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Re: A "Proper" Defense in the West

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  • carlos_detweiller <carlos_detweiller@yah
    Wasn t ASJ line of defense in the West, along with other CSA deployments, based on the strategy of not losing territory in a passive sense, in reality based
    Message 1 of 59 , Feb 4, 2003
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      Wasn't ASJ line of defense in the West, along with other CSA
      deployments, based on the strategy of "not losing territory" in a
      passive sense, in reality based on political motivations?

      Troops were limited by the fact that the individual states didnt
      wholeheartedly want to give up local soldiers to defend "other"
      states, such as defenses in Florida, New Orleans, and even Virginia.

      Also, wasn't Davis trying to gain the support of Great Britian at the
      time and was, more or less, satisfied by holding what he had so as
      not to appear the "weaker side" to the British?

      --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, "Dave Smith <dmsmith001@y...>"
      <dmsmith001@y...> wrote:
      > Given what we know about the rivers running in the West, and given
      > the need, from a political perspective, of maintaining some form of
      > cohesion with all of the seceded states - was there a proper line,
      > strategy, for the South in the west?
      > Just curious, of course.
      > Dave
    • Alan Smolinski
      Sustaining your army off enemy resources while preserving you own is very useful to your moral. Will wrote:Two
      Message 59 of 59 , Feb 7, 2003
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        Sustaining your army off  enemy resources while preserving you own is very useful to your moral.

         "Will <wh_keene@...>" <wh_keene@...> wrote:

        Two thoughts in reaction to Madelon's question:

        1)  Offensive campaigns 'liberate' areas theoretically disposed to
        join the Confederacy (ie: Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri) or lost
        through previous advances of the enemy.

        2) Offensives campaign create opportunities to engage the enemy on
        your terms in his territory.  Victories in this situation could have
        much greater impact on the will of the enemy populace and thus
        greater political impact than defensive victories within one's own


        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, meheatherington@j... wrote:
        > In light of Hank Clark's recent notion about the 'offensive' North
        > the 'defensive' South, I have another question.
        > If, with Hank, we stipulate that "all CSA successes were strictly
        > offensive" (whilst acknowledging that this is a mere stipulation,
        yes yes
        > the Hunley, torpedos, etc.), then what, really, did the South
        expect to
        > gain by taking the offensive?
        > My understanding is that the Confederacy's oft-repeated political
        > (failing either European recognition or one grand knock-out Cannae
        > would bring the North militarily to its knees) was simply to
        outwait the
        > Union, keep up the fighting for so long that squeamish Northern
        > (apparently assumed to be less stout of heart than their Southern
        > counterparts) would sue for a cessation of hostilities, after which
        > South would stagger away, content to be let alone.  Winning by
        > not-losing, so to speak; victory by endurance.
        > So how does a flair for the offensive, with its glamor *and* its
        > attrition rate, advance that rather low-keyed wait-'em-out grand
        > strategy?
        > Or does anybody in the Southern high command think that far ahead?
        > Regards,
        > Madelon

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