Re: A "Proper" Defense in the West
- --- In email@example.com, "Dave Smith <dmsmith001@y...>"
> --- In firstname.lastname@example.org, Jfepperson@a... wrote:The South attempted to fight a conventional war, maintain continuous
> > In a message dated 2/3/2003 7:51:03 PM Eastern Standard Time,
> > dmsmith001@y... writes:
> > I'm not sure. I think the only viable physical line was the Ohio
> > River,but I don't think that was viable in any sort of realistic
> > way.
lines and minimize their territorial losses. This method continued to
the very end with no noticable strategic changes. It played right into
The western theatre presented a daunting supply task for the USA; the
CSA failed to exploit it. Railroad supply lines were especially long
Atlanta is often considered the key campaign in the war. There were no
timetables and lillte sense of urgency in previous USA campaigns.
Failure to capture this city leads to the election of McClellan and a
At some point after Shiloh and before Snake Creek Gap, if the South
had adopted a strategy of large (5,000-10,000) cavalry forces preying
on the long lines of communication and supply in Tennessee, they would
have won the war.
Four such units with Forrest, Van Dorn and even Wheeler and Morgan
would have sufficed.
Hard hitting raids destroying supply lines and depots are one part of
the equation. The other is having a force large enough to *force* a
counter-move and then mobile enough to depart in a hurry.
Sustaining your army off enemy resources while preserving you own is very useful to your moral.
"Will <wh_keene@...>" <wh_keene@...> wrote:
Two thoughts in reaction to Madelon's question:
1) Offensive campaigns 'liberate' areas theoretically disposed to
join the Confederacy (ie: Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri) or lost
through previous advances of the enemy.
2) Offensives campaign create opportunities to engage the enemy on
your terms in his territory. Victories in this situation could have
much greater impact on the will of the enemy populace and thus
greater political impact than defensive victories within one's own
--- In email@example.com, meheatherington@j... wrote:
> In light of Hank Clark's recent notion about the 'offensive' North
> the 'defensive' South, I have another question.
> If, with Hank, we stipulate that "all CSA successes were strictly
> offensive" (whilst acknowledging that this is a mere stipulation,
> the Hunley, torpedos, etc.), then what, really, did the South
> gain by taking the offensive?
> My understanding is that the Confederacy's oft-repeated political
> (failing either European recognition or one grand knock-out Cannae
> would bring the North militarily to its knees) was simply to
> Union, keep up the fighting for so long that squeamish Northern
> (apparently assumed to be less stout of heart than their Southern
> counterparts) would sue for a cessation of hostilities, after which
> South would stagger away, content to be let alone. Winning by
> not-losing, so to speak; victory by endurance.
> So how does a flair for the offensive, with its glamor *and* its
> attrition rate, advance that rather low-keyed wait-'em-out grand
> Or does anybody in the Southern high command think that far ahead?
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