Re: The Extent of the Surprise at Shiloh
- --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, GnrlJEJohnston@a... wrote:
> In a message dated 2/28/2003 8:01:33 AM Eastern Standard Time,which in
> bjewell@i... writes:
> > As for Prentiss, maybe that says
> > something about Prentiss, whom you have repeatedly tried to
> > defend.
> IIRC, Grant had Prentiss hold at all costs at the Hornet's Nest
> return would allow the rest of the army time and a chance toregroup. ISTM
> that Sword covered this thought in his "Shiloh." If this be thecase,
> Prentiss did his duty as was expected of him.That's the way that Prentiss attempted to represent it. IIRC, Grant
had a completely different recollection. In the end, Prentiss
attempted to retreat anyway (in fact, a couple of regiments managed
to escape the encirclement) but found his path blocked because of the
nature of his position (thick brush on both flanks prevented visual
contact with the retreating federal line). This fact and Prentiss'
subsequent self-congratulatory accounts (again, IIRC) seem to support
- --- In email@example.com, "slippymississippi"
> --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, "slippymississippi"The particular unit I'm thinking of was the 6th Mississippi Infantry
> <slippymississippi@y...> wrote:
> > Try looking at it this way: some CSA regiments suffered almost a
> > 90% casualty rate in killed and wounded, suggesting high unit
> > cohesion.
> That should read 70%.
Regiment under Cleburne. The unit charged Sherman's lines several
times, suffering 70% killed and wounded before retiring in disorder.
Half of the remaining men would reform and fight for the remainder of
the first day.
This was the first time this unit had seen the elephant, yet these
numbers suggest a veteran level unit cohesion. Does anyone have
numbers on how other Confederate units and federal units fared?