like
                Prentiss saying he was ordered to hold at all hazards? This is
                contradicted by other accounts, and most especially is
                contradicted by the actions of other division commanders around
                him. Facts like Buell was held up from reinforcing Grant
                because Grant didn't send orders for him? Which is of course
                contradicted by the record.

                I guess there are rather a lot of incorrect facts and unreasonable
                assumptions flying around.
                > Joseph
                >
                > > JEJ
                >
                >
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              • Daniel F. Giallombardo
                The surprise may have been momentary, but it s effects lasted all day. A complete line of defense did not develop almost immediately. Joe, I m unaware of
                Message 7 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
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                                                                          "The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
                  day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."    Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam showed me - in emphatic terms - that combat is a very   fluid situation. Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of no reason to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given, passed to the appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize what we think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to comprehend your complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted above.....

                  "josepharose " wrote:

                  --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
                  > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the following
                  facts:
                  >
                  > 1.  Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in not
                  > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy strength.

                  True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
                  concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
                  reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions, planning,
                  command, and coordination, among others.

                  > 2.  Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
                  immenent.

                  IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.

                  > 3.  Yes,  the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise lasted
                  only
                  > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.

                  The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
                  day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."

                  > 4.  Yes, there were some  regiments and/or brigades derelict in
                  doing their
                  > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy.  However, they
                  later
                  > regrouped and fought bravely.

                  Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.

                  > 5.  Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
                  the first
                  > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the elephant
                  for the
                  > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.

                  But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and overpowered
                  throughout the day.  It was their commander's fault.

                  > 6.  Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived at
                  the
                  > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest of
                  that day
                  > and the following day.  Not at all.

                  There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
                  actions that day.  I'd be very surprised if any commander fought such
                  a battle without making at least one significant mistake.  Grant
                  wasn't made of marble.

                  > 7.  Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle was
                  lost.  He
                  > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
                  tide of
                  > battle.

                  Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.

                  > 8.  Once the battle had been started,  was there any Division
                  Commander that
                  > did not do his duty properly.   No

                  Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing to
                  get himself captured.

                  > 9.  Were there things that should have been different prior to the
                  battle,
                  > during the battle, and after the battle.  Yes with hindsight
                  prevailing.

                  It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
                  almost completely unprepared for the attack.

                  > 10.  Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
                  frustrated enough
                  > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves at
                  Shiloh and
                  > go on to other topics.    YES

                  Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
                  still being made concerning the battle, no.

                  Joseph

                  > JEJ

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                • josepharose <josepharose@yahoo.com>
                  Mr. Giallombardo: You wrote that: Nothing, absolutely nothing, I ve ever seen developed almost immediately. Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated
                  Message 8 of 9 , Mar 2, 2003
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                    Mr. Giallombardo:

                    You wrote that: 'Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen
                    developed "almost immediately."'

                    Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated that, at Shiloh, 'A
                    complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."'

                    You apparently disagree with Mr. JEJ, however, as he suggested
                    that "defense lines developed almost immediately."

                    Joseph


                    --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Daniel F. Giallombardo"
                    <ParrotheadDan@l...> wrote:
                    > "The
                    surprise may
                    > have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
                    > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
                    immediately."
                    > Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam
                    showed me - in
                    > emphatic terms - that combat is a very fluid situation. Nothing,
                    absolutely
                    > nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of
                    no reason
                    > to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given,
                    passed to the
                    > appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize
                    what we
                    > think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to
                    comprehend your
                    > complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted
                    above.....
                    >
                    > "josepharose " wrote:
                    >
                    > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
                    > > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
                    following
                    > > facts:
                    > > >
                    > > > 1. Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
                    not
                    > > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
                    strength.
                    > >
                    > > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
                    > > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
                    > > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
                    planning,
                    > > command, and coordination, among others.
                    > >
                    > > > 2. Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
                    > > immenent.
                    > >
                    > > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
                    > >
                    > > > 3. Yes, the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
                    lasted
                    > > only
                    > > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
                    > >
                    > > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted
                    all
                    > > day. A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
                    immediately."
                    > >
                    > > > 4. Yes, there were some regiments and/or brigades derelict in
                    > > doing their
                    > > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy. However,
                    they
                    > > later
                    > > > regrouped and fought bravely.
                    > >
                    > > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
                    > >
                    > > > 5. Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
                    > > the first
                    > > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
                    elephant
                    > > for the
                    > > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
                    > >
                    > > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
                    overpowered
                    > > throughout the day. It was their commander's fault.
                    > >
                    > > > 6. Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
                    at
                    > > the
                    > > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest
                    of
                    > > that day
                    > > > and the following day. Not at all.
                    > >
                    > > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
                    > > actions that day. I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
                    such
                    > > a battle without making at least one significant mistake. Grant
                    > > wasn't made of marble.
                    > >
                    > > > 7. Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle
                    was
                    > > lost. He
                    > > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
                    > > tide of
                    > > > battle.
                    > >
                    > > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
                    > >
                    > > > 8. Once the battle had been started, was there any Division
                    > > Commander that
                    > > > did not do his duty properly. No
                    > >
                    > > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
                    to
                    > > get himself captured.
                    > >
                    > > > 9. Were there things that should have been different prior to
                    the
                    > > battle,
                    > > > during the battle, and after the battle. Yes with hindsight
                    > > prevailing.
                    > >
                    > > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
                    > > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
                    > >
                    > > > 10. Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
                    > > frustrated enough
                    > > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
                    at
                    > > Shiloh and
                    > > > go on to other topics. YES
                    > >
                    > > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
                    > > still being made concerning the battle, no.
                    > >
                    > > Joseph
                    > >
                    > > > JEJ
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > >
                    > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                  • Daniel F. Giallombardo
                    Actually, I am saying that nothing, absolutely nothing develops almost immediately. And most especially that is true with infantry troops. I am not agreeing
                    Message 9 of 9 , Mar 3, 2003
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                                                              Actually, I am saying that nothing, absolutely nothing develops "almost immediately." And most especially that is true with infantry troops. I am not agreeing with your general premise, nor am I saying that they should have developed  more quickly; I was merely citing my experience that nothing in combat ever goes exactly as it should, and nothing ever remains the same for very long - unless siege operations are in progress I suppose. I've never been involved in a siege, so I cannot speak from personal experience there, though intuitively that would make sense. To argue that a defense should have developed more quickly, or did develop quickly, in my estimation takes away from the value of the post. We cannot change the times taken, we can, it seems to me, only argue how, or if, the time taken could have, or should have been better used and how. Additionally, I would be remiss to not mention that "almost immediately" can, and does mean a number of things: it can mean faster than the glaciers, or it can mean within minutes, hours, days, etc. depending on the timetable, and/or circumstance.
                          I intend no one individual here, but  to argue that this or that general was not ready, less clever, more clever,smarter, better looking, failed to shave that day, etc. is an exercise in the annoying; this type of pedantics diminishes further the entire argument. And again, I'm not agreeing with, or disagreeing with, anyone. Merely my opinion, for whatever that may be worth.
                                      Dan

                      "josepharose " wrote:

                      Mr. Giallombardo:

                      You wrote that: 'Nothing, absolutely nothing, I've ever seen
                      developed "almost immediately."'

                      Thank you for agreeing with me, as I stated that, at Shiloh, 'A
                      complete line of defense did not develop "almost immediately."'

                      You apparently disagree with Mr. JEJ, however, as he suggested
                      that "defense lines developed almost immediately."

                      Joseph

                      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Daniel F. Giallombardo"
                      <ParrotheadDan@l...> wrote:
                      >                                                         "The
                      surprise may
                      > have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted all
                      > day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
                      immediately."
                      > Joe, I'm unaware of your battle field experiences but Viet Nam
                      showed me - in
                      > emphatic terms - that combat is a very   fluid situation. Nothing,
                      absolutely
                      > nothing, I've ever seen developed "almost immediately." I know of
                      no reason
                      > to think otherwise here. It takes time for orders to be given,
                      passed to the
                      > appropriate personnel, and acted upon. We may reasonably criticize
                      what we
                      > think may be dilatory actions, but it is difficult for me to
                      comprehend your
                      > complaint here; no, it did not happen immediately; but as noted
                      above.....
                      >
                      > "josepharose " wrote:
                      >
                      > > --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
                      > > > Within the discussion of Shiloh, we have ascertained the
                      following
                      > > facts:
                      > > >
                      > > > 1.  Yes, Sherman and other division commanders were at fault in
                      not
                      > > > evaluating properly the reports from the field of enemy
                      strength.
                      > >
                      > > True, but they and Grant also failed to fulfill many other duties
                      > > concerning intelligence and preparation: patrols, vedettes,
                      > > reconnaisance, interrogation, entrenchments, dispositions,
                      planning,
                      > > command, and coordination, among others.
                      > >
                      > > > 2.  Yes, Sherman gave an impression to Grant that no attack was
                      > > immenent.
                      > >
                      > > IIRC, it was more than an inpression; it was a statement.
                      > >
                      > > > 3.  Yes,  the attack came as a surprise, but that surprise
                      lasted
                      > > only
                      > > > momentarily and defense lines developed almost immediately.
                      > >
                      > > The surprise may have been "momentary," but it's effects lasted
                      all
                      > > day.  A complete line of defense did not develop "almost
                      immediately."
                      > >
                      > > > 4.  Yes, there were some  regiments and/or brigades derelict in
                      > > doing their
                      > > > duty the first day and initially ran from the enemy.  However,
                      they
                      > > later
                      > > > regrouped and fought bravely.
                      > >
                      > > Thousands upon thousands of men did not regroup the first day.
                      > >
                      > > > 5.  Yes, one has to take into consideration that this battle was
                      > > the first
                      > > > time that the troops, (many of them quite young) saw the
                      elephant
                      > > for the
                      > > > first time and many had to clean out their britches afterwards.
                      > >
                      > > But it wasn't the men's fault that they were flanked and
                      overpowered
                      > > throughout the day.  It was their commander's fault.
                      > >
                      > > > 6.  Once Grant had heard that a battle was going on and arrived
                      at
                      > > the
                      > > > battlefield, should he be faulted for his actions for the rest
                      of
                      > > that day
                      > > > and the following day.  Not at all.
                      > >
                      > > There are certain areas which could well be discussed about his
                      > > actions that day.  I'd be very surprised if any commander fought
                      such
                      > > a battle without making at least one significant mistake.  Grant
                      > > wasn't made of marble.
                      > >
                      > > > 7.  Yes, at no time did Grant ever feel that the total battle
                      was
                      > > lost.  He
                      > > > knew that reenforcements would be arriving in order to turn the
                      > > tide of
                      > > > battle.
                      > >
                      > > Grant suggested that the day might still be lost; it's in writing.
                      > >
                      > > > 8.  Once the battle had been started,  was there any Division
                      > > Commander that
                      > > > did not do his duty properly.   No
                      > >
                      > > Well, Grant seemed to think that Prentiss was faulty for allowing
                      to
                      > > get himself captured.
                      > >
                      > > > 9.  Were there things that should have been different prior to
                      the
                      > > battle,
                      > > > during the battle, and after the battle.  Yes with hindsight
                      > > prevailing.
                      > >
                      > > It doesn't take hindsight to realize that the Union forces were
                      > > almost completely unprepared for the attack.
                      > >
                      > > > 10.  Have we torn, disected, debated, argued, and have been
                      > > frustrated enough
                      > > > to finally put this discussion in one of the mass burial graves
                      at
                      > > Shiloh and
                      > > > go on to other topics.    YES
                      > >
                      > > Not if there are many incorrect facts and unreasonable assumptions
                      > > still being made concerning the battle, no.
                      > >
                      > > Joseph
                      > >
                      > > > JEJ
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > >
                      > > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to
                      http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
                       
                       

                      Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

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