Re: A "Proper" Defense in the West
- Wasn't ASJ line of defense in the West, along with other CSA
deployments, based on the strategy of "not losing territory" in a
passive sense, in reality based on political motivations?
Troops were limited by the fact that the individual states didnt
wholeheartedly want to give up local soldiers to defend "other"
states, such as defenses in Florida, New Orleans, and even Virginia.
Also, wasn't Davis trying to gain the support of Great Britian at the
time and was, more or less, satisfied by holding what he had so as
not to appear the "weaker side" to the British?
--- In email@example.com, "Dave Smith <dmsmith001@y...>"
> Given what we know about the rivers running in the West, and givenor
> the need, from a political perspective, of maintaining some form of
> cohesion with all of the seceded states - was there a proper line,
> strategy, for the South in the west?
> Just curious, of course.
Sustaining your army off enemy resources while preserving you own is very useful to your moral.
"Will <wh_keene@...>" <wh_keene@...> wrote:
Two thoughts in reaction to Madelon's question:
1) Offensive campaigns 'liberate' areas theoretically disposed to
join the Confederacy (ie: Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri) or lost
through previous advances of the enemy.
2) Offensives campaign create opportunities to engage the enemy on
your terms in his territory. Victories in this situation could have
much greater impact on the will of the enemy populace and thus
greater political impact than defensive victories within one's own
--- In firstname.lastname@example.org, meheatherington@j... wrote:
> In light of Hank Clark's recent notion about the 'offensive' North
> the 'defensive' South, I have another question.
> If, with Hank, we stipulate that "all CSA successes were strictly
> offensive" (whilst acknowledging that this is a mere stipulation,
> the Hunley, torpedos, etc.), then what, really, did the South
> gain by taking the offensive?
> My understanding is that the Confederacy's oft-repeated political
> (failing either European recognition or one grand knock-out Cannae
> would bring the North militarily to its knees) was simply to
> Union, keep up the fighting for so long that squeamish Northern
> (apparently assumed to be less stout of heart than their Southern
> counterparts) would sue for a cessation of hostilities, after which
> South would stagger away, content to be let alone. Winning by
> not-losing, so to speak; victory by endurance.
> So how does a flair for the offensive, with its glamor *and* its
> attrition rate, advance that rather low-keyed wait-'em-out grand
> Or does anybody in the Southern high command think that far ahead?
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