- In a message dated 2/4/03 12:16:54 PM, firstname.lastname@example.org writes:Message 1 of 59 , Feb 4, 2003View SourceIn a message dated 2/4/03 12:16:54 PM, wh_keene@... writes:
<< Given his
limitations as a general, the limited resources at his disposal and
the fact that he was reacting to a perceived threat by the enemy I
think what he did is understandable even though it may not have been
wise. While I think the negative consequences outweighed the
positive, I do not think it was a death knell. There was still
opportunity to recover. >>
I don't understand this defense of Polk. He entered the political arena -
and violated the borders of a neutral state. How is that understandable? My
understanding of the perceived threat is that it was a great excuse after the
fact to mollify Davis and the government.
- Sustaining your army off enemy resources while preserving you own is very useful to your moral. Will wrote:TwoMessage 59 of 59 , Feb 7, 2003View Source
Sustaining your army off enemy resources while preserving you own is very useful to your moral.
"Will <wh_keene@...>" <wh_keene@...> wrote:
Two thoughts in reaction to Madelon's question:
1) Offensive campaigns 'liberate' areas theoretically disposed to
join the Confederacy (ie: Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri) or lost
through previous advances of the enemy.
2) Offensives campaign create opportunities to engage the enemy on
your terms in his territory. Victories in this situation could have
much greater impact on the will of the enemy populace and thus
greater political impact than defensive victories within one's own
--- In email@example.com, meheatherington@j... wrote:
> In light of Hank Clark's recent notion about the 'offensive' North
> the 'defensive' South, I have another question.
> If, with Hank, we stipulate that "all CSA successes were strictly
> offensive" (whilst acknowledging that this is a mere stipulation,
> the Hunley, torpedos, etc.), then what, really, did the South
> gain by taking the offensive?
> My understanding is that the Confederacy's oft-repeated political
> (failing either European recognition or one grand knock-out Cannae
> would bring the North militarily to its knees) was simply to
> Union, keep up the fighting for so long that squeamish Northern
> (apparently assumed to be less stout of heart than their Southern
> counterparts) would sue for a cessation of hostilities, after which
> South would stagger away, content to be let alone. Winning by
> not-losing, so to speak; victory by endurance.
> So how does a flair for the offensive, with its glamor *and* its
> attrition rate, advance that rather low-keyed wait-'em-out grand
> Or does anybody in the Southern high command think that far ahead?
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