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Re: [civilwarwest] Re: A "Proper" Defense in the West

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  • Aurelie1999@aol.com
    In a message dated 2/4/03 12:16:54 PM, wh_keene@yahoo.com writes:
    Message 1 of 59 , Feb 4, 2003
      In a message dated 2/4/03 12:16:54 PM, wh_keene@... writes:

      << Given his
      limitations as a general, the limited resources at his disposal and
      the fact that he was reacting to a perceived threat by the enemy I
      think what he did is understandable even though it may not have been
      wise. While I think the negative consequences outweighed the
      positive, I do not think it was a death knell. There was still
      opportunity to recover. >>

      I don't understand this defense of Polk. He entered the political arena -
      and violated the borders of a neutral state. How is that understandable? My
      understanding of the perceived threat is that it was a great excuse after the
      fact to mollify Davis and the government.

    • Alan Smolinski
      Sustaining your army off enemy resources while preserving you own is very useful to your moral. Will wrote:Two
      Message 59 of 59 , Feb 7, 2003

        Sustaining your army off  enemy resources while preserving you own is very useful to your moral.

         "Will <wh_keene@...>" <wh_keene@...> wrote:

        Two thoughts in reaction to Madelon's question:

        1)  Offensive campaigns 'liberate' areas theoretically disposed to
        join the Confederacy (ie: Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri) or lost
        through previous advances of the enemy.

        2) Offensives campaign create opportunities to engage the enemy on
        your terms in his territory.  Victories in this situation could have
        much greater impact on the will of the enemy populace and thus
        greater political impact than defensive victories within one's own


        --- In civilwarwest@yahoogroups.com, meheatherington@j... wrote:
        > In light of Hank Clark's recent notion about the 'offensive' North
        > the 'defensive' South, I have another question.
        > If, with Hank, we stipulate that "all CSA successes were strictly
        > offensive" (whilst acknowledging that this is a mere stipulation,
        yes yes
        > the Hunley, torpedos, etc.), then what, really, did the South
        expect to
        > gain by taking the offensive?
        > My understanding is that the Confederacy's oft-repeated political
        > (failing either European recognition or one grand knock-out Cannae
        > would bring the North militarily to its knees) was simply to
        outwait the
        > Union, keep up the fighting for so long that squeamish Northern
        > (apparently assumed to be less stout of heart than their Southern
        > counterparts) would sue for a cessation of hostilities, after which
        > South would stagger away, content to be let alone.  Winning by
        > not-losing, so to speak; victory by endurance.
        > So how does a flair for the offensive, with its glamor *and* its
        > attrition rate, advance that rather low-keyed wait-'em-out grand
        > strategy?
        > Or does anybody in the Southern high command think that far ahead?
        > Regards,
        > Madelon

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