Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh
- --- In email@example.com, "josepharose <josepharose@y...>"
> ...These battles exhibited similar levels of suprise based on your
> None of these battles exhibited the level of surprise at Shiloh.
expressed criteria--"a solid front line, supported by sufficient
artillery and by nearby reserves, the whole led by its commander" as
well as the your comments about tents, etc.
> At Mills Springs, the Rebels' overnight march ran into the FederalsWhy not? There was not a solid front line, the tents were still up
> vedettes which were stationed out far enough to prevent any
> significant surprise. This was not at all similar to Shiloh.
in the camp, the commanding general had to be fetched from the camp,
> At Stone's River, the extent of surprise probably came closest tounits
> Shiloh's, but the troops engaged were face-to-face with the enemy
> and knew that there would be fighting the next day. The
> Confederates achieved a good deal of surprise by concentrating
> on their left and extending past the Federal flank early in theYes, and thereby there was not a solid front line to meet that enemy
advance. Thus by your criteria, there was significant tactical
> At Chickamauga, there would be a certain amount of surprise anytime
> troops came charging out of the forest. Again, however, the twoIsn't that your argument abotu Shiloh too?
> armies were facing each other and knew that fighting was imminent.
> The big problem wasn't any surprise per se, but the positioning of
> troops along the line.
When Thomas sent a detachment out on Sept 19 at Chicka maugua, he was
poorly informed as to the presence of the enemy. When the enemy
attacked, it was not meet with a solid front line with reserves
nearby and artillery in place.
Your explanation for why you claimed Shiloh was such a tactical
suprise seems applicable to all these other battles.
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "slippymississippi"
> --- In email@example.com, "slippymississippi"The particular unit I'm thinking of was the 6th Mississippi Infantry
> <slippymississippi@y...> wrote:
> > Try looking at it this way: some CSA regiments suffered almost a
> > 90% casualty rate in killed and wounded, suggesting high unit
> > cohesion.
> That should read 70%.
Regiment under Cleburne. The unit charged Sherman's lines several
times, suffering 70% killed and wounded before retiring in disorder.
Half of the remaining men would reform and fight for the remainder of
the first day.
This was the first time this unit had seen the elephant, yet these
numbers suggest a veteran level unit cohesion. Does anyone have
numbers on how other Confederate units and federal units fared?